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Abstract  
  
This  thesis  examines  approaches  to  establishing  liability  in  corporate  groups.  It  
considers  the  problem  that  arises  when  an  insolvent  subsidiary’s  tort  creditors  
suffer   personal   injury,   and   try   to   pursue   recourse   against   other   group  
companies   –   especially   the   parent   company.   Courts   have   tried   to   provide  
answers   regarding   the   parent   company’s   liability   for   the   torts   of   their  
subsidiaries,   but   have   had   limited   success.   The   thesis   reveals   difficulty   in  
extending  liability  to  the  parent  company  by  way  of  insolvency  law  provisions,  
and  by  piercing   the  corporate  veil.   It   recounts   the  hesitation  of   the  courts   in  
broadening  their  perspective  beyond   individual  companies,  so  as  to   take  the  
group   itself   as   the   responsible   entity.   The   thesis   points,   furthermore,   to  
shortcomings  in  proposals  for  a  new  rule  of  unlimited  pro  rata  liability.     
  
Motivated   by   the   inadequacy   of   current   solutions   to   this   pressing   group  
problem,  the  thesis  explores  alternative  tort  law  remedies  under  an  approach  
suggested  by   the  Supreme  Court   in   the   leading  cases  of  VTB  Capital  Plc  v  
Nutritek   International   Corp   and   others   and  Prest   v   Petrodel   Resources   Ltd.  
Chapter   III  discusses  the  role  of   tort  of  negligence   in  establishing  the  parent  
company’s  liability.  The  work  analyses  case  law  decisions  on  how  to  widen  the  
application  of  negligence  in  the  corporate  group  context,  and  compares  UK  law  
with  relevant  United  States’  and  Australian  case  law.  Since  this  group  problem  
involves  multiple   legal  entities,  Chapters   IV  and  V  evaluate   the  possibility  of  
using  the  doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasance  and/or  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  in  
establishing   the  parent   company’s   liability   for   its   subsidiary   company’s   torts.  
These  two  doctrines’  extensions  in  corporate  tort  cases  are  seldom  discussed  
in  the  literature.  To  conclude,  tort  law  solutions,  especially  the  doctrines  of  tort  
of  negligence  and  joint  tortfeasance  based  on  participations  are  recommended  
to  be  further  developed  for  corporate  tort  problems.     
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Chapter  1  Introduction     
  
Business   operation   in   a   group   structure   is   generally   widespread   among  
corporations.   With   the   development   of   society   and   economies,   a   range   of  
issues   have   emerged   among   corporate   groups,   in   a   way   that,   traditional  
company   laws   are   no   longer   considered   adequate   to   solve   the   more  
contemporary   problems. 1    In   this   regard,   one   problem   that   has   attracted  
increased  academic  debates  is  that  of  a  tort  victim  with  personal  injury  claims  
against  one  group  member  who  now  seeks  out  other  elements  of  the  group  to  
satisfy  his  claim.  Courts  have  attempted  to  establishing  the  parent  company’s  
liability  for  the  debts  of  its  subsidiaries,  but  it  has  always  been  difficult  for  them  
to  broaden   their   focus  beyond   the   individual   companies  and   take   the  whole  
group  as  a  single  entity.2   Proposals  in  favour  of  corporate  tort  creditors  in  this  
context  and  for  creating  the  parent  company’s  liability  have  been  made  for  a  
long  time.  Some  legal  scholars  suggested  modifications  of  the  limited  liability  
principle.3  Others  called  for  the  regime  of  unlimited  liability  for  corporate  torts.4  
However,  none  of  these  attracted  widespread  support.     
  
In  this  context,  the  main  research  question  of  my  thesis  is  what  the  best  solution  
is  to  create  liability  in  a  corporate  group,  in  circumstances  where  an  insolvent  or  
impecunious  subsidiary’s  tort  creditors  suffer  personal  injury  and  try  to  pursue  
recourse   against   other   group  members,   especially   the   parent   company.   To  
answer  the  question,  both  the  traditional  approach  based  on  company  law  (the  
doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil),  and  the  potential  development  of   tort  
law  approaches  to  establishing  the  parent  company’s  liability  (the  theory  of  tort  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1   Phillip  I  Blumberg,  ‘Transformation  of  Modern  Corporation  Law:  The  Law  of  Corporate  Groups’  (2004)  
37  Conn  L  Rev  605,  605.  
2   Michael  Gillooly,  The  Law  Relating  to  Corporate  Groups  (1st  edn,  The  Federation  Press  1993)  xix.  
3   Ali  Imanalin,  'Rethinking  Limited  Liability'  (2011)  7  Cambridge  Student  L  Rev  89.     
4   Henry  Hansmann  and  Reinier  Kraakman,  ‘Toward  Unlimited  Shareholder  Liability  for  Corporate  Torts’  
(1991)  100  (7)  Yale  Law  Journal  1879.  
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of   negligence,   the   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance,   and   the   theory   of   vicarious  
liability  in  tort)  will  be  discussed.     
  
For   the   purpose   of   introducing   the   background   information,   theoretical  
framework,  research  questions,  and  methodology,  the  following  topics  will  be  
discussed:  
  
(1)  The  scope  of  the  work.     
  
(2)  The  rationales  for  the  work.  
  
(3)  The  development  of  the  work.  
  
  
1.1  The  scope  of  the  work  (Introduction  to  the  central  problem)  
  
This  section  will  introduce  the  central  problem;;  it  explains  what  kind  of  issues  
will  be  looked  at,  why  they  deserve  attention,  and  demonstrates  the  purpose  of  
looking  at  asbestos-­related  claims  against  the  parent  company  as  a  defendant.     
  
Corporate  group  activities  have  triggered  severe  issues  relevant  to  corporate  
tort   creditors.   In   the  meantime,   problems   of   intra-­group   liability   towards   this  
kind   of   creditors   have   been   raised.   Corporate   tort   creditors   face   particular  
difficulties   as   a   result   of   the   use   of   the   corporate   structure   and   the   strict  
application   of   principles   of   separate   legal   personality   and   limited   liability   of  
individual  members  based  on  corporate  law.5     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5   Gillooly  (n  2)  91.  
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The   question   whether   a   parent   company   is   liable   to   the   subsidiary’s   tort  
creditors  arises   in   the  scenario   that,  manufacturing  businesses   involving   the  
production   of   hazardous   substances   or   chemical   materials   taken   by   the  
subsidiaries  of  a  corporate  group  cause  damages  to  consumers,  employees,  
and  even  outside  parties.  Examples  include  the  manufacture  and  processing  
of   asbestos,   mercury   compounds,   and   the   manufacture   and   distribution   of  
defective  pharmaceuticals.  
  
The   sufferers   include   the  wrongdoing   subsidiaries’   employees  who   have   no  
contractual   relationship   with   parent   companies.   Other   affected   parties   may  
include  residents  living  around  the  industries  where  such  toxic  substances  are  
produced.   The   main   problem   arises   when   the   subsidiary   company   that  
undertakes  the  business  is  responsible  for  the  harm  suffered  by  tort  creditors  
but   is  unable  to  pay  compensation  duly  awarded;;  therefore,  tort  victims  seek  
relief  from  other  possible  defendants  in  the  corporate  group.  It  is  the  problem  
of  the  principal  defendant’s   impecuniosity  that  explains  the  attempts  of   injury  
sufferers   to  claim  against  other   rich  elements  of   the  group,  and  explains   the  
development  of  common  law,  which   intends  to   impose  responsibility   for   torts  
on  a  wider   range  of  persons.6   So   this   thesis   focuses  on   the  personal   injury  
cases   relevant   to   corporate   group’s   intra-­liability,   in   particular,   the  
establishment  of  the  parent  company’s  tort  liability.     
  
In   the  United  Kingdom,   personal   injury   claims   against   corporate   groups   are  
often  brought  for  damages  caused  by  unsafe  workplaces,  and  environmental  
pollution.   Asbestos   exposure   is   widely   acknowledged   as   one   of   the   most  
significant   causes   of   occupational-­related   deaths.7    Employees   working   for  
asbestos-­related   industries,   get   more   chances   to   contract   asbestosis,   lung  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6   ibid.  
7   S  Hutchings,  J  Jones,  and  J  Hodgson,  ‘Asbestos-­related  Disease’  in  The  Office  for  National  Statistics,  
Occupational  Health  Decennial  Supplement  1979-­90  (Series  DS)  (The  Office  for  National  Statistics  1995)  
127.  
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cancer,   or   other   diseases   as   a   result   of   asbestos   exposure.8   It   has   been  
postulated   that   asbestos   industry   workers   have   a   roughly   50-­50   chance   of  
contracting   related   diseases   in   their   later   life.9   The   asbestos   claims   against  
corporate  groups  illustrate  the  common  cause  of  action  of  corporate  tort  cases,  
the   courts’   attitudes,   and   the   difficulties   faced   by   tort   creditors   in   pursuing  
satisfactory  compensation.     
  
In   the   United   Kingdom,   asbestos-­related   tort   litigations   against   corporate  
groups  can  be  divided  into  three  categories:  (1)  claims  brought  by  employees  
who  take  part  in  asbestos  manufacture;;  (2)  claims  brought  by  those  who  have  
handled  the  asbestos  products,  such  as  employees  working  for  construction,  
shipbuilding,  or  unloading  asbestos;;  (3)  claims  brought  by  third  parties,  such  as  
residents   living   in  the  areas  where  such  products  are  manufactured  who  are  
affected  by  the  distribution.10  
  
Many   corporate   tort   cases,   including   the   asbestos   claims,   concern  
multinational  activities  operating  through  subsidiaries  in  developing  countries.  It  
is  because  the  safety  of  the  workplace  might  not  be  subject  to  close  regulation  
by  local  authorities.11   Parent  companies  have  transferred  hazardous  work  from  
its  original  place  such  as  the  UK  to  their  subsidiaries  in  developing  countries  
like  South  Africa,   in  order   to  evade  their   responsibilities.  For   instance,   in   the  
case  of  Sithole  and  others  v  Thor  Chemical  Holdings  Ltd,  an  English  company  
Thor  Chemical  Holdings  Ltd  transferred  its  mercury  compounds  manufacturing  
business   to  South  Africa,   since   local  authorities   in   the  UK  were  against   this  
environmental   harmful   business   and   worried   about   its   health   implications.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8   Nick  Wikeley,  Compensation  for  Industrial  Disease  (1st  edn,  Dartmouth  Publishing  1993)  100.  
9   E  R  A  Merewether  and  C  W  Price,  Report  on  the  Effects  of  Asbestos  Dust  on  the  Lungs  and  Dust  
Suppression  in  the  Asbestos  Industry  (1st  edition,  HMSO  1930)  10.  
10   Nick  Wikeley,  ‘Turner&  Newall:  Early  Organizational  Responses  to  Litigation  Risk’  (1997)  24  Journal  of  
Law  and  Society  252,  253.  
11   Jennifer  A  Zerk,  Multinationals  and  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  Limitations  and  Opportunities  in  
International  Law  (1st  edn,  Cambridge  University  Press  2006)  56.  
12   Sithole  and  others  v  Thor  Chemical  Holdings  Ltd  [1999]  EWCA  Civ  J0203-­5,  [1999]  All  ER  (D)  102.  
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Broadly  speaking,  multinational  claims  concern  two  issues:  first,  the  problem  of  
jurisdiction;;  and  second,  the  substantive  rules  for  establishing   liability.   In   this  
thesis,   the   problem   of   jurisdiction   will   not   be   discussed   in   detail,   since   at  
present,  local  courts  are  more  willing  to  accept  multinational  corporation  cases,  
and   the   focus   of   this   thesis   is   on   the   use   of   tort   law   principles   to   ascertain  
liability  in  corporate  groups.     
  
Establishing   legal   liability   in   other   group   elements   beyond   the   wrongdoing  
subsidiary  in  the  multinational  corporate  tort  cases  is  by  no  means  easy.  What  
is  worse  is  the  absence  of  literature  and  case  law.13   Claimants  prefer  to  bring  
actions  against  the  parent  company  or  other  solvent  members  in  the  group.  It  
is  necessary  to  provide  explanations  for  this.  
  
Despite  the  fact  that  parent  companies  usually  have  more  assets  to  satisfy  the  
relevant  claimants,  another  key  point  is  that  actions  against  a  parent  company  
have   a   great   potential   to   get   access   to   the   courts   of   the   parent   company’s  
home   states   such   as   the  United  Kingdom   or   the  United  States,   so   that   the  
claimants   can   enjoy   certain   procedural   advantages.14   Such   common   law  
countries  as  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia  and  the  United  States  are  able  to  
exercise  civil  jurisdiction  over  foreign  subsidiaries  with  their  actions,  but  this  is  
not  well  accepted  in  civil  law  countries.15   In  addition,  in  common  law  countries  
such  as  the  US,  claimants  are  not  liable  to  pay  the  costs  of  opponents  even  if  
their   claims   are   unsuccessful.   This   encourages   the   tort   claimants   to   seek  
redress  based  on  arguments   that   are  novel   and   risky.  Even  more,   courts   in  
common   law   countries   have   the   chance   to   be   creative   in   dealing  with   legal  
problems  with   regard   to  multinational   corporations,  which   contributes   to   the  
success,  especially   for  claimants  bringing  novel  arguments.  Against   this,   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13   Zerk  (n  11)  200.  
14   ibid  201;;  See  also  Sarah  Joseph,  Corporations  and  Transnational  Human  Rights  Litigation,  (1st  edn,  
Hart  Publishing  2004)  16-­17;;  Connelly  v  RTZ  Corp  plc  [1997]  UKHL  30,  [1997]  3  WLR  373.  
15   Sarah  Joseph,  Corporations  and  Transnational  Human  Rights  Litigation,  (1st  edn,  Hart  Publishing  
2004)  15.  
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procedural  disadvantages  of  bringing  actions   in  some  subsidiary  companies’  
local  courts  rest  on  the  difficulties  in  initiating  litigations  in  the  relevant  cases.  
For   instance,   in   the  case  of  Connelly   v  RTZ  Corporation  plc  and  others   the  
House  of  Lords  observed  that   it  was  appropriate   to  allow  the  proceedings   in  
the  UK,  since  the  legal  aid  in  Namibia  was  not  available  to  Mr  Connelly  in  his  
claim.16   This  means   that  Namibia   is   not   an  appropriate   forum   to   litigate   the  
claim  and  that  its  courts  are  incapable  of  looking  after  the  interest  of  all  parties.  
In   the   case   of   Busisiwe   Ngcobo   and   Others   v   Thor   Chemicals   Ltd,   the  
claimants   filed   an   application   in   the   UK   after   they   gained   unsatisfactory  
compensation   through  criminal  proceedings   in   the  subsidiary’s   local   court   in  
Natal  in  South  Africa.17  
  
Apart  from  this,  the  subsidiaries  might  have  limited  ability  to  provide  sufficient  
recovery  and  might  become  insolvent  individually  or  all  together.  Thus,  in  most  
asbestos-­related   claims,   the   claimants   who   worked   for   the   South   African  
subsidiaries   in   mining   asbestos   chose   to   bring   actions   against   the   parent  
company  since  these  subsidiary  companies  were  no  longer  in  existence  to  be  
sued.18   The  only  glimmer  of  hope  in  such  cases  is  to  seek  recourse  from  the  
parent  company.  Even  in  the  circumstance  that  the  subsidiaries  are  available  
to  be  sued,  it  is  almost  always  the  case  that  the  subsidiary  companies’  native  
laws   and   practices   are   non-­supportive   in   respect   of   damages   recovery   for  
mass   torts. 19    Another   possible   option   is   to   bring   actions   against   other  
elements   of   the   group,   but   this   has   rarely   been   tried   in   common   law  
jurisdictions  since  it  may  be  a  radical  departure  from  existing  rules.20     
  
Consequently,   among   the   limited   examples   in   case   law,   most   are   claims  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16   Connelly  v  RTZ  Corporation  plc  and  others  [1997]  UKHL  30,  [1997]  3  WLR  373  [10]-­[12].  
17   Busisiwe  Ngcobo  and  Others  v  Thor  Chemicals  Ltd  [1995]  TLR  10/11/95  (CA).  
18   Lubbe  v  Cape  plc  [2000]  UKHL  41,  [2000]  1  WLR  1545.  
19   Connelly  (n  16);;  Lubbe  (n  18).  
20   Muzaffer  Eroglu,  Multinational  Enterprises  and  Tort  Liabilities,  An  Interdisciplinary  and  Comparative  
Examination,  (1st  edn,  Edward  Elgar  Publishing  Limited  2008)  77.  
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pursuing   the   parent   company’s   liability.   Bringing   actions   against   parent  
companies   seems   the   most   reasonable   choice   for   obtaining   satisfactory  
compensation.  
  
To   conclude,   this   thesis   frequently  makes   reference   to   the   asbestos-­related  
disease   cases,   in   which   claimants   usually   bring   actions   against   the   parent  
company  in  a  corporate  group,  mostly,  in  the  multinational  case.     
  
  
1.2  The  rationales  for  the  work     
  
This   section   presents   the   rationales   for   examining   the   concept   of   corporate  
liability   in   tort.  The  position  of  tort  creditors  will  be  discussed.  The  author  will  
explore  the  difficulties  this  group  of  creditors  always  meet  when  they  are  injured  
by  an   insolvent  subsidiary  and   intend   to  pursue   recovery   from  other  solvent  
group  elements.  This  section  concentrates  on  the  difficulties  of  claiming  against  
the   parent   company,   which   are   bound   up   with   the   strict   application   of   the  
principles  of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality.  Literature  relevant  to  
the  corporate  group’s  tort  liabilities  in  English  case  law  will  be  examined.  The  
limited  guidance  on  this  issue  provided  by  English  courts  further  motivates  us  to  
explore  efficient  solutions.     
  
1.2.1  The  disadvantageous  position  of  tort  creditors     
	  
This   section   explains   why   tort   creditors   are   in   a   weak   position   in   debt  
negotiation  with  corporate  groups,  and  how  their  disadvantageous  position  is  
magnified  in  the  group  structure.     
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There  are  many  good  business  reasons  why  a  corporate  group  is  formed  and  
expand   its   activities.   It   may   be   economically   efficient   or   administratively  
convenient  to  distribute  work  in  a  group  of  companies.21   It  may  be  financially  
beneficial  to  allocate  assets  by  attracting  outside  investment  without  forfeiting  
overall  control,  and  to  distribute  liabilities  among  subsidiaries.  In  general,  the  
parent  company  organises  group  affairs  for  its  benefit  and  not  in  the  interests  
of  tort  creditors.22   This  could  be  showed  in  a  variety  of  ways.  For  instance,  the  
parent  company  could  intervene  in  decisions  relating  to  the  subsidiary’s  board,  
in   order   to   serve   the   best   interest   of   the   former;;   or   may   allocate   business  
opportunities   to   the   subsidiaries   according   to   the   need   of   the   parent   or   the  
need  of  maximising   the  benefit   of   the  whole  group.23   Furthermore,  a  parent  
company  could  have   the  choice   to   refuse   to   rescue  an   insolvent   subsidiary,  
even  if  sufficient  funds  are  available.24   Tort  creditors  of  subsidiary  companies  
are  particularly  in  a  weak  position.  As  Templeman  J  reasoned  in  Re  Southard  
Ltd:  
  
A  parent  company  may  spawn  a  number  of  subsidiary  companies,  all  
controlled   directly   or   indirectly   by   the   shareholders   of   the   parent  
company.  If  one  on  the  subsidiary  companies,  to  change  the  metaphor,  
turns   out   to   be   the   runt   of   litter   and   declines   into   insolvency   to   the  
dismay   of   the   creditors,   the   parent   company   and   other   subsidiary  
companies  may   prosper   to   the   joy   of   the   shareholders   without   any  
liability  for  the  debts  of  the  insolvent  subsidiary.25     
  
In   this   context,   corporate   tort   creditors   are   more   vulnerable,   due   to   their  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21   Brenda  Hannigan,  Company  Law  (4th  edn,  OUP  2015)  19.  
22   Paul  Lyndon  Davies,  Gower  and  Davies'  Principles  of  Modern  Company  Law  (10th  edn,  Sweet  &  
Maxwell  2016)  244.  
23   ibid.  
24   ibid.  
25   Re  Southard  Ltd  [1979]  3  All  ER  556,  565.  
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involuntary   character.   Andrew   Muscat   draws   a   distinction   between   the  
voluntary   and   involuntary   creditor.   He   takes   it   that   the   distinction   lies   in  
whether   or   not   the   creditor   has   practical   opportunities   to   assess   the   risk   of  
dealing  with   a   corporate   debtor.26   Therefore,   tort   creditors,   belonging   to   the  
group   of   involuntary   creditors,   are   in   a   very   weak   position   in   dealing   with  
injuring  companies.     
     
Tort   creditors  will   never  be  able   to  achieve  parity  with   commercial   creditors,  
and  have  few  approaches  available  to  protect  their  claims.27   In  more  specific  
terms:     
  
(a)  It  is  difficult  to  find  close  relationship  between  the  tort  creditors  of  subsidiary  
companies  and  the  parent  company  as  a  defendant.  The  contractual  creditors  
might  enjoy  long-­term  interests  because  the  parent  company  agrees  to  meet  
the  obligations  of  its  subsidiary.  However,  no  such  interests  exist  in  respect  to  
tort  creditors.28     
  
(b)  Tort   creditors   typically  have   low  awareness  of   injury   risks.  They  are   less  
able  to  predict  the  likelihood  of  injury  inflicted  upon  them,  and  take  appropriate  
steps   such   as   obtaining   insurance   or   other  measures.29   Tort   victims   do   not  
possess   the   knowledge   to   secure   their   interests   before   the   harm,   such   as  
assessing   the   solvency   of   the   subsidiary.   The   potential   tort   victim   cannot  
identify  himself  as  a  claimant  in  need  of  security  before  a  tortfeasor  breaches  
the  duty;;  nor  can  the  victim  identify  the  potential  tortfeasor.30     
  
(c)  Tort  creditors  normally  have  fewer  opportunities  of  avoiding  the  risk  of  harm.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26   Andrew  Muscat,  The  liability  of  the  holding  company  for  the  debts  of  its  insolvent  subsidiaries  (1st  edn  
Dartmouth  Publishing  company  1996)  183.  
27   Stephen  Allen  Edwards,  ‘Tort  Claims  under  the  Present  and  Proposed  Bankruptcy  Acts’  (1978)  11  
University  of  Michigan  Journal  of  Law  417,  435.  
28   Gillooly  (n  2)  95.  
29   ibid  94.  
30   ibid  93.  
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Normally,  contractual  creditors  use  contract  strategies  to  extend  their  reach  to  
group   assets   to   protect   their   profit,  which   ensure   that   they   could   ignore   the  
principle  of  separate  legal  personality.  A  secured  creditor  can  obtain  a  security  
agreement   when   the   obligation   to   pay   arises.   This  mechanism   secures   the  
performance  of  the  obligation  to  pay  a  debt.  Nevertheless,   in  the  absence  of  
this   kind   of   device,   tort   victims   are   in   a   very   weak   position   in   seeking  
compensation.31   Even   if   they   could   anticipate   the   harm   inflicted,   they   may  
have   little   or   no   power   to   influence   the   relevant   activities.32   This   tends   to  
manifest   in   situations   where   no   prior   legal   relationship   exists   between   the  
tortfeasor   and   the   potential   tort   victim,   and   in   situations   where   a   legal  
relationship   actually   exists.   In   the   first   circumstance,   a   tort   creditor   cannot  
choose   by   whom   he   will   be   injured   or   whether   he   will   be   injured   at   all.   A  
common  example  is  that  of  innocent  residents  living  around  the  area  affected  
by   asbestos   exposure.   In   the   second   circumstance,   a   tort   creditor   might  
foresee   the   harm   but   he   has   no   ability   to   protect   himself.   For   instance,   an  
employee   of   an   insolvent   subsidiary   company   gets   injured   in   the   course   of  
employment  and  wants  to  sue  the  parent  company  for  better  compensation  but  
he   has   no   contractual   relationship   with   the   parent   company.   The   employee  
sometimes   cannot   protect   himself   because   he   cannot   decide   the   business  
operations  or  any  policies  created  for  employees’  protections.33  
  
  
1.2.2   The   role   of   principles   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal  
personality  in  corporate  tort  problems     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31   Abhinav  Ashwin,  'Tortious  Liability  of  Company  in  Winding  up:  An  Analysis'  (2005)  26  Company  
Lawyer  163,  170.  
32   Gillooly  (n  2)  94.  
33   Rogers  AJA  pointed  out  in  Briggs  v  James  Hardie  (1989)  7  ACLC  841,  864.  
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Affirmed  in  the  landmark  case  Salomon  v  Salomon  &  Co  Ltd,34   separate  legal  
personality  is  regarded  as  “the  most  pervading  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  
company   law”,35   based   on   which   a   company   has   independent   character  
different   from   its   shareholders   even   in   a   one-­man   company.   Since   this  
remarkable  decision  regarding  a  one-­man  company  was  decided,   the  use  of  
the   separate   legal   personality   principle   has   gradually   evolved   in   the   group  
context.   In   a   group   of   companies,   each   registered   company   ordinarily   is  
formed   under   the   Companies   Act   2006,   and   acquires   its   separate   legal  
personality  upon  incorporation.36   In  a  corporate  group,  if  every  member  exists  
via  legal  incorporation,  having  its  own  management  capability,  owning  its  own  
property   and   doing   its   own   business,   this   company   can   be   treated   as   an  
independent   legal   person,   having   independent   rights  and  obligations.  Under  
the   rule  of   limited   liability,  moreover,   it   is  not   liable   for   the  debts  of  others.37  
Only   in   some   special   circumstances   will   separate   legal   personality   be  
disregarded,   resulting   in   the   parent   company   bearing   further   obligations.38  
English   courts   have   consistently   applied   the   Salomon   principle   to   group  
entities.  
  
Another  prominent  company  law  principle,  limited  liability,  is  mainly  enshrined  
in   the   Insolvency  Act  1986   (s74),  and   the  United  Kingdom   (UK)  Companies  
Acts.  UK  Companies  Act  2006  regulates  the  definitions  of  limited  and  unlimited  
companies   in   its   first  chapter.39   It   is  provided   in  the  Section  3  of  Companies  
Act  2006  that:  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34   Salomon  v  A  Salomon  &  Co  Ltd  [1896]  UKHL  1,  [1897]  AC  22.  
35   Len  Sealy,  Sealy  &  Worthington's  Cases  and  Materials  in  Company  Law  (10th  edn,  OUP  Oxford  2013)  
33.  
36   Hannigan  (n  21)  41,  54;;  Companies  Act  2006,  s  7(1);;  s  16(2).  
37   Davies  (n  22)  37.  
38   Derek  French,  Stephen  Mayson  and  Christopher  Ryan,  Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on  Company  Law  
2013-­2014,  (30th  edn,  OUP  2013)  127.  
39   Companies  Act  2006,  s  3-­6.  
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A   company   is   a   “limited   company”   if   the   liability   of   its   members   is  
limited   by   its   constitution.   It  may   be   limited   by   shares   or   limited   by  
guarantee.   If   their   liability   is   limited   to   the  amount,   if  any,  unpaid  on  
the  shares  held  by  them,  the  company  is  limited  by  shares.40  
  
The  basic  idea  of  the  limited  liability  principle  is  that  a  company’s  debts  belong  
to   the   company,   so   that   shareholders,   or   directors   are   not   directly   legally  
liable.41   In  a  company  limited  by  shares,  no  further  money  would  be  paid  by  
the  shareholders  if  the  shares  they  have  taken  are  fully  paid.42   The  directors,  
managers   or   other   workers   are   not   liable   for   a   company’s   debts,   except   in  
some   specific   circumstances   such   as   wrongful   or   fraudulent  
trading.43  Limitations   on   liability   turn   out   to   be   pervasive.   To   some   extent,  
limited  liability  is  a  starting  point  in  corporate  law,  if  not,  firms  would  create  it  by  
contract,  which  is  not  hard  to  do.44  
  
According  to  the  principles  of  separate  legal  personality  and  limited  liability,  in  
corporate  groups,  where  a  tort  is  committed  by  a  subsidiary  company,  it  is  the  
subsidiary  itself,  not  its  shareholders  or  other  group  members  who  should  be  
liable.  Therefore,  torts  of  one  subsidiary  will  not  usually  be  attributed  to  another  
company  in  the  group.  A  parent  company  can  be  considered  as  a  member  of  its  
subsidiary  company  and  has  its   liability   limited  to  the  amount   invested  in  the  
subsidiary.  The  creditor  of  one  subsidiary,  in  principle,  has  no  remedy  against  
the  parent  company,  or  other  members  within  the  group.  But  this  will  arise  in  
some   specific   situations   where   a   direct   liability   is   imposed   on   the   parent  
company.   Examples   include   situations   where   a   parent   company   issues   a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40   Companies  Act  2006,  s  3.  
41   Davies  (n  22)  207.  
42   ibid  40.  
43   Robert  Austin,  Ford  Harold  and  Ian  Ramsay,  ‘Company  Directors:  Principles  of  Law  and  Corporate  
Governance’  (2005)  LexisNexis  Butterworths  Australia  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=922641>accessed  10  
January  2014.  
44   Frank  H  Easterbrook  and  Daniel  R  Fischel,  ‘Limited  Liability  and  the  Corporation’  (1985)  52  U  Chi  L  
Rev  89,  93.  
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guarantee,   where   a   parent   company   is   liable   for   negligence,   and   where   a  
parent   company   commits   a   tort   jointly   with   the   wrongdoing   subsidiary  
company.45   This  thesis  makes  efforts  to  explore  these  “specific  circumstances”,  
and  discusses  approaches   to   the  parent  company’s   liability   for   its  subsidiary  
company’s  torts,  based  on  the  most  relevant  common  law  principles.  
  
Any  attempts  to  establishing  intra-­group  liability  involve  confrontation  with  the  
two  fundamental  principles  of  company  law  (limited  liability  and  separate  legal  
personality).   Thus,   it   is   necessary   to   discuss   this   issue   here.  As   alleged   by  
Andrew  Muscat,   it   is   inappropriate   to   conduct   a   question   of   intra-­corporate  
liability   without   considering   the   interactions   between   the   principle   of   limited  
liability  and  the  remedy.46     
  
(1)  The  objectives  of   the  two  company  law  principles  are  different   from  
that  of  tort  law     
  
The   principle   of   separate   legal   personality   can   be   justified   by   its   economic  
contributions   and   social   functions.47   Together   with   the   principle   of   limited  
liability,   separate   legal   personality   serves   interests   of   both   society   and  
corporations,   by   facilitating   investment   from   investor   shareholders,   and  
therefore  capital  formation  for  society.48   The  principle  of   limited  liability  could  
be   justified   in   various  ways.   Some   scholars   believe   that   limited   liability   is   a  
privilege   conferred   by   the   state   as   a   result   of   the   act   of   incorporating   the  
business.49   When   the   contractual   nature   of   corporate   law   is   considered,  
limited   liability  can  be  counted  as  a  contract  guideline  between  shareholders  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45   Muscat  (n  26)  31.     
46   ibid  34.  
47   David  Goddard,  ‘Corporate  Personality-­Limited  Recourse  and  Its  Limits’  in  Ross  Grantham  and  
Charles  Rickett  (eds),  Corporate  personality  in  the  twentieth  century  (1st  edn,  Hart  Publishing,  1998)  11.  
48   Kurt  A  Strasser  and  Phillip  Blumberg,  ‘Legal  Form  and  Economic  Substance  of  Enterprise  Groups:  
Implications  for  Legal  Policy’  (2011)  1(1)  Accounting,  Economics,  and  Law  Art  4,  6.  
49   Lewis  D  Solomon,  Kathleen  J  Collins,  ‘Humanistic  Economics:  A  New  Model  for  the  Corporate  Social  
Responsibility  Debate’  (1987)  12  J  Corp  L  331,  338.     
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and   creditors   for   maximising   wealth. 50    Corporations   could   further   obtain  
benefits  of   limited   liability   at  a   lower   cost.51   From   the  perspective  of  market  
contributions,   Halpern,   Trebilcock,   and   Turnbull,   have   provided   a   set   of  
justifications   for   limited   liability.52   They   argue   that   the   principle   of   limited  
liability  is  essential  for  an  organised  securities  market.53   Limited  liability  makes  
an  organised  liquid  market  possible  when  investors  attach  different  values  to  
shares  depending  on  their  wealth.54   In  addition,  there  are  some  other  popular  
rationales  supporting  this  principle.  The  availability  of  limited  liability  facilitates  
both  the  development  of  the  economy  and  the  corporation  itself.  In  respect  of  
the  economy,   it   is  believed   that  contrary   to   investments  under   the   regime  of  
unlimited   liability,   limited   liability   reduces   risks   and   offers   greater   expected  
values  by  facilitating  investments  of  the  middle  and  working  classes.55   As  for  
the  company  itself,  “limited  liability  makes  diversification  and  passivity  a  more  
rational   strategy   and   so   potentially   reduces   the   cost   of   operating   the  
corporation”.56   For   example,   limited   liability   reduces   the   costs   of  monitoring  
agents  and  other  shareholders.57   Managers  are  motivated  and  act  efficiently  
since   the   regime   of   limited   liability   promotes   a   free   transfer   of   shares.58  
Apparently,   all   the   law   attempts   to   do   is   to   provide   maximum   freedom   to  
contract  and  presumably  to  minimise  the  transaction  costs  incurred  by  parties  
in   achieving   mutually   desired   allocations   of   risk.59   No   matter   how   those  
justifications  are  perceived,  principle  of  limited  liability  has  been  firmly  rooted  in  
law  and  in  the  economic  world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50   Richard  A  Posner,  Economic  Analysis  of  Law  (9th  edn,  Wolters  Kluwer  Law  &  Business  2014)  160;;  
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51   Frank  H  Easterbrook,  The  Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law  (1st  edn,  Harvard  University  Press  
1996)  41.  
52   Paul  Halpern,  Michael  Trebilcock  and  Stuart  Turnbull,  ‘An  Economic  Analysis  of  Limited  Liability  in  
Corporation  Law’  (1980)  30(2)  The  University  of  Toronto  Law  Journal  117.  
53   ibid  129-­131.  
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56   F  Easterbrook  and  D  Fischel,  ‘Limited  Liability  and  the  Corporation’  (1985)  52  University  of  Chicago  
Law  Review  89,  94.  
57   Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  The  Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law  (1st  edn,  Harvard  University  Press,  
1996)  41.           
58   David  Kershaw,  Company  Law  in  Context:  Text  and  Materials  (2nd  edn,  OUP  2012)  26.  
59   Halpern,  Trebilcock  and  Turnbull  (n  54)  131.  
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However,   these   two   bedrock   principles   in   corporate   law   (separate   legal  
personality  and  limited  liability)  imperceptibly  become  impediments  to  justice  in  
ways  not  originally  intended.     
  
The  two  principles  undermine  the  fundamental  goals  of  tort  law.  The  aim  of  tort  
law  is  to  provide  satisfactory  compensation  for  loss  and  injury  and  to  deter  and  
punish  the  wrongdoer.  However,  tort  claimants  might  only  receive  a  proportion  
of  the  compensation  owed  them  because  of  the  doctrine  of  limited  liability.60   In  
the  tort  claims  against  a  company,  especially  the  mass  tort  cases,  a  company  
normally  cannot  meet  the  tort  liability  fully  and  when  insolvency  is  initiated,  tort  
creditors  always  get  limited  compensation,  because  of  the  rule  of  priority  under  
insolvency,  and  because  shareholders’  assets  are  protected  by  limited  liability.  
When  a  company   limited  by  share   is  going   into   insolvency,   the  value  of   the  
company’s   assets   is   less   than   its   liabilities.   This   means   that   an   insolvent  
company  cannot  meet  all  the  debts.  In  this  situation,  the  company’s  assets  are  
allocated  in  the  order  of  priority.  A  tort  creditor,  as  an  unsecured  creditor  is  at  a  
low   rank   to   be   paid,   and   cannot   claim   against   the   company’s   shareholders  
because  they  are  protected  by  limited  liability.     
  
Tort   law   intends   to   allocate   liability   to   parties  who   are  most   responsible   for  
injuries   caused.   By   contrast,   the   company   law   principle   of   limited   liability  
facilitates  the  structuring  of  relations  within  groups  and  shields  group  assets,  
and  provide  protections  for  shareholders  with  twin-­layer  limited  liability.61   Both  
the  personal  assets  of  shareholders  and  group  assets  are  immune  from  other  
members’  business  failure.62   The  use  of  group  structure  further  limits  liabilities  
within   a   group.63   The   two   principles   prevent   both   contractual   and   tortious  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60   Muscat  (n  26)180.  
61   Christian  Witting,  ‘Liability  for  Corporate  Wrongs’  (2009)  28  U  Queensland  LJ  113,113.  
62   Alan  Dignam,  Hicks&  Goo’s  Cases  &  Materials  on  company  law  (7th  edn,  OUP  2011)  486.  
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claims  made  against  one  corporate  member  from  affecting  other  members  and  
assets  elsewhere  in  the  group.64   Subsequently,  tort  creditors’  weak  position  is  
worsened.   Company   law   is   deficient   in   this   area,   in   addressing   the   unfair  
position  of  tort  creditors  of  corporate  groups.     
  
(2)  Limited   liability   transfers   the   risk   of   business   failure   from  
shareholders  and  the  group  itself  to  outside  corporate  creditors        
  
In   relevant   commercial   activities,   corporate   groups   profit   from   risk   aversion  
based   upon   separate   legal   personality   and   limited   liability.   Incorporation  
provides  a  chance  for  shareholders  to  avoid  any  serious  risks  to  a  large  extent,  
including  avoidance  of  unlimited  liability.65   Incorporation  of  group  subsidiaries  
could   be   regarded   as   a   form   of   insurance,   providing   a   layer   of   immunity   to  
shareholders  in  the  parent  company  from  exposure  to  personal  liability.66   The  
owners   of   business   pay   for   this   insurance   when   they   pay   for   credit.   The  
experienced   businessman   can   rely   on   trade   protection   associations,   taking  
security,  obtaining  guarantees  (etc),  but  the  “little  person”,  such  as  involuntary  
creditors  who  deserve  particular  protections,  are  often  unconscious  of  risks.67     
  
It  is  argued  that  the  value  of  a  corporation  could  arise  if  outside  creditors  bear  
a  desirable  part  of  the  risk  of  business  failure.68   Creditors  are  regarded  as  risk  
bearers   because   they   are   less   risk   averse   compared   to   shareholders.69  
However,  outside  creditors  are  returned  less  on  their  investments  because  the  
shareholders  take  the  gains   in  the  first  place  when  the  company  runs  well.70  
Problems  of   involuntary  creditors   in   the  consequence  of   limited   liability  need  
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65   Otto  Kahn-­Freund,  ‘Some  Reflections  on  Company  Law  Reform’  (1944)  The  Modern  Law  
Review  7(1-­2)  54,  54.  
66   Goddard  (n  47)  11.  
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more  attention.  The  position  of  tort  creditors  is  the  most  disadvantageous  since  
limited   liability   shifts   the   risk   of   business   failure   to   them  by   denying   them  a  
remedy.71   When  a  defendant  subsidiary  has  sufficient  assets   to  meet   its   tort  
claims,  we  cannot  say   that   limited   liability  has  an  obstructive   function   in   tort  
creditors  pursuing  reasonable  compensations.  However,  limited  liability  indeed  
transfers   the   losses  upon  tort  victims  when  the  debts  exceed  the  company’s  
payment  capacity.72     
  
(3)  The   two   company   law   principles   and   the   doctrine   of   “piercing   the  
corporate  veil”  —  the  response  to  abuse  of  privileges  
  
Sometimes   shareholders   take   advantage   of   the   principles   of   limited   liability  
and  separate  legal  personality  and  conduct  illegally.  For  instance,  a  subsidiary  
company   is   formed   to   evade   certain   statutory   prohibitions,   or   to   evade   a  
contractual   obligation. 73    Although   a   company   is   legally   regarded   as   an  
independent  entity,   it  does  not  have  all   the   features  of  a  natural  person  and  
cannot   always   act   like   a   human   being.74   Courts   permit   the   liabilities   of   a  
company  to  be  attributed  to  shareholders  (usually  controlling  shareholders)  in  
certain  circumstances  when  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality  are  
abused.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.  The  Salomon  case  
explains  this  doctrine  by  indicating  that:  the  principle  of  separate  legal  entity  is  
only   recognised  when   there   is   “no   fraud  and  no  agency  and   if   the  company  
was  a  real  one  and  not  a  fiction  or  myth.”75   Similarly,  in  Littlewoods  Mail  Order  
Stores  Ltd  v  IRC,  Lord  Justice  Denning  MR  noted  that:     
        
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71   Muscat  (n  26)  181.  
72   The  Yale  Journal  Company,  ‘Should  Shareholders  be  Personally  Liable  for  the  Torts  of  Their  
Corporation?’  (1967)  76  Yale  LJ  1190,1195.  
73   ibid.  
74   George  F  Canfield,  ‘Scope  and  Limits  of  Corporate  Entity  Theory’  (1917)  17(2)  Columbia  Law  Review  
128,131.  
75   Salomon  (n  34)  33.  
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A  corporation  will  be  looked  upon  as  a  legal  entity  as  a  general  rule  
but   when   the   notion   of   legal   entity   is   used   to   defeat   public  
convenience,  justify  wrong,  protect  fraud  or  defend  crime  the  law  will  
regard   the   corporation   as   an   association   of   persons…incorporation  
does   not   fully   cast   a   veil   over   the   personality   of   a   limited   company  
through  which   the  courts  cannot  see.  The  courts  can,  and  often  do,  
pull  off  the  mask.  They  look  to  see  what  really  lies  behind.76  
  
It  then  follows  the  question  whether  the  existing  exception  to  the  principles  of  
separate   legal   personality   and   limited   liability   –   the   doctrine   of   piercing   the  
corporate  veil,  is  sufficient  in  dealing  with  corporate  tort  problems.     
  
The   strict   obey   to   limited   liability   and   separate   legal   personality   makes   the  
doctrine  of  veil  piercing  applied  in  a  very  limited  way.  The  decision  in  Salomon,  
on  the  other  side,  has  been  described  as  “shocking”  and  “calamitous”,  and  has  
been  criticised,  for  incorporation  was  there  used  to  avoid  liabilities  and  evade  
obligations.77   However,  the  House  of  Lords  held  that  the  decision  might  incur  
the  feel  of  unfairness,78   but  the  unsecured  creditors  “had  only  themselves  to  
blame,   having   had   full   notice   that   they   were   no   longer   dealing   with   an  
individual”.79     
  
The  case  of  Salomon  concerned  claims  of  unsecured  creditors  who  intended  
to  pursue  compensation   in   the   insolvency  process  of   the  company  Salomon  
Ltd.  A  business  man  Salomon  transferred  his  business  to  Salomon  Ltd,  and  Mr  
Salomon  was  the  company’s  majority  shareholder.  Mr  Salomon  gave  Salomon  
Ltd  a  loan,  which  is  secured  by  a  floating  charge  over  the  company’s  assets.  
Mr   Salmon   sold   all   his   debentures   of   the   company   to   Edmund   Broderip.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76   Littlewoods  Mail  Order  Stores  v  Inland  Revenue  Commissioners  [1969]  1  WLR  1214  (CA)  1254.  
77   Kahn-­Freund  (n  65)  54.  
78   Salomon  (n  34)  51-­54.  
79   ibid  45,  53.  
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Salomon  Ltd.’s  business  was  soon  failed  and  went  to  liquidation.  Mr  Broderip’s  
right  secured  by  the  floating  charge  so  that  he  was  paid  prior  to  the  unsecured  
creditors  who  were  then  left  nothing  from  the  insolvency  of  the  company.  The  
liquidator  claimed  against  Mr  Salomon  for  that  the  company  Salomon  Ltd  was  
just   a   sham   and   Mr   Salomon   should   be   responsible   for   the   debts   of   the  
unsecured  creditors.  The  House  of  Lords,  on  appeal,  reversed  the  ruling  of  the  
Court  of  Appeal  which  declared  that  Salomon  should  be  liable  because  of  the  
trust   relationship      between   he   and   his   company   (Lindley   LJ   held   that   the  
company  was  a  trustee  for  Mr  Salomon).80   The  House  of  Lords  unanimously  
held  that  the  company  Salomon  Ltd  was  duly  incorporated  in  law  and  was  an  
independent   legal  entity  enjoying   its  own   rights  and   liabilities.  Subsequently,  
the  principle  of  separate  legal  personality  was  firmly  established  and  followed  
by  latter  cases.     
  
The  result  of  the  decision  has  been  regarded  as  an  uncompromising  precedent  
in  subsequent  cases.  In  the  case  of  Macaura  v  Northern  Assurance  Co,81   the  
court   held   that,   only   secured   creditors   enjoy   insurance   against   company  
assets;;   unsecured   creditors   do   not   enjoy   any   such   insurance.82   It   may   be  
argued  that  the  weak  positon  of  unsecured  creditors  in  the  case  of  Salomon  is  
not  because  of  the  inducement  of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality,  
but   due   to   the   priority   rules   in   the   insolvency   procedure   and   security   to   the  
secured   creditors   given   by   floating   charge.   However,   the   following   relevant  
case  law  reveals  that  English  courts  are  reluctant  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  –  
they  only  take  this  action  in  very  limited  circumstances.  The  high  authority  of  
the   two   bedrock   principles   of   company   law   makes   the   courts   extremely  
cautious   when   piercing   the   corporate   veil,   accordingly,   posing   considerable  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	   Salomon  v  A  Salomon  &  Co  Ltd  [1895] 2 Ch 323, 337–340 
81  Macaura  v  Northern  Assurance  Co  Ltd  [1925]  AC  619  (HL).  
82   ibid  626.  
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difficulties   for   both   tort   claims   and   contract   claims   against   company  
shareholders.  
  
The   efficiency   of   the   doctrine   of   piercing   the   corporate   veil   in   establishing  
corporate   group’s   liability,   and   as   an   approach   to   rescue   corporate   tort  
creditors  of  an  insolvent  subsidiary,  are  mainly  discussed  in  Chapter  II.     
  
1.2.3  The  approaches  to  establishing  tort  liability  of  corporate  groups  are  
seldom  discussed  in  the  literature     
	  
For  a  long  time,  the  position  of  tort  claimants  has  been  largely  ignored  in  the  
debates  on  corporate  liability.  Also,  the  opportunities  to  establishing  a  parent  
company’s  liability   in  tort  for   its  wrongdoing  subsidiaries  were  absent.  During  
the  19th  century,  tort  claims  against  corporations  obtained  no  judicial  interest  at  
all.  There  is  a  lack  of  reported  cases  favouring  tort  creditors  in  the  early  and  
mid-­19th  century.83   It  was  not  until   the  1920s   that   the   rising  death   toll   in   the  
United  Kingdom,   as   a   result   of   horrible   effects   of   asbestos   exposure   to   the  
employees  of  asbestos  textile  factories,  got  public  attention.84   Then,  in  1950,  
Kelly  v  Turner  &  Newall  Ltd85   became  the  first  well-­known  English  asbestosis  
claim  against  the  parent  company  beyond  the  insolvent  subsidiary.     
  
The  case  of  Adams  v  Cape  Industries  plc,86   in  1990,  pushed  the  debate  to  a  
new  prominence.  The  claimants  aimed  to  disregard  the  corporate  personality  
and   impose   liability   on   the   parent   company   for   the   torts   of   its   subsidiary  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83   Muscat  (n  26)  178.  Several  Parliamentary  reports  are  referenced  here  on  page  178  of  this  book,  like  
the  Report  of  the  Select  Committee  on  Investments  for  the  Savings  of  the  Middle  and  Working  Classes,  
(1850)  BPP  Vol,  XIX  no.  508;;  Report  of  the  Select  Committee  on  the  Law  of  Partnership,  (1851)  BPP  Vol  
XVII  no  509;;  First  Report,  Royal  Mercantile  Law  Commission,  (1854)  BPP  Vol  XXVII  no  1791.  
84   W  E  Cooke,  ‘Fibrosis  of  the  Lungs  Due  to  the  Inhalation  of  Asbestos  Dust’  (1924)  2  Br  Med  J  147.  The  
first  case  of  death  as  a  result  of  asbestos  exposure  was  documented  in  medical  literature  in  1924,  as  
indicated  in  this  text.  
85   Kelly  v  Turner  &  Newall  Ltd  [1950]  Manchester  District  Registry  of  the  High  Court,  Letter  K  No  5685.  
86   Adams  v  Cape  Industries  [1990]  Ch  433  (CA).  
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companies.  Adams  contracted  asbestosis  as  a   result   of   asbestos  exposure,  
and  then  brought  actions  in  the  United  States  against  the  relevant  subsidiary  
companies.  Since  the  subsidiaries  were  not  available  to  meet  the  judgement,  
Adams  sought  to  enforce  the  action  against  the  UK  parent  company  Cape  plc.  
Unfortunately,  the  English  Court  of  Appeal  failed  to  make  the  parent  company  
liable   to   the   tort   creditors   of   its   subsidiaries,   based   on   the   company   law  
doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.  Bare  guidelines  for  applying  the  doctrine  
in  corporate  groups  were  set  out  in  this  case,  but  it  was  still  challenging  for  tort  
creditors   to   attach   liability   to   the   parent   company   based   on   it.   In   the   later  
similar  personal   injury  claims  made  against   the  parent  company  of  a  group,  
like  Lubbe  v  Cape  plc,87   the  judge  rejected  the  potential  grounds  for  piercing  
the  corporate  veil.  Instead,  the  case  gave  us  another  way  to  engage  with  the  
liability   by   introducing   the   use   of   tort   law   principles,   particularly   the   tort   of  
negligence.  Most  cases  before  Chandler  v  Cape  plc  (2013)88   did  not  provide  
much   valuable   guidance,   but   highlighted   the   possibilities   of   doing   so.   The  
Chandler   case   eventually   realized   the   imposition   of   a   duty   of   care   on   the  
parent  company  and   the  Court  of  Appeal  also  provided  a   “four-­part   test”   for  
future   cases.   This   test   was   made   particularly   for   determining   a   parent  
company’s   negligence   liability   for   the   health   and   safety   of   employees   of   its  
subsidiaries;;   it   however   provided   limited   guidance   for   the   courts.   So,   it   is  
expected   that   further   judicial  explanations  on   the  guidance   for  corporate   tort  
liability  can  be  given  in  the  future  by  Supreme  Court.  
  
English   case   law   contains   extremely   limited   examples   as   regards   the  
establishment   of   the   parent   company’s   tort   liability   for   the   debts   of   its  
subsidiary   companies.   Approaches   normally   include   disregarding   the  
corporate   veil   (the   principles   of   separate   legal   personality   and   limited),   and  
establishing  parent  companies’  direct  liability  based  on  the  tort  of  negligence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87   Lubbe  (n  18).     
88   Chandler  v  Cape  plc  [2012]  EWCA  Civ  525,  [2012]  1  WLR  3111.     
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However,  neither  of  them  are  mature.     
  
Since  corporate  tort  problems  are  in  a  close  relationship  with  the  externalities  
of  the  principle  of  limited  liability.  A  group  of  academic  attempts  to  reach  liability  
is   on   the   reform   of   the   limited   liability   principle,   but   this   trend   of  
recommendations  lack  sufficient  support  of  empirical  research  and  evidence.  
In  1991,  Henry  Hansmann  and  Reinier  Kraakman  proposed  a  dominant  reform  
called   “pro   rata   unlimited   liability”   for   corporate   torts   in   their   article   “Toward  
Unlimited   Shareholder   Liability   for   Corporate   Torts”   on   Yale   Law   Journal.  
However,  this  regime  is  highly  controversial  and  after  this,  proposals  of  reform  
on  the  limited  liability  for  corporate  torts  are  rarely  found.     
  
Corporate   tort   problems,   as   introduced   in   the   section   1.1,   always   concern  
corporate   insolvency.  However,   the  position  of   tort  creditors   is   ignored   in   the  
debate  of  creditors’  protection  in  the  insolvency  process.  Relevant  insolvency  
law  provisions,  section  213  fraudulent  trading  and  section  214  wrongful  trading  
in  the  Insolvency  Act  1986,  are  mainly  made  for  voluntary  creditors.  Academic  
discussions   are   always   made   on   the   efficiency   of   these   provisions   for   the  
profits  of  this  group  of  creditors.     
  
Apart  from  the  absence  of  judicial  examples  and  guidance,  literatures  involving  
recommendations   on   the   approaches   to   corporate   tort   problems   are   very  
limited.  Academic  discussions  on  tort  law  remedies  are  particularly  sporadic.     
  
This  thesis  aims  to  assess  the  efficiency  of  the  main  approaches  to  corporate  
tort   liability  and  make   recommendations.  The  approaches  based  on   tort   law  
principles’  extension  in  the  group  context  will  be  particularly  examined,  for  the  
purpose  of  the  maintenance  of  corporate  law  principles,  and  the  realisation  of  
finding  efficient  approaches  to  corporate  tort  problems.           
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1.3  The  development  of  the  work     
  
The  thesis  will  be  developed  broadly  in  the  following  order:  
  
(1)  In  the  whole,  the  main  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  evaluate  the  current  legal  
doctrines   upon   which   a   tort   creditor   may   successfully   claim   against   a  
parent  company  for  the  torts  of  the  subsidiary.  Most  importantly,  this  thesis  
attempts   to   make   a   contribution   to   the   use   of   tort   law   approaches   in  
creating   liability,  especially   the  parent  company’s   tort   liability   in  corporate  
groups.  This  thesis  aims  to  assess  the  main  approaches  to  the  problem,  as  
to  when  liability  could  be  imposed  on  a  parent  company  for  the  debts  of  a  
wholly   owned   subsidiary,   rather   than   to   catalogue   and   discuss   every  
possibility  in  an  exhaustive  way.  
  
(2)  Based   on   the   introduction   to   the   central   problem   in   the   first   chapter,  
especially,  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  principles  of  limited  liability  and  
separate   legal  personality  on   tort   claims  against   corporate  groups  where  
the  subsidiaries  have  engaged  in  tortious  conduct,  Chapter  II  will  discuss  
the  inroads  into  the  principle  of  limited  liability.  Firstly,  proposals  of  pro  rata  
unlimited  liability  will  be  discussed  based  on  relevant  literatures.  Secondly,  
the   statutory   provision   in   Section   214   of   the   Insolvency   Act   1986   (on  
wrongful  trading)  will  be  examined,  and  its  efficiency  in  dealing  with  group  
problems  will  be  assessed.  Thirdly,  the  common  law  doctrine  of  piercing  the  
corporate   veil   as   a   ground   of   redress   for   corporate   tort   creditors   will   be  
assessed.     
  
(3)  The  thesis  is  expected  to  contribute  to  the  discussion  of  the  best  solutions  
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to  the  group  problem  in  the  case  of  tort  victims  suffering  personal  injury,  as  
well  as  to  indicate  the  use  of  tort  remedies  to  establish  liability  in  corporate  
groups.  It  appears  that  tort   law  may  provide  remedies  for  claimants  when  
other  mechanisms  fail  to  do  so.  In  this  circumstance,  the  author  will  explore  
how   the   relevant   tort   remedies   can   be   admitted   or   accepted   in   legal  
practice.  So,   in  Chapter   III,   the  author  will   consider   how   to  establish   the  
parent  company’s  negligence   liability,  as  regards  the  health  and  safety  of  
employees   of   the   subsidiary   companies;;   and   will   assess   the   tort   of  
negligence  as  an  approach  in  a  comparative  perspective,  by  examining  the  
case  law  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia  and  the  United  States.  
  
(4)  Following  the  discussion  of  the  extension  of  tort  of  negligence  in  corporate  
tort  cases,  the  next  two  chapters  are  expected  to  contribute  to  the  literature  
on   establishing   corporate   group’s   tort   liability   based   on   other   tort   law  
doctrines   applicable   to   the   group.   Thus,   Chapter   IV   will   explore   the  
possibility  that  the  parent  company  or  other  group  members  are  held  jointly  
and  severally  liable  for  corporate  tort  victims  based  on  the  doctrine  of  joint  
tortfeasance;;  will  discuss  the  problems  of  establishing  the  joint  liability,  and  
the  efficiency  of  the  approach.  Chapter  V  will  examine  whether  it  is  possible  
to  extend  the  application  of  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  to  corporate  tort  
claims,  and  whether  it  can  serve  as  an  efficient  approach  to  enforce  group  
liability.  These  latter  two  theories’  extensions  in  corporate  tort  problems  are  
seldom  discussed   in   the   literature,  and  have  not  been  applied   in  English  
case  law.  
  
The   whole   thesis   argues   that   the   traditional   approaches   are   insufficient   in  
establishing   the   parent   company’s   liability   for   the   debts   of   its   subsidiary  
companies,   especially   in   the   context   of   personal   injury.   The  proposal   of   pro  
rata  unlimited  liability  lacks  widespread  academic  support.  There  is  no  proper  
provision   in   the   Insolvency   Act   to   deal   with   corporate   liability   towards   tort  
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creditors  in  the  context  of  insolvency.  The  common  law  doctrine  of  piercing  the  
corporate   veil   is   also   argued   to   be   narrow   in   creating   liability   beyond   the  
separate  legal  personality  of  the  company.     
  
It  is  recommended  in  this  thesis  that  efforts  be  made  to  further  develop  tort  law  
solutions   to   some   specific   corporate   group   problems   when   the   primary  
company  law  approaches  are  not  well  accepted  and  applied  by  UK  courts.  The  
theory  of  tort  of  negligence  can  be  properly  applied  to  establish  group  liability  
in  circumstances  where  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing  fails  to  do  so.  However,  it  
is   argued   that   better   explanations   by   the   courts   on   its   application   to   group  
situation  are  needed   for  more  possibilities   in   the   future.  The  doctrine  of   joint  
tortfeasance   based   on   participations   is   particularly   recommended   as   a   new  
possible   solution.   It   is   argued   in   Chapter   IV   that   this   doctrine   is   made   for  
creating  liability  involving  multiple  tortfeasors,  which  happens  to  be  suitable  in  
group  situation.  Furthermore,  the  author  argues  that  the  participation  tests  for  
joint  tortfesance  can  be  properly  applied  in  the  group  context,  which  should  be  
the  most  reasonable  support  for  the  doctrine’s  extension.     
  
The  theory  of  vicarious  liability  in  tort  is  also  recommended  to  be  discussed  for  
the  development  of  the  law  relating  to  group  problems.  It  is  time  to  discuss  the  
uncertain  but  pressing  issue  whether  a  legal  person  can  be  vicariously  liable  
for  the  tort  of  another  legal  person.  The  author  will  try  to  argue  that  the  theory  
of   vicarious   liability   is   not   a   proper   solution   to   achieve   a   parent   company’s  
liability  for  the  subsidiary’s  torts,  and  it  might  be  possible  but  extremely  difficult  
to  establish  vicarious  liability  for  another  legal  person’s  torts.  
  
The  thesis  tries  to  contribute  to  the  discussion  of  proper  solutions  to  corporate  
tort   problems,  and   is   arguably   the   first   sustained  study  of   the   topics  of   joint  
liability  and  vicarious  liability  in  corporate  groups.     
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Chapter   2   Assessment   of   the   unlimited   liability   regime,  
statutory   protections,   and   the   doctrine   of   piercing   the  
corporate  veil        
  
2.1  Introduction     
  
This  chapter  provides  evaluations  of  company  law  in  its  approaches  to  creating     
parent  companies’  liability,  beyond  the  veil  of  shareholder’s  limited  liability  and  
company’s  separate  legal  personality.  The  principle  of  limited  liability  prevents  
tort   creditors   from  pursuing   recourse  on   shareholders   beyond   the   company.  
The   proposal   of   unlimited   liability   regime   is   introduced   to   impose   on  
shareholders  a  pro  rata  unlimited  liability  for  corporate  torts.  In  the  first  part  of  
this  chapter   the  author  discusses  whether   the   justifications   for   this   reform  of  
limited  liability  are  reasonable  and  whether  the  enforcement  of  it  is  feasible.  As  
regards  statutory  protections  on  creditors  in  corporate  insolvency,  section  214  
of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986  should  be  the  most  relevant  provision  which  can  be  
extended   to   create   liability   on   shadow   directors   in   the   group   situation.   To  
evaluate  its  feasibility   in  solving  corporate  tort  problems,  the  efficiency  of  the  
provision   itself   in   creating   director’s   liability,   and   its   extension   in   a   group  
context   will   be   fully   discussed.   The   last   part   of   this   chapter   provides   an  
assessment   of   the   most   important   common   law   doctrine   of   piercing   the  
corporate  veil  based  on  which  a  shareholder’s  liability  can  be  made.  The  main  
arguments  for  piercing  the  corporate  veil,  and  their  extension  in  group  cases  
are  discussed  first,  after  which  limitations  of  the  application  of  this  doctrine  by  
UK   courts   and   the   limitations   of   its   extension   in   future   group   cases   are  
considered.     
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In   this   chapter,   the   author   argues   that   the   above   three   solutions   cannot  
properly  solve  the  corporate  tort  problems  at  the  present  time.     
  
  
2.2  Evaluation  of  the  pro  rata  unlimited  liability  regime  
  
The  company   law  principles  of  separate   legal  personality  and   limited   liability  
isolate  the  parent  company  from  its  wrongdoing  subsidiary.  It  is  generally  held  
that  the  parent  company  as  a  shareholder  has  limited  liability  and  is  not  liable  
for   its   subsidiary’s   debts.   In   this   context,   tort   creditors   want   to   rely   on   the  
integrated   relationship   between   the   subsidiary   and   parent   company   to  
persuade  the  courts  to  treat  them  as  one  legal  person,  and  impose  unlimited  
liability  on  the  parent  company  as  a  shareholder.  Suggestions  and  comments  
have  been  made  by  legal  scholars  for  the  reform  of  the  company  law  principle  
of  limited  liability  as  a  solution  to  the  corporate  tort  problems  in  the  insolvency  
context.89   Among   them,   the  most   influential  proposal   is  called   “unlimited  pro  
rata  shareholder   liability”   for  corporate   torts   introduced  by  Henry  Hansmann,  
and  Reinier  Kraakman.90   They  propose  that  shareholders  can  be  liable  for  the  
share  of  corporate  tort  debt  proportional  to  their  share  of  equity  ownership.91  
In  the  case  of  contract  claims,  the  two  authors  still  support  the  application  of  
limited  liability.92  
  
A  change  to  the  present  limited  liability  regime  can  be  justified  for  two  reasons.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89   Hansmann  and  Kraakman,  (n  4)  1879.  There  are  several  articles  questioning  limited  liability  of  
corporations.  For  example,  Phillip  I  Blumberg,  Law  of  Corporate  Groups:  Substantive  Law  (1st  edn,  Little  
Brown&  Co  Law  &  Business  1987)  681-­692.  (suggesting  abolition  of  limited  liability  among  firms  within  
"corporate  groups");;  Trebilcock  Halpern  &  Turnbull,  ‘An  Economic  Analysis  of  Limited  Liability  in  
Corporation  Law’,  (1980)  30  U  Toronto  LJ  117,  148-­49  (advocating  unlimited  liability  for  small,  
closely-­held  corporations  in  both  tort  and  contract,  and  suggesting  that  directors  of  large,  publicly-­traded  
corporations  be  made  personally  liable  to  involuntary  creditors).  
90   Hansmann  and  Kraakman,  (n  4)  1879.  
91   ibid  1892-­1894.  
92   ibid  1919-­1920.  
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The   first   is  about   the  undesirable  effects  of   limited   liability.  As  one   important  
constituent  of  corporate  law,  it  is  argued  that  the  principle  of  limited  liability  is  
considered  to  be  laid  down  without  sufficient  evaluation  and  assessment.93   It  
has   consequently   resulted   in   the   institutionalization   of   corporate  
irresponsibility.94   Commentators  thus  call  for  initiating  the  regime  of  unlimited  
liability   at   least   in   particular   circumstances,   where   corporations   are   used   to  
escape  liability  by  sitting  behind  the  veil  of  limited  liability.95   It  is  well  accepted  
that  the  principle  of  limited  liability,  as  discussed  in  chapter  one,  was  originally  
made  for  protecting  the   interest  of  shareholders,  not  outside  creditors.96   It   is  
claimed   that   corporations   take   advantage   of   shareholder’s   limited   liability   to  
evade   corporate   liability,   such   behaviour   also   contributes   to   the   increasing  
number  of  tort  claims.97   Limited  liability  permits  cost  and  risk  externalization,  
which   leads   to   overinvestment   in   hazardous   industries.   Many   large  
publicly-­traded  corporations  have  converted  into  highly  leveraged  closely-­held  
companies  with  the  mergers  and  acquisitions  movements.  These  companies  
lack   net   assets   and   are   under   high   pressure   to   maximize   cash   flow,   and  
therefore,  have  strong  motivations  to  do  business  involving  risky  industries.98  
Corporations  sometimes  evade  obligations  and   insulate  assets  by  arranging  
hazardous   activities   in   different   subsidiaries.   This   happens   mostly   in   the  
tobacco   industry  and   the  hazardous  waste   industry,  as  well  as   the  asbestos  
industry.  Shareholders  may  even  choose  to  dissolve  the  company  and  transfer  
assets   in   case   of   tort   liability   attaching.   In   particular,   Henry   Hansmann   and  
Reinier   Kraakman,   in   their   proposal,   admit   the   distinction   between   the  
contractual  and  the  tort  creditors,  therefore  they  believe  limited  liability  should  
be   retained   for   contractual   creditors,   and   recommend   applying   pro   rata  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93   Paddy  Ireland,  ‘Limited  Liability,  Shareholder  Rights  and  the  Problem  of  Corporate  Irresponsibility’  
(2010)  34(5)  Cambridge  Journal  of  Economics  837,  839.  
94   ibid.  
95   ibid.  
96   Daniel  R  Kahan,  ‘Shareholder  Liability  for  Corporate  Torts:  A  Historical  Perspective’  (2008)  97(4)  
Georgetown  Law  Journal  1085,  1087.  
97   Hansmann  and  Kraakman  (n  4)  1879,  1881.  
98   ibid.  
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unlimited  shareholder  liability  to  specific  corporate  tort  cases.  
  
In  the  second  place,  the  unlimited  liability  regime  is  justified  by  the  benefits  it  
would  bring.  Firstly,  removing  the  principle  of  limited  liability  partly  as  proposed,  
and   imposing   pro   rata   unlimited   shareholder   liability   on   the   relevant   group  
member,   might   circumvent   the   undesirable   impact   discussed   above   on   tort  
creditors.  Particularly,   it  would  be  efficient   in   reducing   the  abusive  behaviour  
such  as  transferring  group  assets  to  avoid  tort  liability.  The  enforcement  of  pro  
rata   unlimited   liability   would   also   prevent   shareholders   of   corporate   groups  
from   acting   without   considering   the   position   of   tort   creditors.   The   shield   of  
limited   liability   is   removed   through   this   means.   Secondly,   satisfactory  
compensation   could   be   achieved   through   pro   rata   unlimited   liability   without  
threatening   investment,  corporate  business,  or   the  securities  market.  Such  a  
regime  still  support   the  application  of   limited   liability   for  contractual  creditors.  
This  ensures  most  investments  will  not  be  affected,  but  meanwhile  preventing  
shareholders   from  externalizing  corporate  costs  and   risks  on   tort  creditors.99  
Thirdly,   the   unlimited   liability   regime   is   argued   to   be   feasible   because   it  
allocates  liability  proportionately.  Compared  with  joint  liability  on  shareholders,  
pro  rata  unlimited  liability  in  tort  is  alleged  to  accumulate  recovery  from  widely  
dispersed   shareholders.100   In   this   way,   tort   claimants   could   get   significant  
recovery   while   excessive   collection   costs   would   not   be   imposed   on  
shareholders.  Shareholders  would  seldom  be  forced  into  insolvency  and  would  
be  able  to  pay  since  it  is  unusual  that  the  assessment  of  compensation  against  
shareholders   would   exceed   the   wealth   of   the   investors.   That   is   because  
substantial  shareholdings  belong  to  the  wealthiest  members  or  individuals.101  
Fourthly,  it  is  argued  that  the  unlimited  liability  regime  would  deter  considerable  
number  of  accidents  in  the  long  term.102        
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99   Hansmann  and  Kraakman  (n  4)  1880.  
100   ibid  1903.     
101   ibid.     
102   ibid  1094.  
	   51	  
  
I   believe   that   the   feasibility   of   this   unlimited   liability   regime  depends  on   two  
issues.  Firstly,  would  the  reform  of  the  limited  liability  rule  bring  more  benefits  
for  capital  market  economies?  At   least   it   should  not   result   in  confusion,  and  
economic  disorder.  Secondly,  would  an  unlimited  liability  regime  as  a  solution  
to   corporate   tort   problems   threaten   the   existing   corporate   structure   and  
introduce  new  problems  to  corporations?  At  present,  it  is  still  difficult  to  answer  
these   two   questions   exactly.   The   comprehensive   comparison   of   the  
consequences   of   limited   liability   and   unlimited   liability   remains   open   for  
debate.  
  
There   are   clearly   strong   arguments   against   the   pro   rata   unlimited   liability  
regime.  One  is  that  the  enforcement  of  an  unlimited  liability  regime  would  have  
a   significantly   harmful   effect   on   capital  market   economies  and   corporations.  
Limited  liability  is  always  considered  to  be  an  encouraging  investment  in  risky  
businesses   and   it   facilitates   liquidity   by   separating   management   and   share  
ownership.103   Muzaffer  Eroglu  responds  in  his  paper  that  a  change  to  the  most  
fundamental   principle   of   corporate   law   will   inevitably   result   in   a   negative  
influence  on  the  structures  of  modern  enterprises,  even  though  there  is  a  lack  
of  sufficient  empirical  research  to  evaluate  the  changes  on  capital  markets  and  
corporations  when  were  the  rule  of  limited  liability  to  be  partly  reformed.104   He  
believes   the   reform   of   limited   liability   means   abolishing   limited   liability   for  
corporate  shareholders  and  individual  shareholders,  and  this  is  unlikely  to  gain  
much  support.105     
  
In  respect  of  the  impact  on  investment  and  economic  efficiency,  it  is  argued  by  
the   supporters   of   the   unlimited   liability   regime   that   the   negative   effect   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103   Joshua  Getzler,  ‘Disciplining  the  Corporation  Through  Tort  Liability  and  Disability’,  (2010)  Law  and  
Finance  Workshop  paper,  University  of  Oxford.  
104   Eroglu  (n  20)  233.  
105   ibid  232.  
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unlimited  liability  on  capital  investment  is  overshadowed.106   Mark  R  Patterson,  
in  his  article,  reviews  earlier  experiences  related  to  excess  shareholder  liability  
and   concludes   that   it   is   not   that   unmanageable   for   the   financial  markets.107  
Patterson   takes   the   example   of   Californian   law.   California’s   corporation   law  
used  to  impose  unlimited  liability  on  shareholders.108   He  also  suggests  that  an  
individual   company  should  have   the  ability   to  operate  with  unlimited   liability,  
such  as  was  the  case  with  one  publicly  traded  company,  American  Express.109     
  
However,   California’s   unlimited   liability   statute   was   abolished   in   1931,   and  
American   Express’   unlimited-­liability   operation   was   stopped   in   1965.110   In  
1992,   Professor   Grundfest   drew   out   the   point   that   the   regime   of   unlimited  
liability,   as   proposed,   is   unrealistic   since   liquidity   needs   modern   capital  
markets,   and  unlimited   liability  decreases   the  company’s   share  price.111   But  
then  it   is  noted  by  Daniel  R  Kahan  that  this  conclusion  is  not  that  convincing  
since   the   effect   of   unlimited   liability   on   the   price   of   the   American   Express  
company  common  stock  was  negligible.112   More  empirical  studies  are  needed  
to  make  a  clear  comparison  between   the  consequences  of  unlimited   liability  
and  limited  liability.     
  
The  feasibility  of  the  unlimited  liability  regime  is  also  doubtful.  Professor  Janet  
Cooper  Alexander  takes  the  view  that  if  just  one  country  applies  the  doctrine  of  
unlimited  liability  for  corporate  torts  while  others  have  not  done  so,  tort  claims  
will   not   become   easier   because   of   the   jurisdictional   and   choice-­of-­law  
problems.113   Thus,   it   is  difficult   for  a   tort   creditor   to  claim  against  defendant  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106   Hansmann  and  Kraakman,  (n  4)  1891.  
107   Mark  R  Patterson,  ‘Is  Unlimited  Liability  Really  Unattainable?:  Of  Long  Arms  and  Short  Sales’,  (1995)  
56  Ohio  St  LJ  815.  
108   ibid  820;;  California  Civil  Code  1923,  s  322.     
109   ibid  821.  
110   ibid  822.  
111   Joseph  A  Grundfest,  ‘The  Limited  Future  of  Unlimited  Liability:  A  Capital  Markets  Perspective,’  (1992)  
102  Yale  LJ  387,  394.  
112   Kahan  (n  92)  1103.  
113   Janet  Cooper  Alexander,  ‘Unlimited  Shareholder  Liability  Through  a  Procedural  Lens’,  (1992)  106  
Harv  L  Rev  387,  387.  
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shareholders   of   a   corporation   founded   in   a   country   that   does   not   enforce  
unlimited  shareholder  liability  for  torts.     
  
To   conclude,   as   a   solution   to   corporate   tort   problems,   this   proposal   lacks  
feasibility  and  practicality.  Concerns  about   the  unlimited   liability   regime   lie   in  
the  uncertainty  of  the  consequences  of  removing  the  limited  liability  principle;;  
and  the  lack  of  empirical  evidence  to  support  the  assumptions  of  the  benefits  
of   the   new   regime.   The   principle   of   limited   liability  may   lead   to   undesirable  
effects   for   tort   victims  pursuing  satisfactory   recovery.  However,   the  action  of  
abolishing  limited  liability  will  undoubtedly  influence  investment,  especially  the  
industries  involving  hazardous  operations  and  toxic  substance  manufacture.  A  
change   to   the  corporate  dominating  principle  would  also   influence  corporate  
structure  and  management.  In  fact,  there  is  no  persuasive  evidence,  such  as  
sufficient   empirical   data,   to   support   that   the   unlimited   liability   regime   would  
bring   more   benefits   or   would   not   result   in   certain   concerns.   Besides,   any  
debate   on   this   proposal   requires   a   large   extent   of   thinking,   discussion   and  
empirical  research  and  so  it  would  seem  clear  that  the  proposal  of  abolishing  
limited  liability  should  not  be  accepted  at  the  present  time.  This  thesis  will  be  
concentrating  on  the  discussion  of  the  most  appropriate  and  feasible  approach  
under  the  existing  law.     
  
  
2.3   Evaluation   of   statutory   protections   in   the   insolvency   law   for  
corporate  tort  creditors     
  
In   the   UK,   company   law   and   insolvency   law   are   mainly   used   to   deal   with  
corporate   group   issues.   Most   statutory   protections,   which   are   available   to  
remove  the  shield  of  limited  liability  and  impose  responsibility  on  the  members  
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personally,   are   relevant   to   company   transactions,   tradings,   and   any   other  
contract  activities.114   Sections  213  and  214  of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986,  rather  
than   provisions   in   the   Companies   Acts   carry   the   main   weight   of   creditors’  
protections  in  relation  to  insolvency.115   Principles  of  separate  legal  personality  
and   limited   liability   provide   company   controllers   with  motives   for   defrauding  
creditors   or   ignoring   creditors’   interests. 116    Section   213,   dealing   with  
fraudulent  trading,  and  section  214,  dealing  with  wrongful  trading,  are  created  
for   adjusting   the   undesirable   consequences   of   the   two   company   law  
principles.117   These   two   sections   recognize   the   bad   influence   on   outside  
creditors   resulting   from   the  wrongful  behaviour  of  corporate  members  sitting  
behind  the  shield  of  limited  liability;;  and  the  sections  are  aimed  to  put  directors  
under   a   duty   to   consider   creditors’   interests   when   the   company   is   facing  
various  levels  of  financial  problems.118   Section  213  creates  a  statutory  cause  
of  action  when  any  business  of  the  company  is  carried  on  with  intent  to  defraud  
creditors  of  the  company  in  the  course  of  the  winding  up.  The  section  states  
that   “any   persons   who   were   knowingly   parties   to   the   carrying   on   of   the  
business   in   the   manner   above-­mentioned   are   to   be   liable   to   make  
contributions   to   the   company’s   assets   properly.” 119    Section   214   makes  
provision   to  enable  contributions   to  company’s  assets   for   creditors’   interests  
from  the  directors  who  should  be  responsible  for  the  wrongful  management  of  
an  insolvent  company.120  
  
Currently,   it   is  difficult  to  find  examples  of  personal  liability  being  imposed  on  
shareholders   or   parent   companies   by   corporate   law   to   combat   behaviour  
inflicted  on  tort  creditors  when  externalizing  their  debts.  Thus,  in  the  discussion  
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115   ibid  236.  
116   ibid  227.  
117   ibid.  
118   Andrew  Keay,  'Director’s  duties  to  creditors:  Contractarian  Concerns  relating  to  efficiency  and  
over-­protection  of  creditors  '  (2003)  66  Modern  Law  Review  665,  667.  
119   Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  213.  
120   Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  214.     
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of   redress   for   tort   victims   who   cannot   pursue   contractual   protections,   one  
prominent   clue   is   to   enhance   statutory   protections   by   making   a   company’s  
member  behind  the  corporate  veil  to  be  personally  liable  and  to  contribute  to  
the  company’s  debts.  Section  213  and  section  214  of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986  
are  regarded  as  piercing  the  corporate  veil  under  statutes,  the  contravention  of  
which  will  place  liability  behind  the  corporate  veil.  
  
In  particular,  section  214  has  been  broadened  to  apply  to  the  corporate  group  
situations.  This  section  originally  applied   to  a  director  who  knew  or  ought   to  
have  known  that  the  company  had  gone  into  insolvency  at  some  time  prior  to  
the   commencement   of   the  winding   up,   but   did   not   take   actions   to  minimize  
creditors’   losses. 121    The   primary   aim   of   it   is   to   prevent   directors   from  
externalizing   companies’   debts   and   transferring   future   trading   risks   to  
creditors.122   If  considered  in  a  corporate  group  context,  liability  under  section  
214  could  extend  to  a  shadow  director,  which  encompasses  a  parent  company  
when   the   subsidiary’s   board   can   be   considered   as   “accustomed   to   act”  
according  to  the  parent  company’s  directions.123     
  
The  wrongful   trading   provision  was  made   in   the   consideration   of   protecting  
creditors  who  experience  loss  due  to  the  directors’  unreasonable  behaviour.  It  
was  recommended  at   first  by  the  Cork  Committee  to  provide  civil  actions  for  
unreasonable  trading.124   Due  to  the  character  of  risk  transfer  of  limited  liability  
principle,125   directors  have  no  incentive  to  take  care  of  creditors’  benefits,  and  
even  have  the  opportunity  to  exploit  the  regime  to  their  advantage.126   Section  
214   motivates   directors   to   consider   the   interests   of   the   creditor   by   making  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121   ibid.  
122   Andrew  Keay,  ‘Wrongful  Trading:  Problems  and  Proposals’,  (2014)  65  Northern  Ireland  Legal  
Quarterly  63,  65.  
123   Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  214  (7),  s  215.  
124   Report  of  the  Review  Committee  on  Insolvency  Law  and  Practice  (1982)  (Cmnd  8558),  [1777].  
125   J  Freedman,  ‘Limited  Liability:  Large  Company  Theory  and  Small  Firms’  (2000)  63  The  Modern  Law  
Review  317,329.  
126   H  C  Hirt,  ‘The  Wrongful  Trading  Remedy  in  UK  Law:  Classification,  Application  and  Practical  
Significance’  [2004]  ECFR  71,  83;;  P  L  Davies,  ‘Directors'  Creditor-­Regarding  Duties  in  Respect  of  
Trading  Decisions  Taken  in  the  Vicinity  of  Insolvency’  [2006]  7  EBOLR  301,  306.  
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them  personally  liable.127   To  escape  liability,  directors  must  take  every  step  to  
reduce   creditors’   potential   losses. 128    Actions   include   attempts   to   make  
agreements   with   creditors,   taking   professional   advice   and   taking   actions   to  
secure  financing.129   The  case  of  Re  Produce  Marketing  Consortium  Ltd  (No  2)  
illustrates   how   well   it   works.130   In   this   case,   two   directors   failed   to   put   the  
company  into  liquidation  in  time,  as  a  result  of  which  they  were  required  by  the  
court  to  make  a  contribution  of  £75,000  to  company’s  debts.     
  
It  is  appreciated  that  section  214  is  made  to  protect  creditors  of  a  company,  by  
putting   responsibility   on   the   controllers   of   the   company.   Unfortunately,  
commentators’   attitudes   towards   this   section   seem   not   optimistic   and   they  
doubt  what  it  has  achieved  and  what  it  might  do  in  the  future.131   As  a  statutory  
approach   to  make  company  members   contribute   to  a   company’s  debts,   this  
section  does  not  work  as  well  as  had  been  expected.     
  
(1)  The  extension  of  the  application  of  section  214  into  group  situations  
seems  to  be  inefficient.  
  
Pursuant   to   the   provision,   the   concept   “director”   includes   de   jure   directors,  
shadow   directors132and   de   facto   directors133.   The   term   “shadow   director”  
comprises   parent   companies   and   banks   as   prominent   parties.   A   shadow  
director   is   the   person   whose   instructions   the   company   follows   apart   from  
professional  advisers  or  the  person  who  exerts  direct  control  over  the  board  of  
its  subsidiaries.134  
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It   is   quite   difficult   to   see   how   a   parent   company   can   qualify   as   a   shadow  
director  of  the  subsidiary  company.  The  mere  fact  that  the  subsidiary  is  wholly  
owned  and  the  fact  that  the  director  of  a  parent  company  also  serves  on  the  
board  of  the  subsidiary  cannot  make  the  parent  company  inevitably  a  shadow  
director.135   There   is   no   specific   guidance   to   define   “shadow   director”.   The  
Cork   Committees’   proposal   for   section   214   recommends   that   anyone   who  
participates   in   the   company’s  management  may  acquire   personal   liability.136  
However,   section   214   contains   the   restriction   that   only   directors   (shadow  
directors)   bear   personal   liability.   From   the  outset,   there   is   controversy   as   to  
who  may  undertake  liability  for  its  company’s  debts.     
  
In   the   corporate   group   context,   English   courts   have   adopted   a   limited   and  
inconclusive  approach  on  qualifying  shadow  directorship  under  section  214.  In  
the  case  of  Re  Hydrodan  Ltd,  Millett  J  held  that  the  conduct  “in  which  the  board  
did   not   exercise   any   discretion   or   judgment   of   its   own   but   acted  merely   in  
accordance   with   the   directions   of   others” 137    contributed   to   the   shadow  
directorship.  It  was  later  argued  that  this  illustration  may  go  beyond  the  initial  
legislative  definition.  Paul  Davies  in  his  book  holds  that  the  degree  of  cession  
of   autonomy   by   the   subsidiary   will   depend   upon   how   exactly   intra-­group  
relationships   are   established,   such   as   from   the   perspective   of   detailed  
day-­to-­day   control   exercised   by   the   parent   company. 138    In   the   case   of  
Secretary  of  State  for  Trade  and  Industry  v  Deverell,139   Morritt  LJ  recommends  
that   it   does   not   have   to   establish   the   existence   of   total   control   over   every  
aspect   of   management.   The   fact   that   a   shadow   director   exercises   real  
influence  over  the  board  of  the  company’s  management  would  be  sufficient.140  
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It  is  obvious  that  the  definition  of  shadow  director  is  uncertain  and  depends  on  
the  facts  of  each  case.  Furthermore,  the  courts  have  recognized  that  it  is  not  
appropriate   to   impose   liability  on  a  director  without  proving   that  he  or  she   is  
irresponsible.141   It  means  that  the  liquidator  should  find  the  evidence  that  the  
director   has   ignored   advice   or   find   obvious   signs   that   indicates   inevitable  
failure  of  the  company’s  business.  Those  requirements  add  more  difficulties  in  
practice.  All  in  all,  the  degree  of  effectiveness  afforded  by  the  wrongful  trading  
provisions  within   a   group   of   companies   remains   to   be   seen,   the   courts   are  
suggested  to  be  cautious.142  
  
(2)  Section  214  cannot  work  effectively  since  it  is  difficult  both  to  initiate  
actions  under  this  section,  and  to  satisfy  the  elements  of  the  section  
to  establishing  liability.     
  
Firstly,  in  fact  there  is  little  reported  litigation  on  section  214  since  this  section  
should   be   initiated   by   the   liquidator   who   normally   has   insufficient   funds   to  
support   possible   litigation.143   Since   the   action   has   to   be   brought   by   the  
liquidator  personally,  the  liquidator  would  be  liable  for  any  costs  incurred,  and  
this   largely  prevents   liquidators   from  bringing  actions.144   Another  difficulty   is  
that  most  liquidators  would  be  concerned  about  the  costs  of  litigation  to  ensure  
that   the   funds   are   not   wasted,   thereby   reducing   the   dividend   payable   to  
creditors.145   An   empirical   study   of   disqualified   directors   concluded   that   the  
most  common  basis  for  disqualifying  directors  was  trading  while  insolvent,  but  
hardly  any  corresponding  proceedings  had  been  brought  under  section  214.146  
One  commentator  has  drawn  a  rather  depressing  conclusion  that  section  214  
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“is  of  no  interest  to  the  liquidator,  no  benefit  to  creditors  and  for  wrongdoers  it  is  
the   impotent  progeny  of  a   final   legal   theory”.147   Andrew  Keay  also  says   that  
section  214  does  not  offer  an  efficient  tool  for  liquidators  to  recover  funds  for  
creditors.148  
  
Secondly,   it   is   not   easy   to   establishing   the   elements   of   section   214.   For  
instance,  when  it  comes  to  the  element  concerning  “insolvent  time”,149   it  has  
been  advised  that  the  proper  “insolvent  time”  should  be  a  crisis  point  in  the  life  
of  the  company,  from  which  liability  starts,  and  the  director  must  be  aware  of  
the  inevitability.150   So  reliance  should  be  placed  on  a  particular  date.151   This  
point   is   crucial   for   directors   to   escape   liability,   and   for   liquidators   to   collect  
evidence.  However,  in  practice  it  is  very  difficult  to  define  the  most  appropriate  
time  when  the  insolvency  is   inevitable.152   In  Re  DKG  Contractors  Ltd,153   the  
“right   time”   was   when   the   supplier   rejected   the   crucial   delivery,   which   was  
finally  recognized  by  the  court.   It  was  also  argued  in  this  case  that  the  “right  
time”  is  invoked  by  two  employers’  dismissal.  In  Re  Bangla  Television  Ltd,  the  
crisis   time   was   when   the   heavily   indebted   company   sold   all   of   its   assets,  
leading   to   the   inevitable   insolvency.154   These   examples   illustrate   that   there  
are   some   signs   such   as   loss   of   employees,   contracts,   which   indicate   the  
company   is   on   the  way   to   insolvency.  But   since   section  214  gives  no  more  
guidance,   courts   may   face   difficulties   with   the   different   approaches   to  
predicting  business  failure.155     
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the  commencement  of  the  winding  up  the  defendant  must  know  or  ought  to  have  known  that  insolvent  
liquidation  could  not  be  avoided.  
150   Hicks  A  and  Cooke  T  E,  ‘Wrongful  Trading-­predicting  Insolvency’  (2007)  5  International  themes  in  
business  law  282,  285.  
151   H  Boschma  and  L  Lennarts,  ‘Wrongful  Trading  in  A  Comparative  Perspective’  in  J  Wouters  and  H  
Schneider  (eds),  Current  Issues  of  Cross-­Border  Establishment  of  Companies  in  the  European  Union  
(MAKLU  Uitgevers,  Antwerpen-­Apeldoorn  1995)  205.  
152   Arsalidou  (n  145)  21;;  Finch  (n  141)  700.  
153   Re  DKG  Contractors  Ltd  [1990]  BCC  903  (Ch),  [19].  
154   Re  Bangla  Television  Ltd  Valentine  v  Bangla  TV  and  others  [2009]  EWHC  1632,  [2010]  BCC  143  
[51]-­[57].  
155   Cooke  and  Hicks  (n  149)  339.  
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It   is   argued   that   some   essential   points   in   the   proposal   of   the  Report   of   the  
Review  Committee  on  Insolvency  Law  and  Practice  (1982)  Cmnd  8558  (Cork  
Report)  for  wrongful  trading  should  have  not  been  changed  before  it  became  
section   214   of   the   Insolvency   Act   1986. 156    As   proposed   by   the   Cork  
Committee,   in   addition   to   liquidators,   the   receivers,   administrators,   creditors  
and  even  company  members  were  welcome  to  invoke  the  claim.157   However,  
the  final  section  214  was  amended  in  a  more  restrictive  way.  It  also  regulates  
that  only  directors  (shadow  directors)  could  bear  personal  liability  whereas  in  
the  Cork  Report  it  is  proposed  that  any  person  may  acquire  personal  liability  if  
he   or   she   gets   involved   in   the   company’s   management   process.158   The  
appearance  of  the  wrongful  trading  provision  was  originally  always  considered  
as   an   important   development,   but   subsequently   its   effectiveness   was  
questioned.  
  
To  conclude,  section  214  as  a  statutory  remedy  is  proved  to  be  inadequate  to  
meet  its  initial  objective  to  impose  personal  liability  on  company  members  for  
the  outside  creditors,  and  not   feasible   to  apply   in  group  cases.  The  problem  
lies  in  its  inherent  defects  in  the  enforcement,  and  the  inconclusive  instructions  
given   by   the   courts   on   its   extension   to  make   a   parent   company   a   “shadow  
director”.  In  fact,  it  might  be  quite  complicated  and  difficult  for  tort  creditors  to  
seek  recourse  by  means  of  the  insolvency  legislation,  since  tort  creditors  were  
originally   excluded   from   the   debate.   There   is   limited   support   for   statutory  
priority  for  tort  creditors  in  a  winding  up  in  the  UK.  Unsecured  debts,  including  
tort  debts,  do  not  enjoy  preference  and  security,  but  enjoy  a   relatively  small  
amount  of  priority.  Professor  Andrew  Keay  says  in  his  book  that  it  is  regrettable  
that   the   unsecured   creditors   could   gain   little   or   nothing   in   corporation’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156   Rizwaan  J  Mokal,  ‘An  Agency  Cost  Analysis  of  the  Wrongful  Trading  Provisions:  Redistribution,  
Perverse  Incentives  and  the  Creditor’s  Bargain’  (2000)  59  The  Cambridge  Law  Journal  335,  343.  
157   Report  of  the  Review  Committee  on  Insolvency  Law  and  Practice  (1982)  Cmnd  8558  (Cork  Report),  
para  1806.  
158   ibid.  
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insolvency.159    Pursuant   to   section   328   of   Insolvency   Act   1986,   debts   of  
ordinary  unsecured  creditors  should  be  ranked  after  preferential  debts,  which  
should  be  paid  in  full  first  unless  there  are  insufficient  assets.160  
  
Preferential   debts   are   regulated   by  Schedule   6   of   the   Insolvency  Act   1986,  
which   are   in   priority   to   the   debts   of   other   unsecured   creditors   and   floating  
charge  holders.161   According  to  the  statutory  preferential  debts  in  the  UK,  tort  
victims   should   be   considered   as   ordinary   unsecured   creditors.162   So,   in   the  
context  of  insolvency  law,  it  is  quite  difficult  for  tort  creditors  to  get  satisfactory  




2.4  Evaluation  of  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil  
	  
This   section   examines   the   second   mechanism   for   creating   shareholders’  
liability   beyond   the   veil   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal   personality   in  
English  law.     
  
Given  that  corporate  personality   is  granted  by  statute,  courts  are  cautious  to  
pierce  the  corporate  veil  and  impose  liability  on  the  person  behind  it.  Since  the  
19th   century,   courts   have   been   willing   to   pierce   the   corporate   veil   in   some  
particular   circumstances. 163    Contrary   to   the   careful   statutory   exceptions,  
judicial  inroads  into  the  two  principles  proceed  in  a  more  indeterminate  way.164  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159   Andrew  Keay  and  Peter  Walton,  Insolvency  Law  Corporate  and  Personal  (3rd  edn,  Jordan  Publishing  
Ltd  2012)  525.     
160   Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  328  (2)  
161   Roy  Goode,  Principles  of  Corporate  Insolvency  Law  (3rd  edn,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2005)  275;;  
Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  175.  
162   Insolvency  Rules  1986  rule,  s  13.12(2).  
163   I  Maurice  Wormser,  ‘Piercing  the  Veil  of  Corporate  Entity’  (1912)  12  Colum  L  Rev  496,  517.     
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In   recent  years,   the  doctrine  of  piercing   the  corporate  veil  has  been  brought  
before   English   courts   for   reasons   such   as   fraudulent   conduct,   controller’s  
misrepresentation   defrauding   a   claimant   to   enter   into   a   contract,   and  
concealing  the  real  position  of  the  controller.165   To  explore  the  position  of  the  
doctrine  of  veil  piercing  in  imposing  shareholder’s  liability  for  company’s  torts  
and  its  extension  in  corporate  groups,  it   is  necessary  to  begin  by  introducing  
the  arguments   for  piercing   the  corporate  veil,   followed  by  an  assessment  of  
them.  Discussions  on  the   limitations  of   the  doctrine   in  providing  recourse  for  
tort  victims  of  corporate  groups,  as  well  as  the  failure  to  extend  its  application  
in  this  area  will  be  provided  afterwards.     
  
It  is  difficult  to  apply  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing  to  corporate  tort  cases.  Twelve  
years   before   the   leading   corporate   tort   case  Adams   v  Cape   plc,166   Clive  M  
Schmitthoff  had  observed  that  the  issue  of  the  parent  company’s  liability  for  the  
debts  of   its  subsidiary   is  one  of   the  most  prominent  unresolved  problems  of  
modern  times.167   If  a  well-­funded  parent  company  has  an  insolvent  subsidiary  
that  cannot  meet  mass  tort   liability  of  negligence,  are  the  tort  victims  able  to  
seek   compensation   from   the   parent   company   successfully?   Normally   the  
common  rules  say  no.  Adams  v  Cape  plc168   is  such  a  case,  which  concerns  
the   tort   liability   of   corporate   groups   and   attempts   to   override   corporate  
personality  to  impose  liability  on  the  parent  company  instead.169   Guidelines  for  
veil   piercing   in   corporate   groups   were   set   out   in   this   case,   and   the   court  
showed  the  difficulty  in  creating  a  parent  company’s  liability  for  its  subsidiary’s  
torts.  
  
In  general,   there  are   five   common  arguments   for   piercing   the   corporate   veil  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165   Aleka  Mandaraka-­Sheppard,  'New  Trends  in  Piercing  the  Corporate  Veil:  The  Conservative  Versus  
the  Liberal  Approaches'  (2014)  35  (1)  Business  Law  Review  2,  2.  
166   Adams  (n  85).  
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under  case  law:  (1)  the  single  economic  unit  argument;;  (2)  fraud  and  façade;;  
(3)  agency;;  (4)  interest  of  justice;;  (5)  impropriety.     
  
In  legal  practice,  the  arguments  for  veil  piercing  are  vague  and  unpredictable,  
and   this   leaves   room   for   the   courts   to   decide   cases   without   overly   careful  
considerations  of  precedent  and  appellate   reviews.  Up   to  now   the  corporate  
tort  cases  are  still  decided  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis:  tests  for  liability  are  used  
interchangeably,   or   in   combination. 170    Occasionally,   decisions   of   different  
cases   seem   to   contradict   each   other   bewilderingly.   Courts   keep   a   very  
formalistic   view   of   the   principles   of   limited   liability   and   corporate   legal  
personality   and   prefer   to   disregard   them   just   in   particular   cases,   in   which  
strong  control  is  found  over  the  company,  or  there  is  fraud  or  some  other  kind  
of   “sharp   practice”   in   company’s   management.171   Many   veil-­piercing   cases  
have  been  heard  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  formerly.172   The  latest  two  Supreme  
Court  cases  VTB  Capital  plc  v  Nutritek   International  Corp  and  others173   and  
Prest   v   Petrodel   Resources   Limited   and   others 174    also   have   strong  
implications  for  piercing  the  corporate  veil  in  group  situation.     
  
2.4.1  Assessment  of  the  “single  economic  unit”  argument     
  
The   question   as   to   whether   the   corporate   veil   should   be   pierced   by  
disregarding   the  rule  of   limited   liability  and  separate   legal  personality,   is  one  
that   has   come   before   the   courts   on   many   occasions. 175    Some   judges  
disapprove  of  the  abuse  of  the  group  structure  and  purport  to  distinguish  group  
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171   Witting,  ‘Liability  for  Corporate  Wrongs’  (n  61)  123.  
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cases   from   cases   involving   individuals   as   shareholders. 176    One   formerly  
prominent  argument   for   veil   piercing,  evaluated   in   the   leading  corporate   tort  
case  Cape,   is   the   “one  single  economic  unit”  argument.   It   is  argued   that,   in  
particular  circumstances,  the  court  should  ignore  the  separate  legal  personality  
and  treat  the  overall  business  operation  as  one  single  economic  unit.  However,  
this  argument  has  largely  been  questioned  and  examined  cautiously  by  courts  
in  subsequent  cases.  
  
The  single  economic  unit  argument  was  advanced  successfully  as  a  ground  for  
piercing   the   corporate   veil   in   the   case   of   DHN   Food   Distributors   v   Tower  
Hamlet  Borough  Council   in  1976.177   Then  this  argument  was  brought  before  
the  case  of  Cape  again,  where  Slade  LJ  rejected  it  as  a  ground  for  veil  piercing  
by  treating  members  of  a  group  as  a  single  economic  unit.  It   is  necessary  to  
briefly  introduce  the  facts  of  Cape  here.     
  
The   UK   company   Cape   Industries   plc   was   at   the   head   of   a   group   of  
wholly-­owned  subsidiaries.  Some  subsidiaries  mined  asbestos  in  South  Africa,  
and  others  marketed  their  products  in  the  US.  A  number  of  claimants  injured  by  
asbestos  exposure  brought  actions  against  the  parent  company  Cape  and  the  
relevant   subsidiaries.   In   1974,   462   plaintiffs   brought   actions   in   the   United  
States  Federal  District  Court  at  Tyler,  Texas,  (“the  Tyler  1  actions”)  against  the  
UK   parent   company   Cape,   the   South   African   mining   subsidiary   NAAC,   the  
wholly  owned  English  marketing  subsidiary  Capasco  and  other  parties.  These  
actions  were  settled  in  1977,  which  made  NAAC  liable.  Cape  plc  and  Capasco  
filed   jurisdiction   protests.  NAAC  entered   into   liquidation   in   1978.  Cape   then  
promoted  a   third  company  CPC  to  carry  on   the  marketing  business  of  Cape  
asbestos  in  the  US,  and  the  previous  chief  executive  of  NAAC  held  the  shares  
in   CPC.   Between   1978   and   1979,   more   plaintiffs   sued   against   the   same  
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defendants  of  the  Tyler  1  actions  in  the  Tyler  court  (“the  Tyler  2  actions”).  Cape  
plc   and   Capasco   alleged   that   the   court   had   no   jurisdiction   over   them,   and  
resisted  the  enforcement  of  judgements  in  England.     
  
The  case  Cape  concerns  whether  the  presence  of  NAAC  and  CPC  in  Illinois  
constitute   the  presence  of  Cape  or  Capasco   in   Illinois.   It  was  alleged  by   the  
claimant   that   the   following   facts   contributed   to   the   argument   of   single  
economic  unit:  the  subsidiary  company  NAAC  was  created  for  the  purpose  of  
selling  goods  of  Cape  plc;;  the  insolvency  of  NAAC  was  due  to  the  protection  of  
Cape;;   the   major   decisions   relevant   to   NAAC   were   always   made   by   Cape;;  
Cape  exercised  control  over  the  board  of  NAAC.178   The  court  accepted  all  the  
factual  submissions  and  admitted  that  Cape  as  a  parent  company  indeed  gave  
little   consideration   to   corporate   formalities   between   separate   members.179  
However,   the  court  still   refused   to   regard   the  parent  company  Cape,  and   its  
subsidiary  NAAC,  as  one  unit  and  transfer  liability  between  them  regardless  of  
the  separate  legal  personality.  With  no  more  explanations  provided,  the  court  
just   argued,   “there   has   been   no   challenge   to   the   judge's   finding   that   the  
corporate   forms   applicable   to   NAAC   as   a   separate   legal   entity   were  
observed.”180     
  
According  to  this  case,  it  seems  that  there  is  no  possibility  that  the  argument  of  
one  single  economic  unit  could  succeed  and  go  further  as  a  ground  for  piercing  
the  corporate  veil   for  corporate   tort  debts.  One  single  economic  unit   is  more  
valid  as  an  economic  construct  than  as  a  legal  construct.  The  Court  of  Appeal  
in  the  Cape  case  seems  to  be  reluctant   to  admit   the  existence  of  one  single  
economic  unit  in  law,  even  though  in  practice  such  form  of  operation  possibly  
exists.   In   fact,   the   attitude   of   the   courts   has,   at   times,   changed   when  
distinguishing  separate  group  members.     
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In  the  case  of  DHN  Food  Distributors  v  Tower  Hamlets,181   the  enthusiasm  of  
the   courts   to   pierce   the   corporate   veil   and   disregard   the  Salomon   principle  
probably   reached   its   peak.   Lord   Denning   wished   to   treat   the   group   as   one  
single  economic  entity.182   In  this  case,  the  corporate  veil  was  pierced  on  the  
ground  that  the  group  proceeded  as  though  they  were  in  partnership.183   DHN  
as  the  parent  company,  together  with  other  two  wholly-­owned  subsidiaries,  ran  
a  grocery  business.  One  subsidiary  provided  premises  and  the  other  provided  
vehicles.   Neither   held   operations   of   its   own.   The   premises   were   to   be  
compulsorily   purchased,   then   DHN   claimed   for   compensation   for   the  
interference  of  business.184   The  Court  of  Appeal  held  that:  
  
The  two  subsidiaries  are  bound  hand  and  foot  to  the  parent  company  
and   must   do   just   what   the   parent   company   says…this   group   is  
virtually   the  same  as  a  partnership   in  which  all   the  three  companies  
are   partners.   They   should   not   be   treated   separately   so   as   to   be  
defeated  on  a  technical  point.185  
  
Subsequently   in   this   case   the   rule   of   separate   legal   personality   was  
disregarded,  and  it  was  held  that  DHN  was  entitled  to  claim.     
  
However,  the  DHN  case  was  doubted  in  subsequent  years,  and  the  following  
cases  indicate  that  the  decision  is  contrary  to  current  trends.186   Both  English  
and  Australia  courts  do  not  regard  the  fact  of  “control  by  itself”  as  a  reasonable  
justification.187   For  instance,  in  an  Australian  case  the  James  Hardie,  the  court  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181   DHN  Food  Distributors  Ltd  (n  171).  
182   ibid.  
183   ibid  860.  
184   ibid  852-­854.  
185   ibid  860.  
186   Sealy  (n  35)  69.  
187   In  New  Zealand,  it  seems,  the  same  applies:  see  D  Goddard,  ‘Corporate  Personality  -­  Limited  
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refused  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  and  consider  the  group  as  one  single  unit  
simply  on  the  fact  of  the  parent  company’s  control  over  the  subsidiary.188     
  
In  the  latter  case  of  Woolfson  v  Strathclyde  Regional  Council,  Lord  Keith  was  
suspicious  about  the  decision  of  DHN  case  and  refused  to  follow  it.189   He  still  
emphasized  that  the  only  reasonable  justification  was  that  the  subsidiary  was  a  
“mere  façade  concealing  the  true  facts”.190   Lord  Keith  concluded  that:     
  
I   can  see  no  grounds  whatever,  upon   the   facts   found   in   the  special  
case,   for   treating   the  company  structure  as  a  mere   façade,  nor  do   I  
consider  that  the  DHN  case  is,  on  a  proper  analysis,  of  assistance  to  
the  appellants’  argument.191     
  
It   is   fairly   to   say   that   the   indications   given   in  DHN   case   are   so   limited   and  
facts-­specific,  such  as  the  group  relations  involving  a  partnership  relationship,  
and  so  the  argument  of  a  single  economic  unit  seemingly  cannot  serve  more  
situations  in  the  case  of  corporate  insolvency.     
  
The  case  of  Albacruz  v  Albazero   further   illustrates   the  difficulty  of   treating  a  
group  of  companies  as  a  single  economic  entity,  under  which  the  liability  of  one  
group  member  can  be   transferred   to  another.192   Roskill   LJ   in   this  case  held  
that:  
  
The  rights  of  one  company  in  a  group  cannot  be  exercised  by  another  
company   in   that   group   even   though   the   ultimate   benefit   of   the  
exercise  of  those  rights  would  ensure  beneficially  to  the  same  person  
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190   ibid  160.  
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or  corporate  body.193  
  
The   insistence  of  case   law  on   the  separateness  of   corporate  members  also  
can  be  found  in  the  case  of  Bank  of  Tokyo  Ltd  v  Karoon,194   in  which  Robert  
Goff   LJ   alleged   that   the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary   were   one  
economic  entity  but  distinct  from  each  other  in  law.195     
  
To  conclude,  the  English  courts  are  reluctant  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  within  
groups  simply   relying  on   the   “single  economic  entity”  argument.   In   the  DHN  
case,  the  corporate  veil  is  disregarded  in  the  special  circumstance  where  the  
wholly-­owned  subsidiaries  are  created  with  no  other  purpose  but   to  own   the  
assets  of  the  parent  company  and  the  whole  group  operates  like  a  partnership.  
This  is  not  common  in  groups,  and  there  is  no  corporate  tort  case  following  the  
DHN’s  decision.  Courts  are  more  hesitant   to   take  such  an  argument  against  
the  two  fundamental  corporate  law  principles,  but  are  more  willing  to  see  the  
arguments   established   on   a   particular   statutory   exception   or   the   terms   of   a  
particular  contract.196   A  particular  statute  or  particular  terms  of  a  document  is  
possible   to   justify   the   “one   single   economic   unit”,   but   beyond   this   it   is  
impossible  to  go.197     
  
2.4.2  Assessment  of  the  “fraud  and  façade”  argument     
  
“Fraud  and  façade”  as  an  argument  for  corporate  veil  piercing  is  applied  where  
the  company,  or  subsidiary   is  created  as  a  sham,  to  hide  the  fraud  or  evade  
existing   obligations.   Contrary   to   the   “one   single   economic   unit”   argument,  
courts  prefer  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  on  this  ground.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193   ibid  807.  
194   Bank  of  Tokyo  Ltd  v  Karoon  [1987]  AC  45n  (CA).  
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197   ibid  218.  
	   69	  
  
It   is   widely   acknowledged   by   courts   that   the   corporate   veil   can   be   pierced  
when  the  company  is  proved  to  be  merely  a  façade  concealing  the  true  facts.     
  
In  the  case  of  Cape,  the  claimants  held  that  the  subsidiaries  CPC  and  AMC  in  
the  US  were  a  device  or  sham  for  improper  use  by  Cape  to  avoid  tort  liability  
for  asbestos  injuries  and  for  continuing  trade  in  the  US.198  
  
The  Court  of  Appeal  accepted   the  view   that   the  subsidiaries  CPC  and  AMC  
were  created  to  continue  the  US  asbestos  market  but  rejected  the  argument  
that  CPC  was  treated  as  Cape’s  presence.  The  Court  of  Appeal  observed  that  
the  claimants  failed  to  justify  the  unlawful  purpose  for  creating  the  subsidiary  
companies   and   the   existence   of   impropriety.199   The   mere   recreation   of   the  
alternative  marketing  arrangement  by  means  of  establishing  new  subsidiaries  
and  using  a  corporate  form  could  not  fulfill  the  “fraud  and  façade”  argument.200  
There  was  no  actual  or  potential  illegality.201     
  
The  court  could  not  find  anything  illegal  and  improper  in  Cape’s  arrangement  
of   its  affairs.  Thus,   in  fraud  cases,  what  matters  is  to  prove  that  the  sham  or  
“façade”  companies  are  established  to  hide  any  fraud  or  to  breach  any  existing  
duties.  The  elements  “fraud”  and  “façade  and  sham”  as  exceptions  to  separate  
legal   personality   principle   should   not   be   considered   separately.202   It   is   very  
difficult,   particularly   in   tort   cases,   to   define   and   prove   what   precisely  
contributes  to  making  a  subsidiary  a  “sham”.203   Unfortunately,   in  subsequent  
cases   the   UK   courts   did   not   provide   any   clear   guidance   on   piercing   the  
corporate  veil  in  corporate  tort  cases.  
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The  Supreme  Court  in  a  commercial  case  rejected  the  attempt  of  the  claimants  
to   seek   recourse   on   this   basis,   and   refused   to   apply   the   doctrine   of   veil  
piercing  when  any  other   remedies  existed.   In   the  case  of  VTB  Capital  plc  v  
Nutritek  International  Corp  &  Ors,  the  problem  was  whether  the  corporate  veil  
could  be  pierced   to  make   the  company’s  controller   liable  under  a  contract   if  
this   controller   induced   the   claimant   to   enter   into   that   contract   with   the  
company.204     
  
VTB   Capital   plc   (“VTB”)   is   owned   by   a   Russian   bank   in   majority,   but   is  
incorporated  and  structured  in  England.  VTB  contracted  a  loan  agreement  with  
a   Russian   company,   Russagroprom   LLC   (“RAP”),   under   which   VTB  
contributed   $225   million   to   RAP   for   purchasing   several   Russian   dairy  
companies  from  Nutritek  International  Corp  (“Nutritek”).205     
  
VTB  submitted  that  RAP  defaulted  on  the  loan  and  induced  VTB  to  enter  into  
that  agreement  by  fraudulent  misrepresentations  created  by  Nutritek,  who  had  
always  expressed  that  Nutritek  and  RAP  were  distinct  from  each  other.  But  in  
fact,   they  were  both   ultimately   owned  by  Mr  Malofeev,   a   businessman   from  
Russia.   Since   RAP   was   insolvent,   VTB   claimed   against   Mr   Malofeev   and  
Nutritek   for   business   conspiracy   and   invoked   the   doctrine   of   piercing   the  
corporate   veil   based   on   the   fact   that   RAP   was   just   a   façade   created   and  
arranged  by  the  controller  to  defraud  others.206  
  
Unfortunately,   the   Supreme   Court   believed   that   it   was   contrary   to   legal  
principles  to  regard  a  third  person  as  a  co-­contracting  party  and  liable  under  
such  a  contract.207   For  the  issue  of  veil  piercing,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  
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it  was  improper  and  irrational  in  this  case  to  look  behind  the  borrower  company  
RAP   and   to   claim   against   its   owners   in   contract,   and   the   decision   of   the  
precedent  case  Antonio  Gramsci  was  clearly  overturned.208       
  
(1)  In  the  VTB  case,  the  ground  of  “façade  to  conceal  wrongdoing”  is  not  
available  as  considered  by  the  Supreme  Court.     
  
As   discussed   in   the   above   paragraphs,   the   crucial   question   is   whether   the  
corporate   structure   is  used  as  a   “sham”  or   “façade”   to   conceal  any  wrongs.  
Lord  Neuberger  observed  that  the  evidence  provided  by  VTB  for  veil  piercing  
cannot  sufficiently  justify  the  fact  that  RAP  was  created  as  a  façade  concealing  
the  true  facts.209   In  his  view,  the  “true  facts"  meant  that:  
  
In   reality,   it   is   the   person   behind   the   company,   rather   than   the  
company,  which  is  the  relevant  actor  or  recipient  (as  the  case  may  be).  
Here,  in  VTB,  "the  true  facts"  relate  to  the  control,  trading  performance,  
and   value   of   the   Dairy   Companies   (if   one   considers   the   specific  
allegations  against  Mr  Malofeev),  or  to  the  genuineness  of  the  nature  
of   the   underlying   arrangement   (which   involves   a   transfer   of   assets  
between  companies  in  common  ownership)…Neither  of  these  features  
can  be  said  to  involve  RAP  being  used  as  a  "façade  to  conceal  the  true  
facts.210  
  
Actually,  it  is  improper  to  make  the  company’s  controller  or  owner  liable  under  
any  of  the  company’s  contracts  by  the  approach  of  veil  piercing.        
  
There   are   some   similar   cases   concerning   this   issue   and   the   decisions   are  
different  and  extremely  controversial.  In  the  case  of  Antonio  Gramsci  Shipping  
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Corp  v  Stepanovs,  Burton  J  observed  that  the  controller  behind  a  corporation  
could   be   treated   as   a   contracting   party   and   liable   under   the   company’s  
contract.211   The  Supreme  Court  in  VTB  believed  that  the  decision  of  Antonio  is  
radical   and   strongly   disapproved   of   it.212   The   Supreme   Court   held   that   the  
Antonio’s  decision  has  raised  problems  around  violating  the  privity  of  contract  
principle  by  making  a  non-­party  liable  under  a  contract.  Besides,  the  decision  
of   Antonio   Gramsci   has   also   given   rise   to   further   uncertainties   and   is  
considered  as  over  extending  the  application  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.213     
  
In  the  case  of  Antonio  Gramsci,  it  was  observed  by  Burton  J  that  conditions  in  
Trustor  v  Smallbone  (No.2)  could  justify  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing,214   these  
were  “(1)   fraudulent  misuse  of   the  company  structure,  and  (2)  a  wrongdoing  
committed  “dehors”  the  company.”215  
  
However,  in  the  High  Court  decision,  Arnold  J  rejected  the  findings  in  Gramsci  
and   refused   to   admit   a   claim   could   be   made   for   damages   in   that   context  
whether  the  conditions  in  Trustor  v  Smallbone  (No.2)  were  met  or  not.216     
  
Furthermore,  it  was  concluded  by  Arnold  J  that  in  any  event  it  is  impossible  to  
award   damages   against   the   parent   company   for   its   subsidiary   company’s  
breach  behaviour   by  piercing   the   corporate   veil   due   to   privity   of   contract.217  
However,  equitable  remedies  are  available,  as  alternative  remedies,  to  prevent  
the  parent  company  from  evading  contractual  liability  as  substituted.218  
  
Lord  Neuberger   in   the  Supreme  Court  agreed  with  Arnold  J   for  substantially  
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the   same   reasons,   and   expressly   overruled   Gramsci   and   gave   a   concise  
statement  regarding  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing:     
  
The  fact  that  there  has  been  no  case  (until  Gramsci)  where  the  power  
to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  has  been  extended   in   the  way  for  which  
VTB  contends   in   these  proceedings  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  
VTB's  case,   in  so   far  as   it   is  based  on  piercing   the  veil,  must   fail…  
however,   it   seems   to  me   that   strong   justification  would   be   required  
before  the  court  would  be  prepared  to  extend  it.  …On  analysis  it  is  an  
extension,  which  is  contrary  to  authority  and  contrary  to  principle.219  
  
Lord  Neuberger  refused  to  regard  Mr  Malofeev  as  a  contracting  party,  since  in  
fact  no  actual  parties  intended  to  contract  with  Mr  Malofeev,  and  it  would  have  
been  wrong  to  do  so  even  if  the  subsidiary  proved  to  be  just  a  façade.  There  
was   never   a  moment   when  Mr  Malofeev   so   conducted   himself   as   to  make  
anyone  believe  he  could  be  responsible  for  the  contract.220  
  
(2)  Tort  law  approaches  simplify  the  issue  
  
In  the  case  of  VTB,  the  Supreme  Court  was  reluctant  to  invoke,  and  extend  the  
principle   of   veil   piercing   and   considered   it   unnecessary   to   make   such   an  
extension.221   It  was  held  by  the  Court  that  the  extension  was  redundant  since  
alternative  approaches  already  existed   in   tort   law,   “…if  VTB  establish   that   it  
was  induced  to  enter  into  the  agreements  by  the  fraudulent  statements  which  
he   is   alleged   to   have  made,   then  Mr  Malofeev  will   be   liable   to   compensate  
VTB.”222   So  in  cases  like  VTB,  it  would  be  better  and  simpler  to  claim  against  
the   controller   or   owner   of   the   company   based   upon   fraudulent  
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misrepresentations   in   tort   law.   It   is   recognized   that   generally   the   court   is  
reluctant   to   allow   claimants   to   enforce   agreements   by   means   of   breaking  
through   the  corporate   form.  Other   than  Burton  J’s   judgements   in  Gramsci,   it  
seems  that  no  anyone  else  intends  to  go  that  far.223  
  
The  UK  courts  maintain  a  negative  attitude  towards  the  application  of  piercing  
the   corporate   veil.   The   limited   case   law   on   veil-­piercing   suggests   that   the  
argument  of  “fraud  and  façade”  is  difficult  to  prove  unless  there  is  actual  illegal  
behaviour  in  existence,  which  is  difficult  to  prove  as  well.  In  the  latest  leading  
case  Prest  v  Petrodel  Resources  Ltd,224   Lord  Sumption  provided  two  unique  
principles   (the   concealment   principle   and   the   evasion   principle)   for   further  
explaining   the   “fraud   and   façade”   argument.   The   “concealment   principle”  
means  that  the  court  would  look  behind  a  company  to  find  the  person  who  was  
the  real  actor.  Moreover,  the  “evasion  principle”,  which  replaces  the  old  ground  
of   fraud,  has  become   the  main  principle  which   justifies   the  veil  piercing  and  
sets  out  what  would  be  considered  as  a  relevant  abusive  behaviour.  It  is  now  
recognized  by  the  Supreme  Court  that  the  corporate  veil  can  be  pierced  only  to  
prevent  the  abuse  of  corporate  legal  personality:  
  
I  conclude  that  there  is  a  limited  principle  of  English  law  which  applies  
when   a   person   is   under   an   existing   legal   obligation   or   liability   or  
subject  to  an  existing  legal  restriction  which  he  deliberately  evades  or  
whose   enforcement   he   deliberately   frustrated   by   interposing   a  
company  under  his  control.  The  court  may  then  pierce  the  corporate  
veil   for   the   purpose,   and   only   for   the   purpose,   of   depriving   the  
company  or  its  controller  of  the  advantage  that  they  would  otherwise  
have  obtained  by  the  company’s  separate  legal  personality.225     
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The  Supreme  Court’s  judgements  in  Prest  after  the  case  of  VTB  further  explain  
the  old  and  vague  terms  of  “façade”  and  “sham”,  but  limit  the  circumstances  for  
invoking  the  veil  piercing  doctrine  by  introducing  the  concealment  principle  and  
the   evasion   principle.   These   two   principles   will   be   discussed   again   later   in  
section  2.4.4  to  help  to  explain  the  limitations  of  the  extension  of  this  doctrine.     
  
Case  studies  in  this  section  disclosed  that  even  the  most  well-­accepted  “fraud  
and  façade”  argument  is  not  easy  to  apply  either  in  tort  or  contract  cases.  In  
contract   cases   like  VTB,   it   is   impossible   to   make   the   controller   behind   the  
corporate  veil   liable  under  a  contract  of  its  company  because  the  principle  of  
privity  of  contract  should  not  be  contravened.  It  is  suggested  that  it  is  sensible  
to  find  liabilities  in  other  causes  of  action  such  as  fraudulent  misrepresentation  
in   tort,   the   tort   of   negligence,   or   other   possible   torts.226   For   instance,   in  
conspiracy   cases,   a   controller   cannot   escape   from   responsibility   if   it   is  
established   that   he   or   she   has   conspired  with   the   company   illegally   and   so  
caused  the  harm.227     
  
  
2.4.3   Assessment   of   arguments   of   “impropriety”,   “agency”   and  
“interests  of  justice”  
     
2.4.3.1  Impropriety     
  
The   impropriety   argument   requires   the   fact   of   impropriety:   the   company   is  
created  or  used  to  proceed  with  illegal  activities  or  to  escape  from  the  impact  
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of   court   orders. 228    The   argument   of   impropriety   should   be   the   other  
well-­accepted  argument  for  veil  piercing  according  to  the  relevant  case  law.  In  
the  case  of  Jones  v  Lipman,  the  court  found  that  the  company  of  Mr  Lipman  
was  created  in  an  attempt  to  evade  his  obligations  under  the  sale  contract.229  
Specifically,  Mr  Lipman  changed  his  mind  about  selling  a  house,  and  in  order  
to   avoid   a   specific   order,   he   conveyed   the   house   to   the   company   he   alone  
owned.  The  corporate  veil  was  subsequently  pierced  in  this  case.     
  
However,   the  argument  of   impropriety  was   rejected   in   the   leading  corporate  
tort  case  Cape.  In  Adams  v  Cape  Industries  plc,  it  was  alleged  by  the  claimant  
that  the  company  was  aware  of  the  potential  tort  liability  that  was  inherent  in  its  
business,  and  had  tried  to  avoid  the  impact  of  such  liability.  But  the  court  still  
did   not   regard   Cape’s   use   of   the   corporate   structure   as   being   improper.230  
Slade  LJ  held  that:     
  
We  do  not  accept  as  a  matter  of  law  that  the  court  is  entitled  to  lift  the  
corporate  veil  as  against  a  defendant  company  which  is  a  member  of  
a  corporate  group  merely  because  the  corporate  structure  has  been  
used  to  ensure  that   the   legal   liability   in  respect  of   future  activities  of  
the  group…  will  fall  on  another  member  of  the  group  rather  than  the  
defendant  company.  Whether  or  not  this  is  desirable,  the  right  to  use  a  
corporate  structure  in  this  manner  is  inherent  in  our  corporate  law.231  
  
The  above  comments  of  Slade  LJ  give  rise  to  disputes  on  the  boundary  of  the  
term   impropriety.   It   is   not   very   convincing   that   the   behaviour   of   the   parent  
company,  Cape,   is  proper  and   legal,  who  was   in   the  beginning  aware  of   the  
tort  liability  inherent  in  the  business  and  had  strong  control  over  its  subsidiary  
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company.  Unfortunately,  the  courts  have  not  taken  the  opportunity  to  provide  
any  clear  guidance  on  how  to  reasonably  define  the  boundary  of  impropriety  in  
such  group  situations  in  subsequent  cases.  Even  in  the  recent  Supreme  Court  
case  of  VTB,  the  court  just  confirmed  the  term  impropriety  as  an  argument  for  
piercing  the  corporate  veil,  but  did  not  clearly  explain  the  scope  of  impropriety  
for   future   group   cases.   In   VTB,   the   Supreme   Court   confirmed   that   the  
corporate   veil   can   only   be   pierced   when   there   is   impropriety.   However,  
impropriety  alone  is  insufficient  for  veil  piercing,  it  “must  be  linked  to  use  of  the  
company  structure  to  avoid  or  conceal  liability”.232     
  
In   the   case   of   Prest,   it   seems   that   Lord   Sumption   narrowed   the   scope   of  
impropriety  according  to  his  statements  of  the  two  principles.  As  indicated  by  
Lord  Sumption,  impropriety  will  only  cover  the  activities  that  the  person  creates  
or   uses  a   “façade”   to  evade  an  existing   legal   right   or   liability,   or   an  existing  
legal  restriction  subject  to  him.     
  
As   already   mentioned   in   Section   2.4.2   above,   Lord   Sumption   listed   two  
principles:  the  concealment  principle  and  the  evasion  principle.  As  far  as  Lord  
Sumption  was  concerned,  the  concealment  principle  “is  legally  banal  and  does  
not  involve  piercing  the  corporate  veil  at  all.  It  is  the  interposition  of  a  company  
or   perhaps   several   companies   so   as   to   conceal   the   identity   of   the   real  
actors.”233   In   these   circumstances,   where   the   court   simply   finds   the   fact   of  
concealment,  and  finds  the  corporate  personality  is  used  to  hide  the  identity  or  
position  of  the  true  actor,  the  court’s  judgment  against  the  person  who  does  the  
concealing  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  veil-­piercing.  And  the  concealment  
principle   does   not   involve   or   rely   on   the   “impropriety”   we   discussed   for   the  
purpose  of  veil  piercing.  It  is  because  the  “concealment”  can  be  seen  as  a  use  
of   the   corporate   structure   to   hide   the   actions   actually   belonging   to   him:   for  
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example,  “a  director  setting  up  a  limited  company  to  receive  secret  profits,  or  
money  obtained  in  breach  of  fiduciary  duty.  Where  this  occurs,  there  will  be  an  
equitable  claim  for  the  money  against  both  the  company  and  the  individual”.234  
So  the  “concealment”  here  did  not  cover  the  impropriety  for  veil  piercing,  and  
the  cases  falling  into  the  concealment  principle  were  not  actually  veil-­piercing  
cases  according  to  Lord  Sumption.  
  
Concealment  principle  was  identified  by  Lord  Sumption  as  a  way  to  determine  
corporate  members’   liability  by  evoking  well  established  legal  principles  such  
as   trust   law,   agency   law,   or   even   tort   law.   For   example,   the   concealment  
principle  might  evoke  joint  liability  rules  in  tort  law.  According  to  the  doctrine  of  
joint  liability,  the  third  party  can  be  involved  in  the  claimed  tort  jointly  with  the  
primary  wrongdoer,  by  procuring,  directing  or  authorising  the  act.  The  object  of  
the  joint  liability  doctrine  is  to  extend  the  scope  of  potential  or  possible  parties  
who  can  be  liable  for  the  damages  to  the  tort  victims.  In  accordance  with  the  
concealment  principle,  the  doctrine  of  joint  liability  might  be  applied  to  disturb  
the  corporate  personality  if  there  is  procurement,  direction  or  authorization  by  a  
shareholder.   However,   it   is   not   appropriate   to   say   that   the   concealment  
principle   is   able   to   evoke   all   the   tort   law   rules   to   extend   the   shareholder’s  
liability.   The   negligence   cases   may   not   to   be   seen   as   concealment   cases.  
When  a  tortfeasor  is  liable  in  negligence,  he  or  she  is  directly  liable  for  the  tort,  
and  there  is  no  need  to  prove  a  concealment  relationship  for  establishing  the  
liability.   This   is   different   from   the   situation   of   joint   liability   cases   in   which   a  
relationship   of   procuring,   directing   or   authorizing   should   be   proved.   Such   a  
relationship  may  be  treated  as  one  which  is  needed  in  concealment  cases.  
  
However,   the   introducing   of   the   principles   of   concealment   and   evasion   has  
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been  criticised.  Brenda  Hannigan  notes  that  “concealment  is  inherent  in  many  
evasion   cases,   indeed,   evasion   is   commonly   achieved   through  
concealment.”235   Christian   Wittting   commented   that   the   difference   between  
veil-­piercing  cases  based  on  evasion  and  concealment  principle   is  difficult   to  
distinguish.236   Lord  Clarke  in  the  case  of  Prest  did  not  think  such  a  distinction  
should  be  made  and  believed  that  the  two  principle  needed  more  arguments,  
and  should  not  be  adopted  until  further  detailed  comments  has  been  made  for  
the  court.237  
  
Lord  Sumption  only  accepted  the  evasion  principle  for  piercing  the  corporate  
veil.   This   principle,   as   introduced   in   the   above   section,   maintains   that   the  
corporate   veil   can   be   pierced   where   an   individual   under   an   existing   legal  
obligation,  or   liability,   or   subject   to  existing   legal   restriction,   tries   to   create  a  
“façade”,   or   use   the   corporate   personality   and   limited   liability   to   avoid   his  
existing   legal  obligations.  The  case  of  Jones  v  Lipman   is  regarded  as  a  true  
veil-­piercing  case  by  Lord  Sumption.  That  is  why  we  can  conclude  from  Lord  
Sumption’s   judgements   that   the   scope   of   impropriety   is   narrowed   to   the  
activities   by   which   the   person   creates   or   uses   the   “façade”   to   evade   the  
existing  legal  right,  liability,  or  an  existing  legal  restriction  applying  to  him.     
  
This   narrowing   ruling   on   impropriety   further   limits   the   circumstances   for   veil  
piercing   in   corporate   tort   cases.   It   is   normally   difficult   to   establish   such  
impropriety   in   group   cases   because   usually   the   parent   company   bears   no  
existing  legal  liability  for  the  debt  of  its  subsidiary,  and  bears  no  legal  liability  
for   the   injured   employee   of   its   subsidiary   company.   The   influence   of  
introducing  the  principles  of  concealment  and  evasion,  and  why  they  limit  the  
extension  of  the  veil  piercing  doctrine  in  group  cases  will  be  further  discussed  
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In  corporate  groups,  a  company  can  act  as  an  agent  for  its  shareholders,  and  a  
company  member   could  act   as  an  agent   for   the  parent   company  or   for   any  
other  members   if   authorized.   In   this   context,   the   parent   company  would   be  
liable  for  the  behaviour  of  the  agent  that  falls  within  the  scope  of  authority.238  
The   agency   argument  was   formerly   treated   as   a   ground   for   the   doctrine   of  
veil-­piercing.  Nevertheless,   it  might   be   difficult   to   prove   facts   to   support   the  
agency   relationship   for   veil-­piercing.   Indeed,   the   agent   relationship   between  
the   parent   company   and   the   wrongdoing   subsidiary   is   extremely   difficult   to  
establish.     
  
An   agent   is   a   person  who   is   authorised   to   act   on   behalf   of   the   principal   in  
making   relations   to   a   third   party.   An   agent   includes   natural   persons,  
partnerships,  corporations,  and  any  other   legal  entity.  Obviously,  agency  can  
arise  within  a  corporate  group.  An  agency  is  normally  created  under  the  law  of  
contract,  but  is  not  always  contractual.  It  arises  as  follows:  
  
“The  relationship  of  principal  and  agent  can  only  be  established  by  the  consent  
of  the  principal  and  the  agent.  They  will  be  held  to  have  consented  if  they  had  
agreed   to   what   amounts   in   law   to   such   a   relationship,   even   if   they   do   not  
recognise   it   themselves  and  even   if   they  have  professed  to  disclaim  it…  But  
the   consent  must   have   been   given   by   each   of   them,   either   expressly   or   by  
implication  from  the  words  and  conduct.”239  
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The  classic  agency   relationship   is  usually  established  by  express  or   implied  
consent.  On  a  basis  of  this,  an  agency  relationship  exists  between  the  parent  
company  and  the  subsidiary  company  when  there  is  an  agreement  (implied  or  
express).  In  this  circumstance,  the  subsidiary  might  act  as  the  agent  carrying  
on   business   on   behalf   of   the   parent   company,   and   under   its   control.   The  
subsidiary  company  might  have   the  authority   to  bind   the  parent  company   to  
any  contractual  obligation.  
     
In   the   case   of  Adams   v  Cape   Industries   plc,   the   court   rejected   the   agency  
argument   brought   by   the   claimants.   There   was   a   lack   of   authority   for  
subsidiaries  to  bind  the  parent  company  Cape  to  any  contractual  obligations.  
Besides,  there  was  no  adequate  evidence  to  support  the  suggestion  that  the  
business  of  the  subsidiaries  were  not  their  own  business  and  that  Cape  were  
present  within  the  subsidiaries  at  any  time  in  the  US.240   Specifically,  the  court  
considered  the  agency  argument  in  relation  to  NAAC  and  CPC,  and  declined  
to  accept  it  for  the  following  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  NAAC  and  CPC,  both  
carried  on  business  on  their  own  in  the  United  States  of  America.  Several  facts  
were   in   favour   of   this   finding.   For   example,   NAAC   earned   profits   and   paid  
taxes   thereon;;  NAAC  had   its  own  creditors  and  debtors,  not   those  of  Cape;;  
Cape  was   treated   as  NAAC’s   shareholder   and   obtained   annual   dividend.241  
NAAC’s   functions   were   to   assist   and   encourage   sales   and   marketing   of  
asbestos  in  the  United  States  of  America  for  the  Cape  group.  As  to  CPC,  its  
functions   were   similar   to   those   of   NAAC.   CPC,   although   incorporated   and  
launched  with  Cape  money,  was,  based  on   the  case   facts,  a  separate   legal  
entity  and  its  substantial  part  of  business  was  carried  on  its  own.  Like  NAAC,  
CPC  had  no  authority   to  bind  Cape   to  any   contractual   obligation.  Secondly,  
Cape  had  no  control  over  the  activities  of  CPC  and  NAAC.  CPC  were  “left  free  
to  sell  materials  and  products  other  than  asbestos  fibre  and  to  involve  itself  in  
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other  commercial  activities,  and   it  obviously  did  so.”242   Besides,  both  NAAC  
and  CPC  bought  and  sold  manufactured  textiles  on  its  own  behalf  as  principal.  
  
Even  more,   it   is   difficult   to   construct   such   agency   relationship   between   the  
subsidiary  and  the  parent  company  without  an  obvious  contract.243   Suppose  
that   the  parent  company  had  the   intention  to  avoid  tortious   liability,   it  usually  
would  be  difficult  for  the  injured  tort  victims  of  the  overseas  subsidiary  to  find  
sufficient  evidence  for  any  agency  relationship.  In  Cape,  it  seemed  acceptable  
to  the  court  that  the  group  structure  was  used  to  ensure  the  legal  liability  of  the  
subsidiary   fell   upon   itself.244   It   seemed   reasonable   for   group   members   to  
enjoy  the  benefit  of  group  structure  so  the  court  found  no  reason  to  pierce  the  
corporate  veil  in  this  circumstance.     
  
The  main  concern  is  that  the  criteria  of  the  agency  relationship  in  determining  
group  liability  are  vague  and  are  decided  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis.  There  is  an  
absence  of  case  law  in  this  area  for  corporate  tort  problems.  No  clear   line  is  
drawn  between  different  courts’  decisions  so  that  clearness  and  predictability  
are  still  lacking.245     
  
2.4.3.3  The  interests  of  justice     
  
As  to  the  ground  of  the  interests  of  justice,  it  is  argued  that  it  might  be  proper  to  
disregard  the  corporate  personality  when  justice  requires,  at  least  in  tort  cases  
where   the   victims   suffer   severe   personal   injury.   However,   courts   are   still  
unwilling  to  rely  on  this  argument.  The  interests  of  justice  as  an  exception  itself  
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245   Alexander  Daehnert,  ‘Lifting  the  corporate  veil:  English  and  German  Perspectives  on  Group  Liability’,  
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is  inherently  deficient,  providing  neither  courts  nor  people  engaged  in  business  
with  well-­defined  guidance.246   Although  the  attitudes  of  courts   to   this  ground  
vary   from   time   to   time,   to   this  day   the  general   consensus   is   that  we  cannot  
expect  too  much  from  this  argument  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  in  future  cases,  
including  the  tort  cases.     
  
By   1969,   Lord   Denning   was   enthusiastic   about   encouraging   piercing   the  
corporate   veil. 247    However,   his   decision   about   regardindg   the   corporate  
structure  as  one  single  economic  unit  was  overruled  by  subsequent  cases.  In  
the  DHN  case,  Lord  Denning  observed   that,   in  some  special  circumstances,  
for   the   purpose   of   preventing   abuse   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal  
personality,   and   for   the   purpose   of   justice,   the   rigid   and   formal   distinction  
between   group   members   was   not   necessary:   “Why   then   should   this  
relationship  be  ignored  in  a  situation  in  which  to  do  so  does  not  prevent  abuse  
but  would  on  the  contrary  result  in  what  appears  to  be  a  denial  of  justice?”248  
  
In   Cape,   the   claimants   argued   that   the   DHN   case   reflected   that   “legal  
technicalities”  would  result  in  injustice  in  group  cases,  and  such  technicalities  
“should  not  be  allowed  to  prevail”.249   Nevertheless,  the  court  in  Cape  did  not  
support  the  interests  of  justice  argument  based  on  the  DHN  case  to  go  that  far.  
Contrarily,   the   court   further   established   that   it   was   not   free   to   overlook   the  
principle   of   separate   legal   personality   unless  particular   statutes  or   contracts  
could  be  cited.250   Furthermore,  the  veil  could  not  be  pierced  based  on  “what  
justice  would  require”.251   Slade  LJ  stated  in  Adams  v  Cape,  “The  court  is  not  
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free  to  disregard  the  principle  of  Salomon…merely  because  it  considered  that  
justice  so  requires.”252  
Accordingly   this   exception   remains   developing,   and   further   explanation   is  
needed.253   It   is  difficult   to   find  cases   in  which   the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing   is  
well  justified  by  the  interests  of  justice,  beyond  the  awkward  position  of  offering  
just  one  impractical  approach  to  piercing  the  corporate  veil  as  a  reference.     
  
The  case  of  Creasey  v  Breachwood  Motors  Ltd,254   where  the  judge  thought  it  
was   in   the   interests   of   justice,  was   soon  overruled   in  Ord   v  Belhaven  Pubs  
Ltd.255  
  
Breachwood  Welwyn   Ltd   and  Breachwood  Motors   Ltd  were   two   companies  
sharing   common   directors   and   shareholders.   Mr   Creasey   was   wrongfully  
dismissed  by  Breachwood  Welwyn  Ltd.  Then  Mr  Creasey  brought  an  action  
against  Welwyn  for  wrongful  dismissal.  Shortly  afterwards  Welwyn  stopped  its  
trading   and   transferred   all   of   its   assets   to   Breachwood   Motors   company.  
Motors  took  over  the  business  and  paid  off  the  creditors  of  Welwyn,  apart  from  
enforcing   the   judgment   debt   of   Mr   Creasey.   Subsequently   Mr   Creasey  
successfully   claimed   against   Motors   as   a   substitute,   and   Motors   Ltd   then  
appealed.     
  
In  this  case,  Richard  Southwell  QC  J  held  that  the  common  directors  of  the  two  
companies   transferred   company   assets   without   considering   their   duties   as  
directors  and  disregarded  the  principle  of  separate  legal  personality.  The  court  
permitted   to   pierce   the   corporate   veil   and   imposed   liability   on   Breachwood  
Mortors  as  a  substitute.     
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This   judgment   caused  considerable  criticisms  since   the  Breachwood  Motors  
Ltd  did  not  defend  the  case,  so  the  decision  was  not  challenged.  Actually,  the  
relevant  facts  were  not  sufficient  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil:  that  the  directors  
breached  their  duties  and  the  assumption  that  there  was  a  fraudulent  motive  
for   creating   the   new   company   to   evade   the   legal   obligation   (a   facade  
concealing   the   true   facts). 256    The   argument   of   the   interests   of   justice  
considered  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  this  case  is  not  persuasive.  In  Creasey,  
the   judge   considered   it   reasonable   to   pierce   the   corporate   veil   whenever  
justice  required.  But  this  position  is  obviously  contrary  to  the  decision  of  Cape  
discussed  above.  Moreover,  there  is  no  basis  that  the  case  should  fall  into  the  
interests  of  justice  due  to  the  inconsistent  case  law.257     
  
In  the  latter  case  of  Ord  v  Belhaven  Pubs  Ltd,258   the  decision  of  Creasey  was  
overturned.259   The  court  particularly  noted  that   the  decision   in  Creasy  would  
never  be  an  authoritative  answer.260   The  corporate  veil  was  considered  to  be  
pierced   in   fairly   limited   situations  where   there  was   some   impropriety   or   the  
corporation  was   a   “sham”   concealing   the   true   facts.261   Similarly   to  Creasey,  
this   case   was   also   about   the   reorganisation   of   the   company.   Ord   and   the  
company  Belhaven  Pubs  Ltd  were  involved  in  a  legal  suit  about  a  lease.  Due  
to   financial   problems,   the   structure   of   the   group  was   changed,  which   led   to  
Belhaven  Pubs  having  no  assets  to  meet  the  action.  Ord  then  applied  to  make  
the  parent  company  of  Belhaven  liable.  The  Court  of  Appeal  observed  that  the  
reorganization  of  the  company  was  legitimate.  When  looking  at  the  argument  
of  the  interests  of  justice,  the  court  in  Ord  overruled  the  judgment  in  Creasy.  In  
these  circumstances,  if  the  court  pierces  the  corporate  veil  for  justice,  there  is  
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no  excuse  for  the  court  in  Cape  not  to  fight  for  tort  victims’  compensations.  The  
court   in  Cape   takes   an   extremely   strict   position   on   the   interests   of   justice  
argument.   It   is   undeniable   that   the   case   law   shows   that   English   courts   are  
hesitate   to   apply   this   doctrine   in   answer   to   the   calls   for   “common   sense”,  
“reality”,  or  “fairness”.262  
     
  
2.4.4   Limitations   of   the   extension   of   the   doctrine   of   piercing   the  
corporate  veil  
  
The  UK  case  law  provides  quite  limited  guidance  on  piercing  the  corporate  veil  
in  corporate  groups.  Courts  would  be  more  likely  to  impose  liability  on  a  parent  
company   based   on   a   contractual   promise   or   representation   that   it   would  
support   its  subsidiary.263   Without  any  oral  or  written  agreements,   it   is   indeed  
difficult  for  the  courts  to  impose  liability  on  the  parent  company  for  the  debts  of  
its  subsidiary  based  on  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing.        
  
So   far   the   Supreme   Court   has   twice   expressed   clearly   that   extending   the  
application  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil  would  depart   from  the  authorities   in  
company  law  and  insolvency  law,  both  crucial  for  protecting  commerce.264     
  
Lord  Neuberger  stated  in  the  case  of  VTB  Capital  plc  v  Nutritek  International  
Corpn   that,   the   extension   of   the   use   of   this   doctrine   to   impose   contractual  
liability  to  a  non-­party  controller  has  no  possibility  of  being  deployed  in  future  
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264   Wayne  McArdle  and  Gareth  Jones,  ‘Prest  v  Petrodel  Resources  and  VTB  Capital  v  Nutritek:  A  Robust  
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cases.265   Consequently,   it   is  not  wise   for  claimants,  especially   tort  victims  to  
realize  corporate   liability  by  means  of  an  extension   to  piercing   the  corporate  
veil.   Another   prominent   case  Prest   v   Petrodel   Resources   Ltd266   concerning  
veil-­piercing   in   group   situations   explores   the   current   boundary   of   the  
circumstances  of  piercing   the  veil   in  corporate  groups,  and   further   limits   the  
use  of  the  doctrine  and  illustrates  the  difficulty  of  the  extension.  
  
The   case   of  Prest   concerned   an   allegation   that   a   husband   had   intended   to  
evade  some  obligations  to  his  wife  through  wholly  owning  or  having  effective  
control  of   the  companies  to  which  the  residential  properties  were  transferred  
before  the  breakdown  of  the  marriage.     
  
In  Prest,   Lord   Sumption   recognized   that   it   was   restrictive   for   the   courts   to  
justify  veil-­piercing  in  order  to  prevent  abuse,  and  the  real  difficulty  lay  in  the  
definition  of  “the  relevant  wrongdoing”,  and  the  term  “façade”.267   These  vague  
terms  beg   too  many  questions.   Lord  Sumption   therefore   introduced   the   two  
unique   principles,   as   previously   mentioned,   to   further   explain   the   above  
concepts.  They  are  the  “concealment  principle”  and  the  “evasion  principle”.268     
  
Specifically,  the  concealment  principle  can  be  understood  as  looking  behind  a  
company  to  discover  what  is  being  concealed.269   The  evasion  principle,  unlike  
the   concealment   principle,   justifies   the   doctrine   of   veil   piercing   by   detecting  
any   abusive   behaviour   where   a   company   is   created   for   evading   legal  
obligations.270     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265   VTB  Capital  plc  (n  172)  [133].  
266   Prest  (n  173).  
267   ibid  [28].  
268   ibid.  
269   ibid  [28].  According  to  Lord  Sumption,  the  concealment  principle  does  not  involve  the  piercing  of  the  
veil  at  all.  In  cases  where  a  company  is  interposed  to  conceal  the  identity  of  the  real  actors,  the  courts  will  
simply  look  behind  it  to  discover  what  is  being  concealed.  
270   ibid  [34]-­[35].  
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As  far  as  Lord  Sumption  was  concerned,  the  only  circumstance  in  which  veil  
piercing  is  permitted  is  where  the  defendant  is  under  an  existing  legal  liability  
or   restriction,   and   consequently   the   defendant   deliberately   evades   the  
obligation  by  means  of  creating  a  façade  company  controlled  by  him.  So  the  
evasion  principle  should  be  the  only  principle  to  be  referred  to  for  piercing  the  
corporate  veil.     
  
In   the   case  of  Prest,   it  was   found  by   the  Supreme  Court   that   there  was  no  
evidence   to  support   the  view   that   the  action  of   transferring  properties   to   the  
company  of  which  he  had  ownership  was  intended  to  evade  his  obligation  to  
his  wife.271   As  a  consequence,  Lord  Sumption  declared  the  companies  to  be  
holding   the   properties   on   trust   for   Mr   Prest,   the   controller,   who   beneficially  
owned  the  assets  of   the  company,  upon  which   the  court   transferred  half   the  
value  of  the  properties  owned  by  Mr  Prest  to  Mrs  Prest  under  the  Matrimonial  
Causes  Act  1973  section  24.272  
  
Lord  Sumption  set  out  the  condition  under  which  veil-­piercing  on  the  basis  of  
the  evasion  principle  could  arise:     
  
There   is   a   limited   principle   of   English   law   which   applies   when   a  
person  is  under  an  existing  legal  obligation  or  liability  or  subject  to  an  
existing   legal   restriction   which   he   deliberately   evades   or   whose  
enforcement   he   deliberately   frustrates   by   interposing   a   company  
under  his  control.  The  court  may  then  pierce  the  corporate  veil  for  the  
purpose,   and   only   for   the   purpose,   of   depriving   the   company   or   its  
controller  of   the  advantage  that   they  would  otherwise  have  obtained  
by  the  company’s  separate  legal  personality.273  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271   ibid  [40].  
272   ibid  [49].     
273   ibid  [35].  
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So  the  modern  approaches  to  piercing  the  corporate  veil  clearly  recognize  that  
the   evidence   for   control   or   ownership   as   to   the   company   alone   is   far   from  
sufficient   for   the   doctrine;;   justifications   need   both   control   and   impropriety  
proving  the  company  was  interposed  as  a  façade  to  evade  the  existing  legal  
obligations.274     
  
Coming   back   to   the   corporate   tort   case,  Cape  plc,  a  multinational   asbestos  
manufacturing  company,  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  developing  of  common  
law  in  determining  a  parent  company’s  liability  for  tort  creditors.275   In  Adam  v  
Cape   Industries   plc,   the   Court   of   Appeal   adopted   a   remarkably   narrow  
approach  to  the  imposition  of  the  liability  on  the  parent  companies.  As  restated  
in   VTB,   the   Court   of   Appeal   in   Cape   conceded   that   the   most   reasonable  
argument   should   be   “façade   and   fraud”   where   there   is   a   “mere   façade  
concealing  the  true  facts”.276  
  
According  to  the  statements  of  Lord  Sumption  in  the  case  of  Prest,  if  we  intend  
to   impose   tort   liability   on   the   parent   company   beyond   the   subsidiaries,   two  
essential   factors  should  be  met.  One   is   that   the  Cape  plc  should  have  been  
under  a  certain  legal  obligation  or  is  subject  to  an  existing  legal  restriction;;  the  
foreign   subsidiaries   of   Cape   in   the  US   and   South   Africa   should   have   been  
created  not  for  wealth  protection  or  perhaps  the  avoidance  of  tax,  but  to  evade  
or  frustrate  the  tortious  liability  the  Cape  originally  owed.  The  second  factor  is  
that   the   parent   company   should   have   committed   the   improper   behaviour   of  
evasion,   and   through   being   the   controller   of   the   subsidiaries,   the   parent  
company  avoids  tortious  liability  by  taking  advantage  of  the  principles  of  limited  
liability   and   separate   legal   personality.   However,   these   conditions   are  
extremely  difficult  to  prove  in  corporate  group  cases.     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274   Sealy  (n  35)  55.  
275   Alan  Dignman  and  John  Lowry,  Company  Law  (9th  edn,  OUP  2016)  35-­36.  
276   Adams  (n  85)  515.  
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In  another  case   involving  Cape  plc  as  a  defendant,  Lubbe  v  Cape  plc,277   in  
delivering   the   judgment   of   the   court,   the   judge   rejected   any   suggestions  
concerning  veil-­piercing  as  being  suitable  for  extending  liabilities.  Instead,  he  
gave  us  another  way  of  thinking,  by  approaching  the  question  purely  from  the  
perspective  of  tort  law.  Accordingly,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  circumvent  the  
difficulties  of  applying  the  veil  piercing  doctrine  and  find  other  approaches.     
  
Lord  Neuberger  in  VTB  also  emphasized  that  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing  is  the  
last   remedy,  and   this   is  also  approved  by  Lord  Sumption.278   Other   judges   in  
the  case  of  Prest  concurred  with  Lord  Sumption’s   judgments  but  questioned  
the   limitation   of   the   evasion   and   concealment   principle.   According   to   Lord  
Sumption’s   formulation,   the   doctrine   of   veil   piercing   should   only   be   invoked  
“where  a  person  is  under  an  existing  legal  obligation  or  liability  or  subject  to  an  
existing   legal   restriction  which  he  deliberately  evades  or  whose  enforcement  
he  deliberately  frustrates  by  interposing  a  company  under  his  control.”279  
  
Baroness  Hale  of  Richmond  held  that  she  was  not  sure  whether  it  is  possible  
to   classify   all   of   the   cases   relevant   to   disregarding   the   separate   legal  
personality  as  cases  of  concealment  or  evasion.  She  suggested  that  these  two  
principles  may  just  be  examples  “of  the  principle  that  the  persons  who  operate  
limited  companies  should  not  be  allowed  to  take  unconscionable  advantage  of  
the  people  with  whom  they  do  business”.280  
  
Lord  Mance  and  Lord  Clarke  expressed  that  they  admitted  the  existence  of  the  
doctrine   of   piercing   the   corporate   veil,   and   concerned   that   its   limits   are   not  
clear.   They   both   agreed   that   the   appeal   should   be   allowed   for   the   reasons  
given  by   Lord  Sumption.  However,   they   believed   that   it   is   dangerous   to   set  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277   Lubbe  (n  18).  
  
279	   ibid	  [35].	  
280	   Ibid	  [92].	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such  a  boundary  of  the  veil-­piercing  cases  and  wished  to  reserve  the  position  
for  any  other  situations  which  may  arise.  This  is  an  issue  questioned  by  most  
academic   commentators,   but   it   is   also   believed   that   any   other   exceptions  
would  not  be  easy  to  establish.281     
  
Apparently,   the   latest   leading  case  Prest  provides  that   the   law  in  the  area  of  
veil  piercing  has  not  been   formulated  and  settled  maturely.   It   is  expected   to  
see   the   application   of   the   formulations   provided   in   Prest   in   further   coming  
claims. 282    As   Lord   Clarke   and   Lord   Mance   commented,   other   possible  
exceptions  are  not  definitely  rejected,  but  this  will  be  extremely  difficult  in  the  
current   view.   This   is   why   we   have   almost   given   up   the   approaches   of  
extending  the  circumstances  of  veil  piercing  to  find  liability,  and  are  looking  for  
alternative   methodologies.   It   seems   that   the   court   will   only   “pierce   the  
corporate   veil”  when  all   other   conventional   remedies  have  proved   to   be  not  
available.  
  
Courts   are   encouraged   to   use   alternative   approaches   to   establishing  
liability     
  
Except   for   a   few   very   limited   circumstances,   the   doctrine   of   piercing   the  
corporate   veil   and   its   extensions   are   not  welcome   in  English   law   due   to   its  
running  counter   to  company   law  principles.   If   fraud   in  contractual  claims   like  
VTB   cannot  make  any  progress   in   extending   the  application  of   veil   piercing  
doctrine,   could   tort   claims  be   treated  differently?  Many  commentators  argue  
that   in   tort  cases,  especially   those  concerning  severe  personal   injury,  courts  
should  extend  the  application  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil  to  cover  the  debts  
of  insolvent  subsidiaries.283   However,  both  the  early  case  law  and  the  cases  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281   ibid  [92],  [102],  [103].     
282   Daniel  Lightman  and  Emma  Hargreaves,  'Petrodel  Resources  Ltd  v  Prest:  Where  Are  We  Now?'  
(2013)  19  Trusts  &  Trustees  877,879.  
283   Imanalin  (n  65);;  Timothy  P  Glynn,  'Beyond  'Unlimiting'  Shareholder  Liability:  Vicarious  Tort  Liability  for  
Corporate  Officers'  (2004)  57  Vanderbilt  Law  Review  329;;  Abhinav  Ashwin  ,  ‘Tortious  Liability  of  
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recent  years  such  as  VTB  and  Prest,284   indicate   that   it   is   impossible   for   tort  
victims  to  claim  against  the  parent  company  or  shareholder  on  the  traditional  
basis  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.     
  
What  makes  Prest  distinct  is  the  message  it  conveyed  to  the  lower  court  that  
the   doctrine   of   veil   piercing   should   be   considered   as   the   last   remedy,   but  
alternative  approaches  such  as  looking  to  tort  law  could  be  quite  promising.285  
By  moving  from  the  decision  in  Antonio  Gramsci  Shipping,286   the  lower  courts  
are  encouraged  to  achieve  corporate  liability  beyond  the  corporate  veil  based  
on   other   well-­developed   legal   principles   or   theories,   such   as   the   tort   of  





This   chapter   discussed   the   efficiency   of   three   prominent   categories   of  
approach  to  the  parent  company’s  liability  in  corporate  groups:  the  proposal  of  
pro   rata   unlimited   liability,   statutory   exceptions   to   limited   liability   in   the  
Insolvency   Act   1986   (section   214   on   wrongful   trading)   and   the   doctrine   of  
piercing  the  corporate  veil  under  English  case  law.  
  
In  the  scenario  that  limited  shareholder  liability  for  corporate  torts  is  questioned  
constantly   for   blocking   a   range   of   solutions   of   recourse,   the   approach   of  
imposing  unlimited  liability  on  shareholders  for  corporate  torts  called  “unlimited  
pro  rata  shareholder  liability”  is  proposed  by  legal  commentators.  It  is  justified  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Company  in  Winding  Up  :  An  Analysis’  (2005)  26  Comp  Law  176.  
284   As  in  VTB,  the  court  was  able  to  reach  its  decision  (and  in  the  case  of  Prest  the  same  decision  as  was  
reached  at  first  instance)  without  piercing  the  corporate  veil  and  disregarding  the  separate  legal  
personality  of  the  relevant  companies.  
285   May  Kim  Ho,  'Piercing  the  Corporate  Veil  as  A  Last  Resort:  Prest  v  Petrodel  Resources  Ltd  [2013]  
UKSC  34;;  [2013]  2  AC  415;;  [2013]  3  WLR  1  (2014)  26  Singapore  Academy  of  Law  Journal  249,  250.  
286   Antonio  Gramsci  Shipping  Corp  (n  210).  
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that  the  principle  of  limited  liability  has  inherent  drawbacks  and  threatens  the  
position   of   tort   creditors.   As   an   essential   principle   of   company   law,   limited  
liability   is   created   for   protecting   shareholders   and   the   whole   corporate  
structure  and  group  assets.  Without  considering  the  protection  of  tort  creditors,  
the  abuse  of   limited   liability  and  the  possibility  of  escaping  tort   liability  under  
the   shield   of   limited   liability   both   further   increase   the   tort   occurrence   rate.  
Moreover,  the  principle  of  limited  liability  prevents  tort  claims  against  the  parent  
companies  for  satisfactory  compensation  beyond  the  insolvent  subsidiaries.  It  
is   argued   that   imposing   pro   rata   unlimited   shareholder   liability   just   for  
corporate   torts   provides   recourse   to   the   unfortunate   tort   victims   who   are  
always  left  in  the  cold,  but  will  not  have  a  harmful  effect  on  contract  claims,  the  
economies,   and   corporations.   Nevertheless,   both   the   feasibility   of   the  
enforcement   of   the   unlimited   liability   regime,   and   the   outcome  of   abolishing  
limited  liability  cause  concerns.  The  advantages  of  limited  liability  in  increasing  
investment   and   economic   efficiency   are  well   accepted   in   the   economic   and  
legal   world.   Removing   limited   liability   in   corporate   tort   cases   will   certainly  
influence   investment,   especially   in   hazardous   industries.   It   seems   that   the  
proposal  of  unlimited  liability  attend  to  one  thing  but  lose  another.  Furthermore,  
due  to  the  lack  of  empirical  research,  it  is  difficult  to  compare  the  efficiency  of  
limited  liability  with  that  of  the  pro  rata  unlimited  liability  regime.  The  feasibility  
of  the  proposal  is  also  doubtful  since  there  is  no  persuasive  evidence  such  as  
empirical  data  to  show  that  the  new  regime  would  bring  more  benefits  or  would  
not  result  in  chaos.  Implementation  of  this  unlimited  liability  regime  is  based  on  
a   long-­term  preparation  and  empirical   research,  and   this  pushes  us   to   seek  
other  realistic  approaches.  
  
As  to  the  statutory  inroad  into  the  principle  of  limited  liability,  from  time  to  time  
proposals   for   statutory   provisions   to   modify   the   veil   within   groups   have  
appeared   both   at   community   level   and   domestically,   but   so   far,   without   a  
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satisfactory   result. 287    The   insolvency   law   seem   to   be   made   with   the  
assumption   that   tort   claims   would   infrequently   appear   in   the   process   of  
insolvency,  and   that  when  such  claims  were  presented   they  would  be   in   the  
nature  of  business  torts  such  as  conversion  or  defalcation  rather  than  personal  
injury.  Consequently,   there   is  a   tendency   to   ignore   tort   claims   in   insolvency;;  
there   is   no   statute   in   English   insolvency   law   or   company   law   specifically  
dealing   with   personal   injury   tort   debts   regarding   corporate   groups.288   Thus,  
from   the  perspective  of  statutory   inroad,  we   just  evaluate  section  214  of   the  
Insolvency  Act  1986  as  a  clue  to  enhance  statutory  protections  by  making  a  
parent   company   liable   for   its   insolvent   subsidiaries’   debts.   Section   214,   the  
wrongful   trading   provision,   is   made   for   protecting   creditors   who   experience  
loss  due  to  the  unreasonable  behaviour  of  the  directors.  Liability  currently  has  
extended   to   a   shadow   director,   which   means   a   parent   company   has   the  
potential   to  be   the  defendant   in   violation  of   the  provision.  Unfortunately,   the  
enforcement   of   section   214   in   making   a   parent   company   liable   for   its  
subsidiary’s   debts   is   less   optimistic.   Not   only   the   vague   boundaries   and  
inconclusive  instructions  in  determining  a  “shadow  director”  in  the  context  of  a  
corporate   group,   but   also   its   original   defects   in   the   enforcement   such   as  
problems  of  initiating  actions  and  difficulties  in  establishing  elements  to  make  
the  action  successful,  contribute  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  provision  in  practice.  
In   fact,   both   the   extension   of   the   general   creditor   protection   rules   such   as  
fraudulent   trading   and   wrongful   trading   to   shadow   directors   to   deal   with  
particular   situations   in   the   group,   and   the   development   of   distinct   rules   for  
corporate  torts  are  expected  to  be  improved.  
  
In  the  aspect  of  judicial  inroad  of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality  
as  a  ground  for  corporate  tort  recourse,  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287   Davies  (n  22)  244.  
288   Margaret  I  Lyle,  ‘Mass  Tort  Claims  and  the  Corporate  Tortfeasor:  Bankruptcy  Reorganization  and  
Legislative  Compensation  Versus  the  Common-­Law  Tort  System’  (1983)  61  Texas  Law  Review  1297,  
1304.  
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veil  is  deemed  to  be  inadequate.  Many  lawyers,  academic  commentators  and  
judges   regard   the   veil   piercing   doctrine   as   one   possible   remedy   to   resolve  
injustice   brought   by   the   principle   of   limited   liability.   However,   this   doctrine  
cannot  serve  such  ends.  The  English  courts  have  not  followed  any  consistent  
rules  on  when  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  over  a  very  long  period,  which  has  
led  to  countless  arguments.  Following  the  decisions  of  the  two  latest   leading  
cases   and   the   evaluations   of   the   prominent   arguments   for   piercing   the  
corporate  veil,   it  seems   that   the  standard  of  veil  piercing  has  been  set  even  
higher,   and   it   is   quite   difficult   to   fulfil   the   elements   of   veil-­piercing   tests   in  
personal   injury   cases.   Up   until   now,   both   consensual   and   non-­consensual  
creditors  find  they  are  in  a  weak  position  in  making  the  “controller”  of  a  group  
liable  by  piercing   the  corporate  veil.  Historical  cases  concerning  piercing   the  
corporate  veil  and  the  latest  significant  decisions  of  VTB  and  Prest  reflect  that  
the   doctrine   of   veil   piercing   exists,   but   is   applied   in   a   very   limited  way   and  
could   rarely   be   extended.   Courts   have   less   enthusiasm   in   ascertaining  
corporate   liability   by   this   route.   Instead,   satisfactory   compensation   for   tort  
victims   can   be   fulfilled   in   another   way.   The   Supreme   Court   encouraged  
claimants  to  seek  for  compensation  through  other  long-­standing  and  efficient  
principles  of  English   law,   such  as   the   tort   of  negligence.   It   is   supposed   that  
remedies  in  tort  such  as  pursuing  a  direct  duty  of  care  of  the  parent  company  
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Chapter  3  Corporate  group’s  negligence  liability     
  
3.1  Introduction        
	  
This   Chapter   examines   how   UK   courts   establish   negligence   liability   in  
circumstances   where   the   insolvent   subsidiaries’   tort   creditors   who   suffer  
personal  injuries  pursue  recourse  in  the  whole  group;;  or  in  situations  where  the  
injured  claimants  bring  tort  claims  against  the  rich  element  of  the  group,  such  
as   the   parent   company.   Negligence   cases   from   other   countries   such   as  
Australia  and  the  United  States  are  discussed  as  well.     
  
In  the  first  place,  this  section  will  provide  a  general  overview  of  the  theory  of  
tort,  and  more  specifically,  the  tort  of  negligence,  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  
why   we   turn   to   use   the   tort   law   theory   to   deal   with   problems   of   corporate  
groups.     
  
In  the  common  law  system,  which  is  accepted  in  England  and  Wales,  the  law  
of  tort  is  considered  primarily  in  the  compensation  culture.  Most  civil  lawsuits  
fall  under  the  law  of  tort.  A  tort  can  be  simply  understood  as  a  civil  wrong.  More  
specific  definitions  have  also  been  made  by  legal  scholars.  One  sophisticated  
explanation  is  provided  in  Witting’s  tort  law  book:     
  
Tort   is   that  branch  of   the  civil   law  relating   to  obligations   imposed  by  
operation  of  law  on  all  natural  and  artificial  persons.  These  obligations,  
owed  by  one  person  to  another,  embody  norms  of  conduct  that  arise  
outside  (or  in  addition  to)  contract  and  unjust  enrichment.  Tort  enables  
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the  person  to  whom  the  obligation  is  owed  to  pursue  a  remedy  on  his  
own  behalf  where  breach  of  a  relevant  norm  of  conduct  infringes  his  
interests   to   a   degree   recognised   by   the   law   as   such   an  
infringement.289  
  
Winfield  defines   tort  as   follows,   “Tortious   liability  arises   from  the  breach  of  a  
duty   primarily   fixed   by   law;;   this   duty   is   towards   persons   generally   and   its  
breach  is  redressible  by  an  action  for  unliquidated  damages.”290  
  
Tort  law  thus  can  be  understood  as  a  body  of  rights,  obligations  and  remedies  
for  civil  wrongs  not  arising   from  contractual  obligations.  Tort   law   in  nature   is  
designed   to   protect   fundamental   human   interests,   and   provide   remedies   for  
the  person  who  seeks  compensation  for  loss.291   Thus,  tortious  liability  can  be  
pursued   in  any  context,  which  should   include  the  corporate  group  context.  A  
parent  company  could  potentially  commit  a  tort  to  its  subsidiary’s  employees,  
or  creditors.   In   this  circumstance,   the  claimant  can  both  bring  action  against  
the  subsidiary  company  which   is  of  much  relevance  to  him,  and  bring  action  
against   the  parent   company  who   can  be  proved   to   have   committed   tortious  
conduct  to  him.  This  way,  a  parent  company  can  be  capable  of  bearing  liability  
and  debts  of  its  subsidiary  company.     
  
In   general,   three   categories   of   torts   are   considered   in   tort   law:  
negligence-­based  torts,   intentional  torts  and  strict   liability  torts.  Among  them,  
negligence-­based   torts  are   the   largest  and   the  most  dynamic  group  of   torts,  
which  include  civil  wrongs  done  to  people  due  to  the  failure  of  another  person’s  
exercise  of  certain   level  of  care  –  duty  of  care.  Negligence  thus  embodies  a  
type  of   fault,  a   type  of  conduct   rather   than  a  state  of  mind:   “Negligence  qua  
species   of   fault   refers   to   a   failure   to   take  as  much   care   as   the  hypothetical  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289   Christian  Witting  and  John  Murphy,  Street  on  torts  (14th  edn,  OUP  2012)  4.  
290   W  V  H  Rogers,  Winfield  &  Jolowicz  on  Tort  (17th  edn,  Sweet  &  Maxwell  2006)  3.  
291   Witting,  Street  on  Torts  (n  280)  4.  
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reasonable   person   in   the   defendant’s   position   would   have   taken   in   the  
circumstances.”292   This  means  that  a  natural  or  legal  person  who  consciously  
acts  in  a  risky  manner  can  be  negligently  liable  for  those  risks.  
  
The   nature   and   definition   of   negligence   as   a   tort   provides   possibilities   for  
creditors   or   employees   of   the   subsidiary   company   to   make   claims   against  
other  group  members.  There   is  some  degree  of  overlap  between  negligence  
and   the   concept   of   intention   and   recklessness.   In   other   words,   it   could   be  
possible  that  a  defendant  act  negligently,  and  also  intentionally  or  recklessly.  In  
this  sense,  a  parent  company  can  be  held  negligently  liable  for  its  subsidiary  
company’s   employees   or   tort   creditors,   no  matter   the   loss   arises   out   of   the  
risks   run   by   the   parent   company   intentionally   or   recklessly.293   The   claimant  
only  has  to  prove  the  defendant’s  failure  to  act  where  any  reasonable  person  
would  have  so  acted.  
  
There  are  two  other  reasons  why  the  tort  of  negligence  can  be  considered  as  
one  potential  approach  to  deal  with  corporate  tort  problems.  In  the  first  place,  
negligence   is   the  most   common   cause   of   action   in   the   context   of   personal  
injury  claims,  while  other   regimes  are  still  available.   In   the  UK,  common   law  
negligence  is  usually  a  claimant’s  dominating  cause  of  action  for  work-­related  
and   environmental   damage   related   disease   claims.   Thus,   when   we   are  
considering  personal   injury   claims  against   corporate  group  members,   tort   of  
negligence   should   be   allowed   in   the   circumstances   that   one   tort   claimant  
sustains  injury  as  a  result  of  the  negligence  of  a  company  among  the  group.     
  
The   claimants   vary   from   employees   of   insolvent   subsidiaries   injured   due   to  
poor  workplace  environment,  to  families  who  lose  their  relatives  as  a  result  of  
environmental   damage   caused   by   subsidiary   companies,   as   well   as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292   Rogers  (n  281)  51.  
293   Peter  Handford,  ‘Intentional  Negligence:  A  Contradiction  in  Terms?’  (2010)  32  (1)  Sydney  Law  
Review  29,  30.  
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consumers  hurt  by  unsafe  or  defective  products.  In  some  circumstances,  other  
actions  might   be   brought,   such   as   litigations   for   breach   of   statutory   duty   in  
health   and   safety   legislations   and   actions   under   consumer   protection  
legislation. 294    In   most   cases,   especially   in   the   claims   against   parent  
companies  or  other  company  members,   those  are  secondary  choices   to   the  
principal  negligent  cause.295     
  
In  the  second  place,  tort  law  approaches  are  very  flexible  and  it  can  be  applied  
in   many   novel   cases,   such   as   some   personal   injury   cases   concerning  
corporate  groups.  To  establishing  negligence  liability,  claimants  need  to  prove  
some   essential   elements.   As   discussed   in   Chapter   II,   English   courts   are  
usually  unwilling  to  establishing  liability  to  the  parent  company  for  the  torts  of  
its  subsidiary  company  because  of   the  existence  of  corporate  veil.  However,  
one  can  establish  negligence  liability  to  the  parent  company  for  its  subsidiaries’  
employees  or  other  injured  parties  if  the  test  of  tort  of  negligence  for  the  parent  
company  is  satisfied.  This  could  happen  when  the  principal  elements  for  tort  of  
negligence  are  all  established,  and  the  realisation  of  negligence  liability  of  the  
parent  company  will  not  conflict  with  the  existence  of  the  corporate  veil  that  the  
courts  put  much  weight  on.     
  
To  determine  liability   in  tort  of  negligence  for  corporate  members  in  personal  
injury  claims,  the  following  principal  elements  should  be  established:  
  
(1)  Duty  of  care     
  
To  establish  the  legal  liability  in  negligence,  the  defendant  must  have  owed  a  
duty   of   care   to   the   claimant.   In   cases   of   personal   injury   involving   corporate  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294   Consumer  Protection  Act  1987,  which  implemented  the  European  Product  Liability  Directive  of  1985  
under  which  producers  can  be  held  strictly  liable  for  injury  caused  by  defective  products.  
295   Richard  Best,  ‘Liability  for  Asbestos  Related  Disease  in  England  and  Germany’  (2003)  4  (7)  German  
Law  Journal  662,  664.  
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groups,  a  duty  of  care  should  be  found  among  the  corporate  members,  usually  
a  parent  company  and  the  injured  individuals  such  as  employees  or  other  third  
parties.   In   the   tort   of   negligence,   the   duty   of   care   is   pursued   with   much  
flexibility,   where   controversies   and   difficulties   arise.296   Since   the   case   of  
Donoghue  v  Stevenson297   was  decided,  various  ideas  about  the  key  concepts  
such  as  responsibility  and  relationship  are  frequently  discussed  in  negligence  
tests.  This  suggests   that   the  choice  of   test  used   for   the  duty  of  care   is  very  
crucial.  At  present,  English  courts  are  in  favour  of  the  recommended  approach  
in  Caparo  Industries  v  Dickman,298   in  determining  whether,  on  the  facts  of  a  
particular  case,  a  duty  of  care  is  owed.  
  
The  approach  is  also  named  the  “three-­stage  test”.  A  closer  examination  of  the  
requirements  reveal  the  following  elements:     
  
a.   Foreseeability:   reasonable   foreseeability   of   harm   at   issue   must   be  
found  at  first  in  determining  a  duty  of  care.              
  
b.   The  relationship  of  proximity:  there  should  be  a  relationship  of  proximity  
between   the   claimant   and   the   defendant.   This   requirement   demands  
that  before  determining  a  duty  of  care,  a  certain  type  of  relationship  or  
connection  must  exist  between  the  tort  claimants  (e.g.  employees)  and  
company   members   (e.g.   parent   company).   However,   principles   and  
rules   established   in   the   Caparo   test   tell   very   little   about   what   can  
contribute   to   a   relationship   of   proximity   in   relevant   cases. 299    The  
proximity   relationship   is   undoubtedly   the   most   difficult   part   to   be  
established  when  ascertaining  a  duty  of  care.     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296   Prue  Vines,  ‘The  Needle  in  the  Haystack:  Principle  in  the  Duty  of  Care  in  Negligence’  (2000)  23  
UNSWLJ  35,  36.  
297   Donoghue  v  Stevenson  [1932]  UKHL  100,  [1932]  AC  562.  
298   Caparo  Industries  plc  v  Dickman  [1990]  UKHL  2;;  [1990]  2  AC  605.  
299   Kirsty  Horsey,  Tort  Law  (3rd  edition,  OUP  2013)  63.        
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c.   Reasonable   and   just:   it   should   be   established   that   it   is   fair,   just   and  
reasonable  to  find  that  the  defendant  owes  the  claimant  a  duty  to  take  
reasonable   care   not   to   cause   any   damage.   Arguably,   this   element  
leaves  the  court  with  an  inevitable  “residual  discretion  as  to  whether  or  
not   a   duty   of   care   should   be   recognized”, 300    which   add   certain  
complexities  to  the  new  area  of  establishing  the  tort  liability  of  corporate  
groups  as  well.  
     
Existing   legal   precedents   are   rarely   to   be   found   in   the   case   of   establishing  
negligence   liability   in   corporate   groups   for   personal   injuries.   Therefore,   it  
leaves   considerable   room   for   courts   and   legal   scholars   to   explore   the  
application  of  different  negligence  tests  in  corporate  group  situations.  In  spite  
of  the  classic  “three-­stage  test”,  courts  have  also  considered  other  approaches  
to  establishing  the  liability  for  failure  to  act.301   For  instance,  courts  would  like  
to   find   a   special   relationship   between   the   injured   claimants   and   the  
defendants;;302   or  to  find  an  assumption  of  responsibility  of  a  parent  company;;  
or  other  possibilities  such  a  special  duty  to  control  land,  dangerous  products  or  
a  kind  of  behaviour,   in  order   to  make   the  defendant  negligently   liable   for   its  
omission.     
  
Assumption  of  responsibility     
                 
Particularly,   the   approach   of   assumption   of   responsibility   is   of   much  
importance,   and   is   mainly   applied   by   the   courts   to   establishing   parent  
company’s   negligence   liability.   The   concept   of   voluntary   assumption   of  
responsibility   was   firstly   mentioned   in   a   claim   concerning   compensation   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300   Christian  Witting,  'Duty  of  Care:  An  Analytical  Approach'  (2005)  25  Oxford  Journal  of  Legal  Studies  33,  
62.  
301   Simon  Deakin,  Angus  Johnston  and  Basil  Markesinis,  Markesinis  and  Deakin’s  Tort  Law,  (7th  edn,  
OUP  2013)  103.  
302  White  v  Jones  [1995]  2  AC  (HL)  207,  273.  
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economic  loss,  Hedley  Byrne  v  Heller.303   In  this  House  of  Lords  case,  a  Bank  
was   held   to   be   negligently   liable   for   the   loss   of   a   regular   client   because   it  
supplied  some  ill-­conceived  information.304   A  responsibility  is  thus  imposed  by  
law   on   certain   types   of   persons   or   situations   towards   those   who   act   upon  
advice   or   information;;   and   the   person   who   gives   certain   information   has  
voluntary  assumption  of  responsibility  towards  the  person  so  acting.  A  duty  of  
care  is  built  because  the  defendant  is  in  close  proximity  with  the  claimant  who  
suffers  loss  by  relying  on  the  defendant’s  wrong  information  or  advice  provided  
negligently.   The   concept   of   assumption   of   responsibility   has   been   accepted  
and  developed  by  the  courts  as  an  approach  to  establish  a  duty  of  care,  or  to  
demonstrate   a   general   basis   of   tort   liability   in   a   number   of   cases.   In   these  
cases,  a  duty  of  care   is   reached  because  of   the  existence  of  assumption  of  
responsibility   based   on   “reliance”   by   the   claimant   on   the   defendant’s  
negligently  false  information  or  advice.305  
  
The   courts   have   also   been   developing   the   theory   of   assumption   of  
responsibility   to  give   rise   to  a  duty  of   care  beyond  claims  of  pure  economic  
loss,   to  protect   individuals   from  physical  harm.306   One  classic   judgment  was  
made  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  to  create  a  duty  of  care  based  upon  the  voluntary  
assumption   of   responsibility   in   the   case   of   Leach   v   Chief   Constable   of  
Gloucestershire.307   In  this  case,  a  duty  of  care  was  built  upon  the  creation  of  
an  assumption  of   responsibility,  which  was  owed  by   the   relevant  police   to  a  
volunteer   who   helped   to   investigate   a   serial   killer   case.   The   volunteer   got  
mental   injury   during   the   investigation.   The  police   had  a   “voluntary   assumed  
responsibility”  to  advise  the  claimant  to  have  proper  counseling  service  in  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303   Hedley  Byrne  v  Heller  [1964]  AC  465  (HL).     
304   In  this  case,  negligence  liability  was  not  determined  by  the  court  because  of  a  disclaimer,  but  it  was  
held  to  be  possible.  
305   Cornish  v  Midland  Bank  Plc  [1985]  EWCA  Civ  J0717-­6,  [1985]  3  All  ER  513;;  Chaudhry  v  Prabhakar  
[1988]  EWCA  Civ  J0520-­3,  [1989]  1  WLR  29;;  Welton  v  North  Cornwall  District  Council  [1997]  1  WLR  570  
(CA).  
306   Rogers  (n  281)  170.  
307   Leach  v  Chief  Constable  of  Gloucestershire  [1999]  1  All  ER  215  (CA).  
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process  of  interrogation.  In  addition,  the  claimant  had  reasonable  reliance  on  
the  police  to  offer  such  information,  which  led  to  the  responsibility.     
  
The  decision  of  Hedley  Byrne  created  an  exception   to   the  previous  rule   that  
pure  economic  loss  cannot  be  pursued  in  tort.  Although  originally,  “assumption  
of   responsibility”  was  considered   in   the  context  of  economic   loss  caused  by  
negligent   misstatements,   this   test   is   now   suggested   to   be   applied   more  
widely.308   The  rule  of  assumption  of  responsibility  provides  a  path  to  a  novel  
tort   liability,   or   a   duty   of   care,   based   on   a   special   relationship   between   the  
claimant  and  the  defendant.  This  special   responsibility  would  arise  when  the  
defendant  knows  or  should  have  known  that  the  claimant  will  reasonably  rely  
on  his  particular  advice,   information  or  skill.  This  principle   is  thus  considered  
as   an   approach   to   establishing   parent   company’s   tortious   liability   to   its  
subsidiary’s  debts  in  the  case  of  Chandler  v  Cape.  The  arguments  around  the  
role   of   assumption   of   responsibility   in   group   cases   will   be   given   in   later  
discussion  under  the  case  analysis  of  Chandler  v  Cape.  
        
(2)  Breach  of  duty  of  care  
  
To  impose  liability,  a  duty  of  care  must  have  been  breached  by  the  defendant.  
In  this  regard,  several  elements  are  taken  into  account  such  as  severity  of  the  
potential  harm  and  the  practicable  nature  of  the  resort.  In  the  case  of  corporate  
groups,   for   instance,   if   the   parent   company   has   a   duty   to   supervise   its  
subsidiary’s   activities,   then   it   should   be   considered   whether   the   parent  
company  fails  to  exercise  that  duty.  
                    
(3)  Causation  and  Remoteness     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308   Witting,  Street  on  Torts  (n  280)  51-­52.  
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To  achieve  the  final  element  of  a  claim  in  the  tort  of  negligence,   it  should  be  
established   that   the   damage   suffered   by   the   claimant   is   caused   by   the  
defendant’s   breach   of   duty.   This   step   is   considered   as   first   stage   “factual  
causation”  when  analysing  questions  of  causation   in  English   tort   law.309   The  
claimant   must   prove   that   the   physical   harm   experienced   is   caused   by   the  
defendant’s   actions   or   omissions,   which   have   resulted   in,   or   materially  
contributed  to  that  physical  harm.  In  many  cases,  “causation”  will  be  based  on  
the  same  facts  used  to  set  up  a  duty  of  care,  e.g.,  the  level  of  knowledge  within  
the  parent  company  about  the  risks  associated  with  the  subsidiary’s  activities.     
  
As  regards  the  second  stage  (legal  causation),  normally,  defendants  will  argue  
based  on   the   foreseeability   test,   that,   the  damage   is   too   remote,   in  order   to  
reduce  his  or  her   liability.  Therefore,  a  successful  claim  should  be  based  on  
the  proof  of  factual  causation  and  defeat  of  any  remoteness  argument.  
  
  
3.2  Assessment  of  the  application  of  tort  of  negligence  in  English  case  
law  
  
This  section  examines  early  examples  and   the  case  of  Chandler  v  Cape,   to  
reflect   the  manner   in  which   the   tort  of  negligence   in   (personal   injury)  claims  
against   the   parent   company   are   identified.   Particularly,   the   element   of  
“proximity”   which   contributes   to   a   “duty   of   care”   is   regarded   as   the   central  
matter  in  imposing  negligence  liability.  The  application  of  tort  of  negligence  is  
proved   to  be  a  quite  promising  approach   to  provide  an  effective   recourse   to  
corporate   injured   tort   victims.   However,   at   the   moment,   the   formulations  
available   are   inconsistent   and   inconclusive   and   restricted   in   fixed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309   ibid  218.  
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circumstances.   Future   judicial   guidance   and   academic   research   work   is  
needed.  
  
3.2.1  Application  of  tort  of  negligence  in  early  examples  and  Chandler  v  
Cape  plc  
  
Until   the   decision   of  Chandler   v  Cape   plc,310   the  UK   case   law   provided   no  
clear  guidance  on  how  to  ascertain  a  parent  company’s  negligence  liability  for  
injuries  to  their  subsidiaries’  employees  and  other  third  parties.  It  is  challenging  
for   English   courts   to   impose   a   duty   of   care   on   the   parent   company   directly  
before   the  Chandler  case.  Most  of  cases  were  refused  by  English  courts   for  
forum  non-­conveniens,  or  settled  between  the  parties  out  of  court.  However,  
some  expressions  given  by  the  courts  about  negligence  liability  of  the  parent  
company  are  of  interest.  
  
Since  1992,  a  number  of  cases  of  mercury  poisoning  among  workers  at   the  
South  African  plant  had  been  noted,   including   three  deaths.  Gaining  no   real  
satisfaction  from  criminal  proceedings,  claims  were  brought  before  the  English  
courts  by  twenty  workers.  Eventually,  two  separate  group  actions  were  settled  
out   of   court   after   the   English   courts   refused   the   proceedings   for   forum  
non-­conveniens.311  
  
One  of  the  cases  is  Busisiwe  Ngcobo  and  Others  v  Thor  Chemicals  Ltd,312   in  
which  20  workers  sued  against  the  parent  company  Thor  Chemicals  Ltd,  and  
its  chairman,  Desmond  Cowley,  in  an  English  High  Court.  The  business  of  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310   Chandler  (n  87).  
311   See  Busisiwe  Ngcobo  and  others  v  Thor  Chemical  Holdings  Ltd  [1995]  TLR  10/11/95  (CA),  and  
Sithole  v  Thor  Chemical  Holdings  Ltd  [1999]  EWCA  Civ  J0203-­5,  [1999]  All  ER  (D)  102.  The  Ngcobo  
claim  was  settled  in  1997  for  £1.3  million.  The  Sithole  claim  was  settled  in  October  2000  for  £270,000.  
Halina  Ward,  ‘Governing  multinationals:  The  Role  of  Foreign  Direct  Liability’  (2001)  18  Briefing  Paper  1.  
312   Busisiwe  Ngcobo  and  others  v  Thor  Chemical  Holdings  Ltd  [1995]  TLR  10/11/95  (CA).     
	   106	  
company  in  South  Africa  involved  manufacturing  and  reprocessing  of  mercury  
compounds,  and  the  employees  were  often  exposed  to  hazardous  and  unsafe  
quantities  of  mercury  vapour  or  mercury  compounds  in  the  course  of  their  work;;  
this   was   the   context   of   the   case.   The   claimants   sought   to   establishing   the  
parent  company’s  negligence  in  designing,  building  up,  intervening  operation,  
and   supervising   the   hazardous   process,   as   well   as   the   parent   company’s  
failure   to  protect  workers   in  South  Africa  when   the   foreseeability  of   harm  of  
mercury  was  obvious.     
  
Even  though  the  Court  of  Appeal  refused  the  case  for  forum  non-­conveniens,  it  
admitted  that  the  nature  of  the  claims  raised  serious  issues.  Passing  aside  the  
jurisdiction  issues,  Evans  LJ,  pointed  out  one  of  the  important  disputes  related  
to   liability   in  negligence,  which  should  be  “foreseeability”.   In   this   regard,  one  
point  that  should  be  made  clear  is  that  the  defendants  were  aware  of  the  risk  of  
injury  to  employees  and  that  they  negligently  failed  to  take  sufficient  steps  to  
safeguard   their   employees   in   South   Africa   after   the   move   of   the   business  
there.313     
Since  1997,  the  number  of  claims  against  UK  parent  companies  accepted  by  
UK  courts  has  increased  gradually.  In  Connelly  v  RTZ  Corp  plc,314   the  House  
of  Lords  confirmed  that  the  appropriate  forum  was  England,315   but  the  central  
issues  were  not  resolved,  since  the  Queens  Bench  gave  the  judgment  that  the  
case  was  time-­barred.  Even  so,  the  judgment  of  Wright  J  in  Queens  Bench  is  
worth  exploring  in  further  detail,  as  it  shows  that  the  court  puts  much  weight  on  
the   issue   of   corporate   tort   liability;;   the   case   also   contains   some   valuable  
thoughts   on   the   establishment   of   duty   of   care.   In   particular,   the  High  Court  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313   ibid  2.  
314   Connelly  (n  16).  
315   ibid;;  The  House  of  Lords  rejected  the  defendant’s  application  to  stay  the  proceedings  on  grounds  of  
forum  non-­conveniens,  having  taken  the  view  that  the  inability  of  Mr  Connelly  to  litigate  his  claim  in  
Namibia  (owing  to  the  non-­availability  of  legal  aid)  meant  that  Namibia  was  not  a  forum  in  which  the  
action  could  be  filed  “more  suitably  for  the  interests  of  all  the  parties  and  the  ends  of  justice”.  
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suggested   the  possibility   of   hearing   claims  against   the  UK  parent   company,  
brought  by  its  overseas  subsidiary’s  employees.     
  
Connelly  v  RTZ  Corp  plc,  concerned  a  claim  for  damages  against  the  parent  
company  of  the  operator  of  a  mine  in  Namibia.  The  claimant  alleged  negligent  
exposure  to  uranium  dust  that  caused  cancer.  The  plaintiff  was  employed  for  
several  years  by  the  defendant  company  as  a  foreman  fitter  in  a  uranium  mine  
in  Namibia.  On   his   return   to   Scotland,   the   plaintiff   developed   cancer   of   the  
throat,  as  a  result  of  which  he  became  permanently  disabled.  Accordingly,  the  
plaintiff  issued  proceedings  against  the  defendant  (parent  company)  and  one  
of  its  subsidiaries  in  England,  where  they  were  registered  and  where  he  was  
eligible  for  legal  aid.  He  claimed  that  the  damage  arose  from  the  defendants’  
negligence  in  failing  to  take  reasonable  steps  to  protect  employees  who  were  
exposed  to  the  uranium  dust.  
  
Wright  J  suggested  the  possibility  that  the  third  person  could  have  owed  a  duty  
of   care   to   the   claimant   because   of   the   relationship   appeared. 316  
“Foreseeability”  was  the  first  element  to  consider  in  any  of  these  duty  of  care  
cases.  It  was  suggested  by  the  court   that   there  should  be  some  evidence  to  
prove   that   the   employer   could   foresee   the   damage.   Wright   J   provided   the  
circumstance   of   “advice   by   consultant”   as   an   example.317   The   fact   that   the  
employer  had  accepted  advice  by  a  consultant  on  the  safety  of  work  system  
would  contribute  to  the  foreseeability.318   The  second  point  was  relevant  to  the  
responsibility  of  the  parent  company.  It  was  suggested  that  the  employer  could  
not   avoid   his   responsibility   to   employees   even   if   he   transferred   the   safety  
construction   work   such   as   devising   or   installing   precautions   to   the   third  
party.319   This  means   that  despite   the   independent  contractor   taking  over   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316   Connelly  (n  16)  538.     
317   ibid.  
318   Clay  v  Crump  &  Sons  Ltd  [1963]  EWCA  Civ  J0730-­5,  [1964]  1  QB  533.  
319   Connelly  (n  16)  538.  
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responsibility   for   the  safety  of   the  workplace  of   the  subsidiaries’  employees,  
the  parent  company  might  still  be  deemed   to  be   involved  based  on   relevant  
evidence,  such  as  reasonable  control.     
  
In  this  case,  the  court  made  it  clear  that  it  is  possible  and  acceptable  to  impose  
a   duty   of   care   on   the   defendants   who   undertake   certain   responsibilities,  
contributing  to  the  safety  procedures:  
  
The  situation  would  be  an  unusual  one;;  but  if  the  pleading  represents  
the   actuality   then,   as   it   seems   to   me,   the   situation   is   likely   to  
comprehend   the   elements   of   proximity,   foreseeability   and  
reasonableness   required   to   give   rise   to   a   duty   of   care:  Caparo  
Industries  v  Dickman.320  
  
It  seems  to  Wright  J,  that  the  proximity  relationship  should  be  found  in  relevant  
evidence   that   proved   the   parent   company   had   participated   in   devising   an  
appropriate  policy  for  the  safety  system  of  its  subsidiary:  
  
On  a  fair  reading  of  his  pleading,  it  seems  to  me  that  that  is  more  or  
less  what  the  amended  Statement  of  Claim  alleges  –  namely,  that  the  
first   Defendant   had   taken   into   its   own   hands   the   responsibility   for  
devising  an  appropriate  policy  for  health  and  safety  to  be  operated  at  
the  Rossing  mine,  and  that  either  the  first  Defendant  or  one  or  other  of  
its  English   subsidiaries   implemented   that   policy   and   supervised   the  
precautions  necessary  to  ensure  as  so  far  as  was  reasonably  possible,  
the   health   and   safety   of   the   Rossing   employees   through   the   RTZ  
supervisors.  Such  an  allegation,  if  true,  seems  to  me  to  impose  a  duty  
of   care   on   those   Defendants   who   undertook   those   responsibilities,  
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whatever   contribution   Rossing   itself   may   have   made   towards   the  
safety  procedures  at  the  mine.321  
  
In  the  early  cases,  it   is  apparent  that  the  legal  approach  to  direct  negligence  
does  not  depend  on  the  amount  of  shareholding  owned  by  the  parent  company.  
What   matters   should   be   the   sufficient   and   reasonable   involvement   in   the  
subsidiaries,   evidence   of   control   over   the   subsidiary’s   management   and  
knowledge  of  the  unsafe  workplace.     
  
Another  noteworthy  case  concerning  the  issue  of  intra-­group  liability  is  David  
Newton-­Sealey   v   ArmorGroup   Services   Ltd.322   The   question   whether   other  
corporate  members  have  acted  in  a  way,  which  may  lead  to  a  duty  of  care  to  
the  employee  of  one  subsidiary  is  raised  again.        
  
This  was  a  litigation  brought  by  an  injured  employee  against  three  members  of  
a  corporate  group.  The  High  Court  was  asked  by  the  defendants  to  strike  out  
the   claims   against   them,   and   the   question   was   whether   there   was   a   real  
prospect  of  the  claimant’s  success  in  the  case.323  
  
The  defendants  were  members  of  the  ArmorGroup  of  companies,  which  was  a  
dominant  provider  of  protective  security  services,  training  weapons  and  mine  
reduction  services,  whose  business  expanded  to  countries  suffering  civil  war,  
or   under   a   high   risk   of   terrorist   activity.   The   first   defendant,   ArmorGroup  
Services  Ltd,  (hereafter,  AG  UK),  was  registered  and  had  its  headquarters  in  
London.   The   second   defendant,   ArmorGroup   Services   JerseyLtd   (hereafter,  
Jersey   AGJ),   was   a   Jersey   company.   The   third   defendant,   ArmorGroup  
International   plc,   (hereafter,   AG   plc)   was   the   parent   company   of   the   group,  
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incorporated  in  England  and  Wales.324  
  
The  claimant  signed  a  contract  to  be  employed,  and  provided  security  services  
in  Iraq  with  the  Jersey  company  AGJ,  but  had  his  interview  at  the  AGUK  office  
and  AG  plc  in  London.  The  claimant  was  injured  in  Iraq  while  at  work,  and  then  
he  claimed  against   the   three  defendants  above.  He  argued   that   despite   the  
presence  of  Jersey  company  AGJ,  both  AGUK  and  AG  plc  were  liable  to  him  
under  the  contract  and  the  tort  of  negligence.325     
  
The   court   held   that   there  was   no   real   prospect   of   the   claimant   in   this   case  
establishing  a  contract  with  the  two  London  companies,  AGUK  and  AG  plc.326  
The  court  did  not  think  the  evidence  given  by  the  claimant  such  as  the  place  of  
interview,  and  the  control  the  two  London  companies  exercised  over  him  could  
contribute  to  a  contractual  intention.327   Additionally,  any  internal  arrangements,  
and   allocation   between   members   of   Armor   Group   did   not   give   rise   to   a  
contractual   relationship  with   the  claimant.328   Thus,   in   this  kind  of  cases,   it   is  
quite  difficult   to  establish  a  contractual   relationship  with  other  members   in  a  
group  beyond  the  member  with  whom  the  claimant  signs  the  contract.     
  
The   court   more   favourably   accepted   the   cause   of   action   under   the   tort   of  
negligence,  which  was  significantly  helpful   for   the   injured  claimants  when  an  
attempt   to   establishing   contract   liability   failed.   In   the   first   place,  Cranston   J,  
surely  held   that   the  claimant’s  contract  was  with  Jersey  Company,  who  also  
owed  him  a  duty  of  care.329   Also,  he  further  held  that  the  other  two  defendants  
were  also  potentially  liable  in  negligence.330     
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Thus,  it  is  quite  necessary  to  explore  the  judge’s  reasoning  and  examine  how  
the   negligence   liability   was   ascertained.   The   central   issues   involved   the  
existence  of  a  duty  of  care,  breach  and  causation  between  the  breach  of  the  
duty  of  care  and  the  damage  claimed.     
  
As   to   the   element   of   duty   of   care,   the   issue   was   whether   the   relationship  
between  the  claimant  and  the  two  defendants  (AG  UK  and  AG  plc)  imposed  on  
them   a   duty   of   care   to   avoid   or   prevent   the   injuries   to   the   claimant.   As  
mentioned  by  Cranston  J,  liability  can  be  established  in  two  ways:  application  
of  the  Caparo  approach,  and  the  establishment  of  a  special  type  of  relationship  
between   the   two   sides   based   on   the   voluntary   assumption   of   responsibility  
approach.331    There   is   a   time-­honoured   authority   that   a   duty   of   care   for  
physical  injury  could  be  induced  by  a  voluntary  assumption  of  responsibility.332  
In  the  case  of  Henderson  v  Merrett  Syndicates  Ltd,333   Lord  Goff  observed  that:  
  
An  assumption  of  responsibility  coupled  with  the  concomitant  reliance  
may  give  rise  to  a  tortious  duty  of  care  irrespective  of  whether  there  is  
a  contractual   relationship  between   the  parties,  and   in  consequence,  
unless  his  contract  precludes  him  from  doing  so,  the  plaintiff,  who  has  
available  to  him  concurrent  remedies  in  contract  and  tort,  may  choose  
that  remedy  which  appears  to  him  to  be  most  advantageous.334  
  
The   court   did   not  mention   the   distinction   between   the   two  approaches,   and  
regarded  them  as  the  same  important  in  establishing  a  duty  of  care.  
  
In  fact,  the  evidence  in  this  case  are  of  great  help  in  establishing  such  a  special  
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responsibility.   Specifically,   from   the   way   the   claimant   was   recruited   (the  
interview  occurred   in  London,  not  Jersey,  was  conducted  by  an  employee  of  
AGUK,   working   for   the   group   as   a   whole);; 335    and   the   presentation   of  
ArmorGroup  in  the  process  (no  clear  distinction  was  made  between  members  
of   the   ArmorGroup,   nor   was   it   indicated   that   the   claimant   was   specifically  
employed   by   AG   Jersey…);;336   the   claimant’s   deployment   to   Iraq   (the   initial  
deployment  orders  he  received  on  arriving  in  the  Middle  East,  containing  lists  
of  security  operatives  in  Iraq  and  their  deployment,  was  on  AGUK’s  letterhead,  
under  the  ArmorGroup  banner…);;337   the  conduct  of  operations  there,  not  least  
the  supply  of  equipment.     
  
The   above   evidence   made   the   court   believe   that   ArmorGroup   as   a   whole  
intended  that,  although  the  employee  signed  recruit  contracts  with  AG  Jersey,  
other   parts   of   ArmorGroup,   especially   the   parent   company   had   “special  
relationship  with   and   special   responsibility   for   them”.338   This   kind   of   special  
responsibility   contributed   to   a   duty   of   care   of   the   two   defendants   in   Armor  
Group.  
  
Cases  involving  Cape  plc  as  a  defendant  
  
Cape  plc,  incorporated  in  1893  in  the  UK,  undertaking  the  business  of  mining,  
processing  and  selling  asbestos  products.  It  acquired  South  Africa  subsidiaries  
in  1925  to  extend  its  asbestos  business  there.  Since  1948,  all  the  businesses  
and   share   holdings   were   transferred   to   another   South   African   subsidiary  
“Asbestos  South  Africa  (Pty)  Limited”  (CASAP).  Cape  plc  in  the  UK  held  all  the  
shares   in   this  subsidiary.  Between  1979  to  1989,  Cape  plc  gradually  sold   its  
shares  in  the  South  African  subsidiaries  and  since  1989  Cape  possessed  no  
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assets  there.  
  
Cape  was   first  sued   in  1990,   in   the  case  of  Adams  v  Cape  Plc;;339   the  case  
gained  a   lot   of   publicity.  The  significance  of   this   case  was   that   the  Court   of  
Appeal   first   took   the   chance   to   look   at   the   circumstances   of   piercing   the  
corporate  veil  in  the  past,  but  constricted  the  way  significantly  in  the  future.340  
The  judgment  of  this  case  left  an  issue  whether  the  parent  company  would  be  
liable  for  the  wrongdoing  of   its  subsidiary  companies,  which  had  no  ability  to  
pay  debts  or  be  responsible  for  the  victims  of  tort.  It  was  subsequently  inferred  
that   the   company   law   was   deficient   in   resolving   the   problems   between   tort  
victims  and  the  insolvent  defendant  company.  
  
Since   the   case  Cape   denied   the   application   of   the   veil   piercing   doctrine   in  
imposing  parent  company’s  liability,  other  claimants  began  to  initiate  litigation  
in  the  tort  of  negligence  in  subsequent  cases.  It  was  not  until  the  case  of  Lubbe  
v  Cape  plc,341   that  the  asbestos-­related  disease  litigations  against  the  parent  
company   brought   public   attention   again   and   made   little   progress   in  
establishing  parent  company’s  liability  in  negligence.  
  
In   Lubbe   v   Cape   plc,   Cape   plc   was   sued   for   negligent   control   over   the  
management  of  its  subsidiaries  in  South  Africa,  in  terms  of  failing  to  take  care,  
warn  of  the  dangers,  and  to  provide  adequate  protections  to  the  employees.342  
The   proceedings   in   this   case   were   extra   complex,   with   the   problem   of  
jurisdiction   hanging   over   the   case   from   1988   to   2001,   during   which   some  
claimants   died.   Eventually   in   2001   this   mass   tort   litigation   involving   3000  
claimants  was  settled  out  of  court.     
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Contrary   to   the  decision   in  Adams  v  Cape  plc,   the  decision  of   the  House  of  
Lords   in  Lubbe   was   to   allow   the   litigation   to   go   ahead,   and   it   admitted   the  
possibility  of  holding  a  parent  company  liable  in  negligence  for  its  subsidiaries’  
injured  employees.  
  
Lord  Bingham  mentioned  the  points  to  be  considered  in  establishing  a  parent  
company’s  duty  of  care,  and  divided  them  into  two  segments.  In  the  first  place,  
to  establish  a  duty  of  care,  it  was  important  to  determine  the  responsibility  of  
the  defendant  as  a  parent  company,  to  ensure  that  the  overseas  subsidiaries  
have  proper  health  and  safety  procedures.343   Thus,  a  special  responsibility  of  
the  parent  company  to  its  subsidiaries’  employees  should  be  established.  This  
kind  of  responsibility  could  be  found  in  the  way  the  parent  company  controlled  
its   subsidiaries,   and   the   knowledge   the   parent   company   had   over   its  
subsidiaries’   business   and   employees’   work   environment. 344    Relevant  
evidence   involved   minutes   of   meetings,   reports   of   directors   and  
correspondence  issues.     
  
Secondly,  the  establishment  of  the  parent  company’s  duty  of  care  was  based  
on   the   examination   of   every   individual   case.   Whether   each   claimant   had  
substantial  damage,  and  whether   the  damage  was  as  a   result  of   the  parent  
company’s  breach  of  duty  should  be  proved.345   It  was  quite  complicated  and  
burdensome   to   investigate   each   personal   case   on   these   issues   such   as  
medical   examination   evidence.346   So,   Lord   Bingham   noted   that,   liability   in  
negligence   of   the   parent   company  was   likely   to   be   achieved   if   the   “control”  
based  duty  of  care  was  breached,  but  the  investigation  would  be  an  onerous  
task.  
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Chandler  v  Cape  plc  
  
Corporate   tort   cases   involve   doctrines   of   company   law   and   tort   law.   The  
imposition   of   parent   company’s   liability   for   its   subsidiary’s   tort   is   always  
considered   to   conflict   with   principles   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal  
personality.347   It  took  quite  a  long  time  for  English  courts  to  make  progress  in  
establishing  liability  in  negligence  among  corporate  groups  before  Chandler  v  
Cape  plc.348   In  this  case,  the  Court  of  Appeal  for  the  first  time  held  the  parent  
company   liable   for   negligence   in   asbestos   cases,   and   also   provided   a   new  
four-­part  test  for  future  cases.349     
  
Mr  Chandler  was  an  employee  of  Cape  Building  Products  Ltd  (Cape  Products),  
in  the  period  of  1956  to  1959,  and  1961  to  1962.  During  this  time,  two  different  
processes   in  different  parts  of   the  site   in  Uxbridge  were  carried  out  by  Cape  
Products.   Mr   Chandler   worked   in   the   site   which   manufactured   bricks,   and  
contended  that  the  asbestos  dust  polluted  the  two  workplaces  when  the  other  
site  produced  Asbestolux.  Subsequently,  even  though  the  claimant  worked  as  
a   brick   loader,   he   did   not   have   the   chance   to   avoid   the   exposure   to   the  
asbestos  dust  and  was  diagnosed  with  asbestosis   in  2007.350   Unfortunately,  
Cape  Products  no  longer  existed  at  that  time,  and  no  policy  of  insurance  could  
satisfy  the  damages.  Then  Mr  Chandler  brought  a  negligence  claim  against  the  
UK  parent  company  Cape  plc,  alleging  that  Cape  Products  and  Cape  plc  were  
joint  tortfeasors  jointly  and  severally  liable  to  pay  him  damages.351  
  
  
Chandler  v  Cape  plc  -­  High  Court  decision     
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348   Chandler  (n  87).  
349   ibid  [40];;  the  court  stated  that  “it  appears  that  there  is  no  reported  case  of  a  direct  duty  of  care  on  the  
part  of  a  parent  company”.  
350   ibid  [1-­7].  
351   ibid  [7].  
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According  to  Judge  Wyn  Williams,  his  task  was  to  apply  the  “three-­stage  test”  
for  a  duty  of  care  to  the  facts  of  this  case.352   In  the  first  place,  he  refused  the  
use  of  “piercing  the  corporate  veil”  principle,  since  there  was  no  evidence  that  
the  subsidiary  Cape  Products  was  a  sham.353   Then,  Wyn  Williams  J  quoted  
the   judgment   given   by  Wright   J,   in  Connolly   v  RTZ  Corporation  Plc,354   and  
expressed   his   agreement   to   the   possibility   that   the   parent   company   and  
another   party   of   one   group   could   assume   a   duty   to   the   employee   of   one  
subsidiary.355     
  
Before   continuing   to   examine   the   High   Court’s   reasoning   in   Cape,   it   is  
necessary   to   firstly   introduce   the  case   law  exceptions   to   the  general   rule  of  
negligence  that  a  party  has  no  duty   to  prevent  a   third  party  causing  harm  to  
another.  These  exceptions  are  important  in  assuming  a  duty  of  care  to  a  parent  
company,  and  are  listed  in  the  case  of  Smith  v  Littlewoods  Organisation  Ltd:  
  
A  duty  of  care  may  arise  from  a  relationship  between  the  parties,  which  
gives  rise  to  an  imposition  or  assumption  of  responsibility  upon  or  by  
the  defender…  a  duty  may  arise  from  a  special  relationship  between  
the  defender   and   the   third   party,   by   virtue  of  which   the  defender   is  
responsible  for  controlling  the  third  party.356     
  
In   the   case   of  Chandler,   the   claimant   contended   that   the   defendant   parent  
company  not   only  had  a   special   responsibility   for   preventing   the  employees  
from  the  exposure  to  asbestos,  but  also  had  a  special  responsibility  as  a  result  
of   ultimate   control   over   the   management   of   the   subsidiaries   including   its  
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353   ibid  [71].     
354   Connelly  (n  16).  
355   Chandler  (n  343)  [67]-­[70].  
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asbestos  business.357  
  
In  the  view  of  Wyn  Williams  J,  by  applying  the  Caparo  test,  a  duty  of  care  could  
be  imposed  in  Chandler’s  case.  
  
As   to   “foreseeability”,  Williams  J  had  no  doubt   in   the   fact   that   the  defendant  
had  foreseen  the  risk  of  injury.  It  was  clear  to  the  defendant  at  a  very  early  time  
that   the   exposure   to   asbestos   could   potentially   result   in   life-­threatening  
illness. 358    It   was   obvious   to   foresee   the   risks   of   working   in   the   unsafe  
environment  with  asbestos  exposure,  and  the  defendant  should  have  had  the  
knowledge  of  this.359     
  
Determination   of   proximity   issue   relationship   in   this   case   was   the   central  
challenge.  Wyn  Williams  J  admitted  the  existence  of  proximity,  and  held  that  
the  facts  he  had  found  were  very  convincing.  He  held  that  the  defendant  had  
the   responsibility   for   “ensuring   that   its   own   employees   and   those   of   its  
subsidiaries   were   not   exposed   to   the   risk   of   harm   through   exposure   to  
asbestos”.360   Further,   he   proposed   that   the   parent   company   should   take  
overall  responsibility.  This  special  responsibility  was  based  on  the  evidence  of  
the  employment  of  officers  who  take  responsibility  for  the  health  and  safety  of  
any   group’s   employees.   In   addition,   instructions   on   the   health   and   safety  
policies  were  all  the  time  given  by  the  parent  company.361   In  the  end,  the  court  
took  the  view  that  it  would  not  be  unfair  or  unreasonable  to  impose  the  duty  if  
the  requirements  of  foreseeability  and  proximity  were  both  met.362     
  
The  “control”  exception  listed  in  the  case  of  Smith  v  Littlewoods  Organisation  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357   Chandler  (n  343)  [71].  
358   ibid  [73]-­[76]  Williams  J  stated  that,  “By  the  late  1950s  it  was  clear  to  the  defendant  that  the  exposure  
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Ltd  on  duties  of  care  to  third  parties  is  essential  for  further  understanding  the  
degree  of  control  needed   in   the  proximity   test.  Lord  Goff  held   that  when   the  
defendant  is  in  control  of  a  third  party  that  cause  the  damage,  the  defendant’s  
duty  of  care  could  arise.  In  the  case  of  Chandler,  the  most  contested  issue  was  
what   level   of   control   by   the   defendant   (Cape   plc)   over   the   activities   of   the  
subsidiary   company   (Cape   Products)   would   lead   to   a   duty   of   care.   Wyn  
Williams  J  in  his  High  Court  judgment  has  provided  indications.        
  
In  the  case  of  Chandler,  the  claimant  argued  that,  according  to  the  exception  in  
the  Smith,   there  was   a   special   relationship   between   the   defendant   and   the  
claimant   “based   upon   the   defendant’s   assumption   of   responsibility   for  
safeguarding   the   claimant   against   the   illness   from   exposure   to   asbestos;;  
alternatively,  the  defendant  had  the  ultimate  control  of  those  measures  which  
were   taken  to  protect   the  claimant   from  the  risk  of  exposure   to  asbestos.”363  
Specifically,  the  defendant  (Cape  plc),  not  the  individual  subsidiary  companies,  
dictated  the  health  and  safety  policy  for  the  whole  group.  Even  though  it  cannot  
be  denied  that  the  subsidiary  companies  played  a  part  in  the  implementation  of  
the   policy,   the   actual   facts   of   case   persuaded   the   court   that   the   defendant  
retained   overall   responsibility.   It   is   because  Cape   controlled   the   policy,   and  
could  have  intervened  and  stopped  the  employees  from  being  exposed  to  the  
risk  of  harm  through  exposure  to  asbestos  at  any  stage.  This  kind  of  control,  in  
the  Chandler’s  case,   is  believed   to  establish  a  sufficient  degree  of  proximity  
between  the  defendant  and  claimant.     
  
So  Wyn  Williams  J  in  the  High  Court  judgment  defines  the  concept  of  control  in  
detail,  based  on  which  a  special  relationship  and  proximity  were  established.  
That   is   the  defendant  will   retain  a  duty  of  care  when  he  has  ultimate  control  
over  the  relevant  policy  of  a  third  party  who  cause  the  damage.  Particularly,  the  
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implementation  of  that  policy  was  closely  related  to  the  damage.     
  
  
Chandler  v  Cape  plc  -­  Court  of  Appeal  decision     
  
Cape   instituted   an   appeal,   contending   that   it   had   no   duty   of   care   to   its  
subsidiaries’  employees.  
  
In   the   beginning,   Arden   LJ   mentioned   the   problem   of   liability   insurance   of  
employer,  which  was  considered  to  be  unhelpful   to  protect   the  employees  of  
an  insolvent  subsidiary  in  most  cases.  It  was  compulsory  for  Cape  Products  to  
carry   employer’s   liability   insurance.   However,   the   policy   excluded   liability  
related   to   claims   arising   from   pneumoconiosis,   and   this   exception   was  
extended   to   cover   asbestosis. 364    Thus,   Mr   Chandler   could   not   obtain  
compensation  under  employer’s  liability  insurance.365     
  
Arden  LJ  expressed  her  agreement  with  the  High  Court’s  analysis  and  divided  
the  evidence  for  establishing  the  duty  of  care  into  six  threads:     
  
(a)   Origins   of   Cape   Product’s   asbestos   business;;   (b)   Relationship  
between  Cape  and  Cape  Products;;  (c)  Technical  assistance  given  by  
Cape  to  Cape  Products;;  (d)  Contemporary  evidence  which  was  said  
to  demonstrate  that  Cape  was  involved  with  the  health  and  safety  of  
employees  of  Cape  Products;;  (e)  Evidence  as  to  Cape’s  involvement  
in  the  asbestos  business  of  Cape  Products;;  (f)  Events  subsequent  to  
the  relevant  period.366  
  
Arden  LJ  endorsed  the  application  of  the  Caparo  approach  by  Wyn  Williams  J  
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in  the  High  Court.  According  to  the  relevant  evidence,  Cape  took  control  over  
its   subsidiary’s   management   and   business   in   some   aspects, 367    which  
provided  the  basis  for  assumption  of  responsibility  for  Cape  plc.368  
  
First   of   all,   the   evidence   considered   by   Arden   LJ   definitely   grounded   the  
element  of  “foreseeability”.  For  instance,  evidence  of  thread  (b)  included:  the  
parent   company   obviously   intervened   and   instructed   product   mixes;;   board  
minutes   of   Cape   showed   that   the   all   the   spending   of   the   subsidiary   (Cape  
Products)   was   under   the   supervision   of   Cape;;   the   policy   of   Cape   on  
subsidiaries  and  the  meeting  minutes  both  showed  that  the  health  problems  of  
subsidiary’s  employees  had  been  reported  to  Cape.369   The  parent  company  in  
this   group   knew   the   products,   the   expenditure,   and   health   condition   of   its  
subsidiary.  
  
Foreseeability   was   fully   recognisable,   but   the   difficulty   lay   in   establishing  
“proximity”,  which  brings  focus  on  the  analysis  of  assumption  of  responsibility,  
and  the  level  of  control.  Similar  to  the  reasoning  of  the  High  Court,  Arden  LJ  
preferred  to  consider  assumption  of  responsibility  and  the  concept  of  control  as  
two   crucial   points   for   establishing   a   special   relationship,   and   responsibility  
between  the  parent  company  Cape  and  the  employees  of  its  subsidiaries.     
  
Assumption  of  responsibility     
  
According   to   the   Court   of   Appeal’s   reasoning,   the   theory   of   assumption   of  
responsibility  could  inform  the  requirement  for  proximity.370  
  
The   special   relationship   requires   demonstrations   of   reasonable   reliance,371  
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which   may   be   based   on   the   defendant’s   actions   or   omissions.372   Evidence  
shows   that   the   behaviours   of   Cape   plc   sufficiently   lead   to   a   reliance  
relationship  between  employees  of  the  whole  group  and  the  parent  company  
Cape.  Cape,   the  parent   company,   had   the   knowledge  of   asbestos  business  
superior   to   its   subsidiaries.   The   following   facts   could   illustrate   this:   Cape  
formulated  health  and  safety  policy  for  all  of  the  subsidiaries,   including  Cape  
Products,  and   it  hired   the  chief  chemist  of  scientist   for   the  Cape  group  as  a  
whole.   The   group   medical   officer   researched   into   the   relationship   between  
asbestos   dust   and   asbestos-­related   diseases.   All   of   the   evidence   indicated  
that   it   was   reasonable   for   both   the   subsidiary   and   employees   of   the   whole  
group  to  rely  on  the  parent  company’s  abundant  experience  and  knowledge  of  
asbestos  for  all  relevant  protections.     
  
Concept  of  Control     
  
Aside  from  establishing  an  assumption  of  responsibility,  another  way  of  making  
a  third  party  liable  for  the  damage  is  to  look  for  a  special  responsibility  based  
on  “control”.  In  this  regard,  the  parent  company  may  bear  a  duty  to  prevent  its  
subsidiaries  from  causing  damage  to  its  employees.  
  
Cape   exercised   a   high   level   of   control   over   its   Uxbridge   business.   The  
evidence   for   this  point  not  only  supports   the  establishment  of  assumption  of  
responsibility  but  also  contributes   to   the  special   responsibility  between  Cape  
plc   and   Cape   Products.   Cape   Products   conducted   its   operations   in  
accordance   with   Cape   plc’s   products   specification,   which   were   mainly  
supported   by   the   evidence:   (c)   (Technical   assistance),373   and   (e)   (Cape’s  
intervention   in   the   subsidiary’s   asbestos   business   and   products  
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development).374  
  
Four-­part  test     
  
To   potentially   help   in   future   cases,   Arden   LJ   laid   out   a   “four-­part   test”   for  
determining   the   parent   company’s   special   responsibility   for   the   health   and  
safety   of   its   subsidiaries’   employees   for   future   purposes.   The   requirements  
were  expressed  as  follows:  
  
(1)  the  business  of  the  parent  and  subsidiary  were  in  a  relevant  respect  
the   same;;   (2)   the   parent   had,   or   ought   to   have   had,   superior  
knowledge   on   some   relevant   aspects   of   health   and   safety   in   the  
particular   industry;;   (3)   the   parent   company   knew   the   subsidiary's  
system  of  work  was  unsafe,  or  ought  to  have  known;;  (4)  the  parent  had  
known  or  ought  to  have  foreseen  that  the  subsidiary  or  its  employees  
would   rely   on   the   parent   using   that   superior   knowledge   for   the  
employee's   protection.   Crucially,   it   would   not   be   necessary   to  
demonstrate   that   the   parent   company   regularly   intervened   in   the  
health   and   safety   policies   of   the   subsidiary   company   to   establish   a  
duty   of   care.   The   court   will   look   at   the   relationship   between   the  
companies   more   widely.   The   court   may   find   that   element   (4)   is  
established  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  parent  has  a  practice  
of  intervening  in  the  trading  operations  of  the  subsidiary,  for  example  
production  and  funding  issues.375  
  
In   these  circumstances,  a  duty  of  care  owed  by  Cape  plc   to  Cape  Products’  
employees  was  established.376   The  omissions  to  provide  Cape  Products  and  
even  the  whole  group  with  advice  on  precautions  for  a  safe  workplace,  and  to  
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provide  employees  with  a  safe  work  environment  were  found  by  the  court   to  
constitute  negligence.377  
  
Distinction   between   the   test   advanced   by   Wyn   Williams   J   and   that  
advanced  by  Arden  LJ  
  
In   general,   Arden   LJ   agreed  with  Wyn  Williams   J’s  High  Court   judgment   in  
Chandler   v  Cape.   On   this   basis,   Arden   LJ   further   explained   the   concept   of  
assumption   of   responsibility   and   control.   Particularly,   Arden   LJ   introduced   a  
“four-­part  test”  which  listed  the  appropriate  circumstances  where  the  law  may  
impose   on   a   parent   company   responsibility   for   the   health   and   safety   of   its  
subsidiary’s  employees.     
  
In  the  High  Court  judgment,  Wyn  Williams  J  focused  on  the  application  of  the  
essential  exceptions  given   in   the  case  Smith  v  Littlewoods  Organisation  Ltd.  
That   is,   in   special   or   exceptional   circumstances   a   duty   of   care  might   arise.  
They  are:  a)  where  there  is  a  special  relationship  between  the  Defendant  and  
Claimant  based  on  an  assumption  of  responsibility  by  the  Defendant;;  b)  where  
there  is  a  special  relationship  between  the  Defendant  and  the  third  party  based  
on   the  control  by   the  Defendant.378   Specifically,  Wyn  Williams  J  defined   the  
degree  of  control  for  establishing  the  special  relationship  for  a  duty  of  care  in  
personal  injury  cases  like  Chandler  v  Cape.  It  was  suggested  by  Wyn  Williams  
J   that,   when   the   defendant   parent   company   has   ultimate   control   of   the  
subsidiaries’   policies  or  measures  which  were   taken   to  protect   the  Claimant  
from  the  risk  of  harm,  a  special  relationship  is  established.  This  means  that  at  
any   stage   the   parent   company   could   have   intervened   and   the   subsidiary  
company  would  have  submitted   to   the   intervention.  This   kind  of   relationship  
will  satisfy  the  proximity  requirement  for  a  duty  of  care.     
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In  the  Court  of  Appeal   judgement,  Arden  LJ  found  the  existence  of  a  duty  of  
care   based   on   an   assumption   of   responsibility.   Furthermore,   she   advanced  
that  this  falls  within  the  proximity  part,  and  requirement  of  fairness,  justice  and  
reasonability   in   the   three-­stage   test   to   impose   liability.   This   attachment   of  
responsibility  is  on  a  basis  of  reliance,  which  also  require  a  sufficient  degree  of  
intervention  by  the  parent  company.  Particularly,  a  “four-­part  test”  is  advanced  
by  Arden  LJ  for  future  similar  cases.  Distinct  from  the  test  of  Wyn  Williams  J,  
Arden   LJ   extended   the   scope   of   control   which   contributes   to   a   sufficient  
degree   of   proximity   between   the   parent   company   and   the   claimant.  
Accordingly,   “the   court   will   look   at   the   relationship   between   the   companies  
more   widely.   The   court   may   find   that   element   (4)   is   established   where   the  
evidence   shows   that   the   parent   has   a   practice   of   intervening   in   the   trading  
operations  of  the  subsidiaries,  for  example  production  and  funding  issues.”379  
  
Wyn  Williams  J  provided  a  specific  explanation  of  the  concept  of  control,  while  
Arden  LJ  further  extended  the  scope  of  control.  Arden  LJ’s  test  is  more  flexible  
and  might  be  suitable  for  more  cases.  She  opens  a  door  for  determining  the  
parent  company’s  negligence  liability  in  the  cases  in  which  facts  of  intervention  
of   subsidiary   company’s   health   and   safety   policy   are   not   found.   Such   an  
extension  is  reasonable  and,  should  be  accepted.  It  is  because  what  we  look  
at  centrally  for  establishing  a  duty  of  care,  is  a  sufficient  degree  of  proximity.  A  
practice   of   intervening   in   the   management,   or   trading   operations   of   the  
subsidiaries,   for   example   production   and   funding   issues   might   provide   a  
proximity   relationship.   It   depends   on   the   specific   cases.   In   some  
circumstances,  the  parent  company’s  involvement  in  the  subsidiary  company’s  
business  means  the  relationship  between  the  two  companies  is  characterised  
by  the  flow  of  information  between  them  in  certain  period.  This  might  make  the  
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claimant   reasonably   rely  on   the  parent   company   to   intervene   to  prevent   the  
causation  of  harm  caused  by  the  subsidiary  company.  
  
3.2.2  Comparisons  and  evaluations     
  
From  previous   chapters,  we   conclude   that   the   group  member   is   a   separate  
legal   person   and   that   only   in   very   limited   situations   will   the   “veil”   of   the  
corporation  be  disregarded.  Alternatively,   tort   law   regulates   liability   in  parent  
company   for   the   injury   suffered   where   there   is   a   lack   of   direct   contractual  
relationship.   Here   tort   law   to   some   extent   undermines   some   benefits   of  
separate  legal  personality  and  limited  liability.  The  above  section  explores  and  
discusses  how  the  English  courts  apply  elements  of   the  tort  of  negligence  in  
personal  injury  cases  as  to  corporate  groups.  It  is  revealed  in  Chandler’s  case  
that  the  tort  of  negligence  could  be  well  applied  to  make  the  parent  company  
liable   for   injuries   to   a   subsidiary’s   employee   who   has   an   employment  
relationship   with   the   subsidiary   company   but   not   the   parent   company.   The  
approach   is   normally   based   on   the   “three-­stage   test”.   In   addition,   it   leaves  
room  for  the  court  to  explore  other  possible  guidance  for  fulfilling  the  threefold  
test  such  as  the  theory  of  assumption  of  responsibility.     
  
As  the  first  requirement  of  the  “three-­stage  test”,  the  element  of  foreseeability  
is  not  difficult  to  satisfy  in  corporate  tort  cases.  It  normally  needs  to  be  proven  
that  the  parent  company  is  or  should  have  been  aware  of  the  risk  of  injury  to  
employees  of  subsidiaries  or  other  parties.  Thus,  they  have  the  chance  to  be  
held  to  have  negligently  failed  to  take  steps  to  take  care  of  the  employees  and  
other   potential   tort   victims.  The   relevant   facts   contributing   to   the  element   of  
foreseeability   include   that:   the   parent   company   is   clearly   involved   in   “the  
design,   transfer,  set-­up,  operation,  supervision  or  monitoring  of  a  hazardous  
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process   undertaken   in   its   subsidiary”;; 380    the   parent   company   has   been  
advised   by   the   consultant   on   the   safety   of   the   work   processes   of  
subsidiaries;;381   the   parent   company   is   obviously   involved   in   the   products  
manufacture  of   its   subsidiaries;;   the  parent   company   financially   supports   the  
toxic   product   business;;   and   the   parent   company   dispatches   doctors   to   the  
subsidiary.382   It   is   generally   not   difficult   to   assume   that   the  parent   company  
has   known   or   ought   to   have   known   the   problematic   business   and   unsafe  
workplace  of  its  subsidiaries.     
  
The   most   difficult   and   crucial   step   in   establishing   the   parent   company’s  
negligence   liability   is   to   build   reasonable   proximity   relationship   between   the  
parent  company  and  the  employee  of  the  subsidiary  company.  Attentions  are  
focused   on   the   control   and   knowledge   of   the   subsidiary   operations   by   the  
parent  company.  Interestingly,  courts  have  applied  a  few  different  approaches  
to   determine   the   presence   of   a   duty   of   care   in   previous   cases.   These  
approaches  are  based  on  the  element  of  “control”  by  the  parent  company  over  
the  subsidiary  company  and  the  reliance  relationship  between  the  employee  of  
subsidiary   and   the   parent   company.   For   instance,   in   the   case   of   David  
Newton-­Sealey  v  ArmorGroup  Services  Ltd,   the  court  provided  two  available  
approaches  to  negligence  liability:  one  was  the  threefold  test,  the  other  was  to  
establishing   a   special   relationship   between   the   parent   company   and   the  
claimant   based   on   a   voluntary   assumption   of   responsibility.383   In   Lubbe   v  
Cape,  Lord  Bingham  mentioned  that  the  duty  of  care  was  based  on  the  special  
responsibility  that  could  be  found  in  the  way  of  control  exercised  by  the  parent  
company.384   The   Court   of   Appeal   observed   in   Chandler   that   the   theory   of  
assumption  of  responsibility  contributed  to  the  “proximity”  requirement  for  duty  
of   care;;   this   special   responsibility   could   be   satisfied   by   the   reliance   of   the  
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subsidiary’s  employee  upon  the  parent  company  in  taking  actions  to  ensure  a  
safety  workplace.385   Wyn  Williams  J,   further  held   that   the  duty  of  care  could  
also  be   induced  by  a  special  relationship,  based  on  the  element  of  “control”.  
This  approach  to  negligence  liability  stem  from  the  exceptions  to  the  general  
rule  that  a  third  party  bears  no  duty  to  prevent  a  party  from  causing  harm  to  
another,  as   indicated   in   the  case  of  Smith  v  Littlewoods  Organisation  Ltd.386  
Although  the  approaches  to  “proximity”  requirement  in  different  cases  are  not  
exactly   alike   and   even   limited   in   certain   circumstances,   it   is   not   difficult   to  
conclude  that  the  theory  of  “assumption  of  responsibility”  based  on  a  reliance  
relationship,  and  the  special  responsibility  based  on  “control”  are  two  essential  
parts  in  determining  a  duty  of  care.  Nevertheless,  these  two  approaches  may  
incur  future  confusion  due  to  the  vague  explanations  on  the  specific  application  
both  in  previous  cases  and  the  latest  authority,  Chandler  v  Cape.  
  
3.2.2.1  Problems  concerning  the  “assumption  of  responsibility”     
  
(1)   The   relationship   between   the   “proximity”   requirement   and   the  
“assumption  of  responsibility”  test  
  
The   Court   of   Appeal   in   Chandler   held   that   the   use   of   assumption   of  
responsibility   could   fall   wtin   the   proximity   requirement   of   the   Caparo   test.  
However,   the   combined   use   of   these   two   theories   by  Arden   LJ   in  Chandler  
seems   to   invoke   some   confusion.   In   some   early   cases,   the   approach   of  
assumption  of  responsibility  to  find  the  parent  company’s  negligence  liability  is  
regarded   as   different   from   the   approach   of   applying   the   Caparo   test.   For  
instance,   in   the   case  of  Newton-­Sealey   v  Armor  Group  Services   Ltd,387   the  
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claimant  and  the  defendant  suggested  different  solutions  to  achieve  the  parent  
company’s   duty   of   care.   The   claimant   argued   for   the   application   of   the  
threefold  test  while  the  defendants  held  that  it  was  better  to  use  the  approach  
of  assumption  of   responsibility   to  ascertain   the   loss  of   the  claimants.388   The  
court   did   not   answer   the   question   on   the   difference   between   these   two  
approaches,  and  held  that  the  difference  between  these  two  may  not  change  
the   outcome.   There   should   be   a   real   prospect   of   the   claimant   succeeding,  
either  by  establishing  elements  in  the  Caparo  test,  or  based  on  the  voluntary  
assumption  of  responsibility  approach.389  
  
Interestingly,   the   assumption   of   responsibility   test   is   also   considered   by   the  
court   as   very   similar   in   determining   the   relationship   of   two   parties   to   the  
“proximity”  approach  in  some  circumstances.390   In  the  case  of  Commissioners  
of  Customs  and  Excise  v  Barclays  Bank  plc,   the  House  of  Lords  noted   that  
“assumption  of  responsibility”  could  be  a  type  of  proximity.391   It   is  suggested  
by  Christian  Witting  that:  
  
…the  assumption  of  responsibility  test  is  of  real  relevance  in  those  few  
cases   in   which   the   evidence   suggests   that   the   defendant   has  
voluntarily,   subjectively   assumed   a   responsibility   for   certain   legal  
obligations  owed   to   the  claimant.   In   such  a  case,  a   court   is  able   to  
recognize   the   existence   of   a   duty   of   care   consistent   with   the  
defendant’s   intentions.  In  all  other  cases,  the  law  should  focus  upon  
application  of  the  Caparo  three  stage  test—and  this  goes  for  financial  
losses  just  as  much  as  for  other  types  of  loss.392  
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In   the   personal   injury   claims   against   the   parent   company,   represented   by  
cases  involving  Cape  Industries,  the  approach  of  assumption  of  responsibility  
is  of  much   relevance,  no  matter  whether   it   is  considered  as  an   independent  
approach   to   negligence   liability   or   regarded   as   a   test   helping   to   establish  
“proximity”.  This  is  because  the  fourth  requirement  of  the  Arden  J’s  “four-­part  
test”   for   establishing   parent   company’s   negligence   liability   is   of   much  
relevance  with  the  theory  of  assumption  of  responsibility.  As  provided  by  Arden  
J,   the   fourth   requirement   for   negligence   liability   is   that:   “(4)   the  parent  had  
known  or  ought  to  have  foreseen  that  the  subsidiary  or  its  employees  would  rely  
on  the  parent  using  that  superior  knowledge  for  the  employee's  protection.”393  
So,   to   establish   the   parent   company’s   negligence   liability   for   its   subsidiary  
company’s  employee,  this  requirement  with  the  other  three  in  the  “four-­part  test”  
should   all   be   met.   Interestingly,   according   to   the   theory   of   assumption   of  
responsibility,  if  the  fourth  requirement  is  met,  the  parent  company’s  negligence  
liability  can  also  be  established,  because  an  assumption  of  responsibility  based  
on  reliance  between  the  defendant  and  claimant  has  implicitly  been  proven.     
  
The  test  of  assumption  of  responsibility  could  be  regarded  as  an  independent  
test  when  it  is  applied  mainly  in  the  claims  concerning  pure  economic  loss.  On  a  
basis  of  assumption  of  responsibility,  a  duty  of  care  is  established  because  of  
the  existence  of  reliance  by  the  claimant  on  the  defendant’s  negligently  false  
information  or  advice.  This  approach  has  then  been  developed  by  courts  more  
widely   in   some   physical   injury   cases.   This   reliance   closely   connects   the  
defendant  and  claimant  and  establishes  a  special  relationship.  Arden  LJ  in  the  
Court  of  Appeal  advanced  that  assumption  of  responsibility  could  fall  within  the  
second  (proximity)  and  third  (just  and  reasonable)  part  of  the  three-­stage  test.  
That  means  it  is  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  general  proximity  test  in  the  case  of  
Chandler  v  Cape.  Thus,  in  some  specific  personal  injury  cases  like  Chandler  v  
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Cape,  or  other  novel  cases   in  which  a  duty  of  care   is  not  easy   to  establish,  
particularly,  the  proximity  relationship  is  difficult  to  find,  the  test  of  assumption  of  
responsibility   can  be   regarded  as  one  essential   part   to   invoke   the  proximity  
relationship.   In   fact,   the   proximity   test   has   no   fixed   content   in   its   use   in  
establishing  a  duty  of  care.  So,   it   is   reasonable   to  believe   that   the  proximity  
relationship  can  be   invoked  when  we  find   the  assumption  of   responsibility   is  
settled.  Just  as  Lord  Oliver  pointed  out  in  Caparo:  
  
“Proximity  is,  no  doubt  a  convenient  expression  so  long  as  it  is  realised  that  it  is  
no  more   than  a   label  which  embraces  not  a  definable  concept  but  merely  a  
description  of  circumstances  in  which,  pragmatically,  the  courts  conclude  that  a  
duty  of  care  exists.”394  
  
It   is   expected   that   the   courts   would   further   engage   with   the   theory   of  
assumption   of   responsibility   in   establishing   parent   company’s   negligence  
liability  in  corporate  tort  cases.     
  
(2)  Reliance  for  assumption  of  responsibility     
  
The   establishment   of   assumption   of   responsibility   lies   in   the   existence   of   a  
special  relationship  based  on  reliance.  It  is  the  concept  of  reliance  that  causes  
problems  and  controversies.     
  
The  extension  of  the  concept  of  reliance  made  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  the  
Chandler   case   is   questioned   by   some   legal   commentators.   Normally,   to  
establish  the  assumption  of  responsibility,  it  is  necessary  to  demonstrate  that  
the  injured  parties  have  reasonably  relied  on  the  parent  company  to  take  care  
of  them.  Interestingly,  in  Chandler,  the  court  held  that  the  reliance  of  subsidiary  
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of  the  injured  employees  on  the  parent  company  would  count.395   Commenting  
on   this   case,  Martin   Petrin   observed   that,   extensions   of   this   nature   seldom  
happened,  and  might  only  be  suitable  in  very  limited  circumstances.396     
  
As   far   as   I   am   concerned,   now   that   the   court   has   declared   that   only   the  
reliance  of  subsidiary  on  the  parent  company  would  suffice,  it  might  not  be  that  
important  to  prove  the  reasonable  reliance  between  the  injured  employees  of  
the  subsidiary  and  the  parent  company.  The  injured  employee  is  not  aware  of  
the  parent-­subsidiary  structure,  and  the  parent  company’s  involvement  in  the  
health   and   safety   activities   of   the   subsidiary,   since   they   are   vulnerable   tort  
victims  who  cannot  easily  identify  the  potential  tortfeasor.  It  is  difficult  for  them  
to  know  clearly  the  corporate  structure  and  the  trading  process  or  any  policies  
and   activities   engaged   between   the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary  
company.  This  may  be  the  reason  why  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Chandler’s  case  
extended  the  circumstance  of  reliance.  
  
In  the  case  of  Newton-­Sealey,  different  from  Chandler’s  case,  the  assumption  
of   responsibility  was   established   based   on   the   reliance   between   the   injured  
claimant  and  the  parent  company;;  this  is  because  the  claimant  was  given  the  
impression   that   the   group   act   as   a   whole.397   Specifically,   the   claimant   was  
recruited   in   the   London   parent   company   but   not   the   Jersey   subsidiary  
company;; 398    no   clear   distinction   was   made   between   members   of   the  
ArmorGroup  nor  was  the  claimant   told   to  be  employed  by  AG  Jersey;;399   the  
deployment  order  received  by  the  claimant  was  on  AGUK’s  letterhead,  under  
the   ArmorGroup   banner.400   Compared   with   the   situation   in   Chandler,   the  
claimant  of  Newton-­Sealey  had  opportunities  to  know  more  about  the  parent  
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would  rely  on  the  parent  using  that  superior  knowledge  for  the  employee's  protection.”     
396   Petrin,  (n  338)  617.     
397   ibid.  
398   David  Newton-­Sealey  (n  313)  [11].  
399   ibid  
400   ibid  [12].  
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company   and   most   importantly,   had   been   given   the   impression   and  
information   that   the   group   act   as   a   whole.   Contrarily,   the   claimants   in  
Chandler’s  case  are  in  a  weaker  position  in  pursuing  recourse.  It  should  also  
be  noted  that  the  extension  made  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Chandler  belong  to  
the  “four-­part  test”,  and  only  suitable  in  the  claims  against  the  parent  company  
in  a  negligence   liability   for   the  health  and  safety  of   its  subsidiary  company’s  
employees.   But   we   are   still   not   sure   whether   this   extension   would   lead   to  
future   confusions,   since   the   court   has   not   explained   this   in   detail. 401  
Furthermore,   the  court  added  some  complexities  on  this  part  by  holding  that  
the   reliance   relationship   can   be   achieved   without   showing   that   the   parent  
company   intervenes   in  specific   trading  operations   relevant   to   the  safety  and  
health  issues.402   Therefore,  further  explanations  by  courts  are  needed  in  this  
area.  
  
3.2.2.2  Problems  concerning  the  concepts  of  “control”  and  proximity  
  
In  the  case  of  Chandler  v  Cape,  the  Court  of  Appeal  found  that  Cape  plc  owed  
a  duty  of  care,  particularly  based  on  the  element  of  control.  However,   issues  
around   the   concept   of   control   have   arisen.   There   is   an   argument   that,   the  
element   of   control   is   one   extremely   important   part   when   considering   the  
potential   limitations   of   applying   the   tort   of   negligence   in   asbestos   related  
cases.403   The  concept  of  control  is  not  defined  very  well  by  the  court.  It  seems  
that   courts   in   similar   litigation   regarded   the  concept  of   control   as  a  decisive  
element,  but  relevant  examinations  are  somewhat  ambiguous  and  results  vary  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401   Petrin  (n  338)  617.  
402   Chandler  (n  87)  [80],  “The  court  may  find  that  element  (4)  is  established  where  the  evidence  shows  
that  the  parent  has  a  practice  of  intervening  in  the  trading  operations  of  the  subsidiary,  for  example  
production  and  funding  issues.”  
403   Christian  Witting  and  James  Rankin,  ‘Tortious  Liability  of  Corporate  Groups:  From  Control  to  
Coordination’  (2014)  22  Tort  Law  Review  91,101.  
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in  different  cases  and  jurisdictions.404     
  
The  Court   of  Appeal   attaches  equal   importance   to   the   control   based   theory  
and  the  rule  of  assumption  of  responsibility  for  establishing  a  duty  of  care.  It  is  
the   definition   of   the   concept   “relevant   control”   appeared   in  Chandler’s   case  
that  has  caused  great  disputes.     
  
According  to  the  Court  of  Appeal,  a  parent  company’s  negligence  liability  is  not  
based   on   the   absolute   control   over   its   subsidiaries.   Neither   judgments   nor  
statutes  provided  a  submission  that  duty  of  care  exists  on  the  basis  of  absolute  
control  of  the  subsidiaries.405  
  
In   the   opinion   of   Arden   LJ,   the   intervention   of   group   management   and  
involvement  in  its  subsidiary’s  operations  and  business  can  be  viewed  as  the  
“relevant   control”   that   can   contribute   to   the  negligence   liability.   The   relevant  
actions   included   that,   Cape   issued   instructions   on   corporate   products   and  
products’   development,   and   Cape   supervised   over   its   subsidiary’s   capital  
expenditures.406   Arden  LJ  also  added  her  comments  on  control   in   the  fourth  
stage  of  the  Chandler’s  “four-­part  test”:     
  
   Crucially,   it  would  not  be  necessary   to  demonstrate   that   the  parent  
company  regularly  intervened  in  the  health  and  safety  policies  of  the  
subsidiary  company  to  establish  a  duty  of  care.  It  would  be  sufficient  
that  the  parent  company  had  a  practice  of  intervening  in  the  trading  
operations   of   the   subsidiary,   for   example   production   and   funding  
issues.407  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404   Linn  Anker-­Soensen,  ‘Parental  Liability  for  Externalities  of  Subsidiaries:  Domestic  and  Extraterritorial  
Approaches’  (2014)  14  Nordic  &  European  Company  Law  28,  29.  
405   Chandler  (n  87)  [66].  
406   ibid  [73],  [75].  
407   ibid  [80].  
	   134	  
According   to   Arden   LJ,   it   is   not   necessary   to   justify   the   parent   company’s  
control   specifically   by   interventions   in   the   subsidiary’s   health   and   safety  
polices.  The  parent  company’s  involvement  in  trading  operations  alone  would  
lead   to   the   result.   This   explanation   is   somewhat   different   from   the   relevant  
conceptions  of  “control”  in  the  early  cases  and  questioned  by  commentators.  
  
In  the  case  of  Connelly  v  RTZ,  it  was  considered  by  the  court  that  the  proximity  
could   be   established   through   the   parent   company’s   control   in   devising   an  
appropriate  policy  for  the  safety  system  of  the  subsidiary.408   In  Newton-­Sealey  
v  ArmorGroup  Services  Ltd,  the  court  held  that  there  was  a  special  relationship  
based  on  the  assumption  of  responsibility,  and  a  special  responsibility  based  
on   the   parent   company’s   control,   which   were   both   relevant   to   the   duty   of  
care.409   Specifically,  the  “relevant  control”  could  be  found  in  the  way  that  the  
ArmorGroup  operated,  leading  the  claimant  to  believe  that  he  was  working  for  
the   whole   group. 410    In   Lubbe   v   Cape,   Lord   Bingham   mentioned   that  
negligence  could  be  proved  if  the  “control”  based  duty  of  care  was  breached.  
But   he   did   not   explain   how   to   identify   the   relevant   control   clearly,   and   just  
mentioned  that  “control”  was  to  be  found  in  the  parent  company’s  knowledge,  
and   the   court   could   investigate   the   reports   of   directors   and   business  
correspondence  between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary.411     
  
Compared  with   the  expressions  of   early   cases,   the  definition  of   control  was  
broadened   in  Chandler’s  case.  This  would  benefit   the   tort  victims  by   leaving  
room  for  future  discussions.  It  is  also  believed  that  the  attitude  of  the  Court  of  
Appeal,   in   this  case,   illustrates   that  parent  companies’  active   role  cannot  be  
overlooked  when  considering  group   liability.412   However,   the  definition  of   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408   Connelly  (n  16).  
409   David  Newton-­Sealey  (n  313)  [39].  
410   ibid  [12].  
411   Lubbe  (n  18)  [20].  
412   Andrew  Sanger,  ‘Crossing  the  Corporate  Veil:  The  Duty  of  Care  Owed  by  a  Parent  Company  to  the  
Employees  of  Its  Subsidiary”,  (2012)  71  (3)  CLJ  478,  480.  
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“relevant   control”   for   establishing   a   parent   company’s   negligence   liability   is  
always   a   challenge.   It  might   be   thought   that   a   parent   company’s   control   or  
intervention   in   areas   unrelated   to   health   and   safety   would   contribute   to   the  
establishment  of  negligence.  Some  commentators  even  have  the  concern  that  
the   parent   company’s   liability   could   be   invoked   “when   there   is   no   nexus  
between  the  parent’s  involvement  and  the  harm  that  a  claimant  suffered.”413  
  
As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  the  extension  of  the  scope  of  control  advanced  by  
Arden   LJ   is   reasonable.   The   test   of   control,   could   be   regarded   as   an  
independent   test,   as   explained   in   the   paragraph   about   exceptions   for  
establishing  a  duty  of  care  in  the  case  of  Smith  v  Littlewoods  Organisation  Ltd.  
At  the  same  time,  the  test  of  control  could  also  be  used  as  a  part  of  the  general  
proximity   test   to   impose   negligence   liability,   for   example,   in   the   case   of  
Chandler  v  Cape.  The  judgment  of  Arden  LJ  in  this  case  indicated  that  in  future  
corporate  personal   injury  cases,   in  which   the  proximity   relationship  between  
the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary   company’s   injured   employees   is  
difficult  to  establish,  test  of  control  could  be  considered  as  an  approach.  
  
The  test  of  control  provides  a  real  basis  for  establishing  proximity  between  the  
defendant  and  claimant.  Wyn  Williams  J  in  Chandler’s  first  instance  judgment  
gave  us  a  specific  definition  on   the  degree  of  control   required   to  establish  a  
sufficent   proximity.   It   is   that   the   parent   company’s   ultimate   control   over   the  
subsidiaries’  policy  or  advice  on  health  and  safety  issues.  Arden  LJ  made  an  
extension   that   the   parent   company’s   control   over   the   subsidiary   company’s  
business,   like   trading   issues   might   lead   to   a   proximity   relationship.   As   the  
concept   of   “proximity”   is   not   a   fixed   expression,   but   a   description   of  
circumstances,  there  is  no  need  to  reject  any  other  situations  or  formats  of  the  
parent   company’s  control.  We  only  need   to  prove   that   the  degree  of   control  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413   Petrin,  (n  338)  613.  
	   136	  
could  reasonably  explain  a  close  connection  between  the  parent  company  and  
the  harm  suffered  by  the  subsidiaries’  employees.  In  some  specific  cases,  the  
parent   company’s   control   over   the   trading   operations   of   the   subsidiary  
company   might   lead   to   a   sufficient   proximity.   For   example,   the   parent  
company’s  intervention  on  relevant  product,  or  funding  issues  would  stop  the  
happening  of  harm,  and  the  parent  company  is  able  to  intervene  in  the  relevant  
issues  at  any  stage  and  the  subsidiary  companies  will  definitely  bow  to  it.  
  
There   is   no   need   to  worry   about   that   the   extension  would   lead   to   chaos   in  
establishing  parent  company’s  negligence  liability.  Three  cases  after  Chandler  
v  Cape  have  further  considered  the  degree  of  control  in  establishing  a  duty  of  
care.   These   cases   demonstrated   that   English   courts   are   very   careful   in  
deciding  these  types  of  international  corporate  tort  claims.  What  courts  look  at  
is  the  causal  connection  between  the  degree  of  control  and  the  claimed  harm.  
Besides,   the   first   limb   “foreseeability”   and   the   third   limb   “fairness   and  
reasonability”  in  the  Caparo  test  are  also  essential  parts  considered  by  courts  
for  a  duty  of  care.     
  
The  following  relevant  corporate  tort  cases  are  Dominic  Liswaniso  Lungowe  &  
ors   v   Vedanta   Resources   Plc   and   Konkola   Copper   Mines   Plc   (Lungowe   v  
Vedanta),414     Okpabi  and  others  v  Royal  Dutch  Shell  Plc  and  Shell  Petroleum  
Development  Company  of  Nigeria  Ltd   (Okpabi  v  Shell),415   and  AAA  &  Ors  v  
Unilever  Plc  &  Anor   (AAA  v  Unilever).416   These  cases  all   concern  mass   tort  
claims  against  an  English  parent  company  and  its  foreign  subsidiaries.  Courts’  
decisions   are   centrally   based   on   evaluations   of   proximity   relationships,  
particularly   the   extent   of   control   exercised   by   the   parent   company   over   the  
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subsidiaries.  As  the  author  concluded  on  a  basis  of  the  case  Chandler  v  Cape,  
courts  in  the  following  cases  are  looking  at  the  close  connection  between  the  
extent  of  control  and  the  claimed  damage.  The  following  cases,  further  explain  
courts’  attitudes  on  the  concept  of  control  and  provide  specific  examples  on  the  
degree  of  control  that  may  lead  to  a  duty  of  care.     
  
Different  from  the  cases  of  Chandler  v  Cape,  Lungowe  v  Vedanta  and  Okpabi  v  
Shell,  AAA  v  Unilever  is  a  claim  in  which  the  claimant  sought  to  impose  liability  
on  the  defendant  parent  company  for  the  criminal  acts  of  third  parties.  In  the  
other  three  cases,  by  contrast,  the  loss  and  damage  suffered  by  the  claimant  
were  caused  by  tortious  conduct  of  the  defendant  and  the  subsidiary  company.     
  
In   the  case  of  AAA  v  Unilever,   the  claimants  were  victims  of  ethnic  violence  
carried   out   by   armed   criminals   on   the   Plantation   during   the   2007   Kenyan  
presidential   election.   The   first   defendant,  Unilever  Plc   (UPLC)   is   an  English  
company;;  and  the  second  defendant,  Unilever  Tea  Kenya  Limited  (UTKL),  is  a  
Kenyan   company   that   operated   the   tea   Plantation   in   Kenya.   UPLC   is   the  
ultimate  holding  company  of  UTKL.  The  claimants  alleged  that  the  defendants  
should  be  negligently  liable  for  the  violence,  and  owed  a  duty  of  care  to  protect  
the  claimants  from  the  risk  of  violence.417  
  
Mrs  Justice  Laing  found  that  the  real  issue  was  whether  the  claim  against  the  
defendants  had  arguable  merit.  The  Kenyan  law  follows  the  law  of  England  and  
Wales  on  the  determination  of  negligence  liability,  and  the  approach  of  applying  
the  Caparo   test  was  accepted.  However,  as  Laing  J  considered,   there   is  no  
such  a  duty  of  care  held  by  the  parent  company  for  the  violence  that  occurred  in  
the  Plantation.  Both  the  first  limb  and  third  limb  were  not  met  in  the  test.  It  was  
held  that  the  post-­election  violence  in  Kenya  was  not  foreseeable  by  its  English  
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parent  company,  and   it  was  not   foreseeable   that   law  and  order  would  break  
down   generally   and   that   the   Kenyan   police   would   fail   to   protect   the  
claimants.418  When  considering  the  second  step  of  the  Caparo  test,  the  court  
believed   that   the   facts  of   this  case  were  a   long  way   from  that  of  Chandler  v  
Cape.  Particularly,  there  was  no  close  geographical  link  between  the  UPLC  and  
UTKL.   Furthermore,   UTKL   was   even   not   a   direct   subsidiary   company   of  
UPLC.419     
  
The  case  of  AAA  v  Unilever,  provides  an  example  that  illustrates  the  application  
of  the  “four-­part”  test  in  Chandler  case  cannot  be  extended  too  far.  As  to  the  
issue  of   control,   the  court  may  also  consider   the  shareholding  of   the  parent  
company   when   evaluating   the   proximity   relationship   between   the   parent  
company  and  the  subsidiary,  although  it  should  not  be  a  decisive  element.  
  
In  the  case  of  Lungowe  v  Vedanta,  the  Court  of  Appeal  confirmed  that  it  was  
reasonable  to  hear   the  case   in  England,  and   it  was  arguable  that   the  parent  
company  owed  a  duty  of  care  to  third  parties  affected  by  the  operations  of  the  
subsidiaries.   In   this   case,   a   Zambian   company   Konkola   Copper   Mines   Plc  
(KCM)   owned   and   operated   the   Nchanga   copper  mine   in   Zambia.   Vedanta  
Resources   Plc   (Vedanta)   is   KCM’s   UK   registered   parent   company.   In   July  
2015,   1,826   Zambian   residents   of   the   Zambian   city   of   Chingola   (claimants)  
brought  civil  proceedings  against  Vedanta  and  KCM,  alleging  personal  injury,  
damage   to   property   and   loss   of   income,   amenity   and   enjoyment   of   land,  
caused  by   the  pollution  of   discharges   from   the  Nchanga   copper  mine   since  
2005.     
  
In  2016,  Judge  Coulson,   in   the   first   instance  allowed  the  claim  to  be   tried   in  
English  courts.  The  judge  recognized  that  Vedanta  was  the  real  architects  of  
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the   environmental   pollution,   and   that   there   was   a   real   issue   between   the  
claimants  and  Vedanta  based  on  the  claimants’  arguments  of  the  overall  control  
exercised  by  Vedanta  over  Zambian’s  mining  operations.420     
  
Lord  Justice  Simon,  sitting  in  the  Court  of  Appeal,  provided  his  position  when  
analyzed   the   proximity   limb   of   the   Caparo   test.   He   set   examples   of   the  
circumstances  of  control,  based  on  which,  subject  to  the  Caparo  test,  a  duty  of  
care  may  arise.  LJ  Simon  held   that,   “…such  a  duty  of  care  arises  when   the  
parent  company  has  taken  direct  responsibility   for  devising  a  material  health  
and  safety  policy  the  adequacy  of  which  is  the  subject  of  the  claim,  or  controls  
the  operations  which  give  rise  to  the  claim.”421	  
  
More   specifically,   the  High  Court   and  Court   of   Appeal’s   conclusion   that   the  
control  exercised  by  Vedanta  give  rise  to  a  duty  of  care  was  made  on  a  basis  of  
some   essential   factors.   For   example,   the   Vedanta   issued   a   report   which  
stressed   that   the   oversight   of   all   the   subsidiaries   rested   with   the   parent  
company’s   board   and   clearly   mentioned   the   problems   of   discharges   into  
water.422      Under   the   KCM’s  Management   and   Shareholder   Agreement   with  
Vedanta,  Vedanta  was  required  to  undertake  studies  into  the  mining  projects.  
Vedanta  also  provided  very  detailed  training  across  the  whole  group  on  a  range  
of  health  and  safety  management  issues,  and  environmental  incidents.  There  
was  also  evidence   from  a   former  KCM  employee  who  alleged   that  Vedanta  
have  high  degree  of  control  over  KCM’s  operational  affairs,  such  as  working  
practices  and  cost  cutting.423  
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The  above  facts  strongly  convinced  the  court  that  Vedanta’s  control  over  the  
mining   operation   and   safety   and   health   issue   of   KCM   would   give   rise   to  
Vedanta’s  responsibility  to  the  residents  affected  by  KCM’s  mining  program.     
  
The  other  recent  case  Okpabi  and  others  v  Royal  Dutch  Shell  Plc  and  Shell  
Petroleum   Development   Company   of   Nigeria   Ltd 424 ,   also   concerns  
environmental  tort  claims  against  the  UK  parent  company.  The  decisions  of  this  
case,  however,  stand  in  contrast  to  that  of  Lungowe  v  Vedanta.  Both  the  High  
Court  and  Court  of  Appeal  found  that  the  Nigerian  claimants  could  not  properly  
demonstrate  the  parent  company  owed  a  duty  of  care  to  third  parties  affected  
by  its  Nigerian  subsidiary  company,  and  confirmed  that  English  courts  did  not  
have  jurisdiction  to  hear  this  claim.  This  case,  further  explains  the  position  of  
the  parent  company’s  control  in  establishing  a  duty  of  care.  
  
The  claim  was  filed  by  Nigerian  claimants  from  the  Ogale  community  against  an  
English  parent  company  Royal  Dutch  Shell  (RDS)  and  its  Nigerian  subsidiary  
company  the  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  (SPDC).  The  claimants  
sought   compensation   for   the   damage   caused   by   serious   oil   leaks   from   the  
defendant’s   pipelines   and   associated   infrastructure   in   and   around   their  
community.  RDS  was  incorporated  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  was  the  parent  
company  of  the  Shell  group.  SPDC  was  an  operation  company  incorporated  in  
Nigeria,  and  was  the  operator  of  a  joint  venture  agreement  between  itself  and  
other   three   Nigeria   companies.   However,   RDS   did   not   involve   in   this   joint  
venture.  The  claimant  alleged  that  RDS  owed  them  a  duty  of  care,  because  it  
had  assumed  a  responsibility  to  protect  the  claimants  from  the  environmental  
harm,  and  exercised  a  high  level  of  control  over  the  operation  of  SPDC.     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424	   Okpabi  and  others  v  Royal  Dutch  Shell  Plc  and  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  of  Nigeria  Ltd  ;;  
[2017]  EWHC  89  (TCC);;  [2018]  EWCA  Civ  191.	  
	   141	  
The  High  Court  in  London  dismissed  the  claim,  and  held  that  the  duty  of  care  of  
the  parent  company  was  not  arguable.  With  regard  to  the  second  limb  of  the  
proximity  test,  the  court  noted  that  RDS  did  not  control  the  material  operation  of  
SPDC  which   gave   rise   to   the   claimed   harm.   Specifically,   RDS   did   not   hold  
shares  in  SPDC.  It  held  shares  in  another  company  Shell  Petroleum  NV,  which  
holds  shares  in  SPDC.  RDS  did  not  conduct  oil  operations  and  was  prohibited  
from  doing   this  by  Nigerian   law.  The  activities  which  resulted   in   the  damage  
were  carried  out  by  SPDC,  as  part  of  the  joint  venture.425   As  found  by  Justice  
Fraser  in  the  High  Court,  the  evidence  was  inadequate  to  support  a  high  level  of  
control  by  RDS  over  SPDC’s  operations.  RDS  had  no  superior  knowledge  of  
the  business  of  SPDC,  so  there  was  no  reason  for  the  affected  party  to  rely  on  
RDS  to  protect  them  from  the  harm.426     
  
On  appeal,  Simon  LJ  agreed  with  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  and  treated  
the  degree  of  control  in  the  proximity  limb  as  the  principal  issue.  The  claimants  
argued  that  RDS  had  a  central  role  in  designing,  implementing  and  monitoring  
environmental  and  security  policies  of   the  entire  group.  With   respect   to   this,  
Simon  LJ  held  that  the  policies  mentioned  by  the  claimants  were  too  general  to  
satisfy  the  proximity  test.  He  noted  the  distinction  between  “(1)  instances  where  
a  parent  company  exercises  control  over  the  material  operations  of  a  subsidiary  
and;;   (2)   instances   where   a   parent   company   issues  mandatory   policies   and  
standards  which   are   intended   to   apply   throughout   a   group   of   companies   in  
order  to  ensure  conformity  with  particular  standards.”427   Simon  LJ  considered  
that   the   case   fell   in   the   second   category.  The   issuing  of  mandatory   policies  
through   the  group  does  not  mean  that   the  parent  company  exercises  a  high  
level  control  of  the  operations  of  a  subsidiary  company.428     
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Moreover,  the  Shell  Group,  according  to  the  document  titled  the  ‘Shell  Control  
Framework’,   is   organised   “both   through   legal   entities   and   on   Business   and  
Function   lines.”429   The  documents  relied  on  by  the  claimants  were   just  short  
extracts   from  a   relative   long  group   files.  Those  extracts  had   to  be   read   in  a  
proper  context.  For  example,  the  sentences  like,  “consistent  standards  around  
the  world”,  and  “common  treatment  across  the  Shell  Group”,  were  just  practices  
shared  across  a  group  operation  world  widely.  The  evidence  provided  by  the  
claimants  could  not  demonstrate  that  RDS  had  a  centralised  decision-­making  
level  of  control  over  its  subsidiary  companies.     
  
It  is  necessary  to  note  the  differences  of  the  level  of  control  between  the  case  of  
Okpabi,  and  cases  of  Chandler  v  Cape  and  Vedanta.  In  Chandler  v  Cape,  the  
parent  company  had  completely  control  over  the  health  and  safety  system  of  its  
subsidiary  company.  Cape,  as  the  parent  company,  had  the  ultimate  control  of  
those   measures   which   were   taken   to   protect   the   claimant   from   the   risk   of  
exposure  to  asbestos.  This  degree  of  control,  as  held  by  the  Court  of  Appeal,  
was   sufficient   to   establish   a   special   relationship   for   a   duty   of   care.   It   was  
because   at   any   stage   the   parent   company   could   have   intervened   and   the  
subsidiary  company  would  have  submitted  to  the   intervention.   In  the  case  of  
Vedanta,   the   parent   company   exercised   a   high   level   of   control   over   the  
subsidiary  company  KCM’s  mining  operation  and  infrastructure.  The  control  of  
the  parent  company  involved  the  specific  mining  operation,  which  give  rise  to  
the  damage  to  the  community  citizens.  In  the  case  of  Okpabi,  it  is  obvious  that,  
on  a  basis  of  the  case  facts,  the  parent  company  RDS  had  no  specific  control  
over   particular   operation   which   led   to,   or   had   close   connection   with   the  
damage.  The  fact  that  RDS  issued  mandatory  policies  across  the  Shell  group,  
was  not  enough  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  Court  of  Appeal.  SPDC,  as  
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the  subsidiary  company  retained  autonomy  on   the   imposition  of   those  group  
policies   and   practices.   The   claimants   could   not   demonstrate   that   RDS   has  
active   involvements   in   the  subsidiary   company’s  operation  which   resulted   in  
the  claimed  damage.     
  
To  conclude,  as  considered  by  the  English  courts  in  recent  corporate  tort  cases,  
the  degree  of  control   that  satisfies  a  proximity  relationship   for  a  duty  of  care  
should  be:  (1)  the  parent  company  has  the  ultimate  control  of  those  measures  
(for  example,   the  health  and  safety  policies)  which  were  taken  to  protect   the  
claimant   from   the   risk  of   suffering   the  damage;;   (2)   the  parent   company  has  
control   over   the  material   operations   of   the   subsidiary  which   give   rise   to   the  
harm.  Particularly,   the  only   fact   that   the  parent  company   issues  general  and  
mandatory   requirements  and  policies  across  all   subsidiary  companies   is  not  
very  enough  to  establish  a  duty  of  care.     
  
More   precise   explanations   on   these   crucial   concepts   for   parent   company’s  
negligence  liability  are  still  expected  in  future  cases.     
  
3.2.2.3  Limitations  of  the  “four-­part  test”     
  
In  Chandler’s  case,  the  Court  of  Appeal  provided  guidelines  in  a  “four-­part  test”  
for  determining  the  parent  company’s  duty  of  care  in  respect  of  the  health  and  
safety  of  its  subsidiary’s  employees.430   Regardless  of  the  controversies  on  the  
concept  of  assumption  of  responsibility  and  control  in  the  relevant  guidelines,  
this  test  would  have  a  profound  influence  in  future  cases.  By  providing  such  a  
test,  the  Court  of  Appeal  draw  public  attention  to  this  specific  group  problem.  
The  decision  for  the  first  time  successfully  applied  tort  law  principles  to  impose  
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liability  on  a  parent  company  despite  of   the  separate   legal  personality  of   the  
group  members.  Tort  claimants  in  such  cases  hence  get  appropriate  avenues  
to   realise   satisfactory   compensation,   and   the  group   liability   problem   in   such  
similarly  specific  circumstances  can  be  resolved.  However,  it  is  argued  that  this  
“four-­part”   test   is   limited   in  certain  circumstances,  and  may  not  meet   further  
needs.  The  case  David  Thompson  v  The  Renwick  Group  plc431   in  2014   fully  
demonstrates  the  limitation  of  the  current  four-­part  test.  
  
The  Court  of  Appeal  took  a  different  attitude  in  the  Thompson  case  this  time  
when  compared  with  Chandler  v  Cape.  The  companies,  Arthur  Wood  Ltd  and  
David  Hall   Ltd  were   two   fellow  subsidiaries  of   the  parent   company  Renwick  
Group  Ltd.  The  claimant  Thompson  worked  for  Arthur  Wood  Ltd  as  a  laborer  
unloading  raw  asbestos  from  1969  to  1975.  Since  1975  Arthur  Wood  Ltd  was  
acquired  by  David  Hall  &  Sons  Ltd  and  Mr  Thompson  began  to  work  for   the  
new  company,  but  his  asbestos  unloading  work  continued  while  accepting  a  
new  driving  work.  From  1973,  the  parent  company  began  to  appoint  directors  
to  its  subsidiary  David  Hall  Ltd.  The  parent  company’s  director,  R,  who  had  an  
“extremely  modest  shareholding”  in  the  parent  company,  was  appointed  to  the  
David  Hall   Ltd   in   1976.432   Mr   Thompson   developed   asbestos   cancer   called  
pleural  thickening  and  made  claims  against  the  two  subsidiary  companies,  but  
neither  of  them  could  meet  the  satisfactory  judgment.  Therefore,  Mr  Thompson  
brought  an  action  against  the  parent  company  Renwick  Group  Ltd.  In  the  first  
instance,  the  judge  imposed  a  duty  of  care  on  the  parent  company  based  on  
the   relevant   control   exercised  by   the   parent   company   through  director  R.433  
However,  the  Court  of  Appeal  then  overruled  that  decision.     
  
The  Court  of  Appeal’s  analysis  reflects  problems  inherent  in  the  “four-­part  test”,  
and  the  limitations  of  the  current  approach.     
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The   failure   of  Thompson’s   case   could   be   found   in   two   aspects.   In   the   first  
place,   the   facts   of   Thompson’s   case   failed   to   fulfill   the   “four-­part   test”   in  
Chandler.  The  evidence  provided  by   the  claimants   in  Thompson   fell  short  of  
the  guidelines  from  the  test.  In  Chandler,  there  was  extremely  clear  evidence  
to  support  the  test.  For  instance,  Cape  hired  a  medical  advisor  to  do  research  
regarding  asbestos  dust  and  asbestos  disease   for   the  whole  group,  and  got  
involved   in   the   asbestos   business   of   its   subsidiary   company.434   However,  
according  to  Tomlinson  LJ  in  Thompson,  the  appointment  of  director  R  did  not  
mean   that   the   parent   company   took   control   of   the   subsidiary:   “There   is   no  
basis  upon  which  it  can  be  concluded  that  in  running  the  affairs  of  David  Hall,  
Mr  Rushton  was  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Renwick  Group  Ltd.”435  
  
Other  evidence  provided  in  Thompson  such  as  “the  business  of  the  employer  
emerged  with  the  business  of  another  subsidiary”,436   and  “Mr  Thompson  was  
given   a   new   vehicle   and   used   documents   in   the   course   of   the   employment  
upon   which   the   name   of   the   parent   company   clearly   appeared,”437   were  
insufficient  to  meet  the  conditions  of  the  four-­part  test.     
  
The  key  point  of  Chandler  is  that  the  parent  company  had  superior  knowledge  
over   the   health   and   safety   issues   in   the   particular   industry.   Contrarily,   as  
alleged  by  the  defendants,  Renwick  Ltd  was  not  in  a  similar  position  as  Cape,  
who   engaged   in   the   international   asbestos   business   for   a   century.438   As   a  
parent  company,  Renwick  Ltd,  had  no  superior  knowledge  over  the  asbestos  
business   of   its   subsidiary   companies,   because   Renwick   acquired   the   two  
companies  at  a  much  later   time.  Before  the  acquisition,   the  claimant  already  
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435   David  Thompson  (n  402)  [26].  
436   ibid  [19].  
437   ibid  [15]-­[20].  
438   Julian  Fulbrook,  ‘Thompson  v  Renwick  Group  Plc:  Liability:  Personal  Injury,  Health  and  Safety  at  
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had  contacts  with  raw  asbestos  for  years.  It  is  believed  that  owning  shares  in  
the   subsidiaries   should   be   considered   different   from   having   superior  
knowledge   in   a   particular   business.   The   fact   that   sharing   one   director,   or  
appointing   a   director   who   has   dominant   shares   in   the   parent   company,   is  
unlikely   to   sufficiently   provide   a   proximity   relationship   between   the   parent  
company  and  the  injured  subsidiary  employees.     
  
In   the  second  place,  neither   the  assumption  of   responsibility  nor   the  special  
responsibility  based  on  relevant  control,  can  be  established  in  this  case.  As  to  
the   element   of   “reliance”,   there   was   no   evidence   to   demonstrate   that   the  
parent  company  should  have  had  knowledge  of   the  unsafe  workplace  of   the  
employee,  superior  to  what  the  subsidiary  company  should  have.439   So,  there  
was   no   point   for   the   subsidiary   to   rely   on   the   parent   company   to   provide  
particular   protections   to   its   employees.   As   to   the   element   of   “control”,   the  
co-­ordination  of  business  between  subsidiaries  could  not  unconditionally  lead  
to   the  assumption   that   the  parent  company  controls   the  group  business  and  
had   a   duty   of   care   to   the   subsidiary’s   employees.440   Tomlinson   LJ   finally  
observed  that  the  evidence  provided  was  very  limited  and  fell  far  short  of  what  
was  required  in  the  “four-­part  test”.  
  
We  may   question  whether   this   kind   of   evidence   in  Thompson   is   useless   in  
establishing  the  parent  company’s  negligence  liability  at  all.  At  least  from  the  
perspective  of   the  “four-­part   test”,   the  evidence  provided  by   the  claimants  of  
Thompson’s  case  is  not  enough.  It  is  because  the  “four  part”  test  does  not  list  
other  circumstances   that  may  give   rise   to  a  duty  of  care.  Tomlinson  LJ  also  
commented  on  Chandler’s   test  by  saying   that   “the   test   is  not  exhaustive  but  
descriptive  only.”441   The   four-­part   test   in  Chandler   is   considered   to   be  quite  
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“Cape   specific”   as   to   the   facts.442   However,   the   corporate  groups’   operating  
methods  are  different.443   The  Chandler  case  would  encourage  further  tortious  
claims  against  the  parent  company.  However,  the  court  may  choose  to  take  a  
conservative  attitude  to  determine  a  duty  of  care  if  the  facts  of  a  new  case  vary  
from  the  experience  of  earlier  cases.  It  is  expected  that  English  courts  in  future  
cases   can   broaden   the   “four-­part”   test   properly   for   different   corporate  
situations,   and   provide   more   guidelines   on   the   role   of   assumption   of  
responsibility  and  control  in  establishing  the  negligence  liability.  
  
  
3.3  Application  of  tort  of  negligence  in  other  countries  
  
3.3.1  Australian  cases  
  
Asbestos   cases   occupy   a   considerable   portion   of   personal   injury   claims  
against  corporate  groups   in  Australia.  The  approaches   to  establishing  group  
liability  in  asbestos  cases  hence  provide  a  general  view  of  how  the  Australian  
courts  deal  with  corporate  tort  problems.     
  
Australia   has   witnessed   a   high   number   of   asbestos   cases.   Around   seven  
thousand   Australians   have   died   from   mesothelioma   since   1945,   and   the  
number   is   predicted   to   rise   to   18000   by   2020. 444    The   incidence   of  
asbestos-­related   disease   in   Australia   is   undoubtedly   regarded   as   a   severe  
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disaster,  which  contributes  to  the  large  quantity  of  asbestos-­related  claims.445  
Compensation  claims  have  been  targeted  at  giant  corporate  groups  such  as  
James  Hardie  Group,  CSR,  and  BHP  Billition.  Generally,  claims  are  initiated  in  
the  tort  of  negligence  against  the  relevant  parties.  As  time  progresses,  different  
challenges  are  arising  in  the  litigation.  
  
Generally  speaking,   litigations  against  other  group  members   for   the  debts  of  
one   insolvent   subsidiary   are   rarely   successful,   based   on   the   traditional  
fault-­based   system   of   bringing   negligence   claims.   However,   the   successful  
claims   in   negligence   against   parent   companies   or   other   solvent   companies  
appeared  much  earlier  in  Australia  than  in  the  UK.  So  the  reasoning  in  these  
corporate  group  cases  by  Australian  courts   is  worth  discussing,  and   this  will  
contribute  to  a  broader  narrative  on  group  liability  problem.  
  
The  majority   of   jurisdictions   in   Australia   have   somewhat   analogous   test   on  
negligence.   Australian   law   is   derived   from   English   common   law,   and   the  
development  of  the  rule  of  negligence  was  influenced  by  the  landmark  case  of  
Donoghue   v   Stevenson,446   in   1932,   which   concerned   a   consumer’s   claim  
against  a  ginger  beer  manufacturer  for  the  mental  shock  induced  by  drinking  a  
bottle   of   beer   with   the   remains   of   a   snail.   Before   2001,   the   successful  
negligence   claims   in  Australia  were   decided   on   the   basis   of   the   test   that   is  
similar   to   the  Capraro   test   in  English   tort   law.  Three  elements  needed   to  be  
proved  by   the  claimants   to  get   recovery   from   their   loss:   (1)   the  existence  of  
duty  of  care;;  (2)  breach  of  that  duty;;  (3)  causation  of  damage.  
  
Australian  courts  used  to  follow  the  three-­stage  test  to  establish  a  duty  of  care,  
but   have   adopted   a   new   approach   called   “salient   features”   since  Sullivan   v  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445   ibid.  
446   Donoghue  (n  288).  
	   149	  
Moody447   in   2001.   In   this   case,   the   claimant   sued   the   government   officials  
negligently   charging   the   claimant   for   child   sexual   assault,   but   in   fact   the  
claimant   did  not   commit   the  alleged   conduct.  The   claim  was   rejected   in   the  
decision  of   the  High  Court  of  Australia  because  of   insufficient  arguments   for  
foreseeability  and  proximity.  In  addition,  the  imposition  of  a  duty  of  care  would  
have  conflicted  with  statutory   regulations   for  child  protection.   In   terms  of   the  
method  to  be  adopted  in  duty  of  care  cases,  the  Court  held:     
  
  
What  has  been  described  as  the  three-­stage  approach  of  Lord  Bridge  
of  Harwich  in  Caparo  Industries  Plc  v  Dickman448   does  not  represent  
the   law   in   Australia.   Lord   Bridge   himself   said   that   concepts   of  
proximity   and   fairnesss   lack   the   necessary   precision   to   give   them  
utility   as   practical   tests,   and   ‘amount   in   effect   to   little   more   than  
convenient   labels   to   attach   to   the   features   of   different   specific  
situations  which,  on  a  detailed  examination  of  all   the  circumstances,  
the  law  recognises  pragmatically  as  giving  rise  to  a  duty  of  care  of  a  
give  scope’449.450     
  
Although   the  concept  of   “salient   features”  was  not  actually  mentioned   in   the  
Sullivan  case,   it  was   then  confirmed   in   later  cases.451   Since   the   three-­stage  
test   is   regarded   as   limited   in   certain   circumstances   by   Australia   courts,   the  
courts   have   been   well   developing   the   salient   feature   approach   to   establish     
duties  of  care,  particularly  in  novel  cases.  This  approach  demands  that  courts  
search  for  “salient  features”  to  establish  a  duty  of  care.  The  “salient  features”  
are  determined  based  on  courts’   judgments  about   the  overall  weightiness  of  
the   factors   found   in   the   authoritative   decisions   from   previous   cases   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447   Sullivan  v  Moody  [2001]  HCA  59.  
448   Caparo  Industries  Plc  (n  289)  617-­618.  
449   ibid.  
450   Sullivan  (n  418)  [49].  
451  Graham  Barclay  Oysters  Pty  Ltd  v  Ryan  (2002)  211  CLR  540,  597.  
	   150	  
present.452   According   to   the   relevant   case   law,   the   salient   features   may  
include  but  not  limited  to:  1)  foreseeability  of  harm;;453   2)  the  degree  and  nature  
of  control  able  to  be  exercised  by  the  defendant  to  avoid  the  harm;;454   3)  the  
degree  of  vulnerability  of  the  claimant  to  harm  from  the  defendant’s  conduct,  
including  the  capacity  and  reasonable  expectation  of  a  claimant  to  take  steps  to  
protect   himself/herself,   degree   of   reliance   by   the   claimant   upon   the  
defendant;; 455    4)   any   assumption   of   responsibility   by   the   defendant;; 456    5)  
indeterminate  liability;;457   6)  policy  considerations  .458  
  
The  salient  features  test  indeed  opens  a  door  for  some  novel  cases  so  that  the  
court  could  consider  a  duty  of  care  by  reference  to  these  “features”,  rather  than  
spending  time  on  explaining  the  concept  of  “proximity”.  The  flexibility  given  by  
the   test  makes   it   simple   for   the   law   to   develop   alongside   the   fast   changing  
social  and  commercial  world.        
  
English  courts  are  unwilling  to  “pierce  the  corporate  veil”  and  impose  upon  the  
parent   company   tort   liability   for   its   subsidiary’s   debts   except   in   very   limited  
circumstances.   Although   the   salient   features   test   has   not   been   applied   in  
corporate  group  cases  yet  by  Australian  courts,  it  is  expected  that  the  Sullivan  
v  Moody  test  would  be  adopted  in  such  cases.  The  use  of  this  test  might  prove  
to  be  a  very   flexible  method  for  determining   the  duty   issue,  and  the  decided  
cases  may  provide  an  interesting  reference  for  English  courts.  For  example,  it  
might  provide  indications  of  more  circumstances  of  proximity.  
     
Negligence   liability  could  be  established  based  on   the  salient   feature   test   in  
corporate   tort   cases.   Take   the   case   of   Chandler   v   Cape   as   an   example.  
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Referring  to  the  Australia’s  salient  features  test,  the  parent  company  Cape  in  
the   UK   case   of  Chandler   v   Cape  would   be   potentially   liable   in   tort   to   the  
employees  of   the  subsidiary  as  well.  According   to   the   facts  of  Chandler,   the  
foreseeability  element  will  be  firstly  established,  and  the  subsequent  features  
would  be  satisfied  as  well,  which  includes:  3)  the  degree  and  nature  of  control  
able   to   be   exercised   by   the   defendant   to   avoid   harm;;   4)   the   degree   of  
vulnerability  of  the  claimant  to  harm  from  the  defendant’s  conduct,  including  the  
capacity   and   reasonable   expectation   of   a   claimant   to   take   steps   to   protect  
himself/herself,   degree   of   reliance   by   the   claimant   upon   the   defendant;;   5)  
assumption  of  responsibility  by  the  defendant.     
  
This  hypothetical  application  suggests   that   the  salient   features   test  could  be  
applied  in  corporate  group  liability  cases.  What  of   the  cases  regarding  parent  
company   liabilities   that  have  been  decided  by   the  Australian  courts?  Before  
2001,  relevant  Australian  cases  were  still  based  on  the  three-­stage  test.  The  
corporate   tort   claims   in   Australia   based   on   this   test   provide   valuable  
indications  in  creating  a  parent  company’s  negligence  liability  as  well.  
  
One  major  defendant  in  the  Australian’s  asbestos-­related  claims  was  CSR  Ltd.  
During  the  1970s,  increasing  numbers  of  victims  were  dying  as  a  result  of  the  
exposure   to  asbestos  dust   in   the   course  of   employment   in  CSR  Ltd  and   its  
subsidiaries,  but  without  any  compensation.  Two  early  claims  against  CSR  Ltd  
failed,   and   the   tort   claimants   died   before   the   determinations.459   Battles   to  
realise  justice  for  tort  claimants  in  asbestos  cases  continue,  and  some  of  the  
cases  are  successful,  in  which  the  parent  company’s  tort  liability  is  established.     
In   the   early   case   of   Barrow   and   Heys   v   CSR   Ltd460   in   1988,   the   parent  
company  CSR  was  alleged  to  have  owed  a  duty  of  care  to  two  employees  of  its  
subsidiary  company.  Both  the  claimants  contracted  mesothelioma  and  claimed  
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(Rowland  J).  
	   152	  
damages  against  the  subsidiary,  ABA,  and  the  parent  company,  CSR,  for  their  
negligence  in  failing  to  protect  the  plaintiff  from  the  exposure  to  unsafe  levels  
of  dust  containing  asbestos  fibre,  which  led  to  the  diseases.  The  case  on  the  
one  hand  showed  the  potential  difficulties  of  tort  litigation  faced  by  the  victims  
of  asbestos-­related  diseases,461   on  the  other  hand,  the  case  gave  an  example  
of  the  grounds  the  court  accepted  for  establishing  a  parent  company’s  duty  of  
care.  
     
In  Barrow   and   Heys,   several   grounds   for   establishing   a   duty   of   care   were  
discussed   before   the   Western   Australian   Supreme   Court.   Particularly,  
Rowland  J  focused  on  the  control  exercised  by  CSR  over  ABA,  on  the  basis  of  
which  he  found  a  duty  of  care.  The  existence  of  a  duty  of  care  and  the  violation  
of  it  lay  in  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  parent  and  subsidiaries,  
and  the  degree  of  control.462   His  Honour  held  that  there  must  be  control  “in  the  
sense  that  it  must  bear  upon  events  which  affect  the  particular  conduct  which  
causes  the  breach.”463   It  was  then  found  that  evidence  of  control  such  as  the  
control  of  managerial  appointments  applied  directly  to  the  day-­to-­day  affairs  of  
the  subsidiary:  the  mill  and  dust  control  at  the  mill  were  tasks  allocated  to  CSR  
employees  who  were   responsible  only   to   the  Head  of   the  Building  Materials  
Division  of  CSR;;  the  control  over  funding  of  ABA’s  operation;;  the  control  over  
the   subsidiary’s   budget.464   A   duty   of   care  was   hence   created   based   on   the  
ultimate  control  of  the  parent  company.  
  
In  Wren  v  CSR  Ltd  &  Another,465   the  court  provided  a  clearer  reasoning,  which  
may  represent   the  attitude  of  Australian  courts   to   the  asbestos  cases  at   that  
time.  The  plaintiff,  Norman  Wren,  was  employed  by  Asbestos  Products  Pty  Ltd  
(Asbestos  Products)   for   about   12  months,   from   early   or  middle-­1950   to   the  
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early  or  middle  part  of  1951.  On  29  March  1994,  Colonial  Sugar  Refining  Co  
Ltd   (CSR)   purchased   the   company   Asbestos   Products   Ltd.   The   mine   at  
Wittenoom  in  Western  Australia  was  conducted  by  Australian  Blue  Asbestos  
Ltd   (ABA),  which   subsequently   became  Midalco  Pty,   the   second   defendant.  
The  plaintiff  alleged  that  CSR  controlled  Asbestos  Products  Ltd  and  ABA,  so  
directly  as  to  be  responsible  in  law  for  its  negligent  acts  and  omissions.  Each  
defendant  raised  defences  under  sections  14  and  51  of  the  Limitation  Act  1969,  
and  alleged  that  the  claim  was  out  of  the  limitation  period.  The  arguments  were  
however   rejected  by   the  court,  given   the  nature  of  mesothelioma  -­  a  person  
does   not   have   it   until   shortly   before   symptoms   begin   to   manifest.   So,   the  
statement  of  claim  was  within  the  limitation  period.466  
  
The  court  did  not  think  that  the  plaintiff’s  injury  was  as  a  result  of  the  failure  of  
ABA  to  place  a  warning  upon  asbestos  bags.  This  is  because  the  element  of  
proximity  relationship  could  not  be  established  between  the  plaintiff  and  ABA.  
In  the  court’s  opinion,  only  employees  who  were  in  close  contact  with  asbestos  
bags  were  in  a  relationship  of  proximity  with  ABA.  However,  the  plaintiff  did  not  
ordinarily  carry   the  bags.  Neither  did  he  open   them,  nor  have  direct  contact  
with  them.  Thus,  the  court  ruled  in  favour  of  ABA.467     
  
As  to  the  parent  company,  the  court  held  that  CSR  owed  a  general  duty  of  care  
to  adopt  and  put  in  place  any  of  the  recommended  safeguards  and  precautions  
repeatedly.     
  
The   element   of   foreseeability   was   found   by   analysing   the   conditions   of   the  
workplace,  which  was  so  bad  that  it  was  sufficient  to  constitute  a  risk  of  injury,  
and  it  was  foreseeable  for  CSR.468   The  dust  was  visible  in  the  atmosphere  of  
the  factory  each  day,  it  accumulated  on  flat  surfaces.  Cleaning  the  factory  was  
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not   a   daily   event   but   took   place   on   Fridays.   No   masks   or   ventilators   or  
extraction  devices  were   supplied,   and  no  warning  was  given   to   the  plaintiff.  
Everyday,  the  plaintiff’s  clothes  were  dusty  and  his  hair,  hands,  and  face  were  
covered   in   asbestos   cement   dust.   This   condition   prevailed   throughout   the  
course  of  his  employment.469        
  
From  1928,  CSR  maintained  a  technical  library.  There  was  sufficient  material  
in  CSR’s  library  before  the  plaintiff  was  employed  by  Asbestos  Products.  This  
technical   library   was   available   to   Asbestos   Products   as   well,   to   make   the  
subsidiary  company  aware  that  asbestos  dust  was  dangerous  and  that  it  was  a  
carcinogen.470  
  
O’  Meally  J,  held  that  mesothelioma  was  an  asbestos  disease  like  asbestosis  
and  carcinoma.   It  was  a   foreseeable   risk  against  which   the  plaintiff  ought   to  
have  been  guarded.  
  
As  to  the  element  of  proximity,  the  court  held  that  it  could  be  well  established  
on   the   basis   of   the   nature   of   the   relationship   between   CSR   and   Asbestos  
Products.   It  arose  on  the   important   fact   that   “CSR’s   influence  over  Asbestos  
Products  was  dominant,   pervasive,   constant   and   controlling.”471   Specifically,  
this  was  reflected  on  CSR’s  board  level  and  day-­to-­day  activities  of  control:  not  
only  did  CSR  own  all  the  shares  in  Asbestos  Products,  but  also  the  operations  
of   Asbestos   Products   were   directed   by   CSR   staff.   Therefore,   if   Asbestos  
Products   were   liable   to   the   plaintiff,   so   were   CSR,   which   is   the   mind   and  
directing  will  of  AP.472  
  
It  was  also  found  that  there  was  no  policy  reason  for  denying  recognition  of  a  
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duty  of  care.  Thus,  CSR  had  an  obligation  to  ensure  that  no  foreseeable  risks  
of  injury  were  created  to  its  own  employees  who  worked  at  Asbestos  Products,  
or   to   the  employees  of  Asbestos  Products,  and  CSR   failed   to  carry  out   that  
obligation.  In  its  appeal  case,  CSR  Ltd  v  Wren,473   the  Court  of  Appeal  agreed  
with  the  decision  of  the  Dust  Diseases  Tribunal  of  New  South  Wales.  Besides,  
the  Court  of  Appeal  added  that  the  proximity  relationship  was  based  on  the  fact  
that  the  management  staff  in  charge  of  the  subsidiary’s  activities  were  actually  
employees   of   the   parent   and,   thus,   had   “assumed   responsibility”   for   the  
working   conditions   of   the   subsidiary.474   That   responsibility   would   definitely  
give   rise   to   a   duty   of   care   owed   by   CSR   Ltd   to   the   plaintiff,   which   was  
co-­extensive  with  the  duty  owed  by  an  employer  to  an  employee.475  
  
Another  Australian  case  in  which  a  parent  company  was  held  to  owe  a  duty  of  
care  was  CSR  Ltd  v  Young.476   In  this  case,  the  court  held  that  CSR  Ltd  owed  a  
duty  of  care  to  a  third  party,  the  children  of  one  employee  of  CSR’s  subsidiary  
company.  This  means  that  negligence  liability  could  also  be  established  on  the  
fact   that   the  parent  company   failed   to   take   the  expected   reasonable  care   in  
supervising  the  distribution  of  asbestos.477  
  
The   foreseeability   was   obvious,   and   proximity   of   relationship   could   also   be  
found   in   the   evidence   that   the   parent   company   had   been   appointed   the  
subsidiary’s  managing  agent   “with   full  and  absolute  authority   to  do  all   things  
necessary   for   the   proper   management   and   control   of   the   business   and  
undertaking  of  the  subsidiary”.478   In  this  circumstance,  CSR  had  a  duty  of  care  
to  avoid  foreseeable  injury,  not  only  to  the  people  who  worked  at  the  factory,  
but  also  to  the  residents  of  Wittenoom,  who  had  a  great  potential   to  develop  
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asbestos-­related  diseases.479     
  
It   is   not   difficult   to   find   that   a   duty   of   care   in   each   of   these   cases   exists   in  
particular   situations  where  a  high   level   of   control   is  exercised  by   the  parent  
company.   In   other   words,   it   is   not   conclusive   that   parent   companies   owe   a  
general  duty  of  care  to  employees  of  subsidiaries  if  short  of  such  control.     
  
Speaking  of   personal   injury   cases   relevant   to   corporate  groups   in  Australia,  
another   giant   corporate   group  which   cannot   be   ignored   is   James  Hardie,   a  
major   defendant   in   Australian   asbestos   claims,   which   had   a   dominant  
asbestos  market  position  from  the  1930s  until  the  mid-­1980s.480   James  Hardie,  
established  factories  in  many  parts  of  Australia  such  as  Camellia,  New  South  
Wales   (NSW),   Victoria,   Western   Australia,   and   Queensland.   The   earliest  
action  for  damages  against  James  Hardie  in  New  South  Wales  was  brought  in  
the  1930s.481   In  1989,  in  Briggs  v  James  Hardie  and  Co  Pty  Ltd,482   the  New  
South  Wales  Court   of   Appeal   rejected   an   application   to   hold   James  Hardie  
liable  for  its  subsidiary’s  debts  by  piercing  the  corporate  veil.  In  this  case,  Mr  
Briggs  worked  for  Asbestos  Mines  Pty  Ltd  and  contracted  asbestosis.  Briggs  
sought   compensation   from   James   Hardie   &   Co   Pty   Ltd,   which   was   a   joint  
owner  of  Asbestos  Mines  and  later  became  the  sole  owner.  Briggs  claimed  that  
Asbestos  Mines  was  the  agent  of  James  Hardie  and  beyond  the  corporate  veil,  
James  Hardie  was  the  controller  of  Asbestos.  The  court  refused  to  pierce  the  
corporate  veil,  because,  as  Rogers  A-­JA  demonstrated,  current  case  law  does  
not  clearly  draw  a  boundary  on  that  doctrine,  also,  simply  because  “the  parent  
company   had   a   capacity   to   exercise   control   over   its   subsidiary   and   had   on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479   ibid  64,953-­64,957.  
480   Australian  Council  of  Trade  Unions,  ‘James  Hardie  Asbestos  Victims  Compensation  Background  
Facts’  (2007)  <www.actu.asn.au/Images/Dynamic/attachments/5055/James%20H  >  accessed  01  Dec  
2014.  
481   Tim  Hammond,  ‘Asbestos  Litigation  in  Australia:  Past  Trends  and  Future  Directions’,  (World  asbestos  
report  on  Global  Asbestos  Congress  2004),  
<http://worldasbestosreport.org/conferences/gac/gac2004/PL5-­05.php>  accessed  01  Dec  2014.     
482   Briggs  v  James  Hardie  and  Co  Pty  Ltd  (1989)  16  NSWLR  554.  
	   157	  
occasions  exercised  that  capacity”  is  insufficient.483   However,  for  the  purpose  
of   recovering   from   the   parent   company,   the   court   assumed   that   there   is   a  
possibility   of   applying   tort   law  doctrines,   especially   the   tort   of   negligence.484  
The  amount  of  control  exercised  by  the  parent  company  is  likely  to  be  crucial  
to  the  final  outcome.  However,  at  that  time,  (10  years  before  the  appearance  of  
CSR  cases),  the  assumption  that  the  control  by  parent  companies  increased  
the  risk  of  injury  had  not  been  confirmed  for  establishing  a  parent  company’s  
tort  liability.     
  
Acutally,   James   Hardie   group   had   known   the   safety   problems   affecting   the  
employees   since   the   1960s.   In   2001,  Medical  Research   and  Compensation  
Foundation  was  established  as  a  trust  to  meet  the  relevant  liabilities;;  this  was  
owned  by  a  company  limited  by  guarantee  separate  from  the  group.  In  2009,  it  
was  found  by  the  NSW  Supreme  Court  that  the  controller  and  main  directors  of  
the   group   misled   the   Stock   Exchange   about   the   group’s   ability   to   satisfy  
asbestos   claims.485   Then,   the   ruling   was   overturned   by   the   NSW   Court   of  
Appeal.486   The  litigation  was  finally  ended  up  before  the  High  Court,  in  a  suit  
by  ASIC  against  the  controller  of  the  group,  in  2012.487   The  High  Court  found  
the   liability   of   parental   directors   and   officers   based   on   the   statutory  
provisions—ascertaining  the  duty  of  directors  based  on  civil  penalty  provisions  
of   Corporation   Act   2001-­Section   180(1),   which   requires   directors   of  
corporations   to   behave   in   the   scope   of   reasonable   degree   of   care   and  
diligence.  
  
The  James  Hardies  case  was  a  case  in  which  legal  responsibility  arose  from  
state  legislation.  The  legislation  places  an  obligation  on  government  inspectors  
to  ensure  compliance  by  asbestos  mine  operators,  with  safety  precautions  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483   ibid  557.  
484   ibid  556.     
485   ASIC  v  Macdonald  (No  11)  [2009]  NSWSC  287,  ASIC  v  Macdonald  (No  12)  [2009]  NSWSC  714.  
486  Morley  v  ASIC  [2010]  NSWCA  331;;  James  Hardie  Industries  NV  v  ASIC  [2010]  NSWCA  332.     
487   ASIC  v  Hellicar  [2012]  HCA  17;;  Shafron  v  ASIC  [2012]  HCA  18  (High  Court  of  Australia).  
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the   operation   of   their   mines.488   However,   the   James   Hardies   case   did   not  
provide   a   comprehensive   solution   to   corporate   tort   problems.   The   case  
reflected   the   conflict   of   interests   between   the   company’s   shareholders   and  
outside   tort  creditors.  An  appropriate  solution  was  expected   to  deal  with   the  
mass   tort   litigations   against   big   corporate   groups.   This   was   not   only   for  
remedying  corporations’  unsecured  creditors,  but  also  for  the  maintenance  of  
dominant  corporate  principles  of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality.     
  
However,   the   application   of   tort   of   negligence   in   the   personal   injury   cases  
relevant  to  corporate  groups  is  quite  limited  in  Australia.  The  establishment  of  
a  duty  of  care,  depends  on  the  existence  of  foreseeability  and  proximity.  It   is  
apparent   that   both   English   and   Australia   case   law   emphasise   the   role   of  
control   in   establishing   parent   company’s   negligence   liability.   However,   the  
facts  of  each  case  may  vary,  and  the  manner  of  operation  found  in  CSR  which  
contributed  to  the  liability  may  not  be  found  in  other  cases.489   It  is  obvious  that  
the   establishment   of   a   duty   of   care   owned   by   the   parent   company   for   its  
subsidiary’s   torts   is   restricted   in   very   limited   circumstances   -­   where   a   high  
standard   of   control   is   exercised   by   the   parent   company   over   the   relevant  
aspect  of  the  subsidiary’s  illegal  activities.  The  limitations  inherent  highlight  the  
need  to  develop  a  more  predictable  and  consistent  approach.  
  
3.3.2  United  States’  cases  
  
In  the  United  States,  corporate  group  liability,  especially  the  liability  of  a  parent  
company   for   the   debts   of   its   subsidiaries,   is   frequently   litigated.490   These  
litigations   have   raised  enormous  arguments,   comments   and   suggestions.   In  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488   A  further  example  of  where  a  third  party  to  an  employment  contract  was  found  to  owe  a  duty  of  care  to  
an  employee  is  provided  by  Gordon  v  James  Hardie  and  Co  Pty  Ltd  (1987)  Aust  Torts  Reports  80-­133.  
489   Witting  and  Rankin  (n  390)  101.  
490   Robert  B  Thompson,  ‘Piercing  the  Veil  within  Corporate  Groups:  Corporate  Shareholders  as  Mere  
Investors’  (1999)  13  CONN  J  INTL  L  379,  383.  
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the   US,   each  state  has   its  own   liability   laws,  and   these  kinds  of  actions  are  
usually  based  on   legal   theories  such  as   the   tort  of  negligence,  strict   liability,  
breach  of  warranty,  or  piercing  the  corporate  veil.     
  
Considerations   of   corporate   tort   cases   involving   asbestos   in   the  US   can   be  
traced   back   to   the   1930s.491   One   early   case   was   Pauline   Lasin   plaintiff   v  
Johns  Manville  Corporation,   in  US  District  Court   of  New  Jersey   in  February  
1929.492     
  
Pauline   was   a   widow   who   brought   a   negligence   claim   against   the   parent  
company   Johns   Manville   (JM).   Pauline’s   husband,   John   Lasin,   died   of  
asbestosis,   and  her   lawyer  advised  her   to   institute  an  action  against   JM   for  
$40000.   JM   admitted   that   John’s   death   was   as   a   result   of   exposure   to  
asbestos,  but  alleged  that  the  parent  company  had  no  culpability.  It  was  also  
submitted   by   the   defendant   that   Lasin’s   death   was   also   due   to   his   own  
negligence   in   that  he   failed   to   take   reasonable  care  of  himself  by  wearing  a  
face  mask.  Finally  the  case  was  settled  out  of  court  on  the  condition  that  JM  
could  give  some  charitable  compensation  to  Pauline,  similar  to  most  asbestos  
cases  at  that  time.493  
  
In   fact,   in   the   US,   tens   of   thousands   of   corporate   personal   injury   cases  
involving   toxic   material   manufacture   faced   the   same   problems   for   a   long  
time.494   Borel  v  Fibreboard  Paper  Products  Corp,495   was  the  first  case  in  the  
US  in  which  a  duty  of  care  (in  an  asbestos-­related  case)  was  imposed  on  a  third  
party  beyond  the  injured  claimant’s  employer.  In  Borel,  the  US  court  found  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491   Barry  I  Castleman,  Asbestos:  Medical  and  Legal  Aspects  (3rd  edn,  NYIF  1990)  145-­146.  
492   Pauline  Lasin  plaintiff  v  Johns  Manville  Corporation  US  District  Court  of  New  Jersey,  November  1929.  
Geoffrey  Tweedale,  Magic  Mineral  to  Killer  Dust  Turner  &  Newall  and  the  Asbestos  Hazard  (1st  edn,  OUP  
2000)  264.     
493   ibid.  
494   Jock  Mcculloch,  Geoffrey  Tweedale,  Defending  The  Indefensible:  The  Global  Asbestos  Industry  and  
its  Fight  for  Survival  (1st  edn,  OUP  2008)  50.  
495   Borel  v  Fibreboard  Paper  Products  Corp  493  F2d  1076  (5th  Cir  OLD  1974).  
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the  manufacturer  had  the  duty  but  failed  to  provide  the  workers  with  adequate  
warnings,   which   led   to   the   defendant’s   negligence   and   strict   liabilities.  
However,   it   is   a   pity   that   the   situation   of   this   case   is   not   that   helpful   in  
considering  the  relationship  between  the  parent  companies  and  subsidiaries.  
But   it  successfully  provided  a  possibility   to  establish  negligence   liability  on  a  
third   party   beyond   the   claimant’s   employer,   and   hence   encourage   the  
development  of  solutions  to  corporate  tort  problems  in  further  cases.  
  
In   the  multinational  claims,  US  courts  are  popular   forums   for  personal   injury  
litigations   against   international   corporations. 496    However,   similar   to   the  
situation  in  UK,  it  is  not  easy  for  the  claims  involving  transnational  corporations  
to  get   to   trial   in   the  US  courts,  where   there   is   inherent   lack  of  experience   in  
resolving  the  transnational  corporate  tort  problems.     
  
As   early   as   1984,   in   the   “Bhopal   accident”   in   India,   the   plaintiffs   brought   a  
negligence  claim  against  the  US  parent  company,  Union  Carbide  Corporation  
(UCC),   based   on   the   parent   company’s   involvement   in   the   subsidiary’s  
business,  which  manifested  in  the  parent  company’s  design  and  construction  
of   their   Indian   subsidiary’s   safety   supervising   system.497    However,   these  
arguments  were  never  properly  tested  in  a  US  trial,  for  forum  non-­conveniens.  
Although  some  victims  of  Bhopal  also  attempted  to  bring  litigation  against  UCC  
and   its   chairman   under   the   US   Alien   Tort   Claims   Act   (ATCA),   these  
ATCA-­based   proceedings   were   dismissed   on   the   grounds   that   they   were  
barred  by  the  settlement  orders  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  India.498     
  
The  ATCA  confers  judicial  authority  on  the  “US  district  courts  in  respect  of  any  
civil  action  by  an  alien  for  a  tort  only  committed  in  violation  of  the  law  of  nations  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496   Sarah  Joseph,  Corporations  and  Transnational  Human  Rights  Litigation,  (1st  edn,  Bloomsbury  
Publishing  2004)  16-­17.  
497   Kim  Fortun,  ‘Remebering  Bhopal,  Re-­figuring  Liability’  (2000)  2  Interventions  187,198.  
498   Sarah  Joseph  (n  467)  72.  
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or   a   treaty   of   the   United   States”.499   Any   corporate   member,   including   the  
parent  company,  can  be  held   liable  under  ATCA  if   their  “civil  actions”  breach  
the   “law   of   nations”,   or   violate   the   obligation   applicable   directly   to   a   private  
individual   or   corporate  member   under   common   transnational   law.500      In   the  
legal  practice,  proceedings  under  ATCA  are  infrequent  and  most  of  them  are  
based   upon   allegations   of   “corporate   complicity”   in   breaching   human   rights  
law.501           
  
Instead  of  bringing  actions  under  ATCA,  initiating  a  claim  under  tort  law  as  an  
alternative  way  may   be  more   attractive   for   the   claimants  who   intend   to   sue  
against  foreign  parent  companies,  to  pursue  compensation  for  physical  injuries  
or   remediation   for   environmental   damage. 502    Even   though   the   general  
principles   of   corporate   law   are   opposed   to   normal   allegations   of   the   parent  
company’s  liability  for  the  subsidiary’s  employees,  claims  based  on  negligence  
have  a  greater  potential  to  be  successful  than  any  other  approaches.  
  
In  the  US,  claims  against  parent  companies  are  not  uncommon.  Under  US  law,  
the  injured  employees  could  get  compensation  against  their  direct  employers  
through   Worker’s   Compensation   Act,   which   varies   from   state   to   state.  
Employers’  Liabilities  are  imposed  on  the  existence  of  employment  relationship  
and   injuries   occurring   in   the   course   of   employment.   Furthermore,   the  
employees  could  both  sue  their  employers  under  the  Worker’s  Compensation  
Act,  and  also  claim  against  a  third  party  beyond  the  employer  under  the  tort  of  
negligence.503   This  rule  applies  only  if  specific  independent  act  of  negligence  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499   Alien  Tort  Statute  (28  USC)  §  1350.  
500   Doe  v  Unocal  963  F  Supp  880  (CD  Cal  1997)  and  Beanal  v  Freeport  McMoRan  969  F  Supp  362,378  
(ED  La  1997).  
501   C  Forcese,  ‘ATCA’s  Achilles  Heel:  Corporate  Complicity,  International  Law  and  the  Alien  Tort  Claims  
Act’  (2001)  26  YJIL  487,488.  
502   Michael  Anderson,  ‘Transnational  Corporations  and  Environmental  Damages:  is  tort  law  the  answer?’  
(2002)  41  Washburn  LJ  399,  407.  
503   California  Labor  Code  2016,  s  3852;;  Waste  Management  Inc  v  Superior  Court  of  San  Diego  County  
(2004)  119  Cal  App  4th  105,  109.  
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exists.  The  tortfeasor  could  even  be  the  parent  company.504  
  
The   California   Supreme   Court   has   described   the   theory   of   negligence   as  
follows:  
  
The  general   rule   is   that  a  person  who  has  not  created  a  peril   is  not  
liable   in   tort   for   failing   to   take   affirmative   action   to   protect   another  
unless   they  have   some   relationship   that   gives   rise   to  a  duty   to  act.  
However,   one   who   undertakes   to   aid   another   is   under   a   duty   to  
exercise   due   care   in   acting   and   is   liable   if   the   failure   to   do   so  
increases  the  risk  of  harm  or  if  the  harm  is  suffered  because  the  other  
relied  on  the  undertaking.505  
  
The  US  Second  Restatement  of  the  Law  of  Torts  indicates  that  liability  for  the  
acts  of  third  parties  may  potentially  arise  where  either:  
  
(a)  A  special   relation  exists  between   the  actor  and   the   third  person,  
which   imposes   a   duty   upon   the   actor   to   control   the   third   person’s  
conduct,   or   (b)   a   special   relation   exists   between   the   actor   and   the  
other  [i.e.  the  plaintiff]  which  gives  the  other  a  right  to  protection.506  
  
In  consequence,  a  parent  company  can  owe  a  duty  of  care  to  the  subsidiary’s  
employee  or  other  affected  parties  beyond  the  separate  legal  personality.  The  
problem  is  how  to  identify  the  existence  of  negligence  of  the  parent  company.  
The  claimant  could  demonstrate  that  the  parent  company  assumed  a  duty  of  
care  to  provide  a  safe  workplace  for  its  subsidiary’s  employees.507     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504  Waste  Management  Inc  v  Superior  Court  of  San  Diego  County  (2004)  119  Cal  App  4th  105,111.  
505   Paz  v  State  of  California  (2000)  22  Cal  4th  550,  558.  
506   US  Second  Restatement  of  the  Law  of  Torts,  s  315.  
507   Waste  Management  Inc  (n  475)  110.  
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Under  section  324A  of   the  US  Second  Restatement  of   the  Law  of  Torts,   the  
establishment  of  negligence   liability   is  composed  of   the  duty,  breach  of  duty,  
proximate  cause,  and  damages  elements  of  a  negligence  action.  
  
The  negligence  theory  has  been  accepted  by  the  US  federal  and  state  courts  
for  a   considerable   time   to  determine   the   responsibility  of  parent   companies,  
dominant  shareholders,  and  directors.508     
Many  elements  are   involved   in  establishing  negligence   liability,   including   the  
causation  of   risk,509   element   of   reliance,   as  well   as   control,  which  are   quite  
similar   to   the   crucial   elements   of   negligence   in   the   UK.   Cases   in   the   US  
become  much  more  complex  and  troublesome  since   laws  differ  according  to  
jurisdictions.   In   addition,   the   same   legal   concept   or   theory   are   understood  
differently   sometimes   in   different   states.   For   instance,   the   “control”   element  
under  proximate  cause,  which  is  regarded  as  an  extremely  crucial  element  to  
illustrate  “proximate  cause”,  has  left  many  problems  to  be  resolved.  In  the  US  
case  law,  interestingly,  the  degree  of  control  for  establishing  negligence  liability  
was  understood  differently  in  different  jurisdictions.     
  
In  2007,  the  Illinois  Supreme  Court  gave  a  landmark  decision.  It  acknowledged  
that   the   “direct   participation”   could   be   a   feasible   element   for   creating   tort  
liability   under   Illinois   law.  Consequently,   corporate   liability   could  be   imposed  
without  applying  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing.  From  a  plaintiff’s  perspective,  the  
doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil  is  an  unattractive  option  when  attempting  
to  reach  the  deep  pockets  of  a  parent  company  because  this  doctrine  has  still  
not  developed  with  great  certainty   in   the  US.  Differences  exist   from  state   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508   United  states  v  Bestfoods  (1998)  524  US  51.  A  parent  company  could  be  held  liable  for  its  action  that  
violate  the  Comprehensive  Environmental  Response,  Compensation  and  Liability  Act  of  1980;;  Esmark  
Inc  v  NLRB,  887  F  2d  739,  757  (7th  edn,  CIR  1989)  A  parent  company  was  directly  liable  for  participating  
in  the  unlawful  conduct  of  its  subsidiary.     
509   Noted  by  the  California  Supreme  Court,  the  parent  company’s  involvement  must  have  increased  the  
risk  of  harm.     
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state  such  as  the  emphasis  on  the  evidence  of  veil-­piercing.510   Some  states  
like   Florida,   keep   a   conservative   attitude   and   remain   reluctant   to   apply   this  
doctrine.     
  
In  this  Illinois  case  of  Forsythe  v  Clark  USA  Inc,511   the  parent  company,  Clark  
USA,   was   brought   before   the   court   for   negligence,   since   its   subsidiary’s  
employee  died   in  a  workplace   fire.  This  negligence  claim  was  based  on   the  
parent  company’s  overall  budgetary  strategy.512   It  was  alleged  that  the  parent  
company,  Clark  USA,  breached  its  duty  to  exercise  reasonable  care  under  the  
tort  of  negligence,  and  Clark  USA  had  or  should  have  had  the  knowledge  that  
a   cost-­cutting   strategy   would   lead   to   the   subsidiary   company   to   make  
unqualified   employees   act   as  maintenance  mechanics.   Subsequently,   Clark  
USA  should  be  liable  for  the  two  employee’s  deaths.513  
  
The  Illinois  Supreme  Court  acknowledged  that  the  control  and  involvement  in  
the   subsidiary’s   business   contributed   to   the   fact   that   the   parent   company  
participated   in   its   subsidiary’s   tortious   conduct,   particularly,   if   a   parent  
company  was   involved   in   its   subsidiary’s   decision  making.   In   this   case,   this  
was   evident   in   the   parent   company’s   cost-­cutting  measures   imposed   on   its  
subsidiary,  and  the  proximate  cause  lay  in  the  lack  of  sufficient  funds  for  a  safe  
operating  system  which  resulted  in  the  injuries.     
  
Actually,  in  this  case,  the  court  provided  limited  circumstances  in  which  a  duty  
of   care   could   be   imposed   on.   This   included   situations   in   which   the   parent  
company  had  direct  participation  into  the  finance,  management,  or  business  of  
the  subsidiary,  which  led  to  the  injury,  such  as  the  budget  control.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510   Cindy  A  Schipani,  ‘The  Changing  Face  of  Parent  and  Subsidiary  Corporations:  Enterprise  Theory  and  
Federal  Regulation’  (2005)  37  Conn  L  Rev  691,700.  
511   Forsythe  v  Clark  USA  Inc  864  N  E  2d  227  (Ill  2007).  
512   ibid  231.  
513   ibid.  
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As   regards   the   concept   of   control   for   negligence   liability,   other   jurisdictions  
have   different   understandings.   In   the   case   of   Waste   Management   Inc   v  
Superior  Court  of  San  Diego  County,514   the  court  set  a  clear   limit  on  parent  
corporations’  liability  for  exercising  budgetary  control  over  subsidiaries.     
  
In  Waste   Management,   the   employee’s   family   brought   actions   against   the  
parent   company   for   negligence,   alleging   that   Waste   Management   (WM)  
prevented   the   subsidiary   from   replacing   out-­dated   garbage   trucks,   one   of  
which  subsequently  killed  WMCI  (the  subsidiary)’s  employee.515   The  claimant  
alleged  that   it  was  the  budgetary  control  over   the  subsidiary  that  caused  the  
death.516   The   court   noted   that   a   valid   negligence   claim   required   the   parent  
company  to  have  owed  a  duty  to  the  subsidiary’s  employee.517   However,  the  
court   placed   the   burden   of   providing   for   the   safety   of   the   subsidiary’s  
employees  solely  on   the  subsidiary  corporation.518   Consequently,   the  parent  
company  owed  no  duty  to  provide  a  safe  working  environment.  The  court  also  
held   that   the   plaintiff   could   have   recovered   on   a   direct   liability   theory,   but  
budgetary   control   was   not   sufficient   to   impose   direct   liability   on   the   parent  
corporation.519     
  
Another  case,  Coastal  Corp  v  Torres,520   was   in   favour  of   the  position  of   the  
court  in  the  Waste  Management  case.  The  facts  of  this  case  was  very  similar  
to   the  above   two   cases.  The   claimant   in   this   case  also   sued   in   negligence,  
arguing   that   the   parent   company   controlled   maintenance,   turnaround   and  
inspection   matters   at   the   subsidiary,   through   the   budget   control. 521    This  
allegation  was  rejected  by  the  court,  which  believed  that  a  parent  corporation  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514  Waste  Management  Inc  (n  475).  
515   ibid  105.  
516   ibid  107.  
517   ibid  109.  
518   ibid  109-­110.  
519   ibid  111-­112.     
520   Coastal  Corp  v  Torres  133  SW  3d  776  (Tex  App  2004).     
521   ibid  778.  
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was  only  liable  where  a  specific  control  over  the  activity  existed  and  resulted  in  
the  accident,  but  budgetary  management  should  not  be  included  in  the  scope  
of  specific  control.522  
  
More  generally,  the  parent  company’s  tort  liability  is  a  new  territory  for  the  US  
courts.   It   is  a  cause  of  concern   that   the  decisions   in   these  kinds  of  cases   in  
different  jurisdictions  in  the  US  may  lead  to  confusion  and  difficulties  for  courts  
in  future  cases.  The  courts  fail  to  construct  their  liability  rules  carefully  enough  
to  avoid  confusion.  Sometimes,  judgments  from  different  jurisdictions  may  add  
a   layer   of   complexity   to   an   already   complex   area   of   law.523   Unfortunately,  
similar  to  the  UK  and  the  Australia  case  law,  in  the  US,  the  application  of  tort  of  
negligence  in  the  litigations  for  personal  injury  against  the  parent  company  or  
other  relevant  members  in  a  corporate  group  is  still  a  developing  area,  which  
lacks  thoughtful  approaches  that  could  make  broader  improvements.  
  
3.3.3  Comparisons        
  
Compared  with  UK  case   law,   the  application  of   tort  of  negligence   in  creating  
parent  company’s  liability  is  in  a  developing  phase  in  Australia  and  the  United  
States   as  well.   Generally,   Australia   has   considerably   high   rates   of   asbestos  
litigation.  Australian  courts  had  opportunities  to  consider  corporate  tort  claims  
10  years  before  Chandler  v  Cape.  The  decisions  of   the  cases   involving  CSR  
Ltd  as  a  defendant  provided  valuable   indications.  Cases   like  CSR  v  Wren524  
and   CSR   v   Young, 525    reflected   the   approaches   of   Australian   courts   in  
determining   the   parent   company’s   negligence   liability. 526    The   concept   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522   ibid  779.  
523   Stephen  M  Bainbridge,  ‘Abolishing  LLC  Veil  Piercing’  (2005)  U  Ill  Law  Rev  77,  78.  
524   CSR  Ltd  v  Wren  (n  444).  
525   CSR  Ltd  v  Young  (n  447).  
526   Stefan  H  C  Lo,  ‘A  Parent  Company’s  Tort  Liability  to  Employees  of  A  subsidiary’  (2014)  1  Journal  of  
International  and  Comparative  Law  117,  118.  
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control  was  still   the  crucial  point  of  examination.  The   formulations   for   liability  
establishment  are  based  on  a  conservative  approach  of  the  Caparo  test.  Since  
the  decision  in  Sullivan  v  Moody,527   in  2001,  Australian  courts  have  adopted  a  
new  approach  named  “salient  features”  to  find  a  duty  of  care.  This  new  test  for  
negligence  liability  has  not  been  applied  in  group  situations  in  question,  but  is  
expected  to  conform  to  Sullivan.     
     
In   the  United  States,   corporate   tort   liability   is   also  a   common  and   frequently  
litigation   field.   The   US   Second   Restatement   of   the   Law   of   Torts   guides   the  
establishment  of  negligence  liability,  which  is  composed  of:  duty,  breach  of  duty,  
proximate  cause,  and  damages  elements;;  while   this   instrument  also  outlines  
the  circumstances  of  company’s  negligence  liability  for  the  acts  of  a  third  party.  
Elements  such  as  causation  of  risk,  reliance,  and  control,  are  crucial  in  creating  
the  liability  as  well  in  the  US.  
  
It  can  be  concluded  that  the  approaches  in  establishing  the  parent  company’s  
negligence   liability  are  considered  prudently  and  narrowly  by  courts   in  all   the  
three  countries.  They  all  attach  much  importance  to  the  elements  of  “reliance”  
and   “control”   in   creating   sufficient   proximity.  Similar   to  English   case   law,   the  
understanding  and  definition  of  “reliance”  and  “control”  for  creating  negligence  
liability  in  Australian  and  US  case  law  are  inconclusive  and  need  to  be  further  
elaborated  upon.  
  
In  Australian  case  law,  the  evidence  of  control  is  decisive  to  the  claims’  results.  
It   is   found   that   “the   relevant   control”   could   be:   control   of   managerial  
appointments   in   everyday   affairs,   control   over   funding   of   the   subsidiary’s  
operations,  control  over  the  subsidiary’s  budget;;528   parent  company’s  obvious  
dominant,   pervasive,   constant,   and   controlling   influence   over   the   subsidiary,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527   Sullivan  (n  418)  59.  
528   Barrow  and  Heys  (n  431)  217.  
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embodied  as  the  parent  company’s  day-­to-­day  activities  control.529        
  
In   the   US   case   law,   complexity   lies   in   the   different   understandings   of   the  
“relevant  control”  for  liability  imposing  in  different  jurisdictions  and  states  laws.  
In   one   prominent   case,   Forsythe   v   Clark   USA   Inc, 530    decided   in   Illinois  
Supreme  Court,   the  element  of  control  was  manifested   in   the  budget  control  
and  involvement  in  the  subsidiary’s  business.  Specifically,  the  parent  company  
enforced  cost-­cutting  measures  on  its  subsidiary,  and  the  proximate  cause  was  
on  the  basis  of  insufficient  funds  for  a  safe  operating  system.  However,  in  other  
similar  cases  such  as  Waste  Management,531   decided  by  the  Courts  of  Appeal  
of  California,  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Texas  case  Coastal  Corp  v  Torres,532  
only  the  specific  control  over  the  activity  leading  to  the  claimed  injuries  count.  
Budgetary  management  was  not  regarded  as  sufficient  or  even  relevant  to  the  
scope  of  “specific  control”.533  
  
The  approaches   to  parent  company’s  negligence   liability   in  Australia  and   the  
US  are  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis.  Similar  to  the  UK,  high  requirements  are  set     
for  the  “control  behavior”   in  Australia  and  the  US.  The  Court  of  Appeal   in  the  
English  case  Thompson  v  Renwick  Group  Ltd,534   refused  to  impose  a  duty  of  
care  on   the  parent  company  based  on   that   the  parent  company  appointed  a  
director  having  its  dominant  shares  in  the  subsidiary  company.  Similarly,  in  the  
Australian  case  of  CSR  Ltd  v  Wren,  the  claimed  evidence  for  proximity  rested  
on   the   fact   that   the  management  staff   in   charge  of   the  subsidiary’s  activities  
were   employees   of   the   parent   company. 535    Different   from   the   case   of  
Thompson,   in  CSR  Ltd,   the   court   imposed   negligence   liability   on   the   parent  
company,  not  because  the  management  staff  of  the  subsidiary  was  appointed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529  Wren  (n  436)  52.  
530   Forsythe  (n  482).  
531  Waste  Management  Inc  (n  475).  
532   Coastal  Corp  (n  491).  
533  Waste  Management  Inc  (n  475);;  Coastal  Corp  (n  491)  779.  
534   David  Thompson  (n  402).  
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by   the   parent   company,   but   because   relevant   facts   revealed   that   the   parent  
company  was  embodied  by  the  subsidiary  through  the  appointment  of  the  staff.  
The   sufficient   proximity   between   the   parties   lay   in   the   complete   overlap  
between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary’s  management.536     
  
In  many  corporate   tort  cases,   the  courts  are  conservative  when  applying   the  
tort  of  negligence  in  creating  the  parent  company’s  liability.  However,  we  do  not  
need  to  concern  about  whether  the  application  of  tort  of  negligence  will  conflict  
with  the  basic  principles  of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality,  which  
are  significant  obstacles  when  applying  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  
veil  in  these  kinds  of  cases.     
  
Courts   are   not   reluctant   to   impose   negligence   liability   on   parent   companies.  
Attention   is   required   when   considering   whether   the   parent   company’s  
involvement   in   the  management  or  operations  of   its  subsidiary  company  has  
overstepped   the   constitutional   rights   under   the   company’s   articles   of  
association   as   a   dominant   shareholder.   However,   parent   companies   are  
generally   granted   some   distinct   rights   than   other   shareholders   such   as  
delivering  instructions  over  their  subsidiary  companies.  Thus,  the  most  difficult  
issue   in   applying   the   tort   of   negligence   in   creating   liability   is   how   to   define  
whether  a  parent  company’s  control  over  its  subsidiary  company  goes  beyond  
its   rights   to   do   so.   This   is   the   question   that   is   expected   to   be   answered   by  
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In   recent   years,   courts   in   the   UK,   the   United   States,   and   Australia   have  
favourably   accepted   the   use   of   tort   of   negligence   in   establishing   liability   for  
corporate  torts.  The  long  and  gloomy  period  seems  to  be  fading,  when  courts  
always  hang  over  the  jurisdiction  issues  and  refuse  to  face  the  problem  directly.  
The   courts   have   showed   their   willingness   to   the   application   of   tort   of  
negligence  in  claims  against  the  parent  company  and  other  solvent  elements  
in  a  corporate  group.  In  all  the  three  countries,  compared  with  other  solutions  
(such  as  insurance  regimes,  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil  in  company  
law,   and   strict   liability   in   some   statues),   tort   remedies,   especially  
negligence-­based  mechanisms,  are  more  attractive,  reasonable,  and  feasible.  
But  the  application  of  the  elements  of  negligence  by  courts  is  not  yet  mature:  
there   is   a   lack   of   uniform   and   recognised   rules   in   one   country;;   courts   are  
expected  to  provide  more  practical  features  for  creating  a  negligence  liability;;  
and  the  vague  definitions  and  boundaries  of  some  essential  concepts  such  as  
“control”,   “reliance”,   “proximity”   and   “assumption   of   responsibility”,   open   the  
floodgate   to   future   confusion.   Therefore,   whether   the   parent   company   and  
other  elements  of  a  corporate  group  could  be  negligently  liable  in  tort  for  the  
employees  of  one  subsidiary  or  other  affected  parties  will  still  be  established  on  
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This  chapter  considers  an  alternative  way  to  create  parent  company’s  liability  
for  the  tort  of  its  subsidiaries,  on  the  basis  of  the  joint  liability  theory.     
  
As  discussed   in  Chapter  2,  English  courts  have  been  reluctant   to  pierce   the  
corporate   veil.   The   Supreme   Court   in   the   latest   veil-­piercing   case,  Prest   v  
Petrodel  Resources  Ltd,537   observed   that   the  circumstances   for  veil-­piercing  
are  very  limited  and  the  extension  of  this  doctrine  will  be  extremely  difficult  in  
the  current  view.  In  this  context,  the  Supreme  Court  in  Prest  commented  that  
lower  courts  should  try  to  apply  orthodox  principles  which  could  apply  with  full  
force   as   between   separate   legal   entities.   The   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance  
probably   can  meet   this   expectation,   especially   on   providing   compensations  
and   loss   distribution   in   situations   involving   multiple   tortfeasors.   Even   if   a  
claimant   cannot   get   recovery   against   the   principal   tortfeasor   due   to  
unexpected  excuses  such  as   the   latter  being   insolvent  or  having  a  defence,  
joint  liability  for  other  tortfeasors  may  attach  to  the  principal  tortious  act.  
  
The   theory  of   tort  of  negligence  as  a   relatively  efficient  mechanism  makes   it  
easier  for  corporate  tort  victims  to  obtain  satisfactory  awards  of  damages  from  
the  parent  company.538   However,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  the  “four-­part  test”  
created   by   the  Court   of   Appeal   seems   to   be   too   “Cape   specific”   and   is   not  
sufficient   for   future  needs  of  different  cases.   Indeed,   tort   law  has  developed  
some  other  mechanisms   for  making  one  party   account   for   another’s  wrong.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537   Prest  (n  173).     
538   Chandler  (n  87).           
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Compared  with  the  approach  of  establishing  a  direct  duty  of  care  on  the  parent  
company,  it  might  be  easier  to  pursue  the  parent  company’s  joint  liability  with  
its  subsidiary  company  in  some  circumstances.  The  “four-­part  test”  introduced  
in  Chandler’s   case   is   just   suitable   for   certain   circumstances,   as   laid   out   by  
Arden   LJ.   The   court   held   that   the   parent   company   would   be   liable   for   the  
health  and  safety  of  the  employees  of  a  subsidiary,  where:  
  
“(1)   the   business   of   the   parent   and   subsidiary   were   in   a   relevant  
respect  the  same;;  (2)  the  parent  had,  or  ought  to  have  had,  superior  
knowledge   on   some   relevant   aspects   of   health   and   safety   in   the  
particular   industry;;   (3)   the   parent   company   knew   the   subsidiary's  
system  of  work  was  unsafe,  or  ought  to  have  known;;  (4)  the  parent  had  
known  or  ought  to  have  foreseen  that  the  subsidiary  or  its  employees  
would   rely   on   the   parent   using   that   superior   knowledge   for   the  
employee's   protection.   Crucially,   it   would   not   be   necessary   to  
demonstrate   that   the   parent   company   regularly   intervened   in   the  
health   and   safety   policies   of   the   subsidiary   company   to   establish   a  
duty   of   care.   The   court   will   look   at   the   relationship   between   the  
companies   more   widely.   The   court   may   find   that   element   (4)   is  
established  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  parent  has  a  practice  
of  intervening  in  the  trading  operations  of  the  subsidiary,  for  example  
production  and  funding  issues.”539  
  
In  Dominic  Liswaniso  Lungowe  &  ors  v  Vedanta  Resources  Plc  and  Konkola  
Copper  Mines  Plc  (Lungowe  v  Vedanta),540     Okpabi  and  others  v  Royal  Dutch  
Shell  Plc  and  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  of  Nigeria  Ltd  (Okpabi  v  
Shell),   as   discussed   in   Chapter   3,   English   courts   has   extended   the  
circumstances  in  which  a  parent  company  could  be  liable  in  negligence  for  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539   ibid  [80].  
540   Dominic  Liswaniso  Lungowe  &  ors  v  Vedanta  Resources  Plc  and  Konkola  Copper  Mines  Plc  [2016]  
EWHC  975  (TCC);;  [2017]  EWCA  Civ  1528.  
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third   parties   affected  by   its   subsidiary   companies’   activities.  Particularly,   the  
courts   require   that   the   parent   company   should   have   control   over   the  
subsidiary’s  material  operations,  or  specific  operations  which  give  rise  to   the  
claimed  damage.     
  
The  doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasance,  provides  more  opportunities  and  possibilities  
of  considering  a  parent  company’s  liabilities  when  the  above  situations  are  not  
available  or  difficult  to  establish.  
  
In   the   consideration   of   laws   dealing   with   three   parties’   issues,   joint   liability  
theories   in   tort   law   seem   quite   promising   to   provide   tort   claimants   with  
alternative   attempts   to  widen   liability   and   seek   deeper   pockets.  Sometimes,  
even   though   the   tort   liability   cannot   be   established   against   the   “third   party”  
directly,  the  third  person/legal  individual  could  be  involved  in  some  way  in  the  
commission  of  the  tort  under  the  theory  of  joint  liability.  For  instance,  the  third  
party  can  be  involved  in  the  claimed  tort  jointly  with  the  primary  wrongdoer,  by  
procuring,   directing   or   authorising   the   act.   The   joint   liability   doctrines   can  
attach  to  torts  of  all  kinds,  including  intentional  torts,  intellectual  property  torts,  
breach   of   statutory   duty,   and   negligence.   The   object   of   the   joint   liability  
doctrines   is   to  extend   the  scope  of  potential  or  possible  parties  who  can  be  
liable  for  the  damages  to  the  tort  victims.  A  claimant  will  be  at  an  advantaged  
position   if   he   could   prove   that   the   damage   he   suffered   was   single   and  
indivisible  and  caused  by  several  persons,  thereby  reducing  the  risk  that  one  
of  the  defendants  becomes  insolvent.  Furthermore,  a  claimant  may  just  bring  
actions  against  the  “easiest  defendant”,  which  means  that  the  law  allows  the  
claimant  to  receive  the  total  sum  of  damages  more  easily  by  claiming  against  
just   one   defendant   for   the   whole   sum.   The   defendant   then   may   take  
proceedings   against   any   other   tortfeasors  who   are   responsible   via   the  Civil  
Liability   (Contribution)   Act   1978.   This   mechanism   is   quite   attractive   for   the  
claimant   because   it   provides   them   with   the   chance   to   obtain   the   whole  
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compensation,   rather   than   having   to   claim   against   multiple   defendants   and  
make  successive  actions.  
  
Joint  liability  theory  has  been  described  as  an  “obscure  and  under-­theorized”  
area  of  law,541   but  this  situation  leaves  room  for  further  development  and  the  
possibility  to  extend  liability  based  on  it.     
  
Thus,  this  chapter  explores  the  possibilities  of  using  joint   liability  doctrines  in  
creating  liability  in  corporate  groups.  Particularly,  this  chapter  argues  that  joint  
liability   doctrine   provides   a   great   potential   to   realise   the   parent   company’s  
liability  for  the  same  tort  with  their  subsidiaries.        
  
First   of   all,   there   is   a   need   to   introduce   the   theory   of   joint   liability.   In  
circumstances   where   several   tortfeasors   cause   different   and   independent  
damages  to  one  claimant,  and  lead  to  distinct  injuries,  the  torts  are  several  and  
each   tortfeasor  should  be   liable   for  his  own   fault.   If  multiple   tortfeasors’  acts  
cause   a   single   and   indivisible   damage   to   the   claimant,   then   the   claimant   is  
entitled  to  bring  actions  against  some  or  all  of  tortfeasors  for  compensation.  On  
this  occasion,  every  tortfeasor  is  jointly  and  severally  liable.     
  
Joint  liability  in  tort  arise  generally  in  two  ways.  When  several  tortfeasors  act  
with  the  same  common  goal  and  cause  the  single  and  indivisible  damage,  they  
are   joint   tortfeasors.   A   defendant   can   be   held   jointly   liable,   for   instance,   by  
procuring,   or   authorising   the   commission   of   a   tort   of   another   defendant.  
Additionally,   joint   liability   can   arise   from   the   tort   committed   by   an   agent   or  
employee  (Vicarious   liability).  The  cause  of  action  against  each  defendant   is  
the  same,  as  well  as   the  supporting  evidence.  A  court  has  discretion  on   the  
amount  of  damages,  and  the  claimant  then  can  take  proceedings  against  one  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541   Hazel  Carty,  ‘Joint  Tortfeasance  and  Assistance  Liability’  (1999)  19  Legal  Studies  489,  489.  
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or  all  parties  together  for  recovery.  
  
Where  several  persons  act  independently  but  their  tortious  actions  happened  
to   contribute   to   the   same   harm,   they   are   said   to   be   several   concurrent  
tortfeasors.542   As   the  same  with   joint   tortfeasance   rules,   the  claimants  have  
the  choice  to  sue  one  or  all  defendants.  The  benefit  is  that  the  tort  claimants  do  
not   have   to   be   concerned   about   arguments   of   damage   amounts   allocation  
between  co-­defendants,  who  should  undertake   the  burden  of  apportionment  
based  on  the  fraction  of  their  responsibility  for  the  injury.543     
  
The  asbestos  cases  particularly  attract  academic  discussions  in  the  context  of  
joint  liability.  In  this  kind  of  cases,  it  is  very  difficult  to  decide  whether  there  is  a  
single  and  indivisible  harm,  or  whether  the  harms  are  of  different  types  and  can  
be   apportioned   among   different   tortfeasors.544      Courts   are   cautious   in   the  
apportionment  of  responsibility  in  this  kind  of  cases,  and  are  normally  prefer  to,  
if  possible,  allocate  the  responsibilities  proportionately  according  to  the  level  of     
harm   the   defendants   make,   or   else   equally   distribute   the   contributions  
between   the   defendants. 545    In   one   category   of   asbestos   cases,   the   tort  
claimants   may   have   suffered   asbestos   exposure   at   different   times   when  
working  for  different  employers,  and  suffered  asbestos-­related  diseases.  The  
courts  are  normally  uncertain  on  the  allocation  of  responsibilities,  because  it  is  
not  quite  clear  whether  different  periods  of  risk  of  attracting  the  disease  should  
be   viewed   as   separate   types   of   harms.   The   difficulty   lies   in   the   causal   link  
between   the   defendant’s   omission   and   the   claimed   damage.   In   effect,   the  
causation  of  different  types  of  asbestos-­related  diseases  varies  from  multiple  
exposures  to  single  asbestos  exposure.  Mesothelioma  could  develop  just  after  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542   Fitzgerald  v  Lane  [1989]  1  AC  328,  Vision  Golf  v  Weightmans  [2006]  EWHC  1766  (Ch).  
543   Horsey  (n  290)  567.  
544   Witting,  Street  on  Torts  (n  280)  664;;  Barker  v  Corus  UK  Ltd  [2006]  UKHL  20,  [2006]  2  WLR  1027;;  
Sienkiewicz  v  Greif  (UK)  Ltd  [2011]  UKSC  10,  [2011]  2  AC  229;;  Fairchild  v  Glengaven  Funeral  Services  
Ltd  [2002]  UKHL  22,  [2003]  1  AC  32.  
545   Witting,  Street  on  Torts  (n  280)  664;;  Bank  View  Mills  Ltd  v  Nelson  Corpn  [1942]  2  All  ER  (CA)  477,  
483.  
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one   single   exposure,   while   another   asbestos-­related   cancer   like   asbestosis  
develops  due   to  accumulation  of  amounts  of  exposure.  Particularly,   in  some  
cases  the  claimant  might  have  suffered  both  asbestosis  and  mesothelioma.  It  
is  not  unusual  to  attract  multiple  asbestos-­related  diseases.546   In  this  case,  it  
is  quite  difficult  to  determine  the  responsible  person  or  persons  accurately  in  
the  victim’s  long-­period  working  life.  
  
The   UK   House   of   Lords   accepted   proportionate   joint   liability   in   this   kind   of  
cases   because   they   had   created   an   easier   test   for   causation   in   Fairchild  
case.547   This   is   a   leading   causation   case   in   tort   concerning   the   asbestos  
disease.  The  House  of  Lords  here  approved  that  the  causation  for  joint  liability  
could  be  met  on  a  basis  of  the  test  of  “materially  increasing  risk  of  harm”.  In  the  
case   that   the   claimant   worked   for   a   number   of   different   employers,   an  
appropriate  test  is  to  evaluate  whether  the  defendant  had  materially  increased  
the  risk  of  harm  to  the  injured  person.  This  test  has  the  potential  to  be  applied  
in  group  situations,  when  several  group  members  have  employed  the  claimant  
and  the  potential  defendant  (for  example  the  parent  company)  had  materially  
increased  the  risk  of  harm  to  the  claimant.     
  
The  approval  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  the  Fairchild  test  illustrates  that  in  the  
novel  cases   involving  multiple  defendants,   joint  and  several   liability  could  be  
imposed  and  the  defendant  has  only  proportionate  liability  for  the  part  which  he  
materially   increased   the   risk   of   harm.   It   was   then   questioned   whether   the  
solvent  members  should  bear  the  risk  of  other  defendants  going  insolvent.  The  
House   of   Lords   ruled   that   the   solvent   employer   should   not,   in   the   case   of  
Barker  v  Corus.548  
  
However,   under   the   pressure   of   various  mesothelioma   claims   from  unlawful  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546   Compensation  Act  2006,  s  3.     
547   Fairchild  (n  513).  
548   Barker  (n  513).  
	   177	  
exposure  to  asbestos,  the  government  introduced  the  Compensation  Act  2006,  
to  provide  guidance  just  applicable  to  cases  involving  Mesothelioma.549   In  this  
kind  of  cases  where  the  tort  claimant  is  diagnosed  with  mesothelioma,  former  
employers  who  have  exposed  the  victim  to  asbestos  dust  should  be  held  jointly  
and   severally   liable. 550    Criticisms   arise   due   to   the   special   treatment   of  
mesothelioma.  Arguments  against  this  resultant  regime  are  made  because  of  
the   unfair   consequences   of   the   employers   who   may   only   provide   minor  
contribution.  On  the  contrary,  as  the  law  stands,  the  picture  is  quite  attractive  
and  beneficial  for  tort  claimants  who  not  only  contract  mesothelioma,  but  also  
any   other   asbestos-­related   disease.   This   special   regime   has   introduced  
proposals   to  extend   the  scope  of   realising   joint  and  several   liability   for  other  
personal  injuries  in  relation  to  multiple  tortfeasors.     
  
However,   the   idea   of   proportionate   liability   is   controversial   on   whether   the  
solvent   tortfeasor   should   pick   up   the   proportion   for   which   the   insolvent  
tortfeasor   was   materially   responsible,   and   the   relevant   provision   in  
Compensation  Act  is  just  applied  in  mesothelioma  cases.  So  this  chapter  will  
not   further   discuss   the   idea   of   proportionate   liability   in   group   situation.   The  
well-­developed  doctrine  of  joint  tortfesance  based  on  defendant’s  involvement  
will  be  mainly  examined,  as  well  as  its  extension  in  group  cases.  
  
  
4.2  Doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasance  
  
In  common  law,  tortfeasors  responsible  for  the  same  harm  are  divided  into  two  
general   categories:   joint   tortfeasors   and   several   tortfeasors,   as   introduced  
above.   This   section   will   evaluate   the   possibility   of   creating   the   parent  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549   Witting,  Street  on  Torts  (n  280)  665.     
550   Sienkiewicz  v  Greif  (UK)  Ltd  [2011]  UKSC  10,  [2011]  2  AC  229  [1];;  Fairchild  (n  513).  
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company’s  liability  based  on  the  doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasors.  Firstly,  the  author  
will  undertake  a  review  of  the  doctrine.     
  
Distinct   from   several   concurrent   tortfeasors,   where   several   independent  
persons  cause  separate  torts  but  all  of  them  combine  to  lead  to  one  damage,  
joint  tortfeasors  are  held  liable  for  the  same  tort  on  a  basis  of  the  same  cause  
of  action.551   Joint  tortfeasance  embraces  a  considerable  range  of  cases.  It  is  
not  easy  to  clearly  define  the  scope  of  joint  tortfeasance  because  the  theory  of  
joint  and  several  liability  is  an  area  that  is  still  evolving.  As  to  the  definition  of  
joint  tortfeasors,  Scrutton  LJ,  adopted  the  following  words  from  John  Frederic  
Clerk’s  book  Clerk  and  Lindsell  on  Torts:     
  
Persons  are  said  to  be  joint  tortfeasors  when  their  respective  shares  
in   the   commission  of   the   tort   are  done   in   furtherance  of   a   common  
design…but  mere  similarity  of  design  on  the  part  independent  actors,  
causing  independent  damage,  is  not  enough;;  there  must  be  concerted  
action  to  a  common  end.552  
  
However,   this   definition   has   been   argued   in   later   cases   to   lack   clarity.   At  
different   times,   the   courts   have   noted   that   the   concept   of   common   design  
formulated  in  the  case  of  Kourse  is  quite  narrow.553   An  anomalous  exception  
to  the  “common  design”  is  that  an  employer  or  principal  can  be  held  vicariously  
liable   for   his   employee,   or   agent’s   tort.   In   this   regard,   the   employer   and  
employee,  master  and  servant,  principal  and  agent  are   joint   tortfeasors.   It   is  
generally   well   accepted   that   the   category   of   joint   tortfeasance   includes  
vicarious   liability,   authorisation,   procurement,   breach   of   a   joint   duty,   and  
concerted   action   to   a   common   design.554   When   considered   broadly,   joint  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551   Deakin,  Johnston,  and  Markesinis,  (n  292)  880.     
552   The  Kourse  [1924]  P140  (CA)  156.     
553  Mutua  v  Foreign  and  commonwealth  Office  [2012]  EWHC  2678  (QB);;  Fish  &  Fish  Ltd  v  Sea  
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tortfesance  can  be   reached  by   two  possible   routes:  a   “relationship   link”  or  a  
“participation  link”.555   Hazel  Carty,  uses  this  approach  to  explain  the  doctrine  
of  joint  tortfeasance  in  her  article,  as  have  other  legal  scholars.556     
  
Examples   of   joint   liability   based   on   the   “relationship   links”   include   vicarious  
liability,   the   liability   of   an   employer,   and   the   liability   of   an   independent  
contractor.557   To   establishing   joint   liability   based   on   a   relationship   link,   the  
relationship  between  the  tortfeasors,  such  as  the  relationship  of  employer  and  
employee,  principal  and  agent;;  as  well  as  the  elements  contributing  to  the  tort  
complained  of  by  the  claimants  should  be  both  proved.     
  
Different  from  the  “relationship  link”  basis,  to  achieve  joint  liability  according  to  
the  “participation  link”  test,  a  reasonable  and  sufficient  participation  of  the  joint  
tortfeasor   should   be   clearly   justified.   Currently,   it   is   generally   believed   that  
elements   of   authorisation,   procurement,   and   concerted   actions   are   three  
well-­accepted   participation   links   contributing   to   joint   liability.   However,   the  
scope   of   these   concepts   is   not   sufficiently   clarified.   It   is   because   of   the  
uncertainty  and  obscureness  of  the  scope  of  these  links,  that  we  have  some  
space   to   explore   whether   the   scope   of   these   concepts   could   be   extended  
reasonably   to  connect   the  parent  company  and   its  subsidiary  company.  This  
issue  is  crucial  in  the  present  chapter.  
  
The  issue  of  vicarious  liability  in  the  context  of  group  companies  seems  to  be  
more  complicated.   It   is  an  unresolved  question  whether   the  parent  company  
could  be  held  vicariously  liable  for  the  tort  of  its  subsidiaries.  So  far  English  law  
has   not   decided   whether   a   legal   entity   could   be   held   vicariously   liable   for  
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another  legal  person.  This  important  topic  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  
This   chapter   will   mainly   discuss   the   “participation   links”   based   joint  
tortfeasance.     
  
  
4.2.1  Concerted  action     
  
“Concerted   action”   as   a   participation   link,   or   a   test   for   joint   tortfesance   is  
mentioned   in   the   leading   case   of  The   Koursk.558   In   this   case,   Scrutton   LJ,  
clearly  acknowledged  that,  “…to  be  joint  tortfeasors…  there  must  be  concerted  
action   to   a   common   end.”559   It   was   accepted   and   then   developed   into   a  
category   of   test   for   joint   tortfeasance:  when   one   person   commits   the   tort   in  
concert   with   another   “in   furtherance   of   a   common   design”560,   they   are   joint  
tortfeasors.     
  
This  classic  definition  of  joint  tortfesance  was  previously  enjoyed  high  authority  
in   joint   liability   cases.   “A   further   common   design”   has   however   become   a  
technical   standard   in   evaluating   joint   tortfeasance.  A   typical   application  was  
found  in  the  case  of  Brook  v  Bool,  in  which  a  landlord  and  his  lodger  were  held  
jointly  liable  because  they  acted  in  concert  to  look  for  an  escape  of  gas  with  a  
naked  light  but  the  lodger  negligently  caused  an  explosion.561   In  this  case,  the  
court   found   that   both   tortfeasors   have   acted   for   a   common   purpose.   In   the  
case  of  Unilever  plc  v  Chefaro,  Glidewell  LJ,  observed  that,  not  only  must  there  
be  an  agreement  between  the  potential  defendants,  but  there  should  be  some  
act   in   furtherance   of   the   common   end   to   show   joint   liability.562   The   court   in  
Sandman  v  Panasonic  UK  Ltd,  noted  that  no  joint   liability  will  be  found  if   the  
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two  parties  just  acted  in  concert,  unless  it  was  proved  that  the  joint  tortious  act  
was  for  a  further  common  end.563     
  
Although  well-­accepted,  the  application  of  “concerted  action  for  a  common  end”  
as  a  test  for  liability  has  always  been  criticised.  In  the  case  of  Mutua  v  Foreign  
and   Commonwealth   Office, 564    McCombe   J,   suggested   the   potential   of  
achieving   joint   liability  of   the  British  government,   represented  by   the  Foreign  
and  Commonwealth  Office  (the  “FCO”),  for  the  five  Kenyan  nationals  who  were  
allegedly  mistreated  in  detention  camps  in  Kenya  when  it  was  a  British  colony,  
during  the  Mau  Mau  uprising  in  the  1950s.  McCombe  J,  recognised  that  there  
might  be  a  system  of  torture  of  detainees  as  part  of  a  common  design  shared  
by  the  colonial  government  in  Kenya  and  the  British  Government.  The  British  
Government   might   have   authorised   or   approved   a   policy   under   which  
detainees  in  the  colony  of  Kenya  were  mistreated.  In  this  case,  although  it  is  
not  obviously  convincing  that  the  British  Government  and  the  Kenya  Colonial  
Government   shared   the   common   design   to   ill-­treat   the   detainees   in   the  
detention  camps  of  Kenya,  McCombe  J,  indicated  that  the  scope  of  “common  
design”   might   be   extended.565   Maybe   the   “similar   design”   in   some   special  
circumstances  like  in  this  case,  could  be  included  in  the  scope  of  joint  design,  
however,  English  courts  have  not  accepted   this  kind  of  view  and   there   is  no  
any  precedent  on  this  issue.  
  
However,   just   as  Bankes   LJ,   alleged   in  The  Koursk,   “it  would   be   unwise   to  
attempt  to  define  the  necessary  amount  of  connection”,566   each  case  should  
be  determined  on  its  own  merit.  In  this  regard,  it  is  reasonable  to  just  define  the  
legal  elements  of  joint  tortfeasance  generally  but  not  to  restrict  them  to  certain  
conducts,   because   the   formulation   would   be   very   sensitive   to   the   facts   of  
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different   cases.   Thus,   it   would   be   quite   feasible   to   extend   the   pre-­existing  
formulation,   and   establish   joint   liability   in   group   cases,   and   any   other   novel  
circumstances.  
  
In  the  case  of  Unilever  v  Gillette,  Mustill  LJ,  suggested  to  expand  the  boundary  
of  the  test  as  following:  
  
Whether   (a)   there  was   a   common  design   between   the   primary   and  
secondary  parties  to  do  acts  which…amounted  to  infringements,  and  
(b)  the  secondary  party  has  acted  in  furtherance  of  that  design…this  
idea   does   not,   as   it   seems   to   me,   call   for   any   finding   that   the  
secondary   party   has   explicitly   mapped   out   a   play   with   the   primary  
offender.  Their  tacit  agreement  will  be  sufficient.567     
  
In  Unilever   v  Gillette,   the   concept   of   “common   design”  was   not   confined   to  
fixed  behavior.  The  implied  “joint  design”  between  joint  tortfeasors  such  as  any  
tacit  agreement  would  make  sense.     
  
In   the   case   of  Fish   &   Fish   Ltd   v   Sea   Shepherd   UK,568   the   Supreme  Court  
reconsidered   “concerted   action”   as   a   test   of   joint   tortfesance,   and   indicated  
that  the  boundary  of  the  concept  “common  design”  might  be  broader,  but  the  
court   at   the   same   time   set   out   some   new   restrictions   relevant   to   the  
assessment  of   liability.  This  case   involved  corporate  groups.  Although  not   in  
the  context  of  personal   injury,   it  still  provides  a  view  of  constant  attempts  by  
tort  claimants  to  widen  liability  in  seeking  for  deeper  pockets.  
  
The  claimant,  Fish  &  Fish  Ltd,  operated  a  fish  farm  off  the  shore  of  Malta.  The  
claimant   alleged   that   its   vessel,   used   for   fishing   and   transporting   tuna,  was  
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attacked  by  a  vessel  named  “Steve  Irwin”,  commanded  by  the  third  defendant,  
Mr  Watson.  As  a  result  of  the  attack,  a  cage  of  tuna  was  rammed  and  the  fish  
inside   was   released.   Mr  Watson   is   a   United   State   citizen.   He   founded   the  
second  defendant  Sea  Shepherd  Conservation  Society  (SSCS)  in  1997,  based  
in  Washington,  USA,  which  is  the  parent  organisation  of  Sea  Shepherd  entities  
including  the  first  defendant,  Sea  Shepherd  UK  (a  registered  charity  limited  by  
guarantee),  the  registered  owner  of  “Steve  Irwin”.  Mr  Watson,  is  the  director  of  
the  first  defendant  Sea  Shepherd  UK,  and  the  leader  having  overall  strategic  
control  of  SSCS.     
  
The   claimant   brought   actions   in   trespass   and   conversion   against   the   first  
defendant,   Sea   Shepherd   UK,   the   second   defendant,   SSCS   –   the   parent  
company  based  in  US,  and  the  third  defendant,  Mr  Watson,  implying  that  they  
were  all  joint  tortfeasors.  The  claimant  alleged  that  the  attack  was  performed  
as  a  part  of  the  second  defendant  SSCS’s  campaign  against  illegal  fishing  of  
Bluefin   tuna,   and   that   the   attack  was   committed   under   the   common   design  
among  the  three  defendants.  
  
During  the  trial,  the  first  defendant,  Sea  Shepherd  UK,  was  found  not  capable  
of  being  liable  for  the  tort  committed.  Hamblen  J,  dismissed  the  allegation  that  
Sea  Shepherd  UK  could  be  held  vicariously  or  directly  liable  for  the  loss.  The  
judge   in   the   preliminary   trial   held   that  Sea  Shepherd  UK  exercised  minimal  
importance   in   committing   the   tort.   However,   the   Court   of   Appeal   took   a  
different  view  and  observed  that  Sea  Shepherd  UK  was  jointly  liable  for  the  tort  
committed,  for  the  reason  that  “it  was  not  necessary  whether  or  not  what  the  
Sea   Shepherd   UK   did   should   have   been   of   any   real   significance   to   the  
commission  of  the  tort”.569   Then  Sea  Shepherd  UK  appealed  to  the  Supreme  
Court.     
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The  Supreme  Court  allowed  the  appeal  from  Sea  Shepherd  UK  by  a  majority  
of   three   to   two.  All   five   judges   agreed   on   the   test   for   liability,   but   they   held  
different  opinions  on  the  application  of  the  test  to  the  facts  of  this  case.  Lord  
Neuberger  and  Lord  Kerr,  concurred  to  the  lead  judgments  delivered  by  Lord  
Toulson,  while  Lord  Sumption  and  Lord  Mance  provided  dissenting  opinions.  
  
This  case  is  much  relevant  to  the  application  of  joint  tortfesance  principles  in  
the  context  of  corporate  groups.  It  provides  the  court  with  a  platform  to  revisit  
and   confirm   the   latest   test   of   joint   tortfeasance,   and   to  present   the   inherent  
controversial  points.     
     
The  main  issue  of  this  case  is  whether  the  contribution  of  Sea  Shepherd  UK  
(SSUK),   as   a   separate   legal   entity   from   SSCS,   to   its   parent   organisation’s  
anti-­fishing  campaign  and  subsequently  to  the  tort,  is  of  minimal  importance.     
  
As  to  the  test  for  joint  tortfeasance,  Lord  Toulson  recognised  that  a  defendant  
will  be  jointly   liable  for  the  tort  of  other  principal  tortfeasor   if  he:  “(i)  acts   in  a  
way  which  furthers  the  commission  of  the  tort  by  the  principal;;  and  (ii)  does  so  
in  pursuance  of  a  common  design  to  do  or  secure  the  doing  of  the  acts  which  
constitute  the  tort.”570     
  
It   seems   that   the   judges   had   no   any   dissenting   views   on   the   test   of   joint  
tortfeasance.  Lord  Sumption  expressed  his  agreement  that  a  defendant  will  be  
jointly   liable   if:   “(i)   he   has   assisted   the   commission   of   the   tort   by   another  
person;;  (ii)  it  is  pursuant  to  a  common  design;;  and  (iii)  an  act  is  done  which  is,  
or  turns  out  to  be  tortious.”571  
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Although  such  formulation  (of  the  test)  was  adopted  in  this  case,  it  is  however  
unwise   to  define   the  connection  needed  between   the  defendant  and   the   tort  
committed  by  other   joint  defendants,  since   the   liability  determination   is  quite  
fact-­sensitive. 572    In   addition,   the   case   raises   controversies   on   the   issue  
whether   sufficient   (not   minimal)   assistance   under   a   common   design   is  




The  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court  concurred  to  the  view  that  the  contribution  
of   the   joint   tortfeasor  should  not  be  minimal   in   the  commission  of   the   tort.574  
This   position   is   contrary   to   the   decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeal,   in   which  
Beatson  LJ  believed  that:     
  
It   was   not   necessary   that   what   the   first   defendant   did   should   have  
been   of   any   real   significance   to   the   commission   of   the   tort.   The  
purpose   of   scrutinizing   what   the   first   defendant   did   was   simply   to  
decide  whether  it  was  possible  to  infer  a  common  design.575        
  
In  the  Supreme  Court,  the  justices  differed  in  the  application  of  the  test  of  joint  
liability.   In   this   case,  Lord  Sumption  and  Lord  Mance,   consistently  observed  
that   the   appellant   SSUK’s   participation   in   relation   to   fundraising   and  
recruitment  of  volunteers,  though  small,  could  not  be  regarded  as  so  trivial  that  
it   was   to   be   ignored   in   the   eyes   of   the   law.576   Subsequently,   it   would   be  
possible   to   establishing   a   joint   liability   between   the   parent   entity   and   its  
subsidiaries   if   relevant   facts  are   found   that   cannot  be  said   to  be   ineffective.  
This   is   because,   currently,   no   consistent   rules   are   made   to   determine   the  
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“effective  contribution”  in  commission  of  tort.     
  
This   suggests   that   the   determination   of   joint   tortfeasance   depends   on   the  
court’s   discretion.   In   the  opinion  of   Lord  Sumption,   the  assistance  of   a   joint  
tortfeasor   should   be   material   but   should   not   be   restricted   to   be   significant,  
because   no   justification   has   ever   required   that   it   should   be   more   than  
deminimis.  Lord  Sumption  broadened  the  scope  of  the  test,  by  suggesting  that  
“significant   assistance”   in   furtherance   of   the   common   design   should   not   be  
considered  as  the  only  effective  fact  for  liability.  
  
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  simply  indicates  
the   failure   to  make  SSUK   jointly   liable,  and   that   the  case  cannot  be  sued   in  
England   and   Wales.   Acts   of   the   US   parent   organisation   (SSCS)   obviously  
would   not   be   condoned.   Mr   Watson,   who   commanded   Steve   Irwin   to  
undertake   anti-­fishing   activity,   described   himself   as   the   leader   with   overall  
strategic  control  of  the  parent  organisation,  and  the  director  of  SSUK.  Facts  of  
this  nature,  which  are  based  on  the  overall  “control”  by  the  leader  of  the  parent  
organisation   would   sufficiently   support   a   common   design   and   action   in  
furtherance  to  it.     
  
Application  into  group  cases     
  
Having  reviewed  the  latest  test  of  joint  tortfeasance,  this  section  considers  the  
possibility  of  applying  the  current  test  in  group  situations.     
  
The  reason  why  we  consider  to  establishing  the  parent  company’s  liability  on  a  
basis   of   joint   liability   theory   is   that   it   makes   it   possible   to   add   potential  
defendants   to   fully   compensate   claimants.  When   the   test   for   joint   liability   is  
satisfied,   the   responsibility  will  be  attributed   to  anyone  who  has  ever  shared  
the   common   design   and   actions   in   furtherance   of   it.   Therefore,   to   make   a  
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parent   company   jointly   liable  with   its   subsidiaries,   there   should   be   sufficient  
connections  between  the  parent  company’s  actions  and  the  claimed  torts,  both  
of   them  are   in   furtherance  of   a   common  design.  The  parent   company  must  
have   been   effectively   involved   in   the   commission   of   the   tort,   and   mere  
facilitation   without   a   common   design   does   not   make   it   a   joint   tortfeasor.  
Particularly,   the   two   essential   elements,   “common   design”   and   “acts   in  
furtherance   of   it”,   should   be   both   satisfied   according   to   specific   facts   on   a  
case-­by-­case  basis.  As  suggested  in  the  Fish  &  Fish  case,  this  is  a  one  stage  
test,  rather  than  a  two-­stage  test.577           
  
In  the  Fish  &  Fish  case,  the  Supreme  Court  listed  nine  relevant  factors  for  the  
overall  assessment  of   the   involvement  of  other  parties   in   the  commission  of  
the  principal   tort,  and  observed  that,   “…the  presence  or  absence  of  a  single  
factor   may   not   of   itself   be   determinative   nor   is   the   list   exhaustive.”578   The  
factors  indicated  below  are  of  much  relevance  to  the  group  situation:     
  
…the  extent  to  which  the  other  party  exercises  or  can  exercise  control  
over   the  tortious  actor,  and  does  so   in  relation  to  the  commission  of  
the   tort;;   the   extent   to   which   the   other   party   is   responsible   for   the  
conception,   formulation   and   planning   of   the   common   design;;   the  
extent   to  which   the  designs  of   the   tortious  actor  and   the  other  party  
are  conterminous;;  the  extent  to  which  the  commission  of  the  particular  
tort  was  an  inevitable  or  intended  consequence  of  the  common  design;;  
whether   the   other   party   is   present   at   the   time   and/or   place   of   the  
commission  of  the  tort.579     
  
Based   on   the   above   factors,   we   assume   that   the   parent   company   or   the  
directors  of  the  parent  company  can  be  held  jointly  liable  when  they  exercise  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577   ibid  1229,  1232.     
578   ibid.     
579   ibid.  
	   188	  
certain  degree  of  control  over  the  principal  tortfeasor.  Circumstances  of  control  
may  include  that  the  parent  company  or  parent  company’s  director  controls  a  
majority   votes   on   the   board   of   the   subsidiary   company,   or   has   a   major  
influence  over  the  board  members  of  the  subsidiaries.  In  this  regard,  a  parent  
company’s  joint  liability  may  be  established  if  the  parent  company’s  influence  
over   its  subsidiary  company’s  board  meeting   is   in  relation  to  the  subsidiary’s  
relevant  policy,  and  leads  to  personal  injuries.     
  
Particularly,   the   court   should   take   note   of   the   overlapping   directors   in   the  
parent  company  and  the  subsidiary  companies.  The  overlapping  directors  can  
“wear   two   hats”,   in   which   they   can   act   in   different   guises   when   sitting   on  
different  boards.  The  courts  need   to   take  a   realistic  view  about  whether   this  
happens.     
  
In  Chandler  v  Cape  plc,  the  Court  of  Appeal  determined  negligence  liability  of  
the   parent   company,   Cape,   but   failed   to   talk   about   the   application   of   joint  
liability   theory   in   this   case.   As   initially   asked   by   the   relevant   claimants   (in  
Chandler  v  Cape),  we  question  whether  Cape  can  be  held  jointly  liable  for  its  
subsidiary’s  negligence.  
  
In  this  case,  the  crucial  facts  upon  which  the  Court  decided  to  establishing  a  
duty  of  care  on  the  parent  company  are:  Cape  Industries  as  a  parent  company  
was   found   to   be   highly   involved   in   the   management   and   business   of   its  
subsidiary  (Cape  Products),  and  also  involved  in  the  group  employees’  safety  
policy  making.580   Specifically,   the   court   found   that,  Cape’s   influential   control  
over  its  subsidiary  rested  on  the  following  facts:     
  
Cape’s   board   minutes   show   that   Cape   Products   could   not   incur  
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capital   expenditure   without   parent   company   approval;;   Cape   was  
clearly  in  the  practice  of  issuing  instructions  about  the  products  of  the  
company  such  as  about  products  mixes.581  
  
It  is  obvious  that  Cape  exercised  a  high  degree  of  control  over  some  aspects  
of  its  subsidiary,  which  could  make  Cape  responsible  for  the  subsidiary’s  tort.  
According  to  the  nine  factors  listed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  Fish  &  Fish,  the  
extent  of  exercising  control  by  a  parent  company  over  the  tortious  subsidiary,  
could  be  counted  as  an  effective  element  for  joint  tortfeasance.  Therefore,  we  
may  assume  that  the  material  control  exercised  by  Cape  over  Cape  Product’s  
asbestos   business   and   group   safety   policy,   could   contribute   to   a   common  
design  with  Cape  Products.   In  addition,  Cape’s  significant  contribution  to  the  
decision  making  of   the  Cape  Products’   business   and   the   employee’s   health  
and   safety   policy   could   sufficiently   be   given   as   the   parent   company’s  
involvement   in   the   commission   of   the   tort   of   Cape   Products.   Thus,   it   is  
reasonable   to  make  Cape   jointly   liable   for   its   subsidiary’s   negligence   in   this  
case.     
  
Based  on  the  above  discussion,  we  conclude  that  the  parent  company  could  
be   held   jointly   liable   with   their   subsidiaries   when:   (1)   the   parent   company  
exercises   absolute   control   over   the   subsidiaries’   business   or   the   parent  
company   exercises   certain   control   over   the   subsidiaries   in   relation   to   the  
tortious  act  claimed.  For  example,  the  parent  company  exercises  control  over  
the   health   and   safety   policy  making   for   the   subsidiaries’   employees;;   (2)   the  
parent   company   materially   contributes   to   the   commission   of   the   tort.   For  
instance,  the  parent  company  exercises  high  involvement  in  certain  acts  with  
the  subsidiary,  which  further  leads  to  the  tortious  act  claimed  by  the  victims;;  (3)  
the  relevant  control  and   involvement   in  furtherance  of   the  commission  of   the  
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tort  could  be  given  as  part  of  a  common  design.     
  
To  summarise,  limited  courts’  authorities  are  found  to  make  parent  companies  
jointly  held  liable  with  their  subsidiaries  in  personal   injury  contexts.  However,  
some   English   cases   are   of   much   relevance   in   determining   the   parent  
company’s   joint   liability.   These   cases   indicate   some   relevant   factors   in  
assessing  whether  a  parent  company  could  be  a  joint  tortfeasor.  
  
The  US  case  of  Amoco  Cadiz  
  
Generally,  US  courts  are  more  willing  to  accept  the  application  of  joint  liability  
theory   in   corporate   tort   cases.   Some   cases   are   found   to   be   determined   as  
intra-­group  liability  cases,  in  which  liabilities  are  imposed  on  parent  companies  
for   subsidiaries’   torts. 582    Particularly,   these   cases   involve   environment  
damage  and  workplace   injury,  where  courts  are  exposed   to,  and  have   to  be  
aware   of   the   public   pressure.583   The   decision   in   the   case   of   The   Amoco  
Cadiz,584   given   by   the   US   District   Court   explains   how   a   joint   tortfeasance  
approach  works.     
  
Amoco  Cadiz,  was   a   vessel   carrying   a   cargo   of   light   crude   oil   from   Iran   to  
Western  Europe.  It  was  owned  by  Amoco  Transport  Co.,  (ATC),  and  designed  
and   constructed   in   Spain   by   the   company   Astilleros   Espanoles   SA.   On   16  
March   1978,   the   vessel   rolled   heavily   because   of   a   severe   storm   and  
grounded  on  the  rocks  off  the  coast  of  France.  After  unsuccessful  attempts  to  
repair   the   steering   gear,   a   salvage   tug   owned   and   operated   by   Bugsier  
Reederer  Und  Bergungs  A.G.  tried  to  offer  help  to  Amoco  Cadiz  by  towing  the  
vessel.  The  assistance  failed  soon  and  the  vessel  grounded.  The  oil  cargo  on  
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Amoco   Cadiz   was   discharged   and  more   than   around   200,000   tons   of   light  
crude   oil   leaked   into   the   ocean,   polluting   hundreds   of   miles   of   the   French  
coastline.     
  
The  French  claimants,  including  the  Republic  of  France,  French  municipalities  
and  businesses,  brought  actions  against  Amoco  Group  and  the  Spanish  vessel  
constructing  company,  Astilleros  Espanoles  SA,  in  the  US  District  Court  for  the  
Northern  District  of   Illinois.  The  French  claimants  brought  negligence  claims  
against  ATC  (the  owner  of  the  vessel  Amoco  Cadiz),  Amoco  International  Oil  
Co.,   (AIOC),   and   their   parent   company,   Standard   Oil   Co.,   (Standard).   The  
claimants   alleged   that   the   accident   of   Amoco   Cadiz   was   caused   by   the  
negligence  of  the  relevant  parties  in  the  Amoco  Group  in  the  course  of  building,  
maintenance,  and  operating  the  vessel.     
  
Judge   Frank   McGarr,   imposed   liability   on   both   of   the   subsidiaries   and   the  
parent   company,  Standard.  He  observed   that,   in   the   first   place,  ATC  as   the  
owner  of  Amoco  Cadiz,  “had  failed  to  meet  the  burden  of  proving  that   it  was  
free   from   privity   and   knowledge   with   respect   to   the   negligence   which  
proximately  caused  the  grounding  of  the  vessel.”585   As  to  another  subsidiary,  
AIOC,  Frank  McGarr  J,  concluded  that  this  party  was  negligently  liable  on  the  
basis   that   it   exercised   complete   control   over   the   operating,  maintaining   and  
repair  of  the  vessel,  as  well  as  training  of  her  crew.  In  this  regard,  AIOC  has  a  
duty   to   make   sure   that   the   vessel   was   properly   maintained.586   Particularly,  
Standard,   as   the   parent   company  was   determined   as   a   joint   tortfeasor  with  
ATC  and  AIOC   for   their   negligent   acts  which   led   to   the   damage,   and   to   be  
solely  liable  as  well.587  
  
Judge  Frank  McGarr  observed  that:  
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Standard,   as   a   multinational   corporation   was   responsible   for   the  
tortious   acts   of   its   wholly   owned   subsidiaries,   AIOC   and   Transport;;  
Standard   itself   was   initially   involved   in   and   controlled   the   design,  
construction,  operation  and  management  of  Amoco  Cadiz  and  treated  
the  vessel  as  if  it  were  its  own  so  that  Standard  was  liable  for  its  own  
negligence  and  that  of  AIOC  and  Transport  to  the  French  claimants.588  
  
The   high   involvement   of   the   parent   company,   Standard,   in   the   vessel’s  
management,   and   its   control   over   the   subsidiaries’   decision-­making  
mechanism  were  given  as  sufficient  connections  between  the  parent  company,  
the  subsidiaries  and  its  negligent  acts.     
  
The  judgment  given  by  Judge  McGarr  in  this  case  was  quite  favourable  to  the  
claimants,   and   in   the   long   run,   to   the   future   potential   claimants.589   The  
decision   of   Amoco   Cadiz   provides   the   possibility   that   the   parent   company  
would  not  be  able  to  avoid  liability  if  it  makes  decisions  which  have  significant  
influence  over  its  subsidiaries’  business.  In  this  case,  the  parent  company  was  
made   liable   due   to   its   decisions   on   the   construction,   operation   and  
maintenance  of  the  shipping  business  of  its  subsidiary.  It  was  also  suggested  
that   the   parent   company’s   liability   could   be   established   on   the   basis   of  
integrated  management.590   Unfortunately,  case  law  in  this  area  is  quite  limited  
and  is  not  able  to  provide  sufficient  guidance  to  support  the  fact  of  “integrated  
management”  as  a  sufficient  factor  to  create  joint  liability.     
  
In  the  case  of  Larry  Bowoto  v  Chevron  Corp,591   the  court  declined  to  hold  the  
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parent  company  liable  even  though  a  high  degree  of  integrated  management  
was  found.  The  claimants  from  Nigeria  brought  actions  against  the  US  parent  
company  Chevron  Corp,  alleging  that  the  parent  company  should  be  liable  for  
the   torts   of   its   Nigerian   subsidiary.   The   claimants,   Nigerian   citizens   were  
injured  because  of   the   serious  human   rights  abuses  of   the  Nigerian  military  
personnel.   It   was   alleged   by   the   claimants   that   the   subsidiary   company  
Chevron   Nigeria   Ltd   supported   the   actions   of   the   Nigerian   military   and   the  
injuries   arose   from   its   complicity   with   the   Nigerian   military.   The   US   parent  
company  Chevron  Corporation  was  alleged  to  be  responsible   for   the   injuries  
as  well  because  of  the  high  degree  of  involvement  in  communication  with  the  
subsidiary   in   the   course   of   the   incident,   and   the   high   number   of   parent  
company’s   employees   in   the   subsidiary.   The   claimants   believed   that   these  
evidence  supported  a  high  degree  of  control  and  agency  relationship.  These  
factors   would   have   contributed   to   the   parent   company’s   liability   under   the  
1962(c)  of  the  Racketeer  Influenced  and  Corrupt  Organizations  Act  (RICO).592     
  
In   the   discussion   of   the   indirect   liability   of   the   parent   company,   the   court  
believed   that   the   high   degree   of   control   of   the   parent   company   was   not  
sufficient   to   contribute   to   the   agency   relationship   to   achieve   a   parent  
company’s   liability   under   the   theory   of   agency.593   The   court   held   that   to  
establish  the  liability   in  this  case  under  the  RICO,  the  claimants  should  have  
argued  that  the  parent  company  benefited  from  the  wrongful  behaviour  (RICO  
violations)  through  their  agents  (Nigerian  subsidiary).594     
  
In   the  concluding  part  of   this  summary   judgment,   the  court  noted   that  many  
cases  were  quite  arguable  and  still  unresolved  in  connection  with  this  motion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592   Racketeer  Influenced  and  Corrupt  Organizations  Act,  1962(c):  “it  is  unlawful  for  any  person  employed  
by  or  associated  with  any  enterprise  engaged  in,  or  the  activities  of  which  affect,  interstate  or  foreign  
commerce,  to  conduct  or  participate,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  the  conduct  of  such  enterprise's  affairs  
through  a  pattern  of  racketeering  activity  or  collection  of  unlawful  debt."     
593   Larry  Bowoto  v  Chevron  Corporation  [2007]  481  F  Supp  2d  1010,  1018.  
594   ibid  1152-­1155.     
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The   court   admitted   that   the   results   were   sad,  maybe   even   tragic,   but   as   a  
matter  of  law  the  decision  had  to  be  for  the  defendants.595     
  
If  we  compare  the  judgments  of  the  Chevron  Corporation  case  and  the  Amoco  
Cadiz   case,   it   is   not   difficult   to   find   that   the   success   of   the   latter   rests   on  
sufficient   evidence   to   support   the   existence   of   high   involvement   or   active  
participation  in  the  relevant  business/incident  of  the  subsidiary,  which  provides  
a  causal  link  between  the  parent  company’s  actions  and  the  occurrence  of  the  
tort.   In   addition,   this   kind   of   evidence   supports   the   combined   relationship  
between   the   parent   and   the   subsidiary   company,   based   on   which   a   parent  
company’s  liability  could  be  achieved  under  the  doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasance.     
  
Thus,   in   the   majority   of   the   relevant   cases   where   courts   avoid   to   hold   the  
parent   company   liable   based   on   the   doctrine   of   veil   piercing,   agency  
relationship,  or  on  the  existence  of  relevant  control  (because  of  the  extremely  
high   adherence   to   the   separate   legal   entity   principle),   alternatives   of   joint  
tortfeasance   theory   on   a   basis   of   parent   company’s   concerted   actions,  
procurement  or  authorisation  can  be  tried  to  create  the  liability.  Particularly,  the  
active  participations  in  the  subsidiary’s  business  and  the  relevant  incident  that  
causes  the  claimed  tort,  can  reasonably  contribute  to  the  liability.     
  
The  amount  of  control     
  
As  to  the  amount  of  control  required  to  establishing  a  parent  company’s  liability,  
US  courts  have  developed  checklists  about  the  degree  of  control  necessary  to  
create   a   parent   company’s   liability.   In   particular,   Illinois   courts   have   listed  
eleven   elements   as   indicators   of   parent   company’s   dominance.   These  
elements  are:     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595   ibid  1128.        
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(1)  the  parent  corporation  owns  all  or  most  of  the  capital  stock  of  the  
subsidiary;;   (b)   the  parent  and  subsidiary  corporations  have  common  
directors  or  officers;;  (c)  the  parent  corporation  finances  the  subsidiary;;  
(d)   the   parent   corporation   subscribes   to   all   the   capital   stock   of   the  
subsidiary  or  otherwise  causes  its  incorporation;;  (e)  the  subsidiary  has  
grossly  inadequate  capital;;  (f)  the  parent  corporation  pays  the  salary  or  
other  expenses  and  losses  of  the  subsidiary;;  (g)  the  parent  corporation  
has  substantially  no  business  except  with  the  parent  corporation  or  no  
assets  except  those  conveyed  to  it  by  the  parent  corporation;;  (h)  in  the  
papers  of  the  parent  corporation  or  in  the  statements  of  its  officers,  the  
subsidiary   is   described   as   a   department   or   division   of   the   parent  
corporation,  or  its  business  or  financial  responsibility  is  referred  to  as  
the   parent   corporation's   own;;   (i)   the   parent   corporation   uses   the  
property  of  the  subsidiary  as  its  own;;  (j)  the  directors  or  executives  of  
the  subsidiary  do  not  act  independently  in  the  interest  of  the  subsidiary  
but  take  their  orders  from  the  parent  corporation;;  (k)  the  formal  legal  
requirements  of  the  subsidiary  are  not  observed.596  
  
US  courts  are  inclined  to  establishing  the  parent  company’s  liability  on  a  basis  
of  substantial  existence  of  the  elements.  A  considerable  number  of  corporate  
tort  cases  can  be  found  in  the  United  States  compared  to  other  countries.597  
The  doctrine  of   veil   piercing  has  been   regarded  as  a  dominant  approach   to  
establishing   the   parent   company’s   liability   in   the  United  States.598   However,  
courts’  decisions   in   this   field  are   inconsistent.599   “Veil-­piercing   jurisprudence”  
is   described  as  one  of   the  most   serious   limitations  of   the  US   law.600   In   this  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596   Steven  v  Roscoe  Turner  Aeronautical  Corp  324  F  2d  157  (7th  Cir  1963)  161.  
597   Karl  Hofstetter,  ‘Parent  Responsibility  for  Subsidiary  Corporations:  Evaluating  European  Trends’,  
(1990)  39  ICLQ  576,  591.  
598   ibid  592.        
599   Phillip  I  Blumberg,  Law  of  Corporate  Groups:  Substantive  Law  (1st  edn,  Little  Brown  &  Co  Law  &  
Business  1987)  681.  
600   ibid  136.     
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scenario,   other   equivalent   approaches   such   as   enterprise   liability   doctrine,  
statutory   laws  and   tort   law  have   the  chance   to  be  applied  as  alternatives.601  
This  chapter  will  not  evaluate  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing  in  
the  US,  which  is  still  a  developing  area  of  law.  However,  the  explanations  on  
the  concept  of  control  in  the  US  veil-­piercing  cases  are  worth  referring  to.  This  
is   because   the   proof   of   high   involvement   and   intense   control   of   the   parent  
company  are  also  crucial  to  the  joint  liability’s  establishment.  The  cases  of  the  
two  different  areas  (veil-­piercing  cases  and  joint  tortfeasance  cases)  to  some  
degree   overlap   on   the   consideration   of   the   element   control   to   establish   a  
parent  company’s  liability.  The  “control”  element  is  extremely  important  to  the  
proof   of   connection   between   the   parent   company   and   the   torts   of   its  
subsidiaries.     
  
Phillip  I  Blumberg  summarises  a  “three-­factor”  test  to  be  fulfilled  as  required  in  
establishing   the   parent   company’s   liability:   1)   dominating   control;;   2)   use   of  
control   to   commit   fraud   or   wrong;;   3)   proximate   causation   of   creditor  
damage.602     
  
This   “three-­factor”   test   in  determining   the  amount  of   control   provides  a   very  
valuable  reference  for  the  problem  (i.e.,  how  much  control  could  contribute  to  
the  participation   links  such  as  concerted  action,  or  authorisation   to  establish  
joint   tort   liability)   in   realising   a   parent   company’s   joint   tort   liability.   When  
considering  the  concept  of  control,  the  two  different  mechanisms,  “Veil-­piercing  
doctrine”  and  “joint  tortfesance  doctrine”  indeed  have  overlapping  operations,  
and  it  may  be  preferable  to  make  a  cross-­reference.     
  
In  the  case  of  Amoco  Cadiz,  Standard  as  the  parent  company  was  determined  
as  a  joint  tortfeasor  with  ATC  and  AIOC  for  their  negligent  acts  which  led  to  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601   ibid  105.        
602   ibid  112-­117.        
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damage.  The  reasoning  provided  by  the  court  is  as  follows:     
  
Standard   itself   was   initially   involved   in   and   controlled   the   design,  
construction,  operation  and  management  of  Amoco  Cadiz  and  treated  
the  vessel  as  if  it  were  its  own  so  that  Standard  was  liable  for  its  own  
negligence  and  that  of  AIOC  and  Transport  to  the  French  claimants.603  
  
If  we  apply  the  “three-­factor”  test  in  this  case,  it  is  clear  that  according  to  the  
facts  of  this  case,  the  requirement  of  control  is  fulfilled.  The  degree  of  control  in  
this  case  obviously  belongs  to  the  “third  element”  in  the  “three-­factor”  test:  the  
degree  of  control  of  the  parent  company  Standard  is  a  proximate  cause  of  the  
claimed  damage.     
  
In  the  US  veil-­piercing  cases,  according  to  the  long  checklists  developed,  the  
US  courts  have  considerable  discretion   in  determining  the  parent  company’s  
liability.  Accordingly,  the  parent  company’s  interference  for  liability  has  not  yet  
well   defined.604   However,   joint   tortfeasance   theory   can   be   regarded   as   a  
functionally  equivalent  approach.  Joint  tort  cases  are  all  quite  fact  sensitive.  If  
we   could   establish   reasonable   participation   links   between   the   potential   joint  
tortfeasor   and   the   claimed  damage,   it   could   sufficiently   establish   a   joint   tort  
liability.  It  is  unnecessary  to  make  any  fixed  rules  from  the  perspective  of  tort  




As   introduced  above,  procurement,  authorisation,  and  concerted  actions  are  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603   The  Amoco  Cadiz  (n  553)  338.        
604   Hofstetter,  ‘Parent  Responsibility  for  Subsidiary  Corporations:  Evaluating  European  Trends’  (n  566)  
593.  
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revealed   by   case   law   as   three  major   participation   links   contributing   to   joint  
liability.     
  
It   is   generally   accepted   that   the   concept   of   “procurement”   includes   a   wide  
range  of  conducts  such  as  promoting   the  claimed  tortious  act,605   incitement,  
inducement,606   persuasion,  and  encouragement.607     
  
A  simple  case  illustrating  the  inducement  leading  to  joint  tortfesance  is  Brook  v  
Bool.608   In  this  case,  a  landlord  was  identified  by  the  court  as  a  joint  tortfeasor  
because  he  invited/promoted  the  tenant  to  detect  a  gas  escape  in  the  house  
and  the  tenant  negligently  caused  an  explosion.     
  
The  authoritative  decision   concerning   the   legal   rules  about   “procurement”   is  
provided  in  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad  plc.609   In  this  case,  Lord  Templeman  held  
that  a  defendant  is  a  joint  tortfeasor  if  he  procures  a  breach  of  copyright  and  
this  infringement  leads  to  the  claimed  damage.610   His  Lordship  observed  that:  
“The  joint  tortfeasor   intends  and  procures  and  shares  a  common  design  that  
the   infringement  shall   take  place…a  defendant  may  procure  an   infringement  
by  inducement,  incitement  or  persuasion.”611  
  
In  this  case,  the  defendant  Amstrad  was  not  regarded  as  a  joint  tortfeasor  by  
the  court  because  the  behaviour  of  Amstrad  did  not  amount  to  “procurement”.  
Lord  Templeman  observed  that  “offering  for  sale  machine  which  may  be  used  
for   unlawful   copying,   and  advertising   the  attractions  of   their  machine   to  any  
purchaser   who   may   decide   to   copy   unlawfully”   could   not   constitute  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605   Brook  (n  530).     
606   CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad  Consumer  Electronic  plc  [1988]  AC  1013  (HL)  1058.     
607   News  Group  Newspapers  Ltd  v  Society  or  Graphical  and  Allied  Trades  [1987]  ICR  181  (QB)  214.  
608   Brook  (n  530)     
609   CBS  Songs  (n  575).  
610   ibid.     
611   ibid  1058.  
	   199	  
procurement.612   This  statement  has  found  acceptance  in  the  later  cases.613   It  
has  been  held  that  sales  and  advertisements  of  a  lawful  product  which  may  be  
used  for  unlawful  purposes  cannot  be  “procuring”.  The  acts  of  Amstrad  may  be  
similar   to   “facilitation”,   but   it   is   generally   believed   that   mere   facilitating   the  
doing  of  a  wrongful  act  cannot  contribute  to  joint  tortfesance.  A  joint  tortfeasor  
must  have  procured  (induced,  incited,  persuaded,  or  encouraged)  a  particular  
tortious  act,  which  results  in  the  claimant’s  damage.  
  
The   application   of   the   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance   in   corporate   cases   has  
often   been   discussed   in   the   literature  with   particular   regard   to  widening   the  
concept   of   “procurement”. 614    The   case   law   reveals   that   if   a   director   or  
shareholder  has  authorised,  directed  or  procured  the  tortious  act,  he  would  be  
held  jointly  liable,  even  though  he  has  not  committed  the  claimed  act.615  
  
In   the   leading   case   of   C   Evans   Ltd   &   Sons   v   Spritebrand,616   instead   of  
applying  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil,  the  claimants  tried  to  make  
the   director   personally   liable   for   the   torts   of   the   company   under   the   test   of  
procurement   for   joint   tortfeasance.   The   claimants,   C   Evans   and   Sons   Ltd,  
sued   the   first   defendant   Spritebrand   Ltd   and   the   second   defendant   Paul  
Anthony  Sullivan   (the  director  of   the   first  defendant),   for   jointly   infringing   the  
claimant’s   copyright.  C  Evans   and  Sons   Ltd  were   designers,  manufacturers  
and   suppliers   of   scaffolding   components.   They   alleged   that   the   defendant  
company   had   reproduced   and   authorised   others   to   reproduce   their   works  
under   sections   1(2)   and  3(5)   (a)   of   the  Copyright  Act   1956.   In   addition,   the  
claimants   alleged   that   the   claimed   tortious   acts   of   the   defendant   company  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612   ibid.     
613   Grower  and  others  v  British  Broadcasting  Corporation  [1990]  FSR  607  (Ch);;  Fish  &  Fish  Ltd  (n  522).        
614   Carty  (n  510)  492-­493;;  Helen  Anderson,  Directors’  Personal  Liability  for  Corporate  Fault  (1st  end,  
Kluwer  Law  International  2008)  232-­234;;  Brenda  Hannigan,  Company  Law  (4th  edn,  OUP  2016)  75-­76.     
615   C  Evans  Ltd  v  Spritebrand  [1985]  1  WLR  317  (CA);;  Performing  Right  Society  Ltd  v  Ciryl  Theatrical  
Syndicate  Ltd  [1924]  1  KB  1  (CA);;  Rainham  Chemical  Works  Ltd  v  Belvedere  Fish  Guano  Co  Ltd  [1921]  2  
AC  456  (HL)  488;;  MCA  Records  Inc  v  Charly  Records  Ltd  [2003]  1  BCLC  93  (CA).     
616   C  Evans  Ltd  (n  584).        
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were  acts  that  the  director  personally  authorised,  directed  and  procured.617   In  
support  of  the  alleged  joint  tortfeasance,  the  claimants  relied  on  the  following  
evidence:  
  
The  director  had  at  all  material   times  been  a  director  and  managing  
executive  of   the  company,   in  which  capacities  he  had  at  all  material  
times   decided   what   scaffolding   components   the   company   would  
manufacture;;   and   that   he   had   at   all   material   times   implemented,  
assisted   the   company   to   implement   and   instructed   the   officers,  
servants  and  agents  of  the  company  to  implement  his  decisions.618  
  
The  defendant  applied  to  strike  out  the  action  on  the  ground  that  the  claimant  
had  no  reasonable  cause  of  action,  and  that  there  were  no  facts  to  support  the  
argument  that  the  director  either  knew  that  the  claimed  acts  were  tortious,  or  
that  the  director  was  reckless  as  to  whether  or  not  the  acts  were  likely  to  be  
tortious.619     
  
The  judge  rejected  the  submission  and  dismissed  the  defendant’s  appeal  and     
held  that:  
  
Where  a  company  director  was  sought  to  be  made  liable  for  tortious  
acts   of   his   company,   the   extent   of   his   personal   involvement   in   the  
company’s   tort   had   to   be   carefully   examined,   but   that   where   the  
director  had  authorised,  directed,  and  procured  the  acts  complained  of  
it  was  not  an  essential  precondition  of  his  liability  that  he  knew  that  the  
acts  thus  authorised  were  tortious,  or  was  reckless  as  to  whether  or  
not  they  were  likely  to  be  tortious,  unless  the  primary  tortfeasor’s  state  
of  mind  or  knowledge  was  an  essential  ingredient  of  the  particular  tort  
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alleged.620  
  
The  case  of  C  Evans  provides  an  important  guidance  on  the  “procurement  
test”   for   determining   a   director’s   joint   liability   with   his   company   while  
circumventing  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.  The  guidance  has  
been  followed  in  later  cases  but  with  some  difficulties.  The  central  problem  
lies   in   defining   the   facts   and   extent   of   involvement   of   the   director   in   the  
claimed  torts  on  which  the  procurement  and  authorisation  rely.621  
  
Extension  in  the  group  situation     
  
English  courts  have  accepted  and  developed   the   “procurement   test”,  on   the  
basis  of  which  a  director  can  be  held  jointly  liable  for  the  company’s  wrongful  
acts.  In  respect  of  the  establishment  of  the  procurement,  the  court  in  the  case  
of  MCA  Records  Incv  Charly  Records  Ltd  provided  valuable  statements:  
  
A   director   will   not   be   treated   as   liable   with   the   company   as   a   joint  
tortfeasor  if  he  does  no  more  than  carry  out  his  constitutional  role  in  
the   governance   of   the   company,   that   is   to   say,   by   voting   at   board  
meetings.  That  is  what  policy  requires  if  a  proper  recognition  is  to  be  
given  to  the  identity  of  the  company  as  a  separate  legal  person.  Nor,  
as   it   seems   to  me,   will   it   be   right   to   hold   a   controlling   shareholder  
liable  as  a  joint  tortfeasor  if  he  does  no  more  than  exercise  his  power  
of   control   through   the   constitutional   organs   of   the   company-­for  
example  by  voting  at  general  meetings  and  by  exercising  the  powers  
to  appoint  directors.622  
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621   Hannigan,  Company  Law  (n  583)  75-­76.  
622  MCA  Records  Inc  &  Anor  v  Charly  Records  Ltd  &  Ors  [2000]  EWCA  Civ  J1116-­1,  [2002]  BCC  650  
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In   the   case   of   MAC   Records   v   Charly   Records,   the   issue   in   question   was  
whether  Mr  Jean  Luc  Young  (JY)  was  jointly  liable  with  Charly  Records  Ltd,  for  
the   copyright   infringement   of   one   of   MCA   Records’   sound   recordings.   The  
claimants  alleged  that  JY  was  jointly  liable  with  Charly  Records  Ltd  (CRL)  for  
personally  authorising,  procuring,  and  directing  the  acts  of  CRL,  and  also  on  
the  basis  that  JY  was  a  shadow  director  of  CRL,  even  though  he  did  not  hold  
the   position   as   a   director.623   JY   appealed   against   Rimer   J’s   decision   on  
establishing   the   joint   liability.   The   Court   of   Appeal   however   dismissed   the  
appeal  on  a  very  reasonable  ground.     
  
This  case  again  applied  the  test  of  procurement  by  referring  to  the  decisions  
of  C  Evans  and  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad  plc.  More  specifically,   in  the  case  of  
MAC  Records,  the  Court  of  Appeal  reaffirmed  the  “procurement  test”  on  which  
a   joint   liability   could   be   achieved.   Chadwick   LJ,   observed   that   to   make   a  
person   jointly   liable  with   the   primary   infringer  while   he   does   not   commit   or  
participate  directly  in  those  acts,  it  should  be  found  that  this  person  procured  
or  induced  those  acts  to  be  done  by  the  primary  defendant,  or  alternatively,  he  
jointly  acted  in  concert  to  secure  the  doing  of  the  tortious  acts.624  
  
The  cases  relevant  to  the  “procurement  test”  for  joint  tortfeasance  sufficiently  
reveal  that  it   is  possible  and  reasonable  to  make  a  director,  even  de  facto  or  
shadow   director   jointly   liable   for   the   company’s   tort;;   under   the   UK   law   for  
instance,  a  parent  company  can  be  held  to  be  a  shadow  director.  Following  this  
position,  “procurement  test”  could  be  applied  to  group  cases,  for   instance,  to  
establishing  a  parent  company’s  joint  liability.  Excerpts  from  the  case  of  MAC  
Records  provides  reasonable  support:  
  
…there  is  no  reason  why  a  person  who  happens  to  be  a  director  or  a  
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controlling   shareholder   of   a   company   should   not   be   liable   with   the  
company  as  a  joint  tortfeasor  if  he  is  not  exercising  control  through  the  
constitutional   organs   of   the   company   and   the   circumstances   were  
such  that  he  would  be  so  liable  if  he  were  not  a  director  or  controlling  
shareholder.  If,  in  relation  to  the  claimed  wrongful  acts,  the  individual  
as  a  joint  tortfeasor  with  the  company  arose  from  his  participation  or  
involvement  in  ways  which  went  beyond  the  exercise  of  constitutional  
control,   then   there  was  no  reason  why   the   individual  should  escape  
liability  because  he  could  have  procured  those  same  acts  through  the  
exercise  of  constitutional  control.625     
  
Obviously,   this  quote   indicates  that   if  a  person  has  exercised  control  beyond  
the  constitutional  organs  of  one  company,  he  would  be  liable  even  if  he  were  
not  a  director  or  a  controlling  shareholder.  Relevant  comments  are  also  given  
by  Brenda  Hannigan  in  her  book  Company  Law  that,  if  we  assumed  that  A  was  
the  individual  who  would  be  held  jointly  liable,  and  B  was  the  primary  tortfeasor,  
the  issue  in  question  is  whether  or  not  A’s  participation  in  the  acts  of  B  be  such  
as  to  give  rise  to   liability  as  a   joint   tortfeasor   if  A  were  not  a  director  of  B.626  
The   issue   we   are   looking   at   would   not   be   whether   or   not   the   relationship  
between  A  and  B  is  that  A  is  the  director  of  B.  
  
Accordingly,  a  parent  company,  as  a  legal  person/a  legal  individual,  could  be  
held   jointly   liable   with   other   group   elements   if   it   had   procured,   directed,  
authorised  the  claimed  tortious  acts.  In  other  words,  if  it  acted  beyond  its  role  
to   procure   or   direct   the   other   subsidiary’s   tortious   act   that   leads   to   the  
claimant’s   damage,   there   is   no   reason   to   let   it   escape   the   relevant   liability.  
Furthermore,   the   parent   company   can   be   held   as   a   shadow   director   of   the  
subsidiary  company.  This  makes  the  argument  more  understandable.     
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Notably,  the  same  difficulty  would  arise  on  the  factual  analysis  of  the  defendant  
parent   company’s   conduct.   The   challenge   to   courts   is   how   to   define   the  
“procurement”   behaviour,   particularly   the   extent   of   the   involvement   of   the  
parent  company,  based  on  which  its  personal  joint  liability  is  predicated.     
  
The  relevant  decisions  on  the  director’s  joint  liability  with  the  tortious  company  
provided   some   indications.   Any   fact   that   supports   a   causal   connection  
between  the  parent  company  and  the  claimed  damage  primarily  committed  by  
the  other  joint  defendant  would  be  relevant.  For  instance,  the  parent  company  
beyond   its   constitutional   role,   is   involved   in   control   of   the   crucial   decisions  
related   to   the   company’s   tortious   act,   or   decisions   influential   to   day-­to-­day  
activities.     
  
In   the  case  of  MAC  Records,   for   instance,   the  alleged   joint   tortfeasor  JY  did  
not  hold  a  directorship  in  the  other  joint  defendant  company  CRL,  but  JY  used  
his  power  of  control  over  CRL  to  make  sure  that  the  infringed  recordings  were  
copied  and  issued  to  the  public.  The  judge  in  this  case  held  that  the  documents  
showed  that  JY  exercised   the  ultimate   influence  over  CRL.627   The  decisions  
as  to  strategy,  which  carry  everyday  activities  were  made  by  JY.628   It  is  clear  
from  the  findings  that  JY  procured  the  tortious  act  of  the  company  and  joined  
together  with  the  company  in  concerted  action  to  ensure  its  performance.      In  
another   relevant  case,  Koninklijke  Philps  Electornics  NV  v  Prico  Digital  Disc  
GmbH, 629    the   “procurement   test”   was   established   from   the   defendant  
director’s   day-­to-­day   running   of   the   defendant   company,   and   his   decisions  
were   crucial   in   the   commission   of   the   tortious   actions;;   for   example,   the  
defendant  director,  Mr  Kuo,  negotiated  exclusive  supply  agreement  for  the  sale  
of  the  infringing  products,  and  was  the  only  person  who  would  take  the  crucial  
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629   Koninklijke  Philps  Electornics  NV  v  Prico  Digital  Disc  GmbH  [2003]  EWHC  2588,  [2004]  2  BCLC.  
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decision   in   respect   to   the   tortious   act.630   The   judge   believed   that  Mr   Kuo’s  
activities  extended  beyond  mere  participation  in  board  meetings  as  a  business  
manager  of  the  company.  He  supervised  the  infringing  act  and  was  in  control  
of  the  commercial  decisions  related  to  the  claimant.631     
  
Another  case,  Società  Esplosivi  Industriali  SpA  v  Ordnance  Technologies  (UK)  
Ltd,632   has   demonstrated   that   the   managing   director   and   sole   shareholder  
could  be  held  jointly  liable  with  his  company.  The  factual  analysis  in  this  case  
provides  an  example  of  the  “causal  connection”  between  one  individual/  legal  
individual   and   the   tortious   act   committed   by   another   joint   defendant.  
Specifically,  the  managing  director  or  sole  shareholder  can  be  held  jointly  liable  
when  his  behaviour  constitutes  an  omission,  and  where  he  acts  in  a  manner  
that  facilitates  the  tortious  act  complained  of.     
  
The   claimant,  Società  Esplosivi   Industriali   SpA   (SEI)  was   incorporated   as   a  
manufacturer  of  military  explosives,  munitions  and  weapon  systems.  Ordance  
Technologies  (UK)  Ltd  (OTL)  was  the  first  defendant,  who  was  claimed  to  have  
committed  a  design  right  tort  with  the  third  defendant,  Mr  Stephen  Keith  Cardy,  
the  managing  director  and  sole  shareholder  of  OTL.  OTL  was   found   to  be  a  
tortfeasor  in  the  first  trial,633   and  the  issue  in  question  in  the  second  trial  was  
Mr   Cardy’s   personal   liability   with   OTL.  Mr   Cardy   was   the   only   director   and  
shareholder   of  OTL,   and  was   involved   in   the   day-­to-­day   discussions   of   the  
manufacture  of  their  one  warhead  work  (DPM),  by  which  OTL  was  alleged  to  
have  infringed  the  design  right  owed  by  SEI.  In  this  case,  one  issue  was  that  
Mr  Cardy  gave  no   instructions  on  whether  or  not   to  use  SEI’s   technology   in  
their   DPM   program   meetings,   while   Mr   Cardy   knew   that   the   use   of   the  
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632   Società  Esplosivi  Industriali  SpA  v  Ordnance  Technologies  (UK)  Ltd  [2007]  EWHC  2875,  [2008]  2  All  
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technology  in  their  work  would  infringe  SEI’s  design  right.634   All  the  evidence  
pointed  to  the  fact  that  Mr  Cardy  knew  that  unless  he  took  appropriate  steps,  
the  infringement  would  occur,  i.e.,  if  the  manufacture  team  was  told  nothing  but  
to  proceed  with  creation  of  DPM  work.635   However,  the  issue  in  question  was  
whether  this  factual  basis  implied  that  Mr  Cardy  intended,  procured  and  shared  
a   common   design   with   OTL’s   infringement.   Should   Mr   Cardy’s   failure   to  
prevent  his  company’s  tortious  acts  be  enough  to  make  him  jointly  liable?  The  
court  believed  that   it   is  not   fair   to  say  that  he  shared  a  common  design  only  
based  on  one  of  such  omission.636   However,  in  this  particular  case,  Mr  Cardy  
was  guilty  of  more  than  an  omission.  The  crucial  evidence  was  that  he  did  not  
say  anything  about  the  breakdown  in  the  relationship  between  SEI  and  OTL.  
Besides,  he  stated  that  there  was  absolutely  no  problem  with  SEI.  The  court  
observed  that,  based  on  the  relevant  facts,  Mr  Cardy’s  behaviour  was  a  form  of  
encouragement  or  procurement.637     
  
The  decision  in  this  case  provides  another  possibility  to  construct  joint  liability  
in   the  corporate  scenario.  Particularly,   if   it   is  not  enough  to  put   responsibility  
only  on  one  omission,  or  on  the  closed  relationship  between  the  potential  joint  
tortfeasor  and  the  tortious  company,  “encouragement”  could  be  inferred  from  
the   legal   individual’s   promises   or   behaviour,   which   indicates   that   the   tort   or  
damage   would   not   happen.   This   factual   basis,   could   be   included   into   the  
“encouragement  concept”,  and  lead  to  joint  liability.     
  
4.2.3  Authorisation     
  
“Authorisation”   as   a   basis   for   joint   liability   was  mentioned   in   the   case   of  C  
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Evans  &  Sons  Ltd   v  Spritebrand  Ltd   and  Another.638   In   this   case,  Slade  LJ  
observed   that   it  was  capable  of  creating  a  good  cause  of  action  against   the  
director   of   a   tortious   company,  without   proof   of   knowledge   or   recklessness,  
when   the   director   had   authorised,   directed   and   procured   the   tortious   act  
committed  by  the  company.639   In  this  case,  the  defendant  company  committed  
the  tortious  act  under  the  direction  and  control  of  the  director,   in  reproducing  
the  claimant’s  drawings  without  his  licence  or  consent.640   In  the  C  Evans’  case,  
Slade  LJ  quoted  from  Palmer’s  Company  law:  “So,  too,  if  by  the  order  of  the  
directors,  a  trespass  is  committed,  a  patent  infringed,  or  another  wrongful  act  
committed,  the  directors  who  are  parties  to  it  are  personally  liable.”641        
  
Some  other  cases  can  also  be  found  to  support  the  possibility  of  a  director’s  
joint   liability  with   its   tortious  company  based  on  authorisation.   In   the  case  of  
Rainham  Chemical  Works  Ltd  v  Belvedere  Fish  Guano  Co  Ltd,   two  directors  
were  sued  to  be  liable  for  an  explosion  at  the  company  where  explosives  were  
manufactured.   The   court   held   that   they   were   responsible   because   the  
company  was  under  their  sole  control.642   Lord  Buckmaster,  observed  that  the  
individuals  and  the  company  could  be  held  responsible  when  the  wrongful  act  
of  the  company  was  directed  by  and  under  control  of  the  governing  director:  
  
If  a  company   is   formed  for   the  express  purpose  of  doing  a  wrongful  
act  or  if,  when  formed,  those  in  control  expressly  direct  that  a  wrongful  
thing  be  done,  the  individuals  as  well  as  the  company  are  responsible  
for  the  consequences.643  
  
This   case  was   then   followed  by   the   case  of  Performing  Right  Society   Ltd   v  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638   C  Evans  Ltd  &  Sons  (n  584).     
639   ibid  318.        
640   ibid  319.        
641   ibid  323;;  Sir  Francis  Beaufort  Palmer,  Palmer’s  Company  Law  Vol.1  (23rd  edn,  Sweet  &  Maxwell  1982)  
65-­05.     
642   Rainham  Chemical  Works  Ltd  v  Belvedere  Fish  Guano  Co  Ltd  [1921]  2  AC  456  (HL)  476.     
643   ibid.        
	   208	  
Ciryl  Theatrical  Syndicate  Ltd,  where  Atkin  LJ  referred   to  Lord  Buckmaster’s  
decision  and  believed   that   the  direction  and   control   of   the  director   could  be  
found  both  expressly  and  impliedly.644  
  
Another  case  that  approves  the  application  of  the  “authorisation”  test  for  joint  
liability  in  corporate  contexts  was  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad  Consumer  Electronic  
plc.645   In  this  case,  Lord  Templeman  reaffirmed  “authorisation”  as  a  ground  for  
creating   liability   as   a   joint   tortfeasor,   and   further   widened   the   definition   of  
“authorisation”  by  equating  it  to  sanction,  approval,  and  countenance.646  
  
The   claimants   in  CBS   Songs   alleged   that   the   defendants   should   be   jointly  
liable   with   the   members   of   the   public   who   infringed   their   copyright,   by  
reproducing  their   records  on  blank  tapes.  The  defendant  company,  Amstrad,  
was   claimed   to   have   authorised   the   public   infringement   of   CBS   Songs’  
copyright,   by   manufacturing,   advertising   and   selling   “hi-­fi”   systems   which  
facilitate  the  speed  of  recording  from  prerecorded  cassettes  to  blank  tapes.     
  
The  majority   of   the  Court   of  Appeal   took   the   view   that   the  defendant’s   acts  
could  not  be  said  to  be  “authorisation”,  but  at  the  same  time  the  court  approved  
that  it  is  a  tort  at  common  law  to  authorise,  or  procure  another  to  commit  a  tort.  
  
Extension  in  the  group  situation     
  
“Authorisation”   as   a   ground   to   establishing   joint   liability   is   widely   applied   in  
intellectual   property   and   nuisance   cases.   It   is   recognised   as   a   form   of   joint  
tortfeasance,  either  on  its  own  or  together  with  procurement.  In  Markesinis  and  
Deakin’s  Tort  Law,  it  is  described  in  the  joint  liability  chapter  that,  “tortfeasors  
are  joint   in  cases  of  express  authorization  or   instigation;;  principal  and  agent;;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644   Performing  Right  Society  Ltd  v  Ciryl  Theatrical  Syndicate  Ltd  [1924]  1  KB  1(CA)  14.     
645   CBS  Songs  (n  575)  1013.  
646   ibid  1054.        
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vicarious  liability…”.647   Hazel  Carty  regards  the  “authorisation”  test  as  different  
from  the  “procurement  test”.648   She  also  believes  that  “authorisation”  as  a  test  
could  be  extended  to  apply   in  corporate  situations,  especially   to  establishing  
the   liability   of   company   directors.649   Paul   Davies,   in   his   book   Accessory  
Liability,   also   discusses   the   “authorisation”   and   “procurement”   tests   in   two  
different   parts.   He   regards   authorisation   as   a   form   of   participatory   liability  
distinct   from   other   kinds   of   participation   links.650   It   is   reasonable   to   impose  
joint  liability  on  any  defendant  who  participates  in  another’s  tort  on  the  basis  of  
the  “authorisation”  test.  Several  high  authorities  have  extended  the  use  of  this  
test   in  corporate  context   to  make  the  director   jointly   liable  with  his  company,  
while  circumventing   the  doctrine  of  piercing   the  corporate  veil.651   Under   this  
scenario,  it  might  be  feasible  to  extend  the  application  of  the  authorisation  test  
into   group   situations   and   to   create   joint   liability   when   the   parent   company  
authorises  and  directs  the  tortious  acts  committed  by  its  subsidiary  companies.     
  
Current  case  law  does  not  reject  the  possibility  of  applying  authorisation  test  in  
group  cases.It  is  certainly  not  impossible,  and  would  indeed  be  quite  promising  
to   bring   actions   for   joint   liability   based   on   the   authorisation   or   procurement  
tests  in  the  group  context,  in  proper  situations.  As  regards  the  constitution  of  
authorisation,   the   general   answer  would   be   that   it   will   depend   on   the   exact  
facts  of  every  single  case.652   In  the  previous  cases,  the  courts  have  taken  their  
discretion   in   deciding   joint   liability   based   on   “authorisation”.   The   concept   of  
authorisation  has  not  been   fixed  and   there   is  no  hard  and   fast   rule  here.  As  
indicated  by  Paul  Davies,   this   test  permits  courts   to   look  behind  the  concept  
and  any  form  of  words  used.653   The  fact  that  the  court  is  willing  to  consider  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647   Deakin,  Johnston,  and  Markesinis,  (n  292)  880.  
648   Carty  (n  510)  495.     
649   ibid.           
650   Davies  (n  525)  191.     
651   C  Evans  Ltd  &  Sons  (n  584);;  Rainham  Chemical  Works  Ltd  (n  611)  456;;  Right  Society  Ltd  (n  613);;  
CBS  Songs  (n  575)  1013.     
652   ibid  193.        
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substance  of  the  defendant’s  conduct  but  not  stick  to  a  fixed  definition  makes  
the  test  more  approachable  in  dealing  with  group  problems.  
  
The  question  of  authorisation  was  argued  in  the  case  of  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad  
Consumer  Electronic  plc,654   which  also  provided   indications  of   the  extent   to  
which  this  test  is  useful  in  group  circumstances.     
  
In  this  case,  the  claimants  relying  on  section  1(1)  and  1(2)  of  the  Copyright  Act  
1956   contended   that   people   who   have   authorised   other   persons   to   copy  
should   be   held   to   be   infringers.   The   authorisation   would   be   based   on   the  
consideration  that  infringing  a  copyright  is  a  tort,  and  tort  doctrines  will  apply.     
  
The   meaning   of   the   authorisation   that   is   said   to   constitute   infringement   is  
explained  in  section  2  of  the  Copyright  Act  1956:  “Authorization  meant  to  grant,  
or   purport   to   grant,   expressly   or   by   implication,   the   right   to   do   the   act  
complained  of.”655  
  
To   “authorise”   could   also   be   understood   as   “sanction,   approve   and  
countenance”  based  on  its  ordinary  dictionary  meaning  in  some  early  cases.656     
  
In   fact,   in  most   cases,   including   the   intellectual   property   cases,   the   court   is  
dealing   with   “unauthorised   authorisation”,   which   means   that   in   practice   the  
authorisation   is   issued   by   someone   having   no   authority   in   law,657   and   the  
performance  of   it   is  different.  Sometimes,  a   “purported  grant  of  permission”,  
and   “invitation   together  with   the  provision  of  at   least  some  of   the  means   for  
doing   it”   would   constitute   an   authorisation.658   In   the  CBS  Songs   v   Amstrad  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654   CBS  Songs  (n  575)  1013.  
655   ibid;;  Copyright  Act  1956,  s  1(1)  s  1(2).  
656   CBS  Songs  (n  575)  1021;;  CBS  Inc  v  Ames  Records  &  Tapes  Ltd  [1982]  Ch  91  (Ch)  109;;  Performing  
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case,   the   court   noted   that   a   defendant’s   act   of   selling,   manufacturing   and  
advertising   recorders   to   the   public   without   taking   measures   to   discourage  
unlawful   copying   cannot   constitute   authorisation.   According   to   the  
understanding  of  the  Copyright  Act  1956,  Amstrad  only  authorised  the  use  of  
the  record,  but  did  not  authorise  the  tortious  act  complained  of.659   The  Court  of  
Appeal   found   some   factors   influential   to   the   decision   and   in   favour   of   the  
defendants:     
  
(a)   the  absence  of  any  power  in  the  defendants  to  authorize  or  control  
the  activities  of  people  using  their  audio  systems  after  they  had  left  
their  hands;;     
(b)   the  absence  of  any  purported  exercise  by  the  defendants  of  any  
such  power;;  
(c)   the   incongruity   of   the   suggestion   that   defendants   might   have  
granted   or   purported   to   grant   to   all   the   users   of   their   audio  
systems  the  right  to  make  unlicensed  tape-­recordings  of  musical  
works  protected  by  copyright.660  
  
Referring   to   the   above   factors,   we   can  make   a   proposition   that   if   the   facts  
(conditions)  which  are  said  to  be  absent  in  (a)  and  (b),  are  all  established;;  and  
if  defendants  also  have  granted  or  purported  to  grant  the  tortfeasor  the  right  to  
commit   the  tort,  a   joint   liability  can  be  achieved.  Specifically,   the  reason  why  
the  Court   of   Appeal  was   in   favour   of   the   defendants  was   that   some   crucial  
facts  (conditions)  were  absent.  So,  if  these  crucial  facts  all  exist  in  the  case,  a  
joint  liability  can  be  created.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad,  
if  there  is  the  existence  of  any  power  in  the  defendants  to  authorise  or  control  
the   activities   of   people   using   their   audio   systems  after   the   systems  had   left  
their   hands;;   and   there   is   the   existence   of   any   purported   exercise   by   the  
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defendants  of  any  such  power;;  and  the  defendants  have  granted  or  purported  
to  grant   to  all   the  users  of   their  audio  systems   the   right   to  make  unlicensed  
tape-­recordings   of   musical   works   protected   by   copyright,   the   defendant  
Amstrad  probably  cannot  escape  from  the  joint  liability.     
  
So  the  above  statements  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  broaden  our  understanding  of  
“authorisation”,  and  provide  an  entry  point  to  extend  the  application  of  the  test  
in  group  situations.     
  
If   a   parent   company   has   the   power   to   authorise   and   control   the   tortious  
activities  of  its  subsidiary,  and  has  any  purported  exercise  of  such  power,  and  
also  might  have  granted  the  subsidiary  (as  a  tortfeasor)  the  right  to  commit  the  
tort,   can   we   establish   the   “authorisation”,   and   subsequently   the   parent  
company’s  joint  liability?  The  answer  might  be  yes.  
  
In   favour  of   the  defendant,   the  Court  of  Appeal  also  held   that   the  defendant  
company   cannot   be   a   joint   infringer   because   the   “defendant   had   no   control  
over  or  interest  in  the  use  of  a  tape  recorder  once  it  had  been  sold.”661  
  
Taking  the  court’s  view  into  consideration,  we  could  assume  that   it  would  be  
very  helpful  to  establish  the  parent  company’s  authorisation  if  it  is  proved  that  
the  parent  company  has  control  over  particular  tortious  activity  committed  by  
the  subsidiary,  or  has  some  benefits  from  the  tortious  activity.        
  
The   Australia   case   of   Moorhouse   v   University   of   New   South  Wales662   has  
offered   some   support   to   the   idea   that   exercising   relevant   control   would  
potentially  constitute  authorisation  by  a  parent  company.     
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In  this  case,  the  High  Court  of  Australia  held  that  the  University  of  New  South  
Wales   was   jointly   liable   with   the   person   who   infringed   the   copyright   of  
Moorhouse,  by  using   the  photocopying  machine  of   the  university.  Gibbs  J   in  
this  case  held  that:     
  
A   person   who   has   under   his   control   the   means   by   which   an  
infringement  of  copyright  may  be  committed—such  as  a  photocopying  
machine—and  who  makes   it  available  to  other  persons,  knowing,  or  
have  reason  to  suspect,  that  it  is  likely  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  
committing  an  infringement,  and  omitting  to  take  reasonable  steps  to  
limit  its  use  to  legitimate  purposes,  would  authorize  any  infringement  
that  resulted  from  its  use.663  
  
In  another  case,  RCA  Corporation  v  John  Fairfax  &  Sons  Ltd664   cited   in   the  
judgment  of  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad,  Kearney  J  in  the  Federal  Court  of  Australia  
provided  the  following  statement:     
  
A  person  may  be  said  to  authorize  another  to  commit  an  infringement  
if   the   one   has   some   form   of   control   over   the   other   at   the   time   of  
infringement  or,  if  he  has  no  such  control,  is  responsible  for  placing  in  
the  other’s  hands  materials  which  by  their  nature  are  almost  inevitably  
to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  infringement.665  
  
The  two  cases  above  provide  the  possibility  to  establishing  joint  liability  on  the  
basis   of   having   some   form   of   control   that   contribute   to   the   authorisation  
behavior.     
  
Lord  Templeman  in  CBS  Songs  stated  that,  no  matter  what  arguments  may  be  
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made  about  this  position,  Amstrad  would  not  fit  because  it  had  no  control  at  all  
over   the  use  of   their  models  after   selling   them  and  had  no   control   over   the  
interest   made   by   others   through   the   copyright   infringement.666   It   could   be  
inferred   from   Lord   Templeman’s   position   that   although   the   propositions   on  
control  mentioned  in  the  above  two  cases  seem  to  be  stated  too  widely  for  him,  
he  still  did  not  totally  reject  the  arguments  for  the  extension  in  the  two  cases  
and  did  not  totally  dismiss  the  extension  of  these  ideas  to  particular  cases  in  
which  the  proper  factual  analysis  is  made.  
  
According  to  the  above  discussions,  we  can  make  a  proposition  that  it   is  not  
unreasonable   to  establishing  parent  company’s   joint   liability  with   the   tortious  
subsidiary  based  on  the  authorisation  test  in  particular  cases  in  which  certain  
types  of  control  exist.     
  
The  following  situations  would  be  of  much  relevance:  (1)  the  parent  company  
exercises   relevant   degree   of   control   over   the   tortious   action   (activity)   of   the  
subsidiary,  or  the  parent  company  has  some  benefits  from  the  tortious  activity;;  
(2)   the   parent   company   has   the   power   to   authorise   and   control   the   tortious  
activities  of   their   subsidiary,  and  has  any  purported  exercise  of   such  power;;  
and  might  have  granted  the  subsidiary  the  right  to  commit  the  tortious  activity;;  
(3)   the   tort   is   committed   by   the  means   that   the   subsidiary   is   under   certain  
degree  of  control;;  (4)  the  parent  company  makes  the  business  available  to  the  
subsidiary,  with  knowledge  or  having  reason  to  suspect  that  it  is  likely  to  lead  
to   tort   commission;;   or   (5)   the   parent   company   can  be   said   to   authorise   the  
subsidiary   to   commit  a   tort   if   the  parent  has  some   types  of   control  over   the  
subsidiary  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  tort.     
  
In  this  context,  the  extent  of  “control”  may  be  different  in  different  cases,  but  it  
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will   be   reasonable   to   establish   authorisation   if   there   is   a   clear   causal  
connection   between   the   exercise   of   control   of   the   parent   company   and   the  
subsidiary’s  torts  that  lead  to  the  claimed  damage.     
  
The   position   that   control   would   be   amount   to   authorisation   has   also   been  
discussed  in  Paul  Davies’  book  Accessory  Liability.667   In  this  book  Paul  Davies  
brings  out  one  proposition  that:     
  
…where   the   defendant   enjoys   some   degree   of   control   over   the  
primary  tortfeasor,  then  there  is  some  support  for  the  argument  that  a  
failure  to  prevent  the  tort  may  be  equivalent  to  authorization.668  
  
Paul   Davies   uses   two   cases   to   support   his   argument.   In   the   case   of  
Performing   Right   Society   v   Ciryl   Theatrical   Syndicate   Ltd, 669    Bankes   LJ  
observed  that:  
  
The  court  may  infer  an  authorization  or  permission  from  acts  which  fall  
short  of  being  direct  and  positive;;  I  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  indifference,  
exhibited   by   acts   of   commission   or   omission,   may   reach   a   degree  
from  which  authorization  or  permission  may  be  inferred.670  
  
In  another  supporting  case,  Moore  v  Drinkwater,   671   authorisation  was  inferred  
from   the  negative  behaviour   that  a   landlord  knew  a  broker  distrained  on  his  
tenant’s   fixtures   but   did   nothing   to   prevent   the   wrongful   act.   The   landlord’s  
control  over  the  property  and  the  presence  at  the  time  of  the  tort  commission  
amounted  to  authorisation.672  
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668   ibid.     
669   Performing  Right  Society  (n  613).  
670   ibid  9.     
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This  extension  could  be  well  applied  in  the  Chandler’s  case.673   The  Court  of  
Appeal   imposed   a   direct   duty   of   care   on   the   parent   company  Cape   for   the  
health   and   safety   of   its   subsidiary’s   employees.   The   parent   company’s  
negligence   lay   in   the   assumption   of   responsibility   based   on   the   special  
relationship   between   the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary   and   its  
employees,   and   the   special   responsibility   arising   from   “control”   by   the  
defendant  company.  Consequently,  the  parent  company  had  a  duty  to  prevent  
its  subsidiary  from  causing  damage  to  another.  
  
Above   are   the   arguments   made   by   the   Court   of   Appeal   in   favour   of   the  
claimant,  Chandler.  Viewed  from  a  different  perspective,  it  is  not  difficult  to  infer  
that  Cape  could  be  both  directly  liable  on  negligence,  and  jointly  liable  with  its  
subsidiary  on  the  basis  of  authorisation.  
  
In  the  first  place,  according  to  Paul  Davies’  proposition,  if  the  parent  company  
enjoys  some  degree  of  control  over  the  primary  tortfeasor,  then  it  is  possible  to  
believe   that   the   failure   to   prevent   causing   damage   would   be   equivalent   to  
authorisation.   The   facts   in   this   case   were   that,   the   parent   company,   Cape,  
maintained  a  high  level  of  control  over  the  asbestos  business  of  its  subsidiary  
and  safety  policy  making  of   the  whole  group;;  Cape  had  superior  knowledge  
over   the   health   problem   in   this   particular   industry;;   Cape   knew   that   its  
subsidiary’s  system  of  work  was  unsafe.  Subsequently,  Cape’s  control  relevant  
to  the  asbestos  business  and  involvement  in  the  health  and  safety  program  of  
the  whole  group  clearly  demonstrate  that  it  would  have  known  that  the  health  
of   its   subsidiary’s   employees   might   be   severely   compromised   due   to   the  
subsidiary’s   negligence,   but   did   not   take   steps   to   prevent   such   harms.   This  
would  be  equivalent  to  authorisation,  and  subsequently  contributes  to  joint  tort  
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liability.        
  
In   the   second   place,   according   to   the   factors   derived   from   the   CBS   Songs  
case   discussed   above,   and   the   extension   made   with   the   five   factors   listed  
above,  Cape  would  be  made   jointly   liable   for   its   indirect  authorisation  of   the  
subsidiary’s  tort  (assuming  that  the  subsidiary  itself  is  negligent).  The  decisive  
and  influential  bases  are:  
  
(1)   Cape  had   the  power   to  authorise  and  control   the   tortious  activities  of   its  
subsidiary;;  
(2)   Cape  was  highly  involved  in  its  subsidiary’s  business;;  knew  or  should  have  
reason  to  suspect  that  the  asbestos  business  would  lead  to  personal  injury,  
but  let  the  business  go  on  in  the  subsidiary;;     
(3)   Cape   had   control   over   both   asbestos   business   of   the   subsidiary   and  
workplace  safety  policy  making  of  the  whole  group  at  the  time  the  claimed  
damage  occurred.  
     
In   consequence,   the   above   elements   may   provide   a   reasonable   causal  
connection  between  the  parent  company’s  form  of  control  and  the  claimed  tort  
by   the   subsidiary.   All   of   these   make   Cape’s   joint   liability   based   on   the  
authorisation  test  convincing.     
  
  
4.3  Conclusion     
  
The   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance   is   promising   in   its   extension   to   manage  
corporate   tort   problems,   where   multiple   legal   individuals   are   involved.   The  
essential  approach  to  establishing  joint  liability  in  group  situation  is  discussed  
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from  the  perspective  of   justifying  reasonable  and  sufficient  participation   links  
between   different   group   elements:   concerted   action,   procurement,   and  
authorisation.  The  uncertainty  of   the  scope  of   these  concepts  provides  room  
for   further  exploration  of   the  possibility  of  extension  and  development  of   the  
law  for  group  issues.  All  of  the  three  participation  tests  for  joint  tort  liability  are  
well  accepted   in  common   law  and  could  be  expanded   to  connect   the  parent  
company  and  subsidiary  for  the  same  tort  as  well.     
  
This  part  of  the  work  concentrates  on  the  extension  of  the  tests  of  concerted  
action,   procurement,   and   authorisation   in   corporate   group   cases.   Current  
English  case  law  does  not  provide  obvious  directions,  and  the  courts  always  
circumvent   the   issue   of   imposing   parent   company’s   liability   based   on   this  
developing   theory.   However,   there   are   still   some   cases,   particularly   some  
English   intellectual   property   cases   which   are   of   much   relevance,   and   from  
which  we  can  reasonably  make  an  extension.     
  
All  of  the  three  participation  links  have  a  great  potential  to  apply  in  creating  the  
parent  company’s  liability.  As  discussed  separately  in  three  parts,  the  difficulty  
and   the   crucial   step   of   the   three   tests   (concerted   action,   procurement,  
authorisation)   is  how  to  define   the  parent  company’s  behavior  as  “concerted  
action”,  “procurement”,  or  “authorisation”.  In  other  words,  the  question  is:  what  
contributes   to   a   parent   company’s   concerted   action/   procurement/  
authorisation  that  leads  to  the  claimed  joint  tort,  hence  the  claimed  damage?     
  
Based  on  the  relevant  cases  above,  the  concept  of  “control”  should  arguably  
be   the   decisive   element,   which   contributes   to   establishing   the   parent  
company’s  participation  in  the  commission  of  the  same  tort  with  its  subsidiaries.  
In   the   leading  case  of  Fish  &  Fish,674   the  Supreme  Court   lists  nine   relevant  
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factors  for  the  overall  assessment  of  involvement  of  a  potential  joint  tortfeasor,  
and   one   of   the   factor   is   listed   as   “the   extent   of   control   exercised   by   the  
defendant  joint  tortfeasor”.  This  is  an  important  case  where  we  can  get  strong  
support  that  the  extent  of  control  could  be  the  entry  point.  Then,  in  the  US  case  
of  Amoco  Cadiz,675   the  court   firstly  observed   that   the   relevant  control  of   the  
parent   company  over   its   subsidiary   could  help   to  achieve  parent   company’s  
joint  liability.     
  
It   is   not   difficult   to   make   a   conclusion   that   the   parent   company’s   joint   tort  
liability   lies   in   the   sufficient   evidence   to   support   the   existence   of   high  
involvement/active   participation   in   the   relevant   business/conduct   of   the  
subsidiary,   which   provides   reasonable   causation   between   the   parent  
company’s  actions  and  the  commission  of  the  tort.     
  
Apart  from  the  crucial  concept  of  “control”,  the  parent  company’s  joint  liability  
could   also   be   realised   from   the   extension   of   directors’   liability.   It   has   been  
developed  (by  the  case   law)  that   if  a  director  or  shareholder  has  authorised,  
directed   or   procured   the   tortious   act,   he   would   be   held   jointly   liable,   even  
though   he   has   not   personally   committed   the   claimed   act.   The   extension   is  
made  with  the  support  of  cases  such  as  MCA  Records676   –  a  joint  liability  can  
be  imposed  on  a  shadow  director,  or  even  an  individual  who  does  not  hold  the  
director  position  at  all.  In  this  regard,  the  following  extension  could  be  made:  if  
a  parent  company  acted  beyond   its  role   to  procure,  direct  or  authorise  other  
subsidiary’s  tortious  act  that  leads  to  the  claimant’s  damage,  there  is  no  reason  
to  let  him  escape  from  the  liability.     
  
In  respect  of  the  constitution  of  the  participation  link,  the  general  answer  would  
be  that  it  will  depend  on  the  exact  facts  of  every  single  case.  Fortunately,  there  
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is  no  hard  rule  here,  and  the  tests  permit  courts  to  look  behind  the  concept  of  
concerted   action,   procurement,   and   authorisation,   and   to   consider   the  
substance  of  the  defendant’s  conduct.     
  
Therefore,   the   forms   of   procurement   or   authorisation   may   vary   in   different  
cases.  Following  the  conclusion  that  the  “control”  concept  should  be  the  entry  
point,   one   extension   may   be   reached   on   the   basis   of   Paul   Davies’   work  
Accessory  Liability:  the  failure  to  prevent  causing  damage  would  be  equivalent  
to  authorisation  when  the  parent  company  enjoys  some  degree  of  control  over  
the  primary  tortfeasor.  The  Chandler  v  Cape  case  would  be  a  good  example  to  
illustrate  the  possibility  of  realizing  the  parent  company’s  joint  liability  based  on  
this  theory.  
  
It   is   worth   indicating   here   that,   the   amount   of   control   should   be   the   crucial  
basis  upon  which  the  participation  links  are  forged  in  corporate  cases.     
  
In  the  cases  of  CBS  Songs,  Moorhouse  v  University  of  New  South  Wales,  and  
RCA   Corporation   v   John   Fairfax   &   Sons   Ltd,   several   propositions   were  
provided  to  establish  joint  liability;;  also,  several  factors  were  indicated  in  favour  
of  the  claimants  to  create  a  joint  liability.  From  these  propositions,  the  following  
elements  can  be  extracted  for  the  extension  of  a  parent  company’s  joint  liability:  
(1)  the  parent  company  exercises  relevant  degree  of  control  over  the  tortious  
action   (activity)   of   the   subsidiary,   or   the  parent   company  has   some  benefits  
from  the  tortious  activity;;  (2)  the  parent  company  has  the  power  to  authorise  
and   control   the   tortious   activities   of   their   subsidiary,   and   has   any   purported  
exercise   of   such   power;;   and  might   have   granted   the   subsidiary   the   right   to  
commit   the   tortious   activity;;   (3)   the   tort   is   committed   by   the  means   that   the  
subsidiary   is  under  certain  degree  of  control;;   (4)   the  parent  company  makes  
the  business  available  to  the  subsidiary,  with  knowledge  or  having  reason  to  
suspect  that   it   is   likely  to  lead  to  tort  commission;;  or  (5)  the  parent  company  
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can  be  said  to  authorise  the  subsidiary  to  commit  a  tort  if  the  parent  has  some  
types  of  control  over  the  subsidiary  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  tort.  
  
These  situations  all  reasonably  support  the  establishment  of  the  authorisation  
test,  and  hence   the  parent   company’s   joint   liability.  Even   though   there   is  no  
fixed   standard   to   measure   the   “guilty   control”,   we   can   make   one   general  
conclusion  that  it  would  be  reasonable  to  find  liability  if  there  is  a  clear  causal  
connection  between  the  performance  of  control  of  the  parent  company  and  the  
subsidiary’s  torts  that  lead  to  the  claimed  damage.     
  
Furthermore,  the  US  courts  have  developed  a  checklist  of  eleven  elements  as  
regards  the  degree  of  control  necessary  to  evidence  parent  company  liability.  
The  courts  are  inclined  to  establish  the  parent  company’s  liability  on  the  basis  
of  substantial  existence  of   the  elements.  These  elements   include   the  parent  
company’s   financial   control   over   and   support   for   the   subsidiary,   majority  
ownership  of  the  capital  stock  of  the  subsidiary,  sharing  dominant  directors,  as  
well   as   the   parent   company’s   control   over   the   acts   of   the   directors   or  
executives   of   the   subsidiary.   Although   the   lists   of   factors   are   provided   in  
“veil-­piercing”   cases,   they   are   quite   valuable   in   the   consideration   of   various  
forms  of  control   that  constitute   the  parent  company’s  participations.  The   two  
different  fields  tend  to  overlap  in  the  determination  of  control  to  establish  the  
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Chapter   5   Parent   company’s   vicarious   liability   for   its  
subsidiaries’  tort     
  
5.1  Introduction     
  
Since   the   1990s,   significant   development   has   taken   place   in   relation   to  
vicarious  liability  theory,677   and  more  light  has  been  shed  on  the  intersection  
between  tort  and  corporate  law.  The  theory  of  vicarious  liability  has  shown  its  
importance   in   liability  determination   in   the  corporate   law  context.  This   theory  
belongs  to  the  system  of  joint  and  several  liability,  and  is  also  one  category  of  
strict   liability.  The  most  prevalent  understanding  of  strict   liability   in  tort   is  that  
the   liability   is   determined   regardless   of   fault. 678   Distinct   from   fault-­based  
liability  such  as  negligence,  here,  no  element  in  the  act  is  labelled  as  “fault”.679  
As  one  way  to  claim  against  one  defendant  for   the  other’s  tort,   the  theory  of  
vicarious  liability  makes  one  person  or  legal  person  liable  for  the  tort  of  another  
“regardless   of   fault”.   It   deals   with   cases   involving   multiple   numbers   of  
defendants,   and   therefore,   increases   the   probability   of   targeting   an   insured  
defendant   who   has   the   ability   to   compensate,   making   him   jointly   liable.   It  
therefore  can  be  utilised  to  establish  liability  in  well-­funded  defendants  rather  
than  impecunious  ones,680   and  can  be  applied  in  cases  where  it  is  insufficient  
to   find   personal   duty.   The  most   typical   example   of   vicarious   liability   can   be  
found   between   employer   and   employee,   where   an   employer   is   vicariously  
liable  for  the  torts  of  his  or  her  employees  when  the  tort  is  committed  within  the  
course   and   scope   of   employment.   In   addition   to   this,   relationships   such   as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677   Graeme  Lockwood,  ‘The  Widening  of  Vicarious  Liability:  Implications  for  Employers’  (2011)  53  (2)  
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principal  and  agent,  and  partners  are  other  categories  giving  rise  to  vicarious  
liability.     
  
The  reasons  why  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  is  considered  in  this  chapter  
are  presented  here.  In  the  first  place,   it   is  much  relevant  to  the  theme  of  the  
whole   thesis.   The  main   research   question   of   the   thesis   is   how   to   establish  
parent  company’s  liability  for  the  torts  of  its  subsidiaries  in  the  personal  injury  
context.  Tort  law  as  a  regulating  and  constructing  tool,  has  particular  relevance  
in  developing  an  alternative  liability  regime.  As  one  way  to  achieve  joint  liability,  
and   particularly   based   on   the   defendants’   relationship   but   not   on   fault,   the  
theory  of  vicarious   liability  deserves  further  consideration.  Secondly,  different  
from  the  tort  of  negligence,  the  realisation  of  vicarious  liability  is  based  on  the  
requirements   of   relationship.   This   may   provide   solutions   in   particular  
circumstances  where  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  personal  duty  of  care,  but  it  would  be  
reasonable   and   fair   and   just   to   achieve   liability   on   a   basis   of   the   joint  
tortfeasors’  relationship.  For  instance,  in  most  corporate  cases,  the  operation  
and  organisation  of  different  legal  entities  in  one  corporate  group  are  complex  
and   it   is   impossible   for   the  claimant   to  collect  evidence  and   identify   relevant  
tortfeasor  and  employer.681   Thirdly,  the  boundary  of  vicarious  liability  has  been  
expanded   by   the   Supreme   Court   during   the   past   few   years,   and   the  
development   of   this   theory   suggests   that   it   might   be   possible   to   impose  
vicarious  liability  in  group  situation,  which  means  that  it  is  the  time  to  consider  
the  possibility   that  a   legal  person  can  be  made  vicariously   liable   for  another  
legal  entity’s  tort.  Traditionally,  a  company  will  be  liable  in  tort  as  a  result  of  its  
contribution   or   involvement   in   fault.   Vicarious   liability   for   a   company   always  
happens  where  its  agent  or  employee  commits  a  tortious  act  in  the  course  of  
agency   or   employment.   Now   it   has   been   understood   that   the   degree   of  
relationship   which   triggers   vicarious   liability   beyond   the   employment   is  
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somewhat  uncertain,  especially  since   the   introduction  of   the  relationship   test  
referred   to   as   “akin   to   employment”.   Thus,   it   leaves   room   for   courts   and  
commentators   to   further  consider  how   far   vicarious   liability  may  be   imposed  
beyond   the   relationship   of   employment   if   the   age   of   vicarious   liability   for  
non-­contractual   work   is   coming.   Fourthly,   the   nature   of   vicarious   liability  
provides  us  with  more  courage  to  broaden  its  scope,  and  consider  alternative  
means  for  obtaining  compensation.  The  theory  of  vicarious  liability  is  growing  
from  social  convenience  and  justice,  rather  than  established  legal  principles.682  
It   has   been   acknowledged   by   the   UK   courts   that   vicarious   liability   is   the  
creation   of   different   judges   who   held   different   ideas   of   its   rationales   or  
policies.683     
  
This  chapter  discusses  whether  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  can  be  applied  
to  achieve  parent  company’s  liability.     
  
Relevant  UK  case  law     
  
The   issue   whether   a   parent   company   can   be   vicariously   liable   for   its  
subsidiary’s  tort  has  rarely  been  brought  before  UK  courts.  In  cases  relevant  to  
the   parent   company’s   liability   determination,   the   company   law   doctrine  
“piercing   the   corporate   veil”   has   been   considered.   In   the   leading   case   of  
Adams   v   Cape   Industries   plc,684   the   assumption   that   the   parent   company  
Cape  might   be   vicariously   liable   and   be   present   in   the   UK   jurisdiction   was  
brought  by  the  claimant,  but  was  met  with  no  response  then.685     
  
Nevertheless,  the  development  of  UK  case  law  involving  vicarious  liability,   to  
some   degree,   provides   a   forum   to   discuss   the   possibility   of   the   parent  
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company’s  vicarious  liability  for  its  subsidiaries’  torts.  The  concept  of  vicarious  
liability   is  not  a  static  one,  but  has  changed  from  time  to  time  to  provide  just  
solutions   to  new  problems  and   to  adapt   to  novel  challenges.  The  UK  courts  
have  taken  advantage  of  some  Canadian  decisions  to  expand  the  boundary  of  
vicarious  liability’s  imposition.  Lord  Steyn  extended  the  test  of  vicarious  liability  
in  the  case  of  Lister  v  Hesley  Hall  in  2001  while  referring  to  the  cases  of  Bazely  
v  Currie  and  Jacobi  v  Griffiths,  which  have  been  described  as  “luminous  and  
illuminating”   decisions   to   further   expand   the   test.686   In   Lister,   the   House   of  
Lords   established   the   “relative   closeness”   test,   which   expanded   the  
requirement   that   the   tort  has   to  be  committed   in   the  course  of  employment.  
Closeness  of  connection  between   the   tort  and  relationship  of  employment   is  
expected   to   be   found   for   the   purpose   of   establishing   vicarious   liability.   The  
reasoning   in   Lister   is   then   followed   by   other   abuse   cases.   Particularly,   the  
application   of   the   “close   connection”   test   in   Dubai   Aluminium   Co   Ltd   v  
Salaam,687   suggests  that  this  new  test  in  Lister  can  be  used  in  the  commercial  
context   as   well.   Then   in   the   case   of  Viasystems   (Tyneside)   Ltd   v   Thermal  
Transfer  (Northern)  Ltd,  by  introducing  the  rule  of  “dual  vicarious  liability”,  the  
court   acknowledged   that   the   relationship   of   employment   is   not   restricted   to  
finding   an   old-­fashioned   employee. 688    The   definition   of   the   vicariously  
responsible  “employer”  was  expanded  and  the  UK  courts  from  then  accepted  
the  possibility  that  two  employers  could  be  vicariously  liable  for  one  tort.     
  
The  test  of  vicarious  liability  is  gradually  developing  in  a  more  flexible  way.  It  is  
not   difficult   to   find   that   UK   courts   are   constantly   seeking   for   new   liability  
mechanisms   in   response   to   particular   or   special   circumstances   and   social  
changes.  In  the  case  of  JGE  v  The  Trustees  of  the  Portsmouth  Roman  Catholic  
Diocesan  Trust,  the  Court  of  Appeal  finally  admitted  that,  “the  time  has  come  
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emphatically  to  announce  the  law  of  vicarious  liability  has  moved  beyond  the  
confines  of  a  contract  of  service.”689   The  Court  of  Appeal  was  prepared  to  say  
that   vicarious   liability   could   be   established   where   the   relationship   of   the  
“employer”  and   “employee”   is   “akin   to  employment”.690   The  decision  of  JGE  
brings  one  pressing  question  before  the  courts  and  commentators:  what  kind  
of  relationship  beyond  employment  is  able  to  trigger  vicarious  liability,  and  is  it  
just   and   fair   to   impose   vicarious   liability   when   the   relationship   between   the  
possible   defendant   and   the   tortfeasor   is   so   close   in   character   to   that   of  
employer  and  employee?     
  
Following  JGE,  the  Supreme  Court  in  another  leading  case  The  Catholic  Child  
Welfare  Society  and  others  v  Various  Claimants  (FC)  and  The  Institute  of  the  
Brothers  of  the  Christian  Schools  and  others  (CCWS),691   further  supports  that  
the   category   of   relationship   “akin   to   employment”   is   able   to   give   rise   to  
vicarious  liability.  The  CCWS  case  encourages  us  to  consider  whether  or  not  
the  requirement  of  “akin  to  employment”  can  be  applied  in  particular  situations  
where  a  legal  person  works  for  an  organisation  or  corporation  without  having  a  
contract   of   employment.   The   historical   cases   in   the   UK,   although   does   not  
show   the  possibility   that  one   legal  person  vicariously   liable   for  another   legal  
person,   they   actually   open   a   door   for   expedient   solutions   to   particular  
problems  and  some  bold  developments.     
  
Relevant  literatures     
  
Few  literatures  could  be  found  on  the  research  of  parent  company’s  vicarious  
liability.   As   regards   the   controversial   cases   involving   group   liability   like  
Chandler  v  Cape,  discussions  are  on  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil,  
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and   the   recent   compelling   alternative   rule   of   tort   of   negligence.   Before   the  
appearance  of  Philip  Morgan’s  article,692   which  strongly  explains  a   rationale  
for   the   imposition   of   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability   in   the   current   legal  
context,   this  area  was   rarely  mentioned  and  supported  by   legal   scholars.   In  
one  case  note  of  Chandler  v  Cape,  Petrin  discussed  the  efficiency  of  the  tort  of  
negligence   in   determining   a   parent   company’s   liability   for   its   subsidiary’s  
employees   who   were   injured   because   of   the   poor   workplace   environment.  
When   considering   any   alternative   rule,   Petrin   expresses   that   the   theory   of  
vicarious   liability   might   be   more   straightforward   in   dealing   with   the   liability  
issue   between   the   parent   company   and   subsidiaries   in   certain  
circumstances.693     
  
Lez   Rayman-­Bacchus   and   Philip   R   Walsh,   in   their   book   Corporate  
Responsibility  and  Sustainable  Development  mentioned  that  the  expansion  of  
vicarious   liability   in   imposing   the  parent  company’s   liability   for  a  subsidiary’s  
tort  would  be  a  sustainable  development.694   Karl  Hofstetter,  when  considering  
parent  companies’  liability  law  in  the  context  of  ecological  damage,  particularly  
presents  his  optimistic  views  on  the  function  of  vicarious  liability.  Specifically,  
he  believes  that  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  may  function  as  a  remedy  for  
some   particular   risk   externalisation   in   relation   to   tort   creditors   of   subsidiary  
companies,  who  are   not   able   to   bear   the   burden  of   proof   to   investigate   the  
complex  group  organisation,  and  obtain  compensation  for  bearing  the  risk  of  
limited  liability.695   Additionally,  Hofstetter  regards  vicarious  liability  as  a  vehicle,  
which   can   be   “fine-­tuned   flexibly   and   restricted   to   specific   situations”,   in  
combination  with   proper   prerequisites   and  defences   (“taking  due  account   of  
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694   Lez  Rayman-­Bacchus  and  Philip  R  Walsh,  Corporate  Responsibility  and  Sustainable  Development:  
Exploring  the  nexus  of  private  and  public  interests  (1st  edn,  Routledge  2016)  221.  
695   Karl  Hofstetter,  ‘The  Ecological  Liability  of  Corporate  Groups:  Comparing  US  and  European  Trends’     
in  Teubner  G,  Farmer  L,  and  Murphy  D,  Environmental  Law  and  Ecological  Responsibility:  The  Concept  
and  Practice  of  Ecological  Self-­Organazation  (1st  edn,  Wiley  Chichester  1994)  99.  
	   228	  
the  involvement  of  the  parent  at  the  subsidiary  and  its  relative  monitoring  cost”),  
for   determining   the   parent   company’s   liability.696   Philip  Morgan   in   his   latest  
article   makes   a   great   contribution   in   the   discussion   of   vicarious   liability   for  
group   companies. 697    He   justifies   his   position   by   demonstrating   that   the  
underlying   rationales   for   vicarious   liability   point   towards   vicarious   liability   for  
parent  company.698   Further  more,  he  argues  that  the  current  test  for  vicarious  
liability  is  not  restricted  to  the  old  fashioned  format  of  employment.699     
  
Recent  decisions  involving  vicarious  liability  such  as  JGE  and  CCWS  indicate  
that   the   relationship   requirements   for   triggering   vicarious   liability   may   be  
expanded.  Muzaffer  Eroglu,  in  his  book  strongly  argues  against  the  imposition  
of  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  for  its  subsidiary’s  tort.700   In  his  opinion,  
the  absence  of  case  law  in  this  area  should  be  the  best  proof  of  the  weakness  
of  vicarious  liability,  and  difficulties  arise  from  the  fact-­specific  inquiry  into  the  
structure  and  relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary.701  
Eroglu  believes  that,  to  establish  liability,  it  should  be  straightforward  to  rely  on  
the  fact  of  parent  company’s  breach  of  general  duties.702   He  takes  the  case  of  
Amoco  Cadiz  as  an  example,  in  which  joint  liability  was  imposed  on  the  parent  
company   because   of   close   control   over   its   subsidiary   (on   the   problematic  
vessels’  construction  and  routine  checks).703   However,  the  example  of  Amoco  
Cadiz  case  just  proves  that  the  parent  company  can  be  held  jointly  liable  with  
its   subsidiary   when   closely   involved   in   the   torts   of   its   subsidiary.   The   case  
cannot  sufficiently  demonstrate  why  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  liability  cannot  be  
applied  in  group  situations.  The  imposition  of  vicarious  liability  is  based  on  the  
relationship   and   does   not   require   participation   by   the   defendant   parent  
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company  in  the  commission  of  the  subsidiary’s  tort.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  
the   author   argues   that   the   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance   based   on   the  
defendants’  participation  in  the  same  tort  would  play  a  role  in  the  cases  where  
the  parent  company’s  tort  liability  is  considered.  As  another  way  to  potentially  
achieve  joint  liability,  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  deserves  to  be  considered.     
  
The  research  question  of  this  chapter  is  whether  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  
can  be  applied   to  determine  group   liability,  particularly   the  parent  company’s  
liability  for  its  subsidiary’s  tort.  To  answer  this  question,  the  following  topics  will  
be  discussed:  Firstly,  whether  or  not  the  underlying  justifications  for  vicarious  
liability  will  point  towards  its  application  in  a  group  situation.  In  other  words,  is  it  
fair,   just   and   reasonable   for   the   parent   company   to   bear   the   risk   of   its  
subsidiary’s   negligence   in   suitable   situations?   Secondly,   can   a   subsidiary  
company  be  an  employee?  Thirdly,  is  it  possible  that  the  relationship  between  
the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary  is  “akin  to  employment”?  Fourthly,  how  
should  the  close  connection  test  be  applied  in  a  group  situation?  Finally,  can  
vicarious  liability  serve  as  an  effective  means  of  enforcing  group  liability?     
  
5.2  The  theory  of  vicarious  liability     
  
This  section  briefly  examines  how  the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  works  in  the  
current  legal  context,  with  the  purpose  of  arguing  that  it  is  worthwhile  to  further  
consider  the  boundary  of  vicarious  liability  for  group  liability.        
  
Vicarious  liability  is  one  mechanism  created  to  remedy  harm  and  deter  future  
wrongs.  During  the  past  10  years,  the  Supreme  Court  of  England  and  Wales,  
the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  and  the  High  Court  of  Australia  have  tried  to  
explain   and   apply   the   doctrine   of   vicarious   liability   in   leading   cases.   This  
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doctrine   represents   an   approach   to   responsibility   that   makes   the   potential  
defendant   liable   for   another’s   torts. 704    Vicarious   liability   has   also   been  
regarded  as  alien  to  the  traditional  focus  on  general  rules  of  individual  liability,  
which  advocate  that  one  individual  can  only  be  responsible  for  the  wrong  he  or  
she   commits   against   another.705   Surprisingly,   this   topic   does   not   attract   as  
much   attention   as   expected,   even   though   the   vicarious   liability   theory   is   a  
longstanding  part   of   the   common   law  of   tort   and   the  nature  of   the   theory   is  
unique  and  different  from  other  basic  rules  of  tort  law.     
  
Different  from  other  approaches  to  joint  liability,  vicarious  liability  is  a  category  
of   strict   liability   and   relationship  based   liability.   The  defendant   is   considered  
vicariously   liable   irrespective   of   any   fault   element   such   as   intention   or  
negligence.  It  should  be  noted  that  although  vicarious  liability  does  not  require  
proof  of  fault,  it  is  not  correct  to  believe  that  the  liable  defendant  is  definitely  in  
fact  without  fault.  This  mechanism  of  attributing  responsibility  can  be  regarded  
as   a   way   to   provide   easy   protection   and   a   lower   evidence   threshold   for  
particular  claimants  in  certain  circumstances.  Coming  back  to  the  central  issue  
of   this   thesis,   when   considering   liability   attribution   from   the   perspective   of  
vulnerable  tort  creditors  of  corporate  groups,  especially  those  which  have  large  
and   complex   webs   of   entity   structure,   the   vicarious   liability   for   group  
companies   is  of  unique   interest  and  different   from  the  tort  of  negligence  and  
the  joint  tortfeasance  theory  based  on  defendant’s  involvement.  
  
The  concept  of  vicarious  liability  signifies  the  liability  which  is  imposed  on  the  
potential   defendant   for   damage   caused   to   the   claimant   by   the   tort   such   as  
negligence  of  a  third  party.706   The  claimant  normally  brings  action  against  both  
the   third  party  who  commits   the   tort  and   the  potential  defendant.  This  would  
make   them   jointly   liable   for   the   same   damage.  When   considering   vicarious  
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liability,  there  is  no  need  to  demonstrate  the  potential  defendant’s  involvement  
in  the  joint  tort,  or  investigate  any  breaches  of  duty  by  the  defendant.  The  only  
requirement  is  the  particular  relationship  of  the  defendant  and  the  third  party,  
and   on   a   basis   of,   or   referable   in   a   certain  manner   to   this   relationship,   the  
damage  occurs.707   The  relationships  that  trigger  vicarious  liability  encompass  
several  formats,  such  as  partner’s  vicarious  liability  for  each  other’s  acts,  and  
the   principal’s   liability   for   the   acts   of   their   agents.   In   the   current   legal  
background,  and  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  it   is  generally  understood  that  
the  relationship  of  employer  and  employee  under  a  contract  of  employment,  or  
“akin   to   employment”   will   give   rise   to   vicarious   liability.   The   traditional  
expressions  to  describe  this  relationship  are  “master  and  servant”,  but   these  
two   concepts   were   replaced   by   employer   and   employee.   Recently,   English  
courts  have  adopted  the  expression  “akin  to  employment”,  when  identifying  the  
relationship.   Even   though   the   expressions   have   changed   with   time   and  
appearance  of  new  cases,  they  all  reflect  the  essence  of  the  relationship:  the  
third  party  is  serving  the  interest  of  the  defendant.  It  could  be  understood  that  
the  purpose  of  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  liability  is  to  ensure  that  the  employer  
bears  his  or  her  own  risks  or  costs  of  damage  caused  by  the  business  when  
the  employees  or  servants  serve  the  employer’s  interest.708  
  
In   this   context,   vicarious   liability   is   gradually   developing   to   encompass   dual  
vicarious  liability,  which  means  that  more  than  one  employer  can  be  vicariously  
liable  for  one  “employee”  who  has  committed  a  negligent  act  whilst  working  for  
both  of  them.  The  representative  case  is  Viasystems  (Tyneside)  Ltd  v  Thermal  
Transfer   (Northern)   Ltd.709   In   that   case,   one   worker   (the   tortfeasor)   was  
supplied   by   the   company,   Cat   Metalwork,   but   also   worked   under   the  
supervision  of  another  company  S  &  P.  At  the  first  instance,  Cat  Metalwork  was  
made  vicariously   liable   for   its  employee’s  negligent  act.  Then  Cat  Metalwork  
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appealed  to  make  S  &  P  vicariously  liable  as  well.  In  the  Court  of  Appeal,  May  
LJ  reviewed  the  authorities  and  held  that  dual  vicarious  liability  is  not  bound  by  
any  historical  case.710   This  case  is  a  classic  example  for  the  legal  possibility  of  
dual   vicarious   liability.   It   shows   that   neither   the   “transfer   of   a   contract   of  
employment”,  nor  “the  entire  and  absolute  control”  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  
of  vicarious  liability.  It  is  a  situation  of  shared  control  of  the  tortfeasors’  work.711  
The  Court  of  Appeal  was  in  favour  of  looking  at  the  occurrence  of  the  tort  and  
asking  who  was  entitled  or  obliged  to  give  orders.  
  
The  development  of  dual  vicarious  liability  and  the  rule  of  “akin  to  employment”  
undoubtedly   indicate   that   the   imposition  of  vicarious   liability  moved   from   the  
old-­fashioned  formats  of  “employer”  and  “employee”.  The  new  approaches  and  
ideas  of  vicarious  liability  provide  forum  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  vicarious  
liability  playing  a  role  in  group  liability  determination.  The  occurrence  of  the  tort,  
for  example  the  negligent  act  of  one  employee  of  a  subsidiary,  the  relationship  
between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary,  and  the  relationship  between  
the   parent   company   and   the   tortfeasor   are   to   be   considered   in   light   of   the  
recent  developments.     
  
Liability   for   an  agent’s   torts   is  usually  based  on  scope  of   authority,  which   is  
similar   to,   but   not   the   same  as   the   scope  of   employment.   The   conflation   of  
agency   and   vicarious   liability   has   been   criticised   by   English   academic  
commentator,  Giliker,  who  emphasises  that  agency  is  a  primary  liability  while  
vicarious   liability   is  a   secondary.712   This   chapter  will   however  not   talk  about  
agency   based   liability,   but   focus   on   the   more   acceptable   and   developed  
employment   based   vicarious   liability.   In   the   context   of   the   vicarious   liability  
based  on  employment  relationship,  the  question  is  whether  a  parent  company  
could  be  held  vicariously  liable  for  another  legal  entity’s  tort.  
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Test  of  vicarious  liability     
  
The   test   for   vicarious   liability   focuses   on   relationship.   It   can   be   generally  
concluded   that   the   potential   defendant   (D)   will   be   vicariously   liable   to   the  
claimant  for  the  wrongful  act  of  a  third  party  (A)  only  when  the  below  conditions  
are  established  by  the  claimant:     
  
(1)      A  has  committed  a  tort  against  the  claimant;;     
(2)   The   relationship   between   D   and   A   is   able   to   trigger   vicarious   liability  
according  to  the  current  recognised  rules;;  
(3)  There  are  connections  between  A’s  tortious  act  and  the  above  mentioned  
relationship  between  D  and  A.713  
  
As  to  the  employment  relationship  that  triggers  vicarious  liability,  a  two-­stage  
test  is  applied.  In  the  first  place,  there  should  be  an  employment  relationship  to  
trigger   the   doctrine;;   secondly,   the   tort   committed   by   the   employee   is   in   the  
course  of  the  employment.714     
  
As   for   the   first   stage,   it   is   not   very   straightforward   to  meet   the   relationship  
requirement,  and  there  is  no  any  restricted  and  single  test  for  it.  Traditionally,  
courts  look  at  the  level  of  control  the  employer  exercised  over  its  employee.715  
In   modern   conditions,   it   is   now   recognised   that   the   significance   of   control  
points  towards  employer’s  control  over  what  the  employee  does,  but  no  longer  
“how  he  does”.716   This  is  because  in  the  modern  patterns  of  work,  employers  
on  many  occasions  cannot  control  the  method  of  doing  work  (how  he  does)  of  
the   sophisticated  employees,   such  as   the  work  of   doctors   in   hospital.  Apart  
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from  the  element  of  control,  courts  also  considered  other  factors  including  the  
degree  of  the  worker’s  integration  into  employer’s  business,  regularity  of  work,  
provision  of   tools  and  equipment  of  work.717   The   further  development  of   the  
relationship   requirement   is   the   acceptance   of   “akin   to   employment”  
relationship.  England  and  Wales  courts  now  make  an  extension  that,  it  is  not  
the  employment  contract,  but  the  characteristics  of  the  relationship  that  make  
the  relation  “akin  to  employment”,  and  it  would  be  fair,  just  and  reasonable  to  
trigger   vicarious   liability   for   the   torts   of   the   “employee”.   This   approach   was  
firstly  confirmed  and  adopted  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  the  case  of  JGE.718     
  
The  second  stage,  also  named  the  connection  requirement,  has  also  evolved.  
In   the   latest   case  CCWS,719   the  Supreme  Court   reaffirmed   this   requirement  
after   its   introduction   in   the  case  of  Lister.720   The  essence  of   the   connection  
requirement   comes   from   the   Canadian   case   Bazely   v   Curry. 721    English  
jurisprudence  has  endorsed  this  Canadian  case.  In  the  case  of  Bazely  v  Curry,  
the  court  summarised  as  follows:  
  
…there  must  be  a  strong  connection  between  what  the  employer  was  
asking  the  employee  to  do  and  the  wrongful  act.  It  must  be  possible  to  
say  that   the  employer  significantly   increased  the  risk  of   the  harm  by  
putting   the   employee   in   his   or   her   position   and   requiring   him   to  
perform  the  assigned  tasks.722     
  
The  introduction  of  the  close  connection  requirement  for  employer’s  vicarious  
liability   makes   it   possible   that   the   employer   is   vicariously   liable   for   its  
employee’s  acts  of  sexual  abuse723   and  for  commercial  fraud724.  
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The   evolution   of   the   tests   for   vicarious   liability   provides   courts   and  
commentators   with   the   possibility   that   the   old-­fashioned   employment  
relationship   for   vicarious   liability   can   be   expanded.   Even   if   the   extensions  
would   bring   criticisms,   the   majority   of   the   judgments   suggests   several  
essential  elements  for  the  relationship  of  employment  or  the  relationship  “akin  
to   employment”,   based   on   which   vicarious   liability   can   be   imposed   on  
particular  situations.  These  kinds  of  elements  include  control,  integration,  and  
organisation.725   The  discussion  of  the  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  for  
its  subsidiary’s  tort  will  undoubtedly  benefit  from  these  developments,  because  
the  relationships  within  corporate  groups  are  in  fact  about  control,  integration,  
and   organisation.   The   tests   open   a   door   for   creating   vicarious   liability   in  
corporate  groups.  Even   though   there   is   no  direct   precedent,  we   cannot   say  
that  it  is  impossible.     
  
Distinction  from  the  tort  of  negligence  and  the  joint  tortfeasance  doctrine  
based  on  involvement     
  
The  need  to  explore  the  extension  of  vicarious  liability  for  group  situations  also  
lie  in  its  distinction  from  establishing  liability  through  the  tort  of  negligence  and  
the  doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasance  based  on  defendants’  involvement  of  fault.  In  
the  case  of  Chandler  v  Cape,  the  defendant  parent  company  was  held  liable  
for  negligence  regarding  the  health  and  safety  of  its  subsidiary’s  employee.  In  
circumstances  of   this  nature,   the  defendant   is  directly   liable   to   the  victim   for  
damage  caused  by  a  third  party  and  the  defendant  owes  the  claimant  a  duty  
which   has   been   broken   by   the   defendant.   Thus,   to   establishing   a   parent  
company’s  direct  liability  for  its  subsidiary’s  tort,  the  parent  company’  breach  of  
duty  must  be  proved,  and  the  focus   is  on  the  assumption  of  responsibility  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724   Dubai  Aluminium  Co  Ltd  (n  657).  
725   David  Neild,  ‘Vicarious  Liability  and  The  Employment  Rationale’  (2013)  44  VUWLR  707,  714.  
	   236	  
the  defendant  to  the  claimant.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  vicarious  liability  is  
“a   legal   shorthand”   for   the   rule   that   gives   rise   to   liability   on   a   basis   of  
relationship   between   the   defendant   and   the   tortfeasor,   rather   than   the  
claimant. 726    The   characteristic   of   vicarious   liability   makes   this   doctrine  
attractive  in  some  group  cases  where  a  relationship  of  proximity  between  the  
parent  company  and  the  victim  of  subsidiaries  is  difficult  to  find.     
  
When  we  are  talking  about  vicarious  liability,  it  should  be  noted  that  vicarious  
liability   is   included   in   the  category  of   joint   liability,  where  multiple   tortfeasors  
are  responsible  for  the  same  tort.  This  is  the  true  essence  of  joint  tortfeasance,  
different   from   joint   and   several   tort   liability   where   several   independent   torts  
contribute   to   one   damage.   Joint   tortfeasance   could   be   divided   into   two  
branches.   The   first   category   of   situation   to   trigger   joint   liability   is   when   a  
particular   relationship   between   the   tortfeasors/parties   is   found   (Vicarious  
liability).  Also,   joint   liability  will   be   given  when   two  or  more   tortfeasors   have  
certain   degree   of   involvement   in   the   same   tort.   The   difference   is   that   the  
former  does  not  require  any  participation  but  has  a  relationship  condition,  while  
the   latter   requires   significant   involvement.   In   chapter   4   the   author   has  
discussed   the   application   of   the   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance   based   on  
defendants’   participation   in   fault   to   establish   liability   in   group   situation.   The  
author   finds   that   the   key   approach   to   establishing   joint   liability   in   the   group  
situation   is   discussed   from   the   perspective   of   justifying   reasonable   and  
sufficient   participation   links   between   different   group   elements:   concerted  
action,  procurement,  and  authorisation.  The   three  participation   tests   for   joint  
tort   liability   are   well   accepted   in   common   law   and   could   be   expanded   to  
connect  the  parent  company  and  subsidiary  for  the  same  tort  as  well.  Having  
concluded  as  such,  the  author  intends  to  further  consider  the  situation  of  joint  
liability  based  on  the  particular  relationship.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726   ibid  708.     
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5.3   Discussion   of   policy   justifications   of   vicarious   liability   in   the  
corporate  group  context     
  
The   policy   justifications   are   leading   theories   considered   by   courts   and  
commentators   to  explain   the  existence  of   vicarious   liability.  The  evolution  of  
the  theory  of  vicarious  liability  is  accompanied  by  discussions  of  various  policy  
rationales.  These  rationales  have  been  met  with  controversy  and  not  a  single  
one   is   considered   to   be   perfectly   satisfactory. 727    However,   courts   have  
concluded  that  the  vicarious  liability   is   justified  where  all  these  rationales  are  
combined.  The  leading  justifications  which  have  evolved  through  case  law  and  
legal   comments   include   the   rationale   of   enterprise   liability,  
compensation/deeper  pocket   theory,   loss  spreading  theory,   theory  of  control,  
and  deterrence  argument.  
  
The   question   in   this   chapter   is   whether   the   parent   company   could   be   held  
vicariously  liable  for  its  subsidiary’s  tort.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  any  specific  
case  involving  the  issue  whether  one  legal  entity  can  be  vicariously  liable  for  
another  legal  entity.  In  this  context,  one  departure  point  to  answer  the  question  
is   to  evaluate  whether  the   leading   justifications  for   the  existence  of  vicarious  
liability  can  well  explain  its  extension  in  the  group  situation.  This  depends  on  
the   nature   of   vicarious   liability.   English   courts   have   already   got   a   clear  
understanding  of   it.   Lord  Pearce  held   that,   “the  doctrine  of   vicarious   liability  
has  not   grown   from  any   very   clear,   logical   or   legal   principle   but   from  social  
convenience  and   rough   justice”.728   Similar   comments   can  be   found   in   other  
judgments:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727   Howarth  and  others  (n  683)  1066.     
728   Imperial  Chemical  Industries  (n  652)  [11].     
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Vicarious   liability   is   the   creation   of  many   judges  who  have  different  
ideas  of  its  justification  or  social  policy,  or  no  idea  at  all.  Some  judges  
may  have  extended  the  rule  more  widely  or  confined  it  more  narrowly  
than  its  true  rationale  would  allow;;  yet  the  rationale,  if  we  can  discover  
it,  will  remain  valid  so  far  as  it  extends.729  
  
In   this   sense,   the   discussion   of   the   imposition   of   vicarious   liability   cannot  
proceed  without  understanding  its  policy  rationales.  These  policy  reasons  also  
contribute   to   the   extension   of   the   scope   of   vicarious   liability.   The   primary  
justifications  for  vicarious  liability  have  already  been  provided  in  some  leading  
Canadian  cases  and  recent  UK  Supreme  Court  cases.  In  respect  of  the  theory  
of  vicarious   liability,   two  Canadian  cases  are  quite   influential  and  have  been  
endorsed   by   English   courts.   They   are   Bazley   v   Curry 730    and   Jacobi   v  
Griffiths.731   In   the   case   of   John   Doe   v   Bennett,732   McLachlin   CJ   observed  
that:  
  
In  Bazley,  the  court  suggested  that  the  imposition  of  vicarious  liability  
may   usefully   be   approached   in   two   steps.   First   a   court   should  
determine   whether   there   are   precedents   which   unambiguously  
determine  whether   the   case   should   attract   vicarious   liability.   If   prior  
cases  do  not  clearly  suggest  a  solution,  the  next  step  is  to  determine  
whether   vicarious   liability   should   be   imposed   in   light   of   the   broader  
policy  rationales  behind  strict  liability.733  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729   Williams  (n  653)  231;;  this  statement  was  quoted  by  Lord  Millett,  in  the  case  Lister  and  others  v  Hesley  
Hall  Ltd,  see  Lister  and  others  (n  656)  [65].  
730   Bazley  (n  691).  
731   Jacobi  v  Griffiths  [1999]  2  SCR  570  (Supreme  Court  of  Canada).  
732   John  Doe  v  Bennett  [2004]  1  SCR  436  (Supreme  Court  of  Canada).  
733   ibid  [20].  
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In   this   leading   Canadian   case,   the   judge   has   already   demonstrated   an  
approach   to   address   the   question   of   the   extension   of   circumstances   of  
imposing  vicarious  liability.     
  
In  the  case  of  Bazley,  it  was  indicated  that,  
  
Vicarious  liability  is  based  on  the  rationale  that  the  person  who  puts  a  
risky   enterprise   into   the   community   may   fairly   be   held   responsible  
when  those  risks  emerge  and  cause  loss  or  injury  to  members  of  the  
public.   Effective   compensation   is   a   goal.   Deterrence   is   also   a  
consideration.  The  hope  is  that  holding  the  employer  or  principal  liable  
will  encourage  such  persons  to  take  steps  to  reduce  the  risk  of  harm  
in   the   future.   Plaintiffs   must   show   that   the   rationale   behind   the  
imposition  of  vicarious  liability  will  be  met  on  the  facts  in  two  respects.  
First,   the  relationship  between  the  tortfeasor  and  the  person  against  
whom   liability   is   sought   must   be   sufficiently   close.   Second,   the  
wrongful  act  must  be  sufficiently  connected  to  the  conduct  authorized  
by  the  employer.734     
  
In  the  recent  leading  case  of  CCWS,  the  Supreme  Court  sought  to  extend  the  
doctrine  of  vicarious   liability   to  situations  where   the  relationship  between  the  
defendant   and   the   wrongdoer   is   “akin   to   employment”.   To   accomplish   the  
argument,  Lord  Phillips  laid  out  five  rationales.735   The  first  one  is  the  theory  of  
compensation/deeper   pockets.   It   means   that   the   employer   is  more   likely   to  
have  the  ability   to  compensate   the  victim  than  the  employee  and  be   insured  
against   any   liability.   The   next   two   justifications   focus   on   the   point   of   the  
relationship  between  the  wrongdoer  and  the  defendant’s  business.  One  is  that  
the  tort  is  committed  due  to  the  activity  taken  by  the  wrongdoer  on  behalf  of  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734   Bazley  (n  691)  [15].  
735   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  and  others  (n  661)  [35].  
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“employer”.  The  other  is  that  vicarious  liability  is  imposed  for  the  policy  reason  
that  the  employee’s  activity  is  likely  to  be  part  of  the  business  of  the  “employer”.  
The   fourth   rationale   is   called   the   theory   of   enterprise   risk.   It  means   that   by  
employing  the  “employee”  to  do  the  activity,  risks  of  the  tort  have  been  created.  
The   final   policy   justification   for   imposing   vicarious   liability   is   based   on   the  
control  over  the  “employee”  by  the  “employer”.     
  
Apart  from  the  above  justifications,  the  theory  of  loss  spreading  and  pleading  
convenience  are  invoked  and  recognised  by  courts  and  legal  scholars  as  well.  
Among  the  above  mentioned  policy  reasons,  some  of  them  may  provide  strong  
justifications  for  the  extension  of  vicarious  liability  in  group  situation,  however,  
some   may   not   be   very   convincing.   Referring   to   the   above   judgments,   this  
section  will   evaluate  whether   the   recognised   leading   rationales   for   vicarious  
liability  can  justify  its  extension  to  a  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  for  its  
subsidiary  company’s  tort.  The  author  will  evaluate  them  one  by  one,  following  
which   their   interaction   with   the   corporate   law   principles   of   separate   legal  
personality  and  limited  liability  will  be  discussed.  
  
5.3.1  Theory  of  enterprise  risk     
  
The   theory   of   enterprise   risk   has   been   acknowledged   by   both   English   and  
Canadian  authorities  as  a  strong  rationale  for  the  existence  of  vicarious  liability,  
together   with   other   justifications.   It   is   also   generally   believed   by   legal  
commentators   that   an   enterprise   cannot   properly   disclaim   liability   for   any  
damages  caused  by  intentional  behaviours  or  accidents  which  are  said  to  be  
characteristic  of  the  business  activities.  John  Fleming  in  his  book  states  that,  
“a  person  who  employs  others  to  advance  his  own  economic  interest  should  in  
fairness   be   placed   under   a   corresponding   liability   for   losses   incurred   in   the  
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course   of   the   enterprise.” 736    Given   that   it   is   an   inevitable   commercial  
behaviour   that  employees  or  agents  who  act  on  behalf  of   their  employers  or  
principals   may   cause   damages   to   third   parties,   it   is   reasonable   for   the  
employers  to  bear  any  losses  caused  by  those  activities,  and  accept  the  risks  
of   incurring   legal   liability.737   This   is   because   the   employers   or   principals  
generally  benefit  from  the  work  or  activities  of  their  employees.  It  is  fair  to  place  
loss  created  by  an  activity  on  the  person  who  benefits  from  it.738  
  
For   the   purpose   of   justifying   vicarious   liability,   the   Canadian   courts   have  
expressed  that  the  person  who  created  a  risk  also  had  a  responsibility  to  those  
who  were   harmed   by   this   risk.739   In   the   leading   Canadian   vicarious   liability  
case  of  Bazley  v  Curry,  the  court  believed  it  was  fair  and  just  to  impose  liability  
on   the   employer   because   the   enterprise   of   the   employer   “created   or  
exacerbated”   the   claimant’s   risk   of   suffering   injury. 740    In   this   case,   the  
Canadian   Supreme   Court   imposed   vicarious   liability   on   a   non-­profit  
organisation   for   an   employee  who   committed   sexual  misconduct.   The   court  
went   beyond   the   traditional   “Salmond   test”   in   deciding   a   non-­profit  
organisation’s   vicarious   liability,   and   clarified   two   steps   for   vicarious   liability  
when   there  are  no  precedents   to   refer   to.   In   the   first  place,   the  court  has   to  
consider   whether   or   not   the   policy   justifications   can   be   applied   to   vicarious  
liability.  Secondly,  it  has  to  be  considered  whether  the  tortious  act  is  sufficiently  
connected   to   the  employment   relationship.741   The  Court  believed   that   it  was  
proper   to   impose   vicarious   liability   where   there   was   significant   connection  
between   the   creation   or   enhancement   of   a   risk   and   the   damage   introduced  
therefrom,   even   though   the  employer   did   not   desire   the  damage  when   they  
started  the  work.742     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736   John  Fleming,  The  Law  of  Torts  (9th  edn,  LBC  Information  Services  1998)  410.  
737   Lockwood  (n  647)  150.  
738   Lewis  N  Klar,  Tort  Law  (5th  end,  Carswell  2012)  673.     
739   Bazley  (n  691)  [30].  
740   ibid  [47].  
741   Bazley  (n  691)  535.     
742   ibid  536.     
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The  comments  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  reasonably  explain  how  the  
theory  of  enterprise  risk  helps  to  justify  vicarious  liability  in  the  situation  where  
previous  case  law  has  no  conclusive  decisions.  In  the  relevant  Bazley  v  Curry  
case,  when  considering  whether  a  non-­profit  organisation  can  be  vicariously  
liable   for   its   employees,   the  Canadian  Supreme  Court   observed   that   courts  
should   focus  on  whether   the  employer’s  enterprise  materially   introduced   the  
risk  of  the  sexual  assault  and  hence  the  harm.743   Then  the  court  said  that  the  
test   for   vicarious   liability   must   not   be   applied   mechanically.   Instead,   courts  
should   always   keep   sensitive   to   the   policy   rationales   which   justify   the  
existence  of  vicarious   liability.744   Additionally,   trial   judges  need   to   investigate  
specific  duties  of  employees  and  this   is   for  determining  special  opportunities  
for  wrongdoing.745   To  conclude,  the  court  emphasised  that:  
  
The   opportunity   for   intimate   private   control   and   the   parental  
relationship  and  power  required  by  the  terms  of  employment  created  
the   special   environment   that   nurtured   and   brought   to   fruition   the  
sexual  abuse.  The  employer’s  enterprise  created  and  fostered  the  risk  
that  led  to  the  ultimate  harm.746  
  
Now   that   the   Supreme   Court   of   Canada   permits   liability   in   non-­profit  
organisations   where   enterprise   risk   justifies   vicarious   liability,   it   can   be  
assumed  that  the  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  is  possible  if  this  policy  
reason  can  be  applied.  The  parent  company  might  be  vicariously  liable  for  its  
subsidiary’s   tort   if   it   is   demonstrated   that   the   parent   company’s   business  
materially  increases  or  enhances  the  risk  of  harm  introduced  by  the  subsidiary.  
In   this   circumstance,   if   there   is   any   “intimate   private   control,   the   parental  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743   ibid.     
744   ibid.     
745   ibid.     
746   ibid  537.     
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relationship   and   power   required   by   any   special   terms”   in   creating   a   special  
environment  that  introduced  or  nurtured  the  risk  of  harm,  the  responsibility  can  
be  established   for   fairness  and   future  deterrence.  Looking  back  at   the  Cape  
related   cases,   the   so-­called   “special   environment”   might   be   found   where  
particular  fairness  and  future  deterrence  are  needed.        
  
UK   courts   have   shown   particular   respect   to   the   Canadian   authorities   on  
vicarious   liability.   Following   their   illuminating   judgments,   UK   courts   have  
commented  favourably  on  the  enterprise  risk  theory  as  well.     
  
In  the  case  of  Viasystems  (Tyneside)  v  Thermal  Transfer  (Northern)  Ltd,  Rix  LJ  
observed  that  vicarious  liability  should  be  imposed  on  the  basis  that  those  who  
obtained  profits  from  the  activities  of  their  employees  should  compensate  the  
person  harmed  by  such  activities,   including  those  caused  by   the  employee’s  
negligence.  This   is  because   the  employer   is   in  a  better  position   to  organise,  
control,  and  bear   that   risk   than  employees.747   So   it   is   reasonable   to   impose  
responsibility   on  an  employer   if   his   enterprise   creates   the   risk  of   harm,  and  
most  importantly,  the  employer  is  able  to  organise  and  control  that  risk.     
  
In  the  case  of  JGE  v  The  trustees  of  the  Portsmouth  Roman  Catholic  Diocesan  
Trust,  the  Court  of  Appeal  stated  that,  
  
Fairness  demanded  that  the  employment  enterprise  employing  others  
to   advance   its   own   economic   interest   should   bear   the   burden   of  
providing  a  just  and  practical  remedy  for  wrongs  perpetrated  by  their  
employee.   That   is   fair   to   the   injured   person.   It   is   also   fair   to   the  
employer  because  it  is  right  and  just  that  the  person  who  creates  the  
risk  should  bear  the  loss  when  the  risk  ripens  into  harm…748  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747   Viasystems  (Tyneside)  (n  658)  [55].     
748   JGE  (n  659)  [47].  
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In   the   case   of   The   Catholic   Child   Welfare   Society   and   others   v   Various  
Claimants   (FC),   The   Institute   of   the   Brothers   of   the   Christian   Schools   and  
others  (CCWS),  where  the  Supreme  Court  confirmed  that  relationships  “akin  to  
employment”   would   make   it   fair,   just,   and   reasonable   to   impose   vicarious  
liability   despite   the   lack   of   a   contract   of   employment,   policy   considerations  
especially  enterprise  risk  informed  a  wider  approach  to  vicarious  liability.  The  
Supreme  Court  agreed  that  vicarious  liability  arises  on  a  basis  of  policy  that  the  
person  who  introduce  the  risky  enterprise  into  the  community  is  properly  liable  
when  any  risk  occurs  and  results  in  damage  to  persons.749   Furthermore,  when  
considering   the   establishment   of   the   stage   two,   where   it   has   to   prove   the  
necessary   “close   connection”   between   the   relationship   and   the   tort,   Lord  
Phillips  strongly  endorsed  a  so-­called  “enterprise  risk  test”:  
  
Vicarious   liability   is   imposed  where  a  defendant,  whose   relationship  
with   the  abuser  put   it   in  a  position   to  use   the  abuser   to  carry  on   its  
business   or   to   further   its   own   interests,   has   done   so   in   a   manner  
which  has  created  or  significantly  enhanced  the  risk  that  the  victim  or  
victims  would   suffer   the   relevant   abuse.  The  essential   closeness  of  
connection  between  the  relationship  between  the  defendant  and  the  
tortfeasor   and   the   acts   of   abuse   thus   involves   a   strong   causative  
link.750  
  
In   the  context  of  corporate  groups,  where   the  parent  company’s  business   is  
the  same  as  that  of  its  subsidiary  company,  for  example  in  many  Cape  related  
cases,   the   theory   of   enterprise   risk   could   be   used   to   explain   the   parent  
company’s  vicarious   liability;;  Chandler  v  Cape  can  be   taken  as  an  example.  
Although  the  case  was  determined  in  negligence,  the  facts  of  the  case  could  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  and  others  (n  661)  [66].  
750   ibid  [86].     
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have   inspired   the   claimant   to   claim   for   vicarious   liability.   The   case   opens   a  
door   for   commentators   to   explore   alternative   approaches   to   the   parent  
company’s   liability.  Petrin   in  his  case  note  of  Chandler  v  Cape   indicates  that  
vicarious   liability   doctrine   might   be   more   straightforward   in   determining  
liability.751   This  would  not  be  on  the  basis  of  employment,  but  on  a  relationship  
akin  to  employment  and  justified  by  the  enterprise  risk  theory.     
  
When  looking  at  the  specific  facts  of  Chandler  v  Cape,  it  is  not  difficult  to  find  
that  the  existence  of  the  parent  company’s  liability  can  be  explained  if  based  
on   the   enterprise   risk   theory.   In   Chandler’s   case,   the   parent   company’s  
enterprise   created   the   risk   of   harm   to   its   subsidiary’s   employee,   and   at   the  
same  time  the  parent  company  was  able  to  control  that  risk.  The  specific  facts  
were:  the  business  of  the  parent  company  (Cape),  and  its  subsidiary  company  
(Cape   Products)   were   in   a   relevant   respect   the   same;;   the   parent   company  
Cape  had   the  superior  knowledge  of   the  asbestos   industry,  and   the  relevant  
aspects  of  the  health  and  safety  issues  related  to  asbestos  industry;;  the  parent  
company   Cape   had   day-­to-­day   control   over   its   subsidiary   Cape   Products’  
asbestos   business,   and   knew   the   unsafe   workplace   environment   of   the  
subsidiary   would   probably   lead   to   damage   to   the   employees.   Furthermore,  
Cape   regularly   intervened   in   the  health  and  safety  policies  of   the  subsidiary  
and  also  intervened  in  its  trading  operations.752  
  
Based  on   the   above   circumstances,   it   can   be   demonstrated   that   the   parent  
company  had  intense  control  over  its  subsidiary’s  business,  and  also  benefited  
from   its   subsidiary’s   asbestos   business.   To   some   degree,   its   subsidiary’s  
asbestos  business  can  be  regarded  as  the  parent  company’s  own  enterprise,  
which   introduces  risk  of  harm  to   its  subsidiary’s  employees.  Thus,   in  special  
situations   like   this,   enterprise   risk   theory   has   its   position   in   explaining   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
751   Petrin  (n  338)  603.     
752   Chandler  (n  87)  [80].  
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imposition  of  vicarious  liability.     
  
However,  it  should  be  noticed  that  the  policy  reason  as  one  of  the  elements  for  
liability  in  special  circumstances  as  stated  in  Bazley  v  Curry,  is  not  sufficient  for  
vicarious   liability.  A  connection  requirement  must  be  needed  as  well.  Just  as  
emphasised   in   case  Bazley,   the   policy   reasons   underlying   the   existence   of  
vicarious   liability  are  served  only  where   “the  wrong   is  so  connected  with   the  
employment  that  it  can  be  said  that  the  employer  has  introduced  the  risk  of  the  
wrong.”753  
  
Moreover,   the  enterprise   risk   theory  has   its  own  deficiency   in  explaining   the  
existence  of  vicarious  liability.  It   is  generally  believed  that  vicarious  liability   is  
imposed  because  the  defendant  introduces  the  risky  enterprise  into  the  public  
as  well  as  taking  benefit  on  its  success.  The  scope  of  the  concept  “benefit”  is  
somewhat   limited   on   financial   profits   in   most   situations.   Criticisms  
subsequently   arise   on   the   aspect   that   the   theory   of   enterprise   liability   is  
deficient   in   explaining   vicarious   liability   for   non-­profit   organisations.754   Even  
though  the  Canadian  authority  Bazley  v  Curry  provides  one  exception  that  a  
non-­profit   organisation   is   vicariously   liable   for   one   of   its   employees   who  
committed  sexual  misconduct  because  the  organisation  enhanced  the  risk  of  
damage,   this   example   is   somewhat   extreme   and   deviates   from   the   original  
parameters  of  the  theory  that  people  who  enjoy  the  benefits  should  also  take  
responsibilities.   Therefore,   it   is   not   convincing   that   a   non-­profit   organisation  
should  be  vicariously  liable  based  on  the  enterprise  risk  theory.     
  
5.3.2  Theory  of  deep  pockets  and  compensation     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753   Bazley  (n  691)  [37].  
754   Robert  Stevens,  Torts  and  Rights  (1st  end,  OUP  Oxford  2007)  259.     
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The   solvency   of   the   defendant,   and   the   likely   wealth   of   an   employer   as   a  
defendant,  have  had  an  unconscious  influence  on  the  development  of  the  legal  
principles,  which  include  the  principle  of  vicarious  liability.  We  have  known  that  
the   enterprise   risk   rationale   was   introduced   for   the   purpose   of   striking   a  
balance  between  the  benefits  an  enterprise  owns  and  the  social  costs  it  should  
pay.  Differently,  the  deep  pockets  and  compensation  theory  as  policy  reasons  
for   vicarious   liability   are   considered   from   the  position   of   innocent   claimants.  
The   rules   ensure   that   innocent   claimants   have   a   solvent   defendant. 755  
Compared   with   employees,   employers   have   deeper   pockets,   and   are   in   a  
position   to   provide   satisfactory   compensation   or   to   insure   against   legal  
responsibility.  Fleming  emphasised  that,  “a  master  is  a  more  promising  source  
of   recompense   than  his   servant  who   is   apt   to  be  a  man  of   straw.”756   Some  
legal  scholars  have  argued   that:   “If   there  were  no  vicarious   liability,  much  of  
tort   law   would   be   stultified,   for   it   would   be   impracticable   (and   wasteful)   for  
many   employees   to   insure   themselves   against   liability   incurred   in  
employment.”757  
  
The  theories  of  compensation  and  deeper  pockets  have  been  considered  as  
policy  reasons  to  justify  vicarious  liability  in  many  special  circumstances  such  
as  vicarious  liability  for  a  non-­profit  organisation,  and  vicarious  liability  for  the  
employee’s  acts  of  sexual  abuses.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  Bazley  v  Curry,  
faced  with   the  absence  of  precedents,   the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada   found  
vicarious  liability;;   its   imposition  and  traditional  domain  were  primarily   justified  
by  compensation,  deterrence  and  loss  internalisation.758  
  
In   the   legal  practice,   justifications  explained  by  courts   for   imposing  vicarious  
liability   are   various.   They   generally   depend   on   the   facts   of   every   individual  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755   Howarth  and  others  (n  683)  1067.  
756   Fleming  (n  706)  339.     
757   Peel  and  Goudkamp  (n  523)  642.  
758   Bazley  (n  691)  [29].  
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case,  and  what   the  court  emphasises.  When  the  courts   find  no  precedent   to  
refer  to,  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  the  existence  of  legal  liability,  they  try  to  
apply   the   most   relevant   policy   rationale.   The   theory   of   compensation   and  
deeper   pockets   might   be   the   most   convincing   policy   reasons   for   vicarious  
liability  of  a  parent  company.  Just   like   the  situation   in   the  cases  of  Bazley  v  
Curry   and   Lister   v   Hesley   Hall   Ltd,   where   the   employee   who   commits   the  
tortious   act   can   no   longer   be   sued   or   has   become   insolvent,   reaching   a  
“deeper   pocket”   and   better   compensation   could   drive   the   claim   against   the  
employer.  Similarly,   the  purpose  of  a  satisfactory  compensation  and  seeking  
“deeper  pockets”  justify  the  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  for  the  torts  of  
its  insolvent  subsidiary.     
  
However,   theories   of   fair   compensation   and   “deeper   pockets”   just   provide  
supplemental   supports   for   the   imposition   of   the   parent   company’s   vicarious  
liability.  These   two   theories  cannot  sufficiently   justify   vicarious   liability  alone.  
The   deeper   pockets   theory   is   believed   to   fail   to   demonstrate   why   the  
recognised   law  of   vicarious   liability   cannot   apply   to   all   cases   in   determining  
vicarious  liability  of  all  of  the  employers.759   Referring  to  one  comment  of  Philip  
Morgan,  deep  pockets  theory  is  not  able  to  explain  features  of  vicarious  liability  
by  itself.760   And  it  would  be  the  same  for  fair  compensation  theory.  The  policy  
reasons  should  be  considered  all  together  for  explaining  the  existence  of  the  
vicarious   liability.   In   this   sense,   these   two   theories   cannot   be   the   decisive  
factors   for   developing   a   principled   rule   in   group   situations,   but   provide  
motivations  that  partly  inform  its  development.     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759   Klar  (n  708)  675.  
760   Morgan,  ‘Vicarious  Liability  for  Group  Companies:  The  Final  Frontier  of  Vicarious  Liability?’  (n  651)  
291.        
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5.3.3  Theory  of  loss  spreading     
  
Vicarious   liability   can   be   justified   that   it   works   as   a   tool   of   loss-­spreading,  
whereby  the  economic  loss  that  results  from  the  employee’s  tortious  acts  can  
be  spread  through  multiple  ways,  such  as  insurance.761   Economic  efficiency  is  
therefore  achieved.  Compared  with  employees,  employers  are  able  to  shift  the  
losses   more   easily   through   insurance   or   regulating   the   price   of   goods   and  
services.762   In   general,   the   liability   cost   would   be   distributed   by   means   of  
increasing   prices   on   goods   or   services.   It   is   therefore   believed   that   in  most  
cases,   an   employer   who   is   vicariously   liable   to   pay   for   its   employee’s  
wrongdoing  does  not  have  to  pay  out  of  his  pocket  in  practice.763     
  
In  the  context  of  corporate  groups,  the  theory  of  loss-­spreading  can  also  justify  
the  existence  of  vicarious  liability.  In  the  case  of  company  employers,  the  cost  
of   liabilities  will  be  spread  over  a  period  of   time   to   the  whole  community.  As  
said  above,  the  liability  is  normally  distributed  by  charging  consumers  a  higher  
price.   However,   not   all   the   consumers   are   individuals.   When   the   company  
plays  a  role  of  an  employer,  it  spread  cost  to  consumers.  When  the  business  
enterprise  plays  a  role  of  a  consumer,  it  is  able  to  spread  the  cost  in  turn,  by  
purchasing  other  employer’s  products  and  services  while  supplying  goods  and  
services   themselves.764   In   this  way,   large  sums  are  distributed   to   the  public.  
Moreover,  the  parent  company  is  able  to  pay  insurance  premiums,  and  further  
arrange   its   internal   debts.   Sometimes   the   parent   company   itself   is   able   to  
operate  as  a  self-­insurer.  This  is  because  large  enterprises  have  the  ability  to  
digest  the  liability  cost  internally,  by  reducing  the  dividend  of  shareholders,  and  
making  a  smaller  wage  increase  to  employees.  Thus,  in  practice,  we  could  say  
that  the  liability  cost  of  a  parent  company  can  be  distributed  both  internally  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761   Horsey  (n  290)  327;;  Lister  (n  656)  [56].  
762   Klar  (n  708)  674.     
763   Mark  Lunney  and  Ken  Oliphant,  Tort  Law  Text  and  Materials,  (5th  edn,  OUP  2013)  802.  
764   ibid.  
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externally.   It   is   rather   efficient   to   distribute   loss   and   risks   via   the   parent  
company,  instead  of  an  insolvent  subsidiary.  In  addition,  Philip  Morgan  argues  
that  based  on  the  loss-­spreading  theory,  the  application  of  vicarious  liability  in  
group  situation  “circumvents  the  judgment  proofing  strategy  by  finding  another  
solvent  and  insured  defendant.”765  
  
It  is  accepted  that  compared  with  the  insolvent  subsidiary,  the  parent  company  
is   more   likely   and   able   to   spread   the   loss.   However,   similar   to   other  
justifications,  the  theory  of  loss-­spreading  cannot  alone  demonstrate  vicarious  
liability.   It   is   deficient   to   make   a   parent   company   vicariously   liable   for   its  
subsidiary  company  only  because  the  parent  company  has  stronger  ability  to  
spread  the  loss.     
  
5.3.4  Theory  of  deterrence     
  
Deterrence  has  been   listed   in  case   law  as  one  of   the  most   important  policy  
reasons   for  vicarious   liability.  Fleming   in  his  book   regarded   two   fundamental  
policies   as   the   heart   of   vicarious   liability:   (1)   the   imposition   of   a   just   and  
practical  remedy  for  the  harm;;  (2)  the  deterrence  of  future  harm.766   In  London  
Drugs  Ltd  v  Kuehne  &  Nagel  International  Ltd,  La  Forest  J  identified  the  policy  
concerns   to   include  compensation,  deterrence,  and   loss   internalisation.767   In  
the   case   of   Bazley   v   Curry,   the   Supreme   Court   of   Canada   identified   two  
underlying   rationales   of   “just   and   fair   compensation”   and   “deterrence”   for  
vicarious   liability.768   This   theory   justifies   vicarious   liability   by   explaining   that  
employers   are   in   the   best   position   to   reduce   the   accidents   emerging   in   the  
work   place,   and   intentional   torts   of   employees   by   efficient   organisation,  
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766   Fleming  (n  706)  410.  
767   London  Drugs  Ltd  v  Kuehne  &  Nagel  International  Ltd  [1992]  3  SCR  299  (SC  Can)  [45].  
768   Bazley  (n  691)  536-­537.  
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discipline,   and   supervision.   Vicarious   liability   prevents   the   happening   of  
wrongdoing  by  deterring  employers  from  participating  in  hazardous  enterprises,  
from   employing   inexperienced   workers,   and   from   overlooking   the   unsafe  
workplace  environment.  Employers  who   fail   to  encourage  employees   to  pay  
close  attention  to  dangerous  actions  and  the  safety  of  others,  or  fail  to  provide  
proper  supervision  in  a  risky  business  should  not  be  surprised  when  vicarious  
liability  is  incurred.  
  
The  doctrine  of  vicarious  liability  deters  future  harms  when  other  doctrines  fail  
to  do  this.  For  example,  failure  to  take  care  of  the  workplace  environment  may  
not   be   sufficient   to   reach   a   direct   duty   of   care   against   the   employer.   As  
Wilkinson  J  observed  in  the  companion  appeal’s  trial  judgment:  
  
If   the   scourge  of   sexual   predation   is   to   be   stamped  out,   or   at   least  
controlled,  there  must  be  powerful  motivation  acting  upon  those  who  
control   institutions   engaged   in   the   care,   protection   and   nurturing   of  
children.  That  motivation  will  not  in  my  view  be  sufficiently  supplied  by  
the  likelihood  of  liability  in  negligence.  In  many  cases  evidence  will  be  
lacking   or   have   long   since   disappeared.   The   proof   of   appropriate  
standards  is  a  difficult  and  uneven  matter.769     
  
Approaches   to   liability   based   on   fault   like   negligence   liability,   need   more  
investigations  on  supporting  evidence.  By  contrast,  as  one  category  of  strict  
liability,  vicarious  liability  of  employers  is  easier  to  be  achieved,  and  therefore,  
effectively   encourages   employers   to   take   better   care   of   the   employees   and  
their  work,  and  consequently  reduces  future  harms.770  
  
However,   this   theory   is   accompanied   with   concerns   as   well.   The   goal   of  
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deterrence   can   not   always   be   reached   in   practice.   The   law   does   not  make  
employers   vicariously   liable   for   all   the   torts   of   their   employees.   A   “close  
connection”  requirement  should  be  considered.  In  this  way,  employers  would  
not   be   held   liable   if   the   employees   torts   are   not   so   closely   connected   with  
employment.   As   observed   by   McLachlin   J   in   the   case   of   Bazley   v   Curry,  
“Where  vicarious  liability  is  not  closely  and  materially  related  to  risk  introduced  
or  enhanced  by   the  employer,   it  serves  no  deterrent  purpose,  and   relegates  
the  employer  to  the  status  of  an  involuntary  insurer.”771  
  
On  the  whole,   the   twin  policy  goals  of   fair  compensation  and  deterrence  are  
regarded   as   two   meaningful   motivations   for   the   development   of   vicarious  
liability.   The   theory   of   deterrence   definitely   supports   parent   company’s  
vicarious   liability   for   its   insolvent   subsidiary’s   torts   when   the   relationship  
between  the  parent  company  and  subsidiary  is  akin  to  employment  and  the  tort  
is  closely  connected  with  this  relationship.  When  looking  at  most  cases  related  
to  hazardous   industries  engaged   in  by  groups  of   companies,   such  as  Cape  
related  cases,  we  find   it  necessary  to  warn  these  enterprises  to  take  care  of  
the   employees  working   at   unsafe  workplaces,   and   third   parties   who  will   be  
potentially  affected  by  the  industries.  It  is  not  a  rare  group  of  cases  where  the  
subsidiary  goes  into  insolvency  and  is  left  with  large  numbers  of  tort  creditors  
without   compensation.   Philip   Morgan   lists   three   reasons   why   the  
un-­compensated   situation   of   tort   creditors   from   group   companies   is   so  
pervasive   and   needs   attention.772   Firstly,   enterprises   involving   hazardous  
industries,  in  many  cases  have  deliberately  restructured  themselves  to  escape  
tort   claims.   Secondly,   tort   claims   against   group   companies   related   to  
environmental  damage  such  as  oil  spills  and  asbestos  pollution  always  lead  to  
tort   litigation   which   severely   affects   even   insured   subsidiaries.   Thirdly,   the  
employers   of   large   enterprises   can   be   difficult   to   identify,   which   makes   it  
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problematic   for   tort   claimants   to  adduce  evidence.  Specific   to   this  pervasive  
legal  issue,  it  is  indeed  pressing  to  call  for  approaches  to  deter  future  harms.  
The   extension   of   vicarious   liability   on   parent   companies   in   particular  
circumstances  would  satisfy  this  need.  
  
5.3.5  Theory  of  control  and  pleading  convenience  
	  
At   one   time,   it   was   believed   that   the   control   between   employers   and  
employees  gave  rise  to  vicarious  liability  when  the  employer  failed  to  prevent  
the   torts   from   occurring.773   This   ground   was   rather   widespread   at   the   time  
when   employment   relationships   normally   derived   from   factory   owners   and  
unskilled   hands.   However,   in   the   current   work   environment,   employers   no  
longer  control  the  manner  of  work.  So  the  ground  of  control  here  is  deficient  in  
justifying   a   employment   relationship.   Now   the   significance   of   control   has  
changed  from  controlling  methods  of  working  to  directing  what  the  employee  
does.774   The  theory  of  control  as  one  ground  for  vicarious  liability  is  designed  
for  the  sake  of  the  innocent  claimants.  Employers  must  accept  the  burden  of  
business   that   they   have   controlled   for   their   own   benefit.   Alternatively,   it   is  
assumed   that   the   person   at   the   position   of   controlling   others   may   be   best  
placed   to   provide   compensation   and   spread   losses   as   well.   Moreover,   this  
would   stimulate   the   obligated   party   to   be   cautious  with   respect   to   the   risks  
introduced  from  the  enterprise  under  its  control.775  
  
However,   rather   than  being  a   justification,   the  control   concept  has  gradually  
evolved   as   a   test   to   determine   the   “connection   requirement”   to   establishing  
vicarious   liability.  The  ground  of  control  has  affected   the   interpretation  of   the  
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conditions  for  vicarious  liability.776   When  considering  its  complicated  position,  
the   concept   of   control   may   be   better   regarded   as   one   important,   but   not  
necessary  reason  for  vicarious  liability.  However,  it  might  be  a  good  reason  for  
the  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  in  the  context  of  corporate  groups.  In  a  
number   of   cases,  where   a   group   of   companies   run   the   same  business   and  
have   tight  connections,   the  concept  of  control   is  particularly   important   in   the  
imposition   of   liability.   For   example,   in   the   case   of  Chandler   v   Cape,777   the  
parent   company   maintained   a   great   level   of   control   over   the   subsidiary’s  
asbestos   business,   involving   supervising   product   manufacture   and  
development,   having   a   practice   of   intervening   in   the   trading,   finance  
operations,   and   production   funding   issues   of   the   subsidiary.   If   the   parent  
company  has  such  a  great   level  of  control  over  the  subsidiary  company,   it   is  
not   unreasonable   to   assume   that   the   parent   company   should   bear   certain  
liability  for  the  relevant  torts  of  the  subsidiary.  This  is  because  through  the  tight  
day-­to-­day   control   over   the   subsidiary,   the   parent   company   is   acting   as   a  
master  in  the  traditional  sense,  and  should  take  the  burden  of  the  business  it  
controlled.     
  
Another  practical  justification  for  vicarious  liability,  particularly  in  the  context  of  
the  corporate  group,  is  the  theory  of  pleading  convenience.  When  it  is  difficult  
to   identify   the   tortfeasor,   or   the   tortfeasor   cannot   be   sued   any   more,   the  
doctrine   of   vicarious   liability   would   be   an   efficient   approach   to   provide  
compensation  and  to  reduce  litigation  costs.  Sometimes,  it  is  difficult  to  identify  
who   is   at   fault,   but   you   can   alternatively   identify   whose   employee   is  
responsible.  
  
Pleading  convenience,  sometimes  called  “evidence  theory”,  is  a  justification  for  
vicarious  liability,  although  it  may  not  be  decisive  for  the  doctrine’s  application  
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in   group   situations.  But   it   partly   explain   the  extension.   If   vicarious   liability   is  
introduced   to   the   group   situation  where   the   relationship   between   the  parent  
company  and  the  subsidiary  company  is  akin  to  employment,  the  tort  victim  of  
an   insolvent   subsidiary  will   not   have   to  worry   about   the   identification   of   the  
tortfeasor,   and   issue   of   jurisdiction   when   the   group   of   companies   is  
transnational.  The   tort   claimants   can   sue   the  parent   company  with  pleading  
convenience.     
  
Philip   Morgan   suggests   another   situation   where   the   theory   of  
evidence/pleading  convenience  points   towards  vicarious   liability   in  groups  of  
companies.   This   theory   explains   the   necessity   of   the   extension   of   vicarious  
liability   in  groups  of  companies  on  a  basis  of  some  common  group  pleading  
problems.   It   is   common   that  employees  of   the  group  of   companies  work  on  
several  projects  together.  When  the  tort  is  committed  by  one  of  a  small  group  
of   employees   working   on   the   same   project,   it   is   difficult   to   identify   the  
responsible   employer. 778    Another   example   is   that   employees   of   different  
companies  of  one  corporate  group  work  on  the  same  project,  and  one  or  some  
of   them  commit   a   tort,   such  as  negligence,  but   it   is   unknown  who  does   the  
wrongful   act.   In   this   case,   it   is   impossible   to   sue   any   employer/individual  
company  within  the  group.779   Morgan  makes  the  assumption  that  if  vicarious  
liability  is  accepted  in  the  group  situation,  the  problem  can  be  solved  when  it  is  
proved  that  “the  parent  company  which  controls  the  process  of  the  project  and  
all  of  the  potential  entities  are  within  a  sufficient  relationship  for  stage  one  of  
vicarious   liability.”780   Morgan   provides   some   possible   situations   where   it   is  
convenient   to  sue   the  parent  company   if   the  doctrine   is  extended.  However,  
new  concerns  might  arise  such  as  the  difficulty  in  identifying  the  control  of  the  
parent   company   over   the   project   undertaken   by   employees   of   several  
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subsidiaries.     
  
5.3.6  Concerns  about  the  justifications  for  the  corporate  group  situation     
	  
The   doctrine   of   vicarious   liability   has   been   developed   by   judges   who   have  
different   explanations   on   the   justifications   or   policy   reasons.781   Every   single  
justification   we   discussed   above   has   its   own   deficiency   in   explaining   the  
imposition   of   vicarious   liability,   but   the  multitude   of   rationales   together  may  
justify  the  existence  of  the  doctrine.  Referring  to  John  Fleming’s  famous  quote:  
“Vicarious  liability  cannot  parade  as  a  deduction  from  legalistic  premises,  but  
should   be   frankly   recognized   as   having   its   basis   in   a   combination   of   policy  
considerations.”782  
  
The  justifications  discussed  above  cohere  with  the  evolution  of  the  doctrine  in  
different   jurisdictions.  The  High  Court  of  Australia  has  notably   in   the  case  of  
Hollis  v  Vabu  Pty  Ltd  emphasised  the  theory  of  deterrence  in  reducing  further  
accidents  and   risks.783   In   the  case  of  New  South  Wales  v  Lepore,   risk,   loss  
distribution,   compensation,  and   risk  prevention  were  all   adopted  as   relevant  
factors.784   English  courts  regarded  the  theory  of  enterprise  risk,  loss  spreading  
and   compensation   as   the   most   relevant   underlying   reasons.   These  
justifications  are  highlighted  in  the  famous  case  of  Lister  v  Hesley  Hall785   and  
Dubai  Aluminium  Co  Ltd  v  Salaam786.   In   the   recent   leading  case  of  CCWS,  
enterprise   risk   theory   was   utilised   particularly   for   broadening   the   notion   of  
“course   of   employment”.   This   indicates   that   the   underling   rationales   for  
vicarious   liability  are  of  great  practical   significance  or   concern,  which   inform  
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courts   in   their   construction   of   the   doctrine.   Courts   sometimes   start   from  
interpreting  the  underlying  rationales  to  make  the  doctrine  capable  of  adapting  
and   developing   to  meet   new   social   needs.   Case   law   provides   examples   of  
broadening  the  scope  of  the  doctrine  by  balancing  the  policy  interests.  English  
courts   have   extended   the   liability   for   intentional   torts,   and   broadened   the  
meaning  of  “employer”  and  “employee”  by  referring  to  the  enterprise  risk  theory.  
When  looking  back  at  the  arguments  made  above,  we  have  to  admit  that  the  
primary  and  supplementary  rationales  together,  are  able  to  justify  the  vicarious  
liability  of  group  companies.     
  
However,  we  have  the  following  concerns.  In  the  first  place,  we  concern  about  
whether   these   reasons   for   the   extension   of   liability   in   group   situation   will  
conflict  with  the  principles  of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality.  It  is  
not   convincing   that   a   parent   company   can   be   held   strictly   liable   for   its  
subsidiary’s  tort  just  due  to  the  policy  reasons.  Every  rationale  itself,  such  as  
enterprise   risk,   loss   spreading,   compensation,   deterrence,   control,   and  
pleading  convenience   for  parent  company’s  vicarious   liability   in   fact  conflicts  
with   the  principles   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal   personality.  When  a  
company  is  incorporated,  it  is  treated  as  a  separate  legal  entity  distinct  from  its  
promoters,  directors,  members,  and  employees,  and  hence,  the  concept  of  the  
corporate  veil,  separating  those  parties  from  the  corporate  body,  has  arisen.787  
Corporate   personality   has   been   described   as   the   “most   pervasive   of   the  
fundamental   principles   of   company   law”,   which   constitutes   the   bedrock  
principle  upon  which  a   company   is   regarded  as  a   “person”  distinct   from   the  
shareholders  constituting   it.788   The  case   law  has  given  strong   recognition  of  
the  legal  personality  of  companies.  The  concept  of  the  company  as  a  separate  
legal  personality  can  be  justified  by  its  economic  contributions,  social  functions  
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and   policy   rationale.789   It   is   difficult   to   establishing   parent   company’s   strict  
liability   to   its  subsidiaries  without  any   fault  but   just  based  on  policy   reasons.  
Even  the  most  convincing  theory  of  enterprise  risk  cannot  do  this.  Enterprise  
risk   theory   explains   that   as   it   is   an   inevitable   commercial   behaviour   that  
employees  or  agents  act  on  behalf  of   their  employers  or  principals  and  may  
cause  damage  to  third  parties,  it  is  reasonable  for  the  employers  to  bear  any  
losses   caused   by   those   activities,   and   accept   those   risks   of   incurring   legal  
liability.  However,  we  cannot  make   the  assumption   that   the  parent   company  
should  bear  legal  liability  because  its  subsidiary  company’s  activities  contribute  
considerable  benefits  for  the  parent.  This  is  far  from  enough.  Similarly,  it  is  not  
sufficient  to  establishing  strict  liability  without  any  fault  on  the  parent  company  
just  for  future  accidents  prevention,  for  realisation  of  victims’  compensation,  or  
loss  distribution.  To  what  extent  may  an  innocent  parent  company  be  forced  to  
pay   its   subsidiary’s   debt?   It   is   extremely   difficult   to   draw   the   line.   The   only  
conclusion  we  get  is  that  the  policy  rationales  are  able  to  provide  justifications  
for   the   imposition  of  parent  company’s  vicarious   liability   in  a  secondary  way.  
But  the  legal  principles  must  have  a  great  degree  of  clarity  and  definition,  as  
expressed  Lister  v  Hesly  Hall:     
  
…an  exposition  of  policy  reasons  for  a  rule  is  not  the  same  as  defining  
the   criteria   for   its   application.   Legal   rules   have   to   have   a   greater  
degree  of  clarity  and  definition  than  is  provided  by  simply  explaining  
the   reasons   for   the  existence  of   the   rule   and   the   social   need   for   it,  
instructive  though  that  may  be.790  
     
Only   in   the   circumstance   that   the   relationship   between   the   parent   company  
and  its  subsidiary  company  is  “akin  to  employment”,  can  the  policy  rationales  
point   liability   towards  parent  company  as  we  argued  previously.  When  in   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789   Goddard  (n  47)  11.  
790   Lister  (n  656)  [60].  
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specific  case  that  the  parent  company  acts  as  an  employer,  and  the  employee  
of  the  subsidiary  is  akin  to  the  parent’s  employee,  it  is  difficult  to  say  that  the  
application  of  vicarious  liability  is  impossible.  This  is  because  the  approach  to  
establishing   liability   is   on   the   basis   of   tort   law   principle.   Vicarious   liability   is  
made   for   imposing   liability   based   on   relationships.   To   some   degree,   the  
extension  of  vicarious   liability   to  the  group  situation  emphasises  the  different  
parties  in  the  group  relationship,  because  it  provides  the  opportunity  to  make  a  
legal   entity   vicariously   liable   for   another   legal   person.   Just   as   argued   by  
Morgan:     
  
Such  a  principle  would  be  to  respect  the  fiction  that  the  legal  person  
has  a  separate  legal  identity,  and  take  it  to  its  natural  consequences.  
Indeed  it  would  make  a  legal  person  more  like  a  natural  person  –  thus  
respecting   this  cardinal  principle  of  corporate   law  and   taking   it   to   its  
logical  conclusion.791  
  
We  assume  that  a  parent  company  cannot  be  vicariously  liable  for  all  the  torts  
of   its   subsidiary   companies   because   of   policy   reasons   behind   corporate  
personality,   but   in   particular   circumstances   where   the   existence   of   a  
relationship   akin   to   employment   is   found,   the   extension   may   be   proper.   It  
should  be  recalled  that,  the  tort  of  negligence  has  been  accepted  by  English  
courts   to   provide   a   basis   for   the   direct   liability   of   a   parent   company   for   its  
subsidiary’s  debts  in  certain  situations.  This  tort  law  approach  is  not  regarded  
as   inconsistent   with   the   principle   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal  
personality.   So   we   may   wonder   about   the   possibility   of   another   tort   law  
doctrine   of   vicarious   liability   in   creating   a   parent   company’s   liability.   As   it   is  
well-­known,   under   the   company   law   doctrine   of   veil-­piercing,   a   parent  
company   can   be   held   liable   for   its   subsidiary’s   debts   in   particular  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791   Morgan,  ‘Vicarious  Liability  for  Group  Companies:  The  Final  Frontier  of  Vicarious  Liability?’  (n  651)  
289.  
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circumstances  based  on   the  parent  company’s   fault.  As  shown   in   the  recent  
leading   veil-­piercing   case   of   Petrodel   Resources   Ltd   v   Prest,792   the   only  
circumstance  for  veil  piercing  is  where  the  defendant  is  under  an  existing  legal  
liability  or  restriction,  and  consequently  the  defendant  deliberately  evades  the  
obligation   by   means   of   creating   a   façade   company   controlled   by   him.   This  
indicates  that  although  English  courts  are  reluctant  to  pierce  the  corporate  veil  
for  the  purpose  of  complying  with  the  principle  of  limited  liability  and  separate  
legal  personality,  they  do  admit  exceptional  cases.           
  
Finally,  we  conclude  that  on  the  basis  of  the  cumulation  of  several  underlying  
rationales  for  vicarious  liability,  the  realisation  of  parent  company’s  liability  for  
its  subsidiary’s  tort   is  possible.  To  respect   the  principle  of   limited   liability  and  
separate  legal  personality,  the  discussion  of  whether  policy  reasons  is  able  to  
explain  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  must  be  closely  connected  with  the  
requirements   to  establish  vicarious   liability.   In   the   first  place,   the  relationship  
between  the  parent  entity  and  the  subsidiary  should  be  “akin  to  employment”,  
and  secondly,  the  “connection  requirement”  must  be  met.  In  the  group  situation,  
if  the  two  tests  have  been  met  according  to  the  facts,  policy  reasons  behind  the  
doctrine  cannot  be  an  obstacle  to  vicarious  liability  due  to  the  social  need,  as  
we  discussed  above.  
  
Now  we  conclude  that  the  justifications  for  vicarious  liability  are  able  to  explain  
the  doctrine’s  extension  in  group  situation  only  when  the  relationship  between  
the   parent   company   and   its   subsidiary   is   “akin   to   employment”,   and   the  
subsidiary’s   tort   is   so   closely   connected   with   this   relationship.   In   the   next  
section,   the   author   will   discuss   whether   it   is   possible   to   establish   the  
relationship   requirement   and   the   connection   requirement   in   group   of  
companies,  and  how  it  can  be  realised.     
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5.4  The  possibility   of   applying   vicarious   liability   tests   in   the   corporate  
group  context  
  
The  doctrine  of  vicarious   liability   in  tort  has  evolved  over  time  to  meet  social  
needs.  It  is  a  doctrine  that  plays  a  significant  role  in  providing  compensation  to  
tort  victims.  Paula  Giliker  has  acknowledged  in  her  book  that:  
  
Vicarious   liability   is   thus   a   compromise:   a   private   law   mechanism  
which  seeks  to  provide  solutions  to  the  needs  of  victims  and  reflects  
increasing   awareness   of   the   need   to   respond   to   the   risks   posed   to  
society  by  industrialization  and  technological  advances.793  
  
Vicarious  liability  is  believed  to  continue  to  develop  and  change  in  conformity  
to   the   constant   evolution   of   social   values.   The   question   whether   one   legal  
person  is  able  to  be  vicariously  liable  for  another  legal  person’s  tort  is  posed  in  
the   context   of  modern  group  company  structures  and  corporate  behaviours.  
English  courts  give  us  reasons  to  consider  the  extension  of  vicarious  liability  by  
seeking  a  more  generous  scope  of  the  concept  of  “course  of  employment”  and  
a  broader  meaning  of  relationship   that  gives  rise   to  vicarious   liability  beyond  
the  traditional  format  of  employment  relations.  As  to  the  problem  of  vicarious  
liability   for   group   companies,   although   there   is   a   lack   of   clear   case   law  
instructions  and  sufficient  legal  comments,  previous  court  decisions  and  recent  
developments  are  of  much  assistance.   In   the  corporate  group  context,   there  
are  two  different  situations.  One  is  that  the  parent  company  is  sued  for  the  torts  
of  the  employees  of  one  subsidiary.  In  this  situation,  dual  vicarious  liability   is  
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considered  and  the  employment  relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  
the  tortious  employee  of  the  subsidiary  is  expected  to  be  found.  It  is  not  difficult  
to   determine   the   parent   company’s   vicarious   lability   in   this   context   if   the  
requirement   for   “akin   to   employment”   relationship   and   the   close   connection  
requirement  can  be  established.  The  discussion  on  the  dual  vicarious  liability  
will  be  made  in  the  5.4.1  section.     
  
The   other   situation   is   that   the   parent   company   is   sued   for   the   torts   of   its  
subsidiary  company.  In  this  situation,  vicarious  liability  might  be  applied  where  
the   relationship   between   the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary   is   “akin   to  
employment”.  In  this  case,  the  subsidiary,  as  a  legal  person  is  equivalent  to  an  
employee.  Where  the  difficulty  lies,  and  indeed  what  this  chapter  focuses  on  is  
the  second  situation.  This  is  because  it  is  uncertain  whether  a  legal  person  can  
be   vicariously   liable   for   another   legal   person.   To   answer   the   question,   the  
author   will   firstly   consider   whether   the   relationship   between   the   parent  
company  and  the  subsidiary   is  one  that   is  capable  of  giving  rise  to  vicarious  
liability.  Specifically,  the  core  question  is  whether  the  relationship  between  the  
parent   company   and   subsidiary   company   might   be   “akin   to   employment”.  
Secondly   the   author   will   discuss   what   connection   must   exist   between   the  
tortious   act   and   the   relationship   between   the   subsidiary   and   the   parent  
company.  
  
5.4.1   Relationship   requirements   for   vicarious   liability   in   the   group  
situation  
	  
The  employment   relationship   features  certain   rights  and  obligations.  Various  
legislation  impacts  upon  the  matter,  such  as  employment  law,  labour  law,  and  
human   rights   law.   However,   the   definition   of   “employee”   is   not   static.  
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Expansion  of  the  definition  of  employment  relationship  was  undertaken  in  the  
case   of   JGE   v   The   Trustees   of   the   Portsmouth   Roman   Catholic   Diocesan  
Trust.794   In  the  first  place,  in  this  case,  the  court  distinguished  the  definition  of  
the  concept  of  “employee”  in  vicarious  liability  from  those  in  other  areas  of  law.  
Ward  LJ,  in  JGE  observed  that  the  concept  of  employment  for  the  purpose  of  
vicarious  liability  should  be  distinguished  from  the  concepts  in  areas  such  as  
employment   law,  and   taxation.795   In   these  areas,  a   legal  entity   (a  company)  
has  not  been  mentioned  to  have  the  capacity  to  be  an  employee.796   However,  
as   observed   by   Ward   LJ,   the   format   of   contract   is   no   longer   restricted   to  
employment   relationship. 797    Furthermore,   to   dissolve   this   restriction,   the  
category  of  “akin  to  employment”  to  create  vicarious  liability  was  developed  in  
this   case.   It   is   indicated   that,   it   is   the   function   rather   than   format   that  
determines   the  employment   relationship   that   is  able   to  give   rise   to  vicarious  
liability.   Consequently,   the   scope   of   employee   is   also   extended,   and   a  
company  as  a  legal  entity  has  no  reason  not  to  be  included  as  an  employee  for  
the  purpose  of  vicarious  liability.     
  
The  forms  of  employment,  and  business  structures  have  changed  in  the   last  
few   decades.   These   unprecedented   changes   are   believed   to   result   in   the  
growth   of   employment   forms   which   becomes   more   difficult   to   define. 798  
Commentators  and   judges  have  acknowledged   that   the   idea  of  employment  
relationship  has  jumped  out  of  the  restriction  of  contract  of  service.  It  is  stated  
in  Edwin  Peel  and  James  Goudkamp’s  tort  book  that:  
  
   It   is   perfectly   possible   to   say   that,   while   there   is   no   ongoing  
relationship   between   the   defendant(D)   and   the   tortfeasor(A)  
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795   ibid  [59].  
796   Morgan,  ‘Vicarious  Liability  for  Group  Companies:  The  Final  Frontier  of  Vicarious  Liability?’  (n  651)  
295.     
797   JGE  (n  659)  [60].  
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amounting  to  a  contract  of  service,  A  is  D’s  employee/servant  at  least  
for  the  purpose  of  vicarious  liability,  while  he  is  actually  working.799  
  
JGE’s  approach  to  determine  vicarious  liability  based  on  the  relationship  “akin  
to   employment”   was   approved   by   the   Supreme  Court   in   the   recent   leading  
case   of   The   Catholic   Child   Welfare.   In   this   case,   the   Supreme   Court  
emphasised  that  the  relationship  of  employment  is  not  confined  to  a  contract  of  
service  in  the  strict  sense,  although  it  is  the  most  common  situation.800   Several  
tests  have  been  quoted  or  introduced  by  courts  and  commentators  to  define  a  
relationship   of   employment.   Some   of   them  may   not   carry   the   matter   much  
further,   such   as   the   test   of   control   or   some   tests   used   to   distinguish   the  
employee   and   an   independent   contractor,   but   they   are   still   helpful   for   the  
discussion  of  the  relationship  of  employment  in  group  situations.  It  is  currently  
believed   that,   a   composite   approach,   in   which   different   elements   of   the  
relationship  will  be  considered  together,  is  expected  to  be  taken.801   So,  for  the  
purpose  of   considering   the  possibility   of   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability,  
we   should   in   the   first   place   check   the   essential   tests   for   employment  
relationship,   and   discuss   whether   the   relationship   between   the   parent  
company  and  its  subsidiary  can  meet  those  tests.     
     
It   is   acknowledged   that   the   current  method   for   determining   the   employment  
relationship   is   not   to   rely   on   one   single   test,   but   to   apply   multiple   relevant  
elements,  which   include  control,  profit  ownership,  equipment  ownership,  and  
the  risk  of  damage  the  tortfeasor  takes.  The  list  of  tests  is  not  exhaustive.  The  
application   of   tests   is   believed   to   depend   on   the   specific   features   of   the  
relationship  in  each  case.802  
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801   Peel  and  Goudkamp  (n  523)  646;;  Stevenson,  Jordan  and  Harrison  Ltd  v  Macdonald  and  and  Evans  
[1952]  1  TLR  101  (CA)  111.     
802   Howarth  and  others  (n  682)  1073.  
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5.4.1.1  Test  of  control  
  
Control  as  a   test   for  employment   relationship  has   long  been   treated  as  one  
touchstone  of  employment.  This  test  was  well  suited  at  the  time  when  business  
owners  had   skills   and   knowledge  of   production,   and   the   skills  were  handed  
down  by  oral  tradition  from  business  owners  to  unskilled  hands.803   McKenna  J  
in  the  case  of  Ready  Mix  Concrete  (South  East)  Ltd  v  Minister  of  Pensions  and  
National   Insurance,  outlined   the   importance  of   the  control   test   in  making   the  
other  an  employer,  and  provided  classical  ideas  on  the  traditional  meaning  of  
the  concept  of  control:     
  
Control  includes  the  power  of  deciding  the  thing  to  be  done,  the  way  in  
which  it  shall  be  done,  the  means  to  be  employed  in  doing  it,  the  time  
when  and  the  place  where  it  shall  be  done.  All  these  aspects  of  control  
must  be  considered  in  deciding  whether  the  right  exists  in  a  sufficient  
degree  to  make  one  party  the  master  and  the  other  his  servant.804  
  
In   the   opinion   of  McKenna   J,   control   should   be   an   important   distinguishing  
factor   of   the   relationship   of   employment.   In   latter   years,   when   social   and  
economic   conditions   became   increasingly   complex,   and   when   the   different  
forms  of  work,  such  as  labour-­only  sub-­contracting,  and  zero  hours  contracts  
arose,   the   control   test   was   set   out   in   more   limited   terms   than   before.805  
According  to  these  limits,  it  is  no  longer  treated  as  a  single  and  significant  test  
for  employment.     
  
Although  not  regarded  as  a  single  test,  the  concept  of  control  is  considered  as  
one  essential  element   to   realise   the  new   form  of  employment   relationship   in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803   O  Kahn-­Freund,  ‘Servants  and  Independent  Contractors’  (1951)  14  MLR  504,505-­506.  
804   Ready  Mix  Concrete  (South  East)  Ltd  v  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  [1968]  2  QB  497  
(QB)  151.  
805   Howarth  and  others  (n  683)  1037.  
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recent   leading   cases.   Considering   the   need   for   a   new   understanding   of  
employment  relationship,  the  scope  of  control  test  was  broadened  as  well.  In  
the  case  of  JGE,  the  court  emphasised  that  the  question  of  control  should  be  
understood  in  a  wider  sense,  rather  than  merely  asking  whether  the  employer  
controls  the  employee’s  work.806   Control  as  a  test,  notwithstanding  that  its  role  
was  reduced  before,  would  be  a  more  essential  concept  than  some  others  to  
test  the  relationship  for  vicarious  liability.  The  test  can  be  considered  as  one  of  
several  essential  tests  for  determining  the  relationship  “akin  to  employment”  in  
the  current  modern   legal  practice.   In   the  case  of  Market   Investigations  Ltd  v  
Minister  of  Social  Security,  the  court  outlined  a  three-­step  test  for  establishing  
the   employment   relationship,   and   the   first   one   is   to   evaluate   whether   an  
employer  has  control  and  direction  over  the  relevant  employee.807     
  
In  the  JGE  case,  the  court  listed  five  essential  tests  to  indicate  vicarious  liability,  
and   the   test  of  control  was   the   first   to  be  considered.   In   this  case,   the  court  
provided  a  broad  new  meaning  of  control  for  further  use:        
  
The   question   of   control   should   be   viewed   in   a   wider   sense   than  
merely  enquiring  whether  the  employer  has  the  legal  power  to  control  
how  the  employee  carries  out  his  work.  It  should  be  viewed  more  in  
terms  of  whether  the  employee  is  accountable  to  his  superior  for  the  
way  he  does  the  work  so  as  to  enable  the  employer  to  supervise  and  
effect   improvements   in   performance   and   eliminate   risks   of   harm   to  
others.808  
  
The  judgment  in  this  case  provided  multiple  ways  to  look  at  the  control  test  for  
modern  legal  situations.  According  to  the  court,  one  way  to  look  at  the  control  
test,   is  to  examine  whether  the  employee  is  controlled  in  every  detail  of  how  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806   JGE  (n  659)  [76].  
807  Market  Investigations  Ltd  v  Minister  of  Social  Security  [1962]  2  QB  173  (QB)  184-­185.  
808   JGE  (n  659)  [76].  
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things  should  be  done.  Another  way   is   to  examine  whether   the  employee   is  
asked  to  achieve  detailed  result.  A  wider  way  to  look  at  control  is  to  “examine  
the  degree  to  which  the  employee  is  accountable  to  the  employer,  or  to  what  
extent  he  is  subject  to  the  managerial  procedures  of  the  employer  in  relation  to  
such  matters  as  quality  of  work,  performance,  and  productivity  etc.”809;;  and  to  
examine  “the  degree  of  managerial  control  which  is  exercised  over  the  activity  
and  this  may  depend  on  how  far  a  person  is  integrated  into  the  organization  of  
the  enterprise.”810  
  
The   decision   of   JGE   was   approved   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  
CCWS.  In  the  case  of  CCWS,  Lord  Phillips  confirmed  that  although  the  control  
test  was  no  longer  regarded  as  the  critical  test  for  vicarious  liability,  there  was  
one   area   of   the   law   of   vicarious   liability   where   this   test   was   particularly  
important.  That  is  the  area  of  dual  vicarious  liability  and  the  area  of  vicarious  
liability   without   a   contract   of   service.811   For   most   cases   in   this   area,   one  
cannot   find   the   employment   contract   against   the   defendant   who   is   not   a  
permanent   employer.   The   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   the   case   of  CCWS  
greatly  supports  the  application  of  this  doctrine  in  group  situations,  where  the  
injured  claimant  of  one  subsidiary  may  sue  the  parent  company  through  “dual  
vicarious  liability”  or  by  simply  relying  on  the  theory  of  “akin  to  employment”.     
  
In  the  CCWS  case,  the  Institute  of  the  Brothers  of  the  Christian  Schools  (the  
Institute),   in   civil   law,   was   an   unincorporated   association   of   its   members,  
founded   by   lay   brothers   of   the  Catholic  Church.  However,   this   institute  was  
deemed  as  having  corporate  features  such  as  a  hierarchy  of  authority.812   The  
problem   considered   in   this   case   was   whether   the   Institute   was   vicariously  
liable   in   law   for   the   alleged   acts   of   physical   and   sexual   abuse   of   children  
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810   ibid.  
811   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [37].  
812   ibid  [2].     
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committed  by  its  members  at  St.  Williams,  in  Yorkshire.  
  
It  was  alleged   that   the   children  were  physically   and   sexually   abused  by   the  
staff  at  the  school  between  1958  to  1992.  The  first  group  of  defendants  were  
the  managers  of   the  school.  The  school  was   founded   in  1865  by  a  group  of  
Catholic  benefactors,  and  since  1982,   it  was  managed  by   the  Catholic  Child  
Welfare  Society.  The  second  group  of  defendants  consisted  of  members  of  the  
Institute  and  the  Institute.  One  brother  from  the  Institute  called  Brother  James  
and  some  other  brothers  were  claimed  to  have  committed  abusive  acts  against  
the  school  boys  when  teaching  in  the  school.     
  
The  first  group  of  defendants  accepted  the  judgment  given  by  the  High  Court  
that   they   were   vicariously   liable   for   the   actions   of   their   employees,   but  
appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  basis  that  the  Institute  of  the  Brothers  of  
the   Christian   Schools   should   share   the   vicarious   liability.   The   Institute   was  
alleged  to  be  vicariously  liable  for  the  brothers  belonging  to  it  who  taught  at  the  
School  and  abused  the  children  there.     
  
The  Supreme  Court  allowed  the  appeal  and  indicated  that  it  was  fair,  just  and  
reasonable  to  impose  vicarious  liability  on  the  Institute  for  the  abuse  committed  
by   its   members.   In   this   case,   Lord   Phillips   confirmed   the   synthesis   of   two  
stages  for  establishing  vicarious  liability  provided  by  Hughes  LJ  in  the  Court  of  
Appeal:  
  
i)   consider   the   relationship   of   the   first   defendant   and   the   second  
defendant   to   see   whether   it   is   one   that   is   capable   of   giving   rise   to  
vicarious  liability;;  
ii)   the   requirement   of   an   examination   of   the   connection   between   the  
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second  defendant  and  the  act  or  omission  of  the  wrongdoer.813  
  
To   establishing   the   first   step,   the   control   test   was   considered.   Lord   Phillips  
referred  to  the  cases  involving  dual  vicarious  liability  such  as  Wharton  &  Down  
Construction   Syndicate   Ltd, 814    and   Mersey   Docks   and   Harbour   Board   v  
Coggins   &   Griffith   (Liverpool)   Ltd, 815    in   which   a   very   stringent   test   was  
imposed  making  a  transfer  of  vicarious  liability  almost   impossible  in  practice.  
According  to  the  decisions,  focus  should  be  on  those  possessing  the  right  to  
“control  the  way  in  which  the  act  involving  negligence  was  done”,816   and  “the  
inquiry  should  concentrate  on  the  relevant  negligent  act  and  then  ask  whose  
responsibility   it   was   to   prevent   it.”817   In   CCWS,   Lord   Phillips   considered  
control  as  one  of  the  four  essential  elements  to  establishing  vicarious  liability.  
More  specifically,  the  defendant  Institute  in  this  case  exercised  control  over  the  
teaching   brothers   by   issuing   directions,   requirements   and   determining   the  
position  of  work  in  the  course  of  the  employment.     
  
In  the  corporate  group  context,  dual  vicarious  liability  might  be  considered  in  
the  situation  where  the  parent  company  is  sued  for  the  torts  of  the  employees  
of   one   subsidiary.   In   this   situation,   a   relationship   akin   to   employment   is  
expected  to  arise  between  the  parent  company  and  the  tortious  employee  of  
the   subsidiary.   In   another   situation,   vicarious   liability   might   also   be   applied  
where  the  relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary  is  “akin  
to  employment”.  In  this  case,  the  subsidiary,  as  a  legal  person  is  equivalent  to  
an  employee.  According  to  the  previous  discussion  of  the  control  test,  we  can  
draw  a  conclusion  that  in  these  two  circumstances,  the  control  test  would  be  
significant.  In  respect  of  the  control  test  applied  in  the  group  situation,  we  will  
look   at   the   degree   to   which   the   parent   company   (as   an   employer)   is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
813   ibid  [21].  
814  Wharton  &  Down  Construction  Syndicate  Ltd  [1893]  1  QB  629  (QB).  
815  Mersey  Docks  and  Harbour  Board  v  Coggins  &  Griffith  (Liverpool)  Ltd  [1947]  AC  1  (HL).  
816   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [38].     
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accountable  to  the  subsidiary  company  (as  an  employee),  or  to  what  extent  is  
the   subsidiary   company   (as   an   employee)   subject   to   the   managerial  
procedures  of  the  parent  company  (as  an  employer)  in  relation  to  such  matters  
as   quality   of   work,   performance,   and   productivity.818   Furthermore,   we   will  
examine   the   degree   of   managerial   control   of   the   parent   company   which   is  
exercised  over  the  activity  related  to  the  tort,  and  this  may  depend  on  how  far  
the   subsidiary   company’s   business   is   integrated   into   the  organisation  of   the  
parent  company’s  business.     
  
  
5.4.1.2  Tests  of  organisation,  integration  and  entrepreneur     
  
These   three   tests,   together   with   the   control   test   were   introduced   and  
emphasised   in   the   case   of   JGE   v   The   Trustees   of   the  Portsmouth  Roman  
Catholic   Diocesan   Trust.819  Although   there   is   no   employment   relationship   if  
judging  the  issue  on  conventional  lines,  the  bishop  can  however  be  vicariously  
liable   when   the   relationship   is   akin   to   employment.   The   Court   of   Appeal  
extended   the  scope  of   the  doctrine,  and  concluded   that   the   “time  has  come  
emphatically  to  announce  that  the  law  of  vicarious  liability  has  moved  beyond  
the  confines  of  a  contract  of  service.”820      In   the   Court   of   Appeal,  Ward   and  
Davis  LJ  found  it  possible  to  describe  the  relationship  between  the  bishop  and  
the  priest  as  being  “akin  to  employment”.  Ward  LJ  achieved  this  by  treating  the  
ministry  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  as  a  business  carried  on  by  the  bishop,  
by  finding  that  the  priest  carried  on  that  business  under  a  degree  of  control  by  
the  bishop  and  by  finding  that  the  priest  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  organisation  
of  the  business  and  integrated  into  it.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818   JGE  (n  659)  [72].  
819   JGE  (n  659).  
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The   tests   of   control,   organisation,   integration,   and   entrepreneur   were  
introduced  by  Professor  Richard  Kidner   in  his  article,821   and  emphasised  by  
LJ  Ward  as  essential  and  decisive  tests  for  determining  the  “relationship  akin  
to  employment”  for  vicarious  liability.822     
  
The  organisation  test  is  to  examine  how  central  the  tort,  or  the  activity  leading  
or  closely  relevant  to  the  damage  is  to  the  employer’s  business  from  the  point  
of  view  of  the  business  or  enterprise  objectives.  Specifically,  we  have  to  look  at  
the  person  who   is  engaging   in   that   tort  or  activity,  and   it   is  believed   that   the  
more  relevant  the  tort/activity  is  to  the  objectives  of  the  employer’s  business,  
the   more   appropriate   it   is   to   attribute   the   tort/risks   of   the   activity   to   that  
business.823      The   integration   test   is   closely   connected  with   the  organisation  
test  and  also  a  part  of  the  entrepreneur  test.  It  asks  whether  the  tort  or  activity  
is  integrated  into  the  business  or  organised  structure  of  the  enterprise.824   The  
entrepreneur   test   examines   whether   the   person   is   in   business   on   his   own  
account.   An   employee   has   no   chance   to   behave   as   an   independent  
entrepreneur.   As   confirmed   by   Ward   LJ,   “even   if   a   person’s   activity   is  
peripheral   to   the   enterprise   and   even   if   he   is   not   for   managerial   purposes  
regarded  as  part  of   the  organization,  a  person  could  still  be   regarded  as  an  
‘employee’  if   it   is  clear  that  in  relation  to  that  business  he  is  not  acting  as  an  
entrepreneur”. 825    It   should   be   noted   that   to   determine   the   imposition   of  
vicarious  liability,  the  four  tests  should  be  considered  together  because  every  
single  one  is  intimately  involved  in  the  other  three.  Based  upon  these  four  tests,  
Ward  LJ  added  that  the  relationship  between  the  defendant  and  the  tortfeasor  
should  be  so  “close  in  character  to  one  of  employer/employee  that  it  is  just  and  
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fair  to  hold  the  employer  vicariously  liable.”826     
  
Ward  LJ  applied   the  above   tests   to   the   specific   facts   of   the  JGE   case,   and  
concluded  that  the  priest  was  in  a  relationship  with  his  bishop  which  was  close  
enough  and  so  akin  to  employer  and  employee  as  to  make  it   just  and  fair  to  
impose  vicarious  liability.827        
  
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  relationship  between  the  priest  and  the  bishop  
cannot  meet  all  of  the  requirements  of  a  conventional  employment  relationship.  
For  example,   the  priest   is  not  directly  paid  a  salary  by  his  bishop.  However,  
Ward  LJ  emphasised  that  even  though  the  priest  could  not  match  every  facet  
of  becoming  an  employee,  but  various  features  made  it  very  close  to  it.828     
  
In  the  case  CCWS,  again,  Lord  Phillips  ignored  some  differences  between  the  
true   relationship   of   the   teaching   brothers   and   defendant   Institute   and   the  
typical   relationship   of   employer   and   employee.   According   to   his   Lordship,  
neither   of   those   differences   was   material. 829    For   instance,   the   teaching  
brothers  had  no  contract  of  service  with  the  Institute,  and  they  were  not  paid  a  
salary,  the  Institute  catered  for  the  teaching  brothers  from  the  Institute’s  funds.  
Lord  Phillips  confirmed  the  tests  applied  by  Ward  LJ  in  case  JGE,  and  imposed  
vicarious   liability   based   on   the   essential   elements   of   the   employment  
relationship.  Those  elements  believed  by  Lord  Phillips  to  be  essential  include  
(1)  the  teaching  activity  was  under  the  control  of  the  Institute;;  (2)  the  teaching  
activity  was  in  furtherance  of  the  objective  of  the  business  of  the  Institute;;  (3)  
the  working  manner  was  under  the  direction  of  the  Institute  rule.830     
  
These  two  leading  cases  provide  a  strong  indication  that  vicarious  liability  can  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826   ibid  [73].  
827   ibid  [81].  
828   ibid  [80].  
829   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [58].  
830   ibid  [56].  
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be   realised   based   on   several   essential   elements   that   point   towards  
employment   relationship,   and   furthermore   if   these   essential   elements   are  
found,   some   differences   between   the   conventional   employment   relationship  
and  the  relationship  “akin  to  employment”  can  be  ignored.     
  
According   to   the   tests   for   ascertaining   the   relationship   akin   to   employment  
confirmed   in   recent   leading  cases,   it  would  be  reasonable   to  assume  that   in  
particular   circumstances,   for   the   purpose   of   vicarious   liability,   a   parent  
company   and   the   subsidiary   company   could   be   in   a   relationship   akin   to  
employment.  The  tests  of  control,  organisation,  integration,  and  entrepreneur  
might  be  met   in   some  complex  group  situations.  When   the  parent   company  
has  day-­to-­day  control  over  certain  activities  of  the  subsidiary  company  which  
result   in   the   damage,   and   at   the   same   time   the   activity   is   exercised   in  
furtherance   of   the   parent   company’s   business,   or   the   activity   is   part   of   or  
integrated  into  the  organised  structure  of  the  parent  company’s  business,  and  
the   subsidiary   does   not   undertake   this   business   on   its   own   account,   the  
relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary  can  fall   into  the  
scope  of  a  relationship  “akin   to  employment”  defined   in   the  JGE  and  CCWS  
case.  Of  course,  there  might  be  difficulties  in  the  collection  of  proper  evidence  
to  fulfill  the  tests  of  control,  organisation,  integration  and  entrepreneur.     
  
Taking  the  Cape  related  cases  as  examples  again.  Petrin,  in  his  case  note  on  
Chandler  v  Cape  mentioned  that   it  would  be  more  straightforward  to   impose  
parent   company’s   vicarious   liability   than   relying   on   direct   duty   of   care.831   In  
this  context,  it  is  worth  considering  whether  the  above  essential  tests  could  be  
met  in  the  Chandler  v  Cape  case.  The  test  of  control  can  definitely  be  met  in  
this  case  because  sufficient  evidence  suggested  that  the  parent  company  had  
day-­to-­day   control   over   the   subsidiary’s   asbestos   business,   and   also   took  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831   Petrin  (n  338)  603.     
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control  over  its  subsidiary’s  management  in  some  aspects.832   The  second  test  
of  organisation  and  the  third  test  of  integration  can  be  met  as  well.  In  this  case,  
Arden  LJ   in  the  Court  of  Appeal   listed  several  categories  of  evidence  on  the  
intimate   relationship   between   the   parent   company  Cape   and   the   subsidiary  
Cape   Products,   for   the   purpose   of   establishing   duty   of   care.   Among   these  
categories   of   evidence,   origins   of   the   subsidiary   Cape   Product’s   asbestos  
business,  and  evidence  as  to  Cape’s  involvement  in  the  asbestos  business  of  
Cape  Products  show  that  the  subsidiary  company’s  asbestos  business  can  be  
regarded   as   helping   to   meet   its   parent   company’s   asbestos   business  
objectives,   and   can   be   regarded   as   integrated   into   its   parent   company’s  
business   as   well.   The   problem   lies   in   the   last   test   of   entrepreneur.   As   a  
subsidiary  company,  Cape  Products  was  not  found  as  a  façade  to  just  carry  on  
the  business  of  its  parent  company.  Cape  Products  was  totally  a  separate  legal  
entity,  owning  its  properties,  taking  profits  and  responsible  for  its  own  debts.  It  
is  difficult  to  say  that  Cape  Products  was  doing  business  on  behalf  of  its  parent  
company  Cape.  So  in  the  Chandler  v  Cape  case,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  establish  
a   relationship   akin   to   employment.   Is   there   any   circumstance   that   the  
subsidiary  company  lose  its  separate  legal  personality  and  carry  on  business  
or  activities  just  on  behalf  of  its  parent  company?  It  is  difficult  to  say  no.  It  does  
happen   in   the  business  world   that  a  subsidiary  company   is  established  as  a  
façade  to  escape  legal  responsibility  or  to  do  business  just  for  the  interests  of  
its  parent  company.  However,  this  will  bring  the  issue  back  to  the  same  tough  
question   for   the   doctrine   of   veil-­piercing   again,   the   question   about   in   what  
circumstance  a   subsidiary   is   regarded  as  a   “façade”,   lose   its   separate   legal  
personality,  and  just  carry  on  business  on  behalf  of  its  parent  company.  This  is  
a  much  more  complex  issue  than  proving  whether  a  priest  works  on  behalf  of  
his  bishop,  or  teaching  brothers  work  on  behalf  of  their  Institute.     
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Another  problem  as  to  the  issue  whether  the  relationship  between  the  parent  
company  and   the   subsidiary   can  be   “akin   to   employment”   regards   the   legal  
personality  of   the  subsidiary  company.  Vicarious   liability   is  a  doctrine   that   is  
applied  to  liability  for  torts  of  natural  persons/individuals.  The  question  whether  
the   subsidiary   company,   or   a   corporation/organisation,   as   a   legal   individual,  
could  behave  as  a  natural  individual  in  corporate  relations  is  controversial  and  
ambiguous.  
  
Morgan,  in  his  article  argues  that  a  company  can  be  in  a  position  of  employee.  
According  to  recent  leading  cases,  the  employment  contract  is  not  necessary  
in  determining  employment  relationship  for  the  purpose  of  vicarious  liability.833  
Secondly,  vicarious   liability  applies   to   the   torts  of  a   legal  entity  because   this  
extension   indeed   “respects   the   fiction   that   the   legal   person   has   a   separate  
legal  identity,  and  takes  it  to  its  natural  consequences…it  would  make  a  legal  
person  more  like  a  natural  person－thus  respecting  the  principle  of  corporate  
law  and  taking  it  to  its  logical  conclusion.”834     
  
Morgan’s  arguments  are  inspiring,  however,  still  cannot  sufficiently  support  the  
feasibility  of  vicarious  liability  for  a  subsidiary’s  torts.  According  to  the  leading  
cases   of   CCWS   and   JGE,   vicarious   liability   can   be   realised   without   the  
contract   of   employment.   However,   this   extension   still   applies   only   in  
relationships  between  a   legal  person/natural  person  and  a  natural  person   in  
accordance  with   the  current  case   law.   It  can  be  regarded  as  a  breakthrough  
which  increases  the  possibility  that  a   legal  entity  can  be  vicariously   liable  for  
another   legal   individual’s   torts,   but   not   a   decisive   step   which   is   able   to  
absolutely  lead  to  the  result.     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833   Morgan,  ‘Vicarious  Liability  for  Group  Companies:  The  Final  Frontier  of  Vicarious  Liability?’  (n  651)  
295.  
834   ibid  297.  
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5.4.2   The   close-­connection   test   for   vicarious   liability   in   the   group  
situation     
  
When   the   first   requirement   of   employment   relationship   is   satisfied,   the  
employer  will   be  vicariously   liable   if   it   is   then  proved   that   the  wrongdoing   is  
committed   “in   the  course  of   the  employment”  of   the  employee.  The  same   is  
true   when   the   relationship   between   the   defendant   and   the   tortfeasor   has   a  
close  connection  with  the  tort.  This  “close  connection”  test  was  introduced  in  
the   decision   of   the   House   of   Lords   in   Lister   v   Hesley   Hall.835   The   close  
connection  test  will  be  met  when  the  relationship  between  the  tortfeasor  and  
the  defendant  is  “akin  to  employment”,  and  the  tort   is  closely  connected  with  
this  relationship.836   The  Supreme  Court  in  the  CCWS  case,  after  reviewing  the  
precedent  authorities,  confirmed  that  the  close  connection  test  can  be  fulfilled  
when   the   relationship   between   the   tortfeasor   and   the   defendant   is   akin   to  
employment,   and   the   existence   of   the   relationship   increased   the   risk   of   the  
damage  occurring.837  
  
The   judgment   of   the   famous  Canadian   case  Bazely   v   Curry   was   quoted   in  
CCWS:     
  
…there  must  be  a  strong  connection  between  what  the  employer  was  
asking   the   employee   to   do   (the   risk   created   by   the   employer’s  
enterprise)  and   the  wrongful  act.   It  must  be  possible   to  say   that   the  
employer   significantly   increased   the   risk   of   the   harm   by   putting   the  
employee   in   his   or   her   position   and   requiring   him   to   perform   the  
assigned  tasks.838     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835   Lister  (n  656).  
836   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [62].  
837   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [86].  
838   Bazely  (n  687)  [42];;  The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [64].  
	   277	  
            In   Lister   v   Hesley   Hall,   Lord   Millett   also   commented   on   the   “risk   test”   as  
follows:  
  
The   fact   that  his  employment  gave   the  employee   the  opportunity   to  
commit   the  wrong   is  not  enough   to  make   the  employer   liable.  He   is  
liable  only  if  the  risk  is  one  which  experience  shows  is  inherent  in  the  
nature  of  the  business.839  
  
This  kind  of  explanation  of  close  connection  test  is  described  as  referring  to  the  
“enterprise  risk  approach”  in  Markesinis  and  Deakin’s  Tort  Law  as  well.840   Lord  
Phillips   of   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   CCWS   case,   acknowledged   that   the  
extension  of   the  enterprise  risk  rationale  had  been  broadened  to   this  extent.  
According   to   his   Lordship,   the   creation   of   risk   is   not   simply   a   policy  
consideration.  Although   “creation   of   the   risk”   itself   is   not   sufficient   to   trigger  
vicarious   liability,   it  would  always  be   included   in   the  criteria   that  give   rise   to  
such   liability.841   In   this   case,   the   initial   intention   of   developing   the   law   of  
vicarious   liability   this   far   is   to   ensure   that   there   is   a   remedy   for   the   sexual  
abuse   victims,   which   is   provided   by   those   who   should   bear   the  
responsibility.842   For  this  reason,  the  “risk  test”  is  introduced  and  confirmed  to  
establish   the   necessary   close   connection   between   the   relationship   akin   to  
employment   and   the   abuse.   Now   that   the   “creation   of   risk”   has   been  
considered  by   the  Supreme  Court   as   one   criterion   for   vicarious   liability,   this  
principle   should   have   broader   applicability   based   on   the   same   underlying  
reasoning.  Referring  to  the  explanation  and  reasoning  provided   in  precedent  
cases,  particularly   in   the  Supreme  case  CCWS,   a  broader  understanding  of  
the  risk  test  is  concluded  as  follows:  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
839   Lister  (n  656)  [65].  
840   Deakin,  Johnston,  and  Markesinis  (n  292)  554.     
841   The  Catholic  Child  Welfare  Society  (n  661)  [87].  
842   ibid.  
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Vicarious   liability   can   be   imposed   where   a   defendant,   whose  
relationship  with  the  tortfeasor  put  it  in  a  position  to  use  the  tortfeasor  
to  carry  on  its  business  or  to  further  its  own  interest,  has  done  so  in  a  
manner  which  has  created  or  significantly  facilitated  the  risk  that  the  
victim   would   suffer   the   relevant   harm.   The   relationship   akin   to  
employment   has   enhanced   the   commission   of   the   tort   or   the  
happening  of  the  damage.  This  involves  a  strong  causative  link.843     
  
The  risk  test  is  then  followed  by  a  non-­abuse  case  Cox  v  Ministry  of  Justice844  
in  2014,  which   fully   illustrates   its  extended  use.   In  Cox,   the  Court  of  Appeal  
held   that   the   Ministry   of   Justice   was   vicariously   liable   for   the   prisoner’s  
negligence.  A  catering  manager  at  a  prison  was  injured  when  a  prisoner,  who  
was  carrying  out  paid  work  loading  food  supplies  onto  trolleys  for  the  kitchen,  
negligently  dropped  a  heavy  bag  on  her.  Applying   the   test   in  CCWS,   it  was  
found   that   the   Ministry   was   better   able   to   compensate   the   claimant,   the  
engagement  of  the  prisoner  to  do  the  specific  work  created  the  risk  of  the  injury  
being  caused  to  the  claimant  and  the  prisoner  was  under  the  Minister’s  control.  
  
The   risk   test   is   also   able   to   explain   the   close   connection   between   the  
relationship   of   the   parent   and   subsidiary   company,   and   the   torts   of   the  
subsidiary  company  in  cases  where  negligence  is  committed  in  group  situation.  
More  specifically,   the  risk   test  can  be  applied   in  many  group  cases   involving  
environmental   pollution   and   personal   injury,   where   the   relationship   between  
the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary,   and   the   business   they   carry   on  
together,  has  significantly  facilitated  toxic  substance  exposure  which  results  in  
severe   damage   to   the   subsidiary’s   employees   and   third   parties.   This   is  
because   many   enterprises   in   hazardous   industries,   such   as   the   asbestos  
industries,   try   to   restructure   themselves   in   the   corporate   group   structure   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843   ibid  [86].  
844   Cox  v  ministry  of  Justice  [2014]  EWCA  Civ  132,  [2015]  QB  107.  
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escape   tort   claims.   In   this   case,   the   parent   company   and   its   subsidiary  
company   have   a   special   relationship   beyond   the   relationship   among  
independent  individual  legal  entities.  
  
The   Cape   related   cases   provide   a   good   example   to   illustrate   this   kind   of  
special  relationship.  In  Chandler  v  Cape  case,  Cape  had  been  involved  in  the  
business  of  asbestos  production  from  the  19th  century  and  had  some  factories  
in  the  UK;;   in  1953,   it  acquired  the  outstanding  shares  of  Cape  Products,  the  
subsidiary  company,  and  appointed  a  manager  to  manage  Cape  Products  as  
“a   branch   of   Cape”.845   Cape   Products   contributed   a   great   value   to   Cape’s  
business.846   Cape  Products  then  became  a  part  of  the  organisational  structure,  
integrated   into   a   group   companies   headed   by   Cape.   In   1965,   Cape   as   the  
parent  company  approved  Cape  Products   to  have  a  separate  administration  
as   to  management,  production,  and  sales,  but   “in  accordance  with  company  
policy”.  This  is  understood  as  “inconsistent  with  Cape  Products  being  able  to  
be   in   charge   of   its   own   management   systems.”847   At   relevant   times   Cape  
Products  was  directed  by  directors  of  Cape,  and  most  of  the  board  meetings  of  
this  subsidiary  were  held  in  London,  at  the  parent  company  Cape’s  head  office.  
Even   though   Cape   tried   to   make   Cape   Products   act   as   an   independent  
company   in   a   large   corporate   group,   Cape’s   board   still   “took   an   interest   in  
issues  relating   to   the  management  by  subsidiaries  of   their  own  business.”848  
Cape   constantly   provided   technical   assistance   and   appointed   the   experts  
employed  by  Cape  itself  to  provide  support  towards  product  development  and  
health  and  safety  issues  in  Cape  Products.  It  was  recorded  in  a  number  of  the  
board  minutes   that  Cape  as  a  parent   company  had  high   involvement   in   the  
asbestos   business   of   Cape   Products,   such   as   taking   decisions   on   the  
expansion  of  the  subsidiary’s  business.849     
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It  is  not  difficult  to  conclude  that  Cape  controlled  at  least  some  aspects  of  the  
business  of  Cape  Products  according   to   the  relationship  between  the  parent  
company  Cape  and  the  subsidiary  Cape  Products.  This  is  also  the  conclusion  
from  the  Court  of  Appeal’s  judgment:     
  
It   is   the  fact   that  Cape  Products  had  acquired   its  asbestos  business  
from  Cape  and,  when  it  suited  it,  Cape  intervened  in  the  management  
of   Cape   Products’   business;;   the   experts   employed   by   Cape   was  
involved  in  the  health  and  safety  issue  of  the  whole  group.850     
  
What   is  of  great   importance  is  that  the  damage  happened  due  to  the  unsafe  
working  environment  of  the  subsidiary,  and  happened  during  the  period  when  
Cape  was  highly  involved  in  Cape  Products’  asbestos  business.     
  
The  parent   company  Cape  put   the  subsidiary   in  a  position   to  undertake   the  
asbestos   business   for   its   own   interest,   and   such   business   significantly  
enhanced  the  risk  of  the  damage.  According  to  the  risk  test,  it  is  reasonable  to  
conclude  that  the  subsidiary’s  negligence  has  very  close  connection  with  the  
special  relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary.  Thus,  it  is  
possible  to  apply  the  close  connection  test  in  the  corporate  group  context.     
  
  
5.5  Further  evaluation  of  the  extension  of  vicarious  liability  in  the  group  
situation  
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5.5.1  Policy  reasons     
     
The  underlying  rationales  for  vicarious  liability  explain  the  doctrine’s  existence,  
as  well  as  the  doctrine’s  development  in  accordance  with  the  social  changes  
and  needs.  A  proper  remedy  for  the  tort  victims  of  an  insolvent  or  impecunious  
subsidiary  against  a  solvent  parent  company  is  a  real  social  need.  The  primary  
justifications   for   vicarious   liability,   such  as   the   theory   of   enterprise   risk,   loss  
spreading,   compensation,   deterrence,   control   and   pleading   convenience,   to  
some  degree  create  the  potential  of  the  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  for  
its  subsidiary.  All  the  rationales  together  justify  this  assumption  in  a  plausible  
way.  However,  do   these  explanations   for  parent  company’s  vicarious   liability  
conflict   with   the   bedrock   principles   of   limited   liability   and   separate   legal  
personality  in  corporate  law?  Unlike  legal  principles  which  have  better  clarity,  
we   have   to   admit   that   all   the   policy   rationales   just   play   a   role   in   a  
supplementary  way.  From  this  point  of  view,  in  general  circumstances,  the  two  
corporate  law  principles  are  huge  obstructions  in  the  way.     
  
The   only   case   in   respect   of   a   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability   for   its  
subsidiary  company’s   tort   is   found   in  1972,  a   reported  decision  by   the  Nova  
Scotia  Supreme  Court  in  Canada.851   The  action  was  brought  by  the  Council  in  
the   Right   of   the   Province   of   Nova   Scotia   (the   Crown)   against   Waverley  
Construction  Company  Limited,  for  the  destruction  of  a  bridge  caused  by  the  
negligent  work   of  Douglas  Adshade,   employed  by  Waverley’s  wholly   owned  
subsidiary  company  Tidewater  Construction  Company  Limited.  To  establishing  
vicarious  liability  on  the  parent  company  Waverly,   the  claimant  tried  to  argue  
for   an   agency   relationship   between   Tidewater   and  Waverley.   However,   the  
court  found  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  determine  the  parent  company  liability  
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based  on  vicarious   liability.  At   that   time,  no   relevant  case   law  had  ever  held  
that  a  parent  company  could  be  held  vicariously  liable  for  the  negligence  of  a  
servant  of   its  subsidiary  on  the  ground  of  agency.   It  was  necessary   to  prove  
that   the   subsidiary   company   was   carrying   on   the   business   relevant   to   the  
damage   on   behalf   of   the   parent   company.   The   court   found   no   sufficient  
evidence  to  support  such  a  complex  relationship,  and  the  court  noticed  that  it  
would   be   inconsistent   with   the   rigid   corporate   law   principles   if   imposed  
vicarious  liability  on  the  parent  company.852     
  
As  we  discussed  previously,  the  relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  
the   subsidiary   should   have   the   possibility   to   be   akin   to   employment,   and  
therefore   lead   to   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability.   Morgan,   in   his   article  
argues   that   vicarious   liability   does   respect   the   principle   of   separate   legal  
personality.853   Vicarious  liability  can  apply  to  the  torts  of  a  legal  entity  because  
this  extension  indeed  “respects  the  fiction  that  the  legal  person  has  a  separate  
legal  identity,  and  takes  it  to  its  natural  consequences…it  would  make  a  legal  
person  more  like  a  natural  person－thus  respecting  the  principle  of  corporate  
law  and  taking  it  to  its  logical  conclusion.”854   As  he  explained,  vicarious  liability  
is   a   doctrine,   by   extending   its   scope,   one   can   be   held   vicariously   liable   for  
another   legal   person’s   tort.   This   process   can   be   regarded   as   a   natural  
consequence   of   a   separate   legal   entity   who   behaves   more   like   a   natural  
person.855     
  
However,  Morgan’s  argument  still  cannot  sufficiently  explain  that  the  imposition  
of   vicarious   liability   for   a   legal   individual’s   tort   does   not   conflict   with   the  
principle  of  separate  legal  personality.  When  one  company  is  incorporated,  it  
enjoys  a  separate   legal  personality  distinct   from  its  shareholders.  This   is   the  
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853   Morgan,  ‘Vicarious  Liability  for  Group  Companies:  The  Final  Frontier  of  Vicarious  Liability?’  (n  651)  
297.  
854   ibid.  
855   ibid.  
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bedrock   concept   that   forms   company   law   along  with   “Limited   Liability”.   The  
concept  of  corporate  personality  stresses  that  as  a  legal  person,  a  company  is  
not  an  agent  or  trustee  of  its  shareholders,  but  has  a  unique  identity.     
  
In  a  corporate  group,  a  company  has   its  unique   registration  number  distinct  
from  other  companies.  It  can  behave  as  a  legal  person,  with  a  directing  mind  
and  will,   to   seek   the   best   interests   and   benefits   of   the   company   itself.   The  
argument  from  Morgan  that  “…it  would  make  a  legal  person  more  like  a  natural  
person”   is   not   convincing   because   actually   the   purpose   of   the   creation   of  
separate  legal  personality  of  a  company  is  in  nature,  to  some  degree,  different  
from   the   concept   of   “a   natural   person”.  A   natural   person   can  behave  as   an  
employee,   who   works   with   directors   and   shareholders   for   the   purpose   of  
maximising  the  company’s  benefits  and  completing  the  company’s  objectives.  
However,  the  purpose  of  being  a  separate  legal  entity  is  to  be  distinct  from  its  
shareholders,   and   to   be  a   “person”   to   have   its   own   rights   and  bear   its   own  
responsibilities,   moreover,   to   maximise   its   own   interests.   If   a   company  
behaves   as   an   employee   of   its   parent   company,   it   will   definitely   lose   its  
corporate   personality   because   as   an   employee   this   company   should   do  
business  for  the  benefits  and  objectives  of  its  parent  company.  A  legal  person  
is  not  equivalent  to  a  natural  person  who  can  behave  as  an  employee  to  work  
totally   for   the   benefits   and   objectives   of   his   employer,   and   the   purpose   of  
creating  the  principle  of  separate  legal  personality  is  not  to  make  a  corporate  
entity  behave  like  a  natural  person  but  to  give  it  some  “features”  like  a  natural  
person.  One  company  will  definitely  lose  its  corporate  personality  if  it  works  on  
behalf  of   its  parent  company  and  for   the   interests  and  missions  of   its  parent  
company.   In   practice,   the   function   and   objective   of   the   separate   legal  
personality  of  a  company  will  be  more  complicated,  or  to  say,  to  some  degree  
different   from   a   natural   person’s   independent   personality.   In   practice,   it   is  
extremely  difficult   to   take  away  a  company’s   separate   legal  personality,   and  
this  is  one  hurdle  to  realising  the  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability.     
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Furthermore,   when   considering   the   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability   we  
must   pay   attention   to   the   statutory   hurdle   in   the   Insolvency   Act   1986,   the  
principle   of   limited   liability.   The   principle   of   limited   liability,   along   with   the  
principle  of  separate   legal  personality,   is  another  bedrock  of  company   law.   It  
means  that  a  limited  liability  company  can  only  be  sued  up  to  the  degree  that  
the  company’s  own  assets  are  exhausted.  Shareholders  of  the  company  enjoy  
limited   liability   regarding   the   company’s   debts   up   to   the   extent   of   their  
investment.  Creditors  cannot  turn  to  claim  against  the  shareholders  for  further  
debts  if  the  shareholder  has  met  his  commitments.  The  statutory  existence  of  
limited  liability  can  be  traced  to  the  Insolvency  Act  of  1986,  section  74  (d):  “in  
the  case  of  a  company  limited  by  shares,  no  contribution  is  required  from  any  
member   exceeding   the   amount   (if   any)   unpaid   on   the   shares   in   respect   of  
which  he  is  liable  as  a  present  or  past  member.”856  
  
In   the   context   of   corporate   groups,   limited   liability   operates   like   a   shield   to  
protect   group   members   from   paying   excessive   amount   of   money.   Like   the  
individual   shareholder,   other   corporate   group  members  will   not   be   asked   to  
pay  more  than  the  amount  unpaid  on  the  shares  in  respect  of  which  they  are  
liable  as  shareholders.  According  to  this  policy,  the  parent  company  is  not  to  
be   fully   liable   for   the   debts   of   its   subsidiaries   beyond   its   investment  
commitments.  However,  the  realisation  of  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  
will  definitely  be  a  strike  against  traditional  company  law  system  and  even  for  
the   economic   market.   The   realisation   of   vicarious   liability   of   the   parent  
company  for  its  subsidiary  company’s  tort  means  that  the  parent  company  will  
be  strictly  liable  for  its  subsidiary’s  tort  debts  as  an  employer  regardless  of  its  
limited  liability.  Even  in  the  situation  that  a  subsidiary  totally  loses  its  corporate  
personality  and  runs  the  business  on  behalf  of  its  parent  company  and  for  the  
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   285	  
final   interests  and  objectives  of   its  parent  company,   in  other  words,  behaves  
like  an  employee,  it  is  unknown  whether  it  is  proper  to  remove  limited  liability.  
We  are  not  sure  whether  the  benefits  brought  by  limited  liability   in  the  whole  
corporate  group,  investment  and  economic  market  will  be  reduced  when  such  
a  strict  liability  based  on  employment  relationship  between  corporate  members  
is  accepted.  This  is  a  huge  concern  that  cannot  be  ignored.  
  
  
5.5.2  Realisation  of  the  relationship  akin  to  employment     
  
When  considering   the  extension  of  vicarious   liability   theory  more  deeply,  we  
find   that   the  decisive  question  as   to   the   liability  determination   is  whether   the  
subsidiary  company  can  meet   the   requirements  of  being  an  employee  of   its  
parent  company.  This  is  where  the  difficulty  lies.  The  underlying  rationales  for  
vicarious  liability  are  actually  closely  connected  with  the  requirements  (tests)  of  
the  liability  determination.  In  the  context  of  corporate  groups,  we  cannot  firmly  
say  that   the  extension  of  vicarious   liability  will  conflict  with  the  two  corporate  
law  principles.  However,  to  respect  the  separate  legal  personality  and  limited  
liability   of   corporate   shareholders,   the   discussion   of   whether   the   underlying  
rationales   can   support   the   existence   of   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability  
must   be   in   the   context   of   realising   the   relationship   akin   to   employment  
according  to  the  current  case  law.  
  
There  is  no  direct  precedent  on  the  issue  of  parent  company’s  vicarious  liability  
for  its  subsidiary’s  tort  in  UK  case  law.  But  the  tests  for  the  relationship  akin  to  
employment  provided  in  recent   leading  cases  indicate  one  way  to  bridge  the  
relationship  between  the  parent  company  and  its  subsidiary  company  for  the  
imposition  of  vicarious  liability.  As  discussed  in  section  5.4,  the  essential  tests  
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for   relationship   requirement   include   test   of   control,   organisation,   integration,  
entrepreneur,  and  test  of   just  and  fair.  The  first   three  tests  are  not  difficult   to  
meet.  As   regards   the   test   of   control,  we   examine   the   degree   of  managerial  
control   of   the   parent   company   exercised   over   its   subsidiary’s   activity.  
Specifically,  we  examine  to  what  extent  the  parent  company  is  accountable  to  
the   subsidiary   company,   and   to  what   extent   the   subsidiary   is   subject   to   the  
managerial   procedures  of   the  parent   company   in   relation   to   the  activity   that  
leads  to  damage.  The  control  test   is  also  closely  connected  with  how  far  the  
subsidiary  company’s  business  is  integrated  into  the  organisation  of  the  parent  
company’s  business,  interests  and  objectives.  The  extension  of  the  tests  into  
group  situation  and  the  central  position  of  the  test  of  control,  organisation  and  
integration  are  also  emphasised  in  Morgan’s  article:  
  
Control  via  internal  corporate  law  process,  such  as  through  appointing  
directors  and  board  votes,  must  be  ignored  as  internal  mechanisms  of  
corporate  governance.  However,  control   through  contractual  means,  
or  in  fact,  may  be  taken  into  account.857  
  
However,  as  to  the  test  of  organisation  and  integration,  there  is  a  concern  that  
organisation   and   integration   cannot   sufficiently   explain   the   employment  
relationship   in  group  of  companies  because   these   two  concepts  are  actually  
two  features  of  the  corporate  group.  It  is  not  strange  that  the  parent  company  
and  subsidiary  company  have  common  interests,  business  objectives  and  that  
is  why  we  call   it  corporation.  The   test  of  organisation  and   integration  should  
adjust  to  the  specific  situation  of  group  cases.  For  the  purpose  of  establishing  
a   relationship   akin   to   employment,   we   can   look   at   whether   the   subsidiary  
acquires  the  business  (closely  relevant  to  damage)  from  the  parent  company,  
and  whether   the  business   is   totally   in   the   furtherance  of   the   interests  of   the  
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parent   company,   or   whether   the   integrated   behaviour  makes   the   subsidiary  
totally  lose  its  separate  legal  personality.     
  
Another  concern  is  about  the  test  of  entrepreneur,  which  examines  whether  the  
person   is   doing  business  on  his   own  account.  This  would  be   the   significant  
obstacle  to  realising  the  relationship  akin  to  employment  between  the  parent  
company  and  the  subsidiary  company.   It   is  extremely  difficult   to  prove  that  a  
subsidiary  is  not  carrying  on  business  on  his  behalf.  As  stated  by  Cooper  J  A,  
in  the  case  of  Waverley,  “the  issue  here  involves  not  a  question  of  taxation  nor  
occupation  of  property  but  rather  the  vicarious  liability  of  a  parent  company  for  
the   negligence   of   the   subsidiary   company”.858   In   the   Waverley   case,   the  
claimant  referred  to  the  case  Smith,  Stone  &  Knight  Ltd  v  City  of  Birmingham,  
in  which  Atkinson  J  held  that:  
  
The  parent  company,   the  claimant,  was  entitled  to  compensation  for  
the  removal  on  the  compulsory  acquisition  of  the  premises  occupied  
by   its   subsidiary   company.   The   question,   was   whether   or   not   the  
subsidiary  company  was  carrying  on  the  parent  company’s  business  
of  its  own.859  
  
In  the  case  of  Smith,  Stone  &  Knight  Ltd  v  City  of  Birmingham,  Atkinson  J  was  
in   favour  of   the  claimant,  and   found   that   the  subsidiary  company  was   totally  
doing   business   on   behalf   of   his   parent   company   and   lost   its   separate   legal  
personality.  Atkinson  J  found  that:  
  
The  parent  company  had  complete  control  over  the  operations  of  the  
subsidiary.   There   was   no   tenancy   agreement   of   any   sort   with   the  
subsidiary   company;;   they   were   just   there   in   name.   Apart   from   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
858   The  Queen  (n  821)  233.  
859   Smith,  Stone  &  Knight  Ltd  v  City  of  Birmingham  [1939]  4  ALL  ER  116  (KB)  118.  
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name,  it  was  really  as  if  the  manager  appointed  to  the  subsidiary  by  
the  parent  company  was  managing  a  department  of  the  company.  The  
subsidiary  company  never  declared  a  dividend;;  they  never  thought  of  
such   a   thing,   and   their   profit   was   in   fact   treated   as   the   parent  
company’s  profit.860  
  
Atkinson  J  provided  some  clues  on  how  to  determine  whether  a  subsidiary  was  
carrying   on   its   own   business.   These   clues  may   be   good   indications   for   the  
application   of   the   test   of   entrepreneur   in   the   group   situation.   Furthermore,  
Atkinson   J   gave   six   points   for   the   determination   of   the   issue:   who   is   really  
carrying  on  the  business?  These  points  are:     
  
(1)  Were  the  profits  treated  as  the  profits  of  the  parent  company?  (2)  
Were   the  persons  conducting   the  business  appointed  by   the  parent  
company?  (3)  Was  the  company  the  head  and  the  brain  of  the  trading  
venture?   (4)   Did   the   company   govern   the   adventure,   decide   what  
should  be  done  and  what  capital  should  be  embarked  on  the  venture?  
(5)  Did  the  parent  company  make  the  profits  by  its  skill  and  direction?  
(6)  Was  the  company  in  effectual  and  constant  control?861  
  
These   six   points   would   be   of   great   help   for   considering   the   relationship  
between   the   parent   company   and   subsidiary   company   here,   particularly   the  
first   point.   In   the  Waverley   case,  although   the  court  was  not   sure  about   the  
feasibility   of   this   six-­point   test,   Cooper   JA   still   applied   the   first   point   to   the  
case’s  facts  and  concluded  that  the  profits  of  Tidewater,  the  subsidiary,  were  
not  treated  as  profits  of  Waverley.  Furthermore,  as  pointed  out  by  Cooper  JA,  
Waverley   was   not   involved   in   the   specific   contract   entering   process   of   the  
business  of  Tidewater  with  the  Highway  construction,  which  led  to  the  damage.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860   ibid  119-­120.  
861   ibid  121.     
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If   the   tests   for   the   relationship   akin   to   employment   for   vicarious   liability  
provided  by  the  case  JGE  and  confirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  CCWS  can  
be  extended  to  apply  in  the  corporate  group  situation,  the  test  of  entrepreneur  
will   be   the   most   difficult   to   satisfy.   This   is   because   the   determination   of   a  
subsidiary   company   doing   business   on   his   parent   company’s   behalf   is  
extremely   difficult   in   modern   corporate   patterns   and   relations.   Proof   of   the  
specific  points,  as  laid  out  by  Atkinson  J,  is  out  of  the  question  in  most  cases.  
Even  if  in  the  Cape  group,  in  which  the  parent  company  had  extremely  close  
connections  with  its  subsidiaries,  the  court  never  firmly  removed  the  separate  
legal   personality   of   its   subsidiary.   In   Chandler   v   Cape,   as   we   know,   Cape  
Products   behaved   as   a   branch   in   operating   the   asbestos   business   of   the  
parent  company  Cape.  However,   since  Cape  Products  became  a  part  of  an  
integrated  group  of  companies  headed  by  Cape,  it  remained  the  owner  of  its  
own  assets  and  handled  its  own  sales  and  dealings  with  third  parties.862   Thus,  
it  can  never  be  held  that  Cape  Products  was  treated  as  a  division  or  branch.  
That  is  why  the  court  established  parent  company’s  liability  on  a  basis  of  tort  of  
negligence,  not  the  doctrine  of  veil-­piercing.     
  
It  may  not  be  very  difficult  to  establish  that  a  priest  is  carrying  on  his  bishop’s  
business,   and   does   his   job   to   further   the   interests   and   objectives   of   his  
bishop’s  business.  That   is  because  the  priest  himself  cannot  be  regarded  as  
an  entrepreneur   in  a  common  sense.  However,   the  situation  becomes  much  
more  complex  in  the  context  of  corporate  groups,  and  a  subsidiary’s  behaviour  
is  much  more  complicated  than  that  of  a  priest  or   teaching  brothers.   It  could  
happen  that  the  subsidiary  company  loses  its  separate  legal  personality  as  in  
some  cases  of  veil-­piercing,  but   that  will  be  a  rare  situation.  That  will  be   the  
main  reason  why  it  is  possible,  but  very  difficult  to  realise  a  relationship  akin  to  
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employment  between  the  parent  company  and  the  subsidiary  company.     
  
5.5.3  Concerns  about  the  enforcement  and  efficiency  of  vicarious  liability  
in  the  group  situation     
  
Compared  with  the  corporate  law  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil  which  
requires  some  form  of   illegitimate  conduct  and  the  removal  of  separate  legal  
personality,   tort   law   approaches   seem   to   be   more   flexible   and   creative   in  
establishing  parent  company’s  liability.     
  
The  tort  of  negligence  has  been  confirmed  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  the  case  
of   Chandler   v   Cape,   as   an   effective   cause   of   action   against   the   parent  
company  for   its  subsidiary’s   tort.  The  establishment  of  negligence   liability  on  
the   parent   company   requires   an   assumption   of   responsibility   based   on   the  
special   relationship   between   the   two   companies.   The   concept   of   control   is  
regarded   as   the   essential   element   for   realising   proximity   relationship.   As  
indicated  in  Chandler  v  Cape,  the  following  patterns  of  control  are  decisive:  the  
control  over   the  specific  asbestos  business  which   leads   to   the  damage,  and  
control   over   the   health   and   safety   policies   and   issues   for   the   whole   group  
which  makes  the  employees  of  the  whole  group  rely  on  the  parent  company  to  
exercise  protections.  Referring  to  the  “four-­part”  test  and  the  discussion  of  the  
control   concept  given  by   the  Court  of  Appeal,   it   is  not   legally  contentious   to  
pursue   a   remedy   against   the   parent   company   from   the   point   of   tort   of  
negligence.        
  
The   doctrine   of   joint   tortfeasance   based   on   the   multiple   defendants’  
involvements  in  the  same  tort,  is  also  very  promising  in  its  extension  to  group  
situations.  The  key  approach  to  establishing  joint  liability  in  the  group  situation  
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is   discussed   from   the   perspective   of   justifying   reasonable   and   sufficient  
participation   links   (concerted   action,   procurement,   authorization)   between  
different  group  companies.  All  the  three  participation  tests  for  joint  tort  liability  
are   well   accepted   in   common   law   and   could   be   expanded   to   connect   the  
parent  company  and  the  subsidiary  company  for  the  same  tort  as  well.  Based  
on  the  research  of   the  relevant  cases,   the  concept  of  “control”  could  also  be  
the   decisive   element,   which   contributes   to   establish   the   parent   company’s  
participation   in   the   commission   of   the   same   tort   with   its   subsidiaries.   The  
amount  of  control  should  be  the  crucial  basis,  on  which  the  participation  links  
rely  in  the  corporate  situation.  Referring  to  the  conclusion  of  chapter  4,  we  get  
the  proposition  that  the  following  elements  relevant  to  control  are  of  great  help  
in  group  cases:  the  parent  company  exercises  relevant  degree  of  control  over  
the  tortious  behaviour  of  the  subsidiary,  and  also  has  control  over  the  interests  
or  benefits  made  through  the  tort  or  made  along  with  the  happening  of  the  tort;;  
the   parent   company   has   the   power   to   authorise   and   control   the   tortious  
activities   of   their   subsidiary,   and   has   purported   to   exercise   such   power;;   the  
parent  company  can  be  said  to  authorise  the  subsidiary  to  commit  a  tort  if  the  
parent  has  some  form  of  control  over  the  subsidiary  at  the  time  of  the  tort  being  
committed.  
  
When  considering  the  possible  application  of  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  liability  
in   group   cases,   it   is   not   difficult   to   find   that   the   concept   of   control   again  
becomes   a   decisive   element.   For   the   purpose   of   establishing   a   relationship  
akin  to  employment  between  the  parent  company  and  its  subsidiary  company,  
the   element   of   control   is   a   crucial   part   to   be   discussed   to   meet   the   tests.  
However,   the   requirement   of   the   degree   of   control   for   vicarious   liability’s  
extension   in   group   situation   would   be   extremely   high.   This   is   because  
vicarious   liability   is   a   category   of   strict   joint   liability   based   on   relationship.  
Although   it   does   not   need   the   participation   links,   fault   involvement,   or   the  
requirement  of  foreseeability  of  the  damage  and  proximity  relationship  for  duty  
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of   care,   it   needs   strict   requirements   on   relationship.   Particularly,   in   order   to  
meet   the   test   of   entrepreneur   for   ascertaining   a   relationship   akin   to  
employment   between   the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary,   the   level   of  
control  over   the  subsidiary  would  depend  not  merely  on   the  control  over   the  
specific  involvement  in  the  tort,  or  control  over  significant  shares,  it  would  need  
the  degree  of  control  that  destroys  separate  legal  personality.     
  
To   discuss   this   tough   question,   we   can   refer   to   one   US   statute,   The  
Comprehensive   Environmental   Response,   Compensation,   and   Liability   Act  
(CERCLA),   under   which   the   US   courts   are   able   to   create   parent   company  
liability  for  environmental  damage  caused  by  its  subsidiary’s  industry.863   This  
route   has   been   used   by   the   US   courts   as   an   alternative   to   the   doctrine   of  
piercing  the  corporate  veil,  which  requires  losing  of  separate  legal  personality  
and   illegitimate   conduct.864   Under   the   CERCLA,   to   impose   a   strict   parent  
company’s   liability,   the  US  courts  try   to  constitute  the  parent  company  as  an  
“owner  or  operator”  of  its  subsidiary’s  industry  based  on  specific  provisions.  
  
The   specific   provisions   derive   from   the   CERCLA   section   107   (a),   which  
imposes  liability  on:  
  
(1)  the  owner  and  operator  of  a  vessel  or  a  facility;;  (2)  any  person  who  
at  the  time  of  disposal  of  any  hazardous  substance  owned  or  operated  
any  facility  at  which  such  hazardous  substances  were  disposed  of;;  (3)  
any   person   who   by   contract,   agreement,   or   otherwise   arranged   for  
disposal  or  treatment,  or  arranged  with  a  transporter  for  transport  for  
disposal  or  treatment,  of  hazardous  substances  owned  or  possessed  
by   such   person,   by   any   other   party   or   entity,   at   any   facility   or  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
863   The  Comprehensive  Environment  Response,  Compensation,  and  Liability  Act  of  1980  (CERCLA  42  
US  Code)  §  9601-­9657  (1982).  
864   Hofstetter,  ‘The  Ecological  Liability  of  Corporate  Groups:  Comparing  US  and  European  Trends’  (n  
665)  99.     
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incineration  vessel  owned  or  operated  by  another  party  or  entity  and  
containing  such  hazardous  substances…865  
  
In  the  relevant  cases,  to  establishing  the  strict  liability  of  the  parent  company,  
courts   try   to   prove   that   the   parent   and   its   subsidiary   have   a   very   close  
relationship   and   the   parent   exercised  massive   control   over   the   subsidiary’s  
management  and  operations  and  thus  constituted  an  "owner  or  operator"   for  
purposes  of  CERCLA.866   The  District  Court  of  Rhode  Island  in  United  States  of  
America  v  Kayser-­Roth  Corporation,  noted  that  a  parent  company  could  not  be  
regarded  as  the  “owner  or  operator”  just  based  on  the  status  of  shareholder.  
However,   the   facts   of   pervasive   control   over   its   subsidiary   company   would  
contribute   to   the   decision,   such   as   the   “total   monetary   control   including  
collection   of   accounts   payable;;   its   restriction   on   the   subsidiary’s   financial  
budget;;   its   directive   that   subsidiary-­governmental   contract   including  
environment   matters   be   funneled   directly   through   the   parent   company  
Kayser-­Roth;;   its   placement   of   Kayser-­Roth   personnel   in   almost   all   the  
subsidiary  company’s  director  and  officer  position,  as  means  of  totally  ensuring  
that   Kayser-­Roth   corporate   policy   was   exactly   implemented   and   precisely  
carried   out”.867   In   another   famous   case   Lowendahl   v   Baltimore   Ohio   RR  
Coporation,  the  New  York  court  described  the  required  level  of  control   in  the  
following  words:  
    
Control,  not  merely  majority  or  complete  stock  control,  but  complete  
domination,  not  only  of  finances,  but  of  policy  and  business  practices  
in  respect  to  the  transactions  attacked  so  that  the  corporate  entity  had  
at  the  time  no  separate  mind,  will  or  existence  of  its  own.868  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
865   CERCLA  42  US  Code,  s  107  (a).  
866   United  States  of  America  v  Kayser-­Roth  Corporation  724  F  Supp  15  (DRI  1989).  
867   United  States  of  America  (n  836)  [12].  
868   Lowendahl  v  Baltimore  Ohio  RR  Corporation  247  App  Div  144  (NY  App  Div  1936)  157.  
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The  above  references  clearly  show  that  for  the  purpose  of  parent  company’s  
strict  liability  for  the  environmental  damage  caused  by  its  subsidiary  company,  
the  relationship  requirement  based  on  the  element  control  is  extremely  high.  It  
can  be  assumed   that   the  same   type  of   requirement  might  be  needed   in   the  
discussion  of  the  UK  common  law  vicarious  liability’s  extension  in  group  cases.     
  
It  is  very  difficult  to  find  a  relationship  akin  to  employment  between  the  parent  
company  and   the  subsidiary,  and  subsequently,  difficult   to  avoid   the  conflict  
with   the   corporate   law   principles   of   separate   legal   personality   and   limited  
liability.   It  seems  that   the  doctrine  of   tort  of  negligence,  and   joint   tortfesance  
based  on  the  defendant’s  participation  in  the  same  tort,  are  more  efficient  and  
promising  approaches  as  regards  determining  the  parent  company’s  liability.  
  
  
5.6  Conclusion     
  
Vicarious  liability  is  not  a  static  concept  and  has  been  adjusted  over  centuries  
to  meet  social  challenges  and  needs.  It  is  challenging  to  create  a  strict  liability  
mechanism   which   is   fair   and   just   in   striking   a   balance   between   protecting  
employers’  interests  and  providing  remedies  for  victims  harmed  by  employer’s  
business.869   Referring  to  the  extension  of  this  doctrine  in  recent  leading  cases,  
we   cannot   deny   the   possibility   that   the   relationship   between   the   parent  
company   and   the   subsidiary   company   could   be   akin   to   employment   for   the  
purpose  of  vicarious  liability.  The  underlying  rationales  of  vicarious  liability  may  
also  properly  explain  the  doctrine’s  extension  in  group  cases,  but  liability  only  
arise  in  the  condition  that  the  relationship  and  close  connection  requirements  
are   all   met.   The   “close   connection”   test   may   not   be   a   significant   obstacle  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
869   JGE  (n  659)  [81].  
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because  the  “enterprise  risk  test”,  which  is  of  great  help  to  connect  the  claimed  
tort   and   the   relationship   between   group   companies,   has   been   introduced   in  
precedents  and  enhanced   in   the  recent  Supreme  Court  case  of  CCWS.  The  
risk  test,  if  possible,  can  explain  the  close  connection  between  the  relationship  
of   the   parent   and   subsidiary   company   and   the   torts   of   subsidiary   company  
such  as  negligence.     
  
Particularly,   the   risk   test   can   be   met   in   many   group   cases   related   to  
environmental   pollution   and   personal   injury,   where   the   relationship   between  
the   parent   company   and   the   subsidiary,   and   the   business   they   carry   on  
together  has  significantly  facilitated  the  happening  of  toxic  substance  exposure  
which  results  in  severe  damage  to  the  subsidiary’s  employees  or  third  parties.  
However,   the   two-­stage   tests   for   vicarious   liability   belong   to   one   synthetic  
system.  While  the  “close-­connection”  test  can  be  well  satisfied  in  proper  group  
cases,   the   relationship   requirement   is  more   contentious   in   its   application   in  
group  situations.  Similar  to  the  situation  of  the  doctrine  of  piecing  the  corporate  
veil,   it   will   be   very   rare   for   a   subsidiary   company   to   lose   its   separate   legal  
personality   and   carry   on   business   on   behalf   of   the   parent   company,   and  
therefore,  behave  as  an  employee.  So,  we  conclude  that  there  is  the  possibility  
that   the  parent  company  might  be  vicariously   liable   for   its  subsidiary’s   tort   in  
particular  situations,  where  the  subsidiary  company  does  business  on  behalf  of,  
and  for   the  benefit  of   its  parent  company.  However,   the  construction  of  strict  
liability  needs  higher   relationship  requirements.  So   it   is  a  significant  problem  
whether   the   court   would   be   willing   to   overlook   the   corporate   separate  
personality  and  make  a  principled  approach.  
  
The   discussion   of   the   law   relating   to   vicarious   liability   cannot   be   without  
considerations   of   different   strands   of   policy   reasons   and   social   needs.  
However,   I   agree  with   what   Justice  Ward   said   in   the   case   of   JGE,   that,   “a  
coherent  development  of  the  law  should  proceed  incrementally  in  a  principled  
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way,   not   as   an   expedient   reaction   to   the   problem   confronting   the   court.”870  
Compared   to   the   tort   of   negligence,   and   joint   tortfeasance   based   on  
defendant’s   involvement,   the   parent   company’s   vicarious   liability   for   its  
subsidiary’s   tort   has   significant   difficulties   in   its   enforcement   and   efficiency,  
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Chapter  6  Conclusion     
  
The   thesis  began  with   the  consideration  of   the  parent  company’s   liability   for  
the  debts  of   its  subsidiary  companies   in   the  context  of  corporate   insolvency.  
The  main  problem  arises  in  personal  injury  cases,  in  which  corporations  cause  
harms  to  their  employees,  consumers,  and  third  parties.  Claims  arise  out  of  the  
insolvency  of  the  subsidiary  company  which  is  not  able  to  provide  satisfactory  
compensation   towards   relevant   tort   creditors.   Therefore,   courts   have   been  
trying   to   look   at   the   possibility   of   creating   parent   company’s   liability   for   the  
debts  of   it’s   insolvent  subsidiary.  This  research  project  was  motivated  by  the  
following  elements:  the  intense  relationship  between  the  tort  creditors  and  the  
defendant  companies,  the  disadvantageous  position  of  tort  creditors  compared  
with  commercial  creditors  in  pursuing  compensation  against  corporate  groups,  
difficulties   of   broadening   liability   beyond   individual   companies,   and   the  
absence   of   efficient   approaches   to   the   parent   company’s   liability   in   the  
literature.  
  
It  was  argued  in  Chapter  2  that  neither  the  statutory  inroad  to  the  principles  of  
limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality,  nor  the  common  law  doctrine  of  
piercing  the  corporate  veil   is  efficient   in  dealing  with  corporate  tort  problems.  
Chapter   3   and   the   subsequent   chapters   discussed   tort   law   approaches   as  
alternatives   to   break   through   the   limitations   of   traditional   company   law  
solutions.   This   thesis   took   up   the   challenge   to   evaluate   the   well-­developed  
common  law  principles  in  establishing  corporate  liability.  Chapter  3  concluded  
that  the  principle  of  tort  of  negligence  would  be  a  proper  remedy  for  corporate  
tort  victims,  based  on  which  a  parent  company’s  liability  could  be  established.  
Further,  the  author  sought  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  literature  on  extending  
liabilities   of   corporate   groups   through   two   other   doctrines:   the   joint  
tortfeasance   and   vicarious   liability   in   tort.   These   latter   two   approaches   are  
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seldom  discussed  in  the  literature,  and  have  not  been  well  applied  in  English  
case  law.  Conclusions  are  made  that:  (1)  the  doctrine  of   joint  tortfeasance  is  
quite  promising  in  its  extension  to  deal  with  corporate  tort  problems  involving  
multiple  legal  individuals.  The  participation  tests  for  the  determination  of  joint  
liability   can  be  extended   to   connect   the  parent   company  and   the   subsidiary  
company  for  the  same  tort.  (2)  Vicarious  liability  as  one  category  of  strict  joint  
liability,   has   more   stringent   requirements   of   relationship   and   connection  
between   the   claimant   and   the   defendant.   It   might   be   possible   to  make   the  
parent  company  vicariously  liable  for  its  subsidiary’s  tort  in  particular  situations,  
where  the  subsidiary  company  does  business  on  behalf  of  its  parent  company  
and   behaves   like   an   employee.   However,   it   cannot   be   overlooked   that   the  
court  is  reluctant  to  pierce  the  veil  of  corporate  personality.  Construction  of  a  
strict  joint  liability  between  a  parent  company  and  its  subsidiary  companies  will  
particularly  look  at  the  relationship  requirement,  which  would  be  rarely  capable  
of  proof.     
  
The  motivation  to  evaluate  tort  law  approaches  to  establishing  liability,  rests  on  
the   limitations   in   the   traditional   ways   in   addressing   the   problem.   Chapter   2  
engaged  with  three  prominent  and  traditional  answers  to  the  parent  company’s  
liability  in  corporate  groups:  the  proposal  of  pro  rata  unlimited  liability,  statutory  
exceptions  to  limited  liability  in  the  Insolvency  Act  1986  (section  214),  and  the  
common   law   doctrine   of   piercing   the   corporate   veil.   Assessments   of   these  
three   approaches   revealed   the   current   gaps   and   the   need   for   alternative  
answers.     
  
In  situations  where  the  parent  company  is  not  liable  for  its  subsidiary’s  debts  
because  the  separate  legal  personality  isolates  legal  individuals  in  a  group  and  
the  limited  liability  principle  makes  every  member  liable  in  a  limited  amount  for  
its  capital  investment,  legal  scholars  doubt  the  limited  shareholder’s  liability  for  
corporate  torts.  Henry  Hansmann  and  Reinier  Kraakman,  proposed  a  regime  
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called   “unlimited   pro   rata   shareholder   liability”   for   corporate   torts,   which  
suggested   that   shareholders   would   be   liable   for   the   share   of   corporate   tort  
debts   proportional   to   their   share   of   equity   ownership.871   Justifications   were  
provided  from  the  aspects  of  undesirable  effect  of  limited  liability  on  tort  claims  
against   companies   and  benefits   of   the   reform.  The  unlimited   liability   regime  
was  argued  to  be  efficient  in  reducing  abusive  behaviours  in  a  group  structure  
such  as   transferring  group  assets   to  avoid   tort   liability.  The   regime  was  also  
believed   to   be   feasible   because   of   its   nature   of   proportionately   allocating  
liability.   Tort   claimants   thus   could   get   recovery  while   excessive   collection   of  
costs   would   not   be   imposed   on   shareholders.   Moreover,   it   would   have   the  
effect   of   deterrence,   to   prevent   the   members   of   a   corporate   group   from  
behaving  without  adequate  consideration  of  tort  victims.  However,  concerns  of  
the  unlimited   liability   regime  appear   to  be  reasonable.  The  consequences  of  
removing   limited   liability   are   uncertain,   and   there   is   a   lack   of   empirical  
evidence   to   fully   support   the   supposed   benefits.   Notably,   one   consequence  
could  be  predicted:  the  reform  of  dominating  company  law  principle  in  this  way  
will  definitely  threaten  investment  in  industries  involving  hazardous  operations  
and   toxic   substance  manufacture.   In   this   case,   our   focus   should   turn   to   the  
development  of  more  feasible  and  realistic  approaches.     
  
Statutory   protections   consequently   attract   our   attention.   Rather   than   the  
Companies  Act,   sections  213  and  214  of   the   Insolvency  Act  1986  carry   the  
main   weight   of   creditors   protection   in   relation   to   insolvency.   Particularly,  
section  214  is  regarded  as  a  statutory  provision  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil,  
which  applies  to  a  director  who  knew  or  ought  to  have  known  that  the  company  
has   gone   into   insolvency   at   some   time   prior   to   the   commencement   of   the  
winding   up,   but   did   not   take   actions   to   minimise   creditors’   losses.872   The  
recent  development  on   the   interpretation  of   this   section   is   that,   “director”,   in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871   Hansmann  and  Kraakman,  ‘Toward  Unlimited  Liability  for  Corporate  Torts’  (n  4)  1892-­1894.  
872   Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  214.  
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this  provision  can  be  extended   to  a  shadow  director,  which  should   include  a  
parent  company  when  the  subsidiary  company  is  accustomed  to  act  according  
to  the  directions  of  the  parent  company.  Section  214  thus  can  be  regarded  as  
an  approach   to  enable  contribution  by   the  parent  company   for   its  subsidiary  
company’s  debts   in   the  winding  up.  However,   this   statutory   remedy  has  not  
been  proven  as  efficient  as  expected  in  dealing  with  group  problems  and  rarely  
covers   the   situation  of   tort   claims.  This   conclusion  depends  on   the   inherent  
defects   of   section   214   in   its   enforcement,   and   inconclusive   and   inadequate  
case  law  on  parent  companies  as  shadow  directors.     
  
In  the  first  place,  it  is  difficult  to  succeed  in  both  bringing  actions  and  satisfying  
the  conditions  of  establishing   liability  under  section  214.  The  reported  cases  
are   few   in   number   because   the   action   should   be   brought   by   the   liquidator  
personally   who   will   be   liable   for   any   costs   incurred.   This   to   a   large   extent  
prevents  liquidators  from  bringing  actions.  In  the  second  place,  since  section  
214  provides  no  clear   instructions  on   the  essential  elements   for  establishing  
liability,  such  as  the  “insolvency  time”,  or  “business  failure”,  courts  are  troubled  
by   technical   issues.   Particularly,   this   section   lacks   specific   indications   on  
qualifying  a  parent  company  as  a  shadow  director  of  a  subsidiary  company.  
Moreover,   it  seems   that   tort  creditors,   included   in   the  category  of  unsecured  
creditors   could   gain   extremely   limited   compensation   in   corporate   insolvency  
process.   This   is   all   because   of   the   rule   of   priority   in   the   winding   up   which  
decides  that   lower  ranking  categories  of  creditors  are  to  be  paid  after  higher  
categories.     
  
Compared   with   the   proposal   of   pro   rata   unlimited   liability   regime,   and   the  
insolvency  law  remedies,  the  judicial  inroad  of  corporate  legal  personality  –  the  
doctrine   of   piercing   the   corporate   veil   is   more   successful   in   achieving   the  
parent   company’s   liability   for   its   subsidiaries   debts.   The   concern   is   that   this  
doctrine  is  applied  in  very   limited  circumstances  by  English  courts  and  could  
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rarely  be  extended  into  tort  claims.  In  general,  arguments  for  veil-­piercing  that  
have  been  listed  by  English  courts  are  inconsistent  and  the  decision  is  made  
on  a  case-­by-­case  basis:  tests  for  veil-­piercing  are  used  interchangeably,  or  in  
combination.  Courts   keep  a   very   formalistic   attitude   towards   the  principle  of  
limited   liability   and   separate   legal   personality,   which  makes   them   extremely  
careful  in  the  veil-­piercing  cases.     
  
Historical   cases   show   that  English   courts   prefer   to   pierce   the   corporate   veil  
when  it  is  found  that  the  company  is  merely  a  façade  concealing  the  true  facts.  
The   latest  case   law  further  narrows   the  scope  of  applying   the  doctrine.  Lord  
Neuberger   in   VTB   Capital   plc   v   Nutritek   International   Corp   and   others,873  
emphasised  that  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing  should  be  the  last  remedy,  which  
was   then   approved   by   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   Prest   v   Petrodel  
Resources  Ltd   (Prest).874   In  the  case  of  Prest,   the  Supreme  Court  approved  
that   the   only   circumstance   for   veil   piercing   was   where   the   defendant   was  
under  an  existing  legal  liability  or  restriction,  and  consequently  the  defendant  
deliberately   evaded   the   obligation   by  means   of   creating   a   façade   company  
controlled   by   him.875   When   considering   the   rule   in   corporate   group   context,  
the   modern   approaches   clearly   recognise   that   the   evidence   for   control   or  
ownership  as  to  the  company  alone  is  far  from  sufficient.  Corporate  veil  is  only  
to  be  pierced  when  both  control  and  impropriety  are  found  to  exist.  But  English  
courts   have   been   reluctant   to   widen   the   circumstances   in   which   the   veil   is  
pierced,   no   matter   whether   in   commercial   claims   or   tort   claims.   In   the  
prominent   commercial   veil   piercing   case   of   VTB   Capital   Plc   v   Nutritek  
International   Corp   and   others,   the   Supreme   Court   clearly   held   that   the  
extension  of   the  doctrine  would  depart   from  authorities   in   company   law  and  
insolvency  law.  Lord  Neuberger  thus  rejected  the  extension  of  the  doctrine  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873   VTB  Capital  plc  (n  172).  
874   Prest  (n  173)  [35].  
875   ibid.  
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impose  contractual  liability  to  a  non-­party  controller.876   As  to  tort  claims  based  
on  the  doctrine  of  veil  piercing,  the  Court  of  Appeal  had  previously  rejected  the  
arguments   for   the   parent   company’s   liability   in   the   case   of  Adams   v   Cape  
Industries  plc877   long  before.  Furthermore,  the  latest  Supreme  Court  decision  
in  Prest  narrows  the  rule  in  a  more  rigid  way.  If  we  intend  to  impose  tort  liability  
on   the   parent   company   for   its   subsidiary,   as   indicated   by   Lord   Sumption’s  
principles,  Cape  plc  has   to  be  under  certain   legal  obligation  or  subject   to  an  
existing   legal  restriction;;  besides,   the  foreign  subsidiaries  of  Cape  should  be  
created  not   for   the  wealth  protection  or  maybe  avoidance  of   tax,  but  only   to  
evade  Cape’s  tortious  liability.     
  
Moreover,  the  parent  company  must  has  engaged  in  an  improper  behaviour  of  
evasion   or   concealment   to   avoid   tortious   liability.   The   above   conditions   are  
very   difficult   to   establish   in   most   corporate   group   cases.   That   is   why   the  
Supreme  Court  encouraged  lower  courts  to  look  for  alternative  methodologies  
based  on  well-­developed  legal  principles,  such  as  the  tort  of  negligence,  rather  
than  to  be  caught  in  the  inconclusive  and  unsettled  doctrine.     
  
In   response   to   the   problem   of   lacking   efficient   approaches   to   establishing  
corporate   tort   liability,   and   to   the   need   of   providing   proper   protection  
mechanisms  for  unsecured  creditors,   this  thesis  aims  to  evaluate  three  most  
relevant   tort   law   approaches.   In   Chapter   3,   the   author   pointed   out   that   the  
negligence  based  mechanism  is  well-­accepted  by  English  courts,  as  well  as  in  
Australia   and   United   States.   Such   an   approach   creates   direct   liabilities   for  
corporate  faults  in  some  specific  circumstances,  and  its  current  applications  by  
courts  prove  its  feasibility.  
  
The  reason  to  consider  negligence  based  remedy  is  that  the  nature  of  tort  law  
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is  to  protect  fundamental  human  interests  and  to  provide  remedies  for  persons  
seeking   compensation   for   loss.   Tortious   liability   can   be   pursued   in   group  
context   if   the   elements   for   a   tort   liability   are   all   met.   A   parent   company   is  
capable   of   bearing   liability   for   its   insolvent   subsidiary   company   when   it   is  
proved   that   the   parent   company   has   jointly   or   independently   committed  
tortious  conducts  against  an  employee  of  the  subsidiary  or  a  third  party.  Any  
concern  about  consistency  with  the  principles  of   limited  liability  and  separate  
legal   personality   subsequently   can   be   ignored.   Furthermore,   the   tort   of  
negligence   is   the   most   popular   ground   in   personal   injury   claims   against  
corporate  group  members  in  historical  case  law.  This  is  because  of  its  flexibility,  
which  makes  the  tort  available  for  many  novel  cases.     
  
To  assess  the  efficiency  of  the  tort  of  negligence  in  establishing  group  liability  
beyond  the  corporate  veil,  the  author  mainly  discussed  the  development  and  
limitations  of  the  negligence-­based  approach  in  UK  case  law,  as  well  as  adding  
comparisons  with  that  in  Australian  and  US  cases.        
  
English   courts   have   not   provided   clear   answers   about   how   to   establish   a  
parent  company’s  liability  in  negligence  until  the  appearance  of  the  Chandler  v  
Cape  case.878   Before  that,  most  personal  injury  claims  against  both  subsidiary  
and  parent  companies  were  settled  out  of  court  or   refused  on   the  ground  of  
forum   non-­conveniens.   Even   in   the   early   cases,879   in   which   claims   were  
brought   for   parent   company’s   negligence   in   intervening   operations,  
supervising  working  processes,  or  failure  in  protecting  subsidiary’s  employees  
when  foreseeability  of  harm  was  obvious,  English  courts  did  not  address  the  
claims  directly,  but  just  admitted  the  possibility  that  the  parent  company  can  be  
involved  in  the  direct  negligence  based  on  reasonable  control,  management,  
knowledge   over   unsafe   work   environment,   and   participation   in   devising  
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policies  for  the  safety  systems  of  the  subsidiary  company.     
  
The   courts   provided   some   indications   of   the   approach   to   parent   company’s  
negligence  liability  in  two  cases  in  the  2000s.  The  House  of  Lords  mentioned  
two  issues  to  be  considered  in  achieving  a  duty  of  care  in  the  case  of  Lubbe  v  
Cape. 880    Lord   Bingham   expressed   that   the   investigation   of   the   special  
responsibility   of   the   defendant   as   a   parent   company   for   the   safety   of   its  
subsidiary’s   employees   should   be   the   first   issue.   Secondly,   liability   in  
negligence  of  the  parent  company  would  likely  be  achieved  if  a  “control”  based  
duty  of  care  were  breached.   In  another  case,  Newton-­Sealey  v  ArmorGroup  
Services  Lt,881   it  was  mentioned  that  apart  from  the  Caparo  approach,  a  duty  
of   care   could   also   be   induced   by   a   voluntary   assumption   of   responsibility,  
which  required  concomitant  reliance  between  the  defendant  and  the  claimant  
irrespective   of   whether   there   was   a   contractual   relationship   between   the  
parties.     
  
Examples   of   negligence   cases   before   2012   illustrate   that   English   courts  
regarded   the   tort   of   negligence   as   a   reasonable   approach   to   make   parent  
companies   liable   for   individuals   who   also   have   primary   relationship   with  
relevant  subsidiary  companies.  However,  the  guidance  provided  by  the  courts  
was  insufficient.     
  
Since   the   appearance   of   the   decision   of   the  Court   of   Appeal   in  Chandler   v  
Cape,   clear   approaches   to   negligence   liability   in   this   group   situation   have  
become  available.  A  negligence  liability  for  group  members  is  normally  based  
on   the   Caparo   Industries   plc   v   Dickman   three-­stage   test.882   The   Court   of  
Appeal   also   assimilated   the   theory   of   assumption   of   responsibility   into   the  
requirement   for   proximity   relationship   in   this   prominent   case.   As   the   first  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880   Lubbe  (n  18).  
881   David  Newton-­Sealey  (n  313).     
882   Caparo  Industries  plc  (n  289).  
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requirement  of   the   three-­stage   test,   “foreseeability”  was  not  difficult   to  meet.  
The  relevant  facts  could  be  that  the  parent  company  was  clearly  involved  in  the  
“design,  transfer,  set-­up,  supervising  of  a  hazardous  process  undertaken  in  its  
subsidiary”;;883   the  parent  company’s  obvious  knowledge  over  the  business  of  
its  subsidiary,  or  the  financial  support  to  the  business.     
  
The  most  difficult   and  controversial   part   of   the   test   for  duty  of   care  was   the  
establishment   of   “proximity”   relationship   between   the   defendant   parent  
company  and  the  claimant.  The  finding  of  a  special  relationship  between  the  
parent  company  and   the  subsidiary  company  based  on  control,  or  a  special  
responsibility  based  on  reliance,  has  been  admitted  to  be  the  essential  ways  to  
establish  a  proximity  relationship,  and  consequently  a  duty  of  care.  However,     
early   examples   and   the   latest   cases   have   shown   that   the   explanations   for  
these  approaches  to  negligence  liability  still  lack  clarity  and  may  cause  future  
confusions.     
  
One   problem   relates   to   the   relationship   between   the   test   of   assumption   of  
responsibility   and   the  proximity  within   the   three-­stage   test.  The   confusion   is  
whether  the  test  of  assumption  of  responsibility  is  able  to  induce  a  duty  of  care  
in  group  cases  on   its  own,  or   it  should  be   included   into   the  second  stage  of  
proximity  requirement  within  the  three-­stage  test.  As  decided  by  the  Court  of  
Appeal  in  the  Chandler  case,  the  assumption  of  responsibility  is  one  element  
contributing   to   the   proximity   relationship,   and   afterwards,   the   third   stage  
causation  and  remoteness  are  still  required  to  prove.  As  indicated  by  Christian  
Witting,  “the  assumption  of  responsibility  test  is  of  real  relevance  in  those  few  
cases   in   which   the   evidence   suggests   that   the   defendant   has   voluntarily,  
subjectively  assumed  a  responsibility  for  certain  legal  obligations  owed  to  the  
claimant.  In  all  other  cases,  the  law  should  focus  upon  the  three-­stage  test.”884  
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In   the   corporate   group   cases,   a   clearer   explanation   with   respect   to   the  
approach  of  assumption  of  responsibility  is  needed.  This  demand  also  comes  
from   the  vague   interpretation  of   the  element  of   reliance  based  on  which   the  
special  relationship  for  assumption  of  responsibility  can  be  achieved.        
  
Another   problem   is   the   uncertainty   about   the   degree   of   control   required   for  
establishing  a  duty  of  care.  The  Court  of  Appeal  has  broadened  the  concept  of  
control.  It  is  not  necessary  to  find  the  parent  company’s  control  over  the  health  
and   policies   of   the   subsidiary;;   the   parent   company’s   involvement   in   trading  
operations  can  lead  to  a  duty  of  care  in  specific  cases.  This  explanation  in  the  
Chandler  case   is  different   from  that   in   the  early  examples  and  has   triggered  
confusion.  This  will  benefit   tort  claimants  by   leaving  room  for   individual  case  
discussions   in   the   future.  However,  authoritative  and  consistent  explanations  
are  also  expected.     
  
Arden   LJ,   in   the   Chandler   case   particularly   laid   out   a   “four-­part”   test   for  
determining   the   parent   company’s   special   responsibility   for   the   health   and  
safety  of  its  subsidiary’s  employees  for  future  purposes.  This  test  on  the  one  
hand   provides   an   authoritative   approach   to   parent   company’s   negligence  
liability   and   will   encourage   further   tortious   claims;;   on   the   other   hand,   it   is  
believed  by  some  commentators  to  be  too  descriptive  and  “Cape  specific”  as  
to  the  facts.  
  
In  addition  to  the  UK  case  law,  parent  company’s  negligence  liability  has  been  
considered  and  developed  in  Australian  and  United  States  jurisdictions  as  well.  
The  approaches  to  liability  in  these  three  countries  are  quite  similar  and  have  
the  same  emphasis.  The  concepts  of  “control”  and  “reliance”  in  contributing  to  
sufficient  proximity  relationship  are  regarded  as  the  decisive  elements  for  the  
success  of  liability  in  all  of  the  three  countires.  The  difference  lies  in  different  
explanations   to   these   essential   factors.   Australian   courts   have   adopted   an  
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extremely  rigorous  approach  in  determining  the  negligence  liability.  The  parent  
company’s   domain,   pervasive,   constant,   and   controlling   influence   over   the  
subsidiary  is  required  to  find  a  sufficient  proximity.  In  the  US,  complexity  lies  in  
different  interpretations  of  the  concept  of  “control”  in  different  jurisdictions.  The  
approaches   to   liability   in   all   of   the   three   countries   are   still   developing.  
Negligence   liability   is   decided   on   a   case-­by-­case   basis.   Courts   are   not  
reluctant  to   impose  negligence  liability  on  the  parent  company  if   the  relevant  
tests   have   been   met.   It   still   leaves   room   for   future   authorities   and  
commentators   to  provide  reasonable  and  consistent  guidance  to  cover  more  
circumstances.  
  
Apart  from  the  tort  of  negligence,  two  other  potential  solutions  to  the  corporate  
tort  problems,  based  on  tort   law,  were  provided  in  Chapter  4  and  Chapter  5.  
Chapter  4  explored  the  possibility  of  using  the  doctrine  of  joint  tortfeasance  in  
creating   liability   in   corporate  groups.   It  was  argued   that   the  doctrine  of   joint  
tortfeasance   can   be   developed   as   an   approach   to   realise   the   parent  
company’s   liability   for   the  same  tort  of   its  subsidiary  company.  The  theory  of  
joint   tortfeasance  was  originally   designed   for   liability   determination   involving  
multiple  tortfeasors.  A  third  party  can  be  involved  in  the  claimed  tort  jointly  with  
another  wrongdoer  by  procuring,  directing,  or  authorising  the  doing  of  it.  It  was  
concluded  in  Chapter  4  that  these  participation  links  to  realise  joint  liability  can  
probably   be   extended   in   corporate   group   cases   to  make  a   parent   company  
jointly   liable   with   the   subsidiary   company.   The   joint   liability   in   the   group  
situation   can   be   realised   by   proving   reasonable   and   sufficient   participation  
links   between   different   group  members.   The   links   include   concerted   action,  
procurement   and  authorisation,  which   are   all  well   accepted   in   common   law,  
and  it  is  possible  to  connect  the  parent  company  and  subsidiary  for  the  same  
tort.     
  
Chapter  4  generally  focused  on  the  extension  of  the  tests  of  concerted  action,  
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procurement,  and  authorisation  in  corporate  group  cases.  Although  there  was  
very   few   personal   injury   cases   to   refer   to,   some   other   group   cases   were  
however  of  much  relevance,  and  based  on  which  we  can  reasonably  make  an  
extension.  The  research  then  turned  to  examine  what  contributes  to  a  parent  
company’s   concerted  action,   procurement,   and  authorisation   that   leads   to   a  
joint  liability.  The  relevant  cases,  especially  the  leading  corporate  case  of  Fish  
&  Fish,  reveal  that  the  concept  of  control  (the  extent  of  control  exercised  by  the  
defendant  joint  tortfeasor)  should  be  the  decisive  element,  which  contributes  to  
establish   the  parent   company’s   participation   in   the   commission  of   the   same  
tort  with  its  subsidiary  company.  Specifically,  the  evidence  for  joint  tortfeasance  
should   demonstrate   the   existence   of   a   parent   company’s   high  
involvement/active   participation   in   the   relevant   business   or   conduct   of   the  
subsidiary,   which   should   also   provide   reasonable   causation   between   the  
parent  company’s  controlling  behaviour  and  the  happening  of  the  tort.     
  
Based  on  the  group  cases  like  MCA  Records  Inc  v  Charly  Records  Ltd,885   we  
can  also  conclude  that  if  a  parent  company  acted  beyond  its  role  to  procure,  
direct   or   authorise   a   subsidiary’s   tortious   act   that   leads   to   the   claimant’s  
damage,  a  joint   liability  can  be  found  to  exist.  This  extension  is  made  on  the  
procurement   test   that   if  a  director  or  shareholder  has  authorised,  directed  or  
procured  the  tortious  act,  he  would  be  held  jointly  liable.  According  to  the  case  
of  MCA  Records,  the  “director”  here  can  be  extended  to  a  shadow  director,  or  
even  the  individual  who  does  not  hold  the  director  position  at  all.     
  
As  to  the  test  of  authorisation,  extension  can  also  be  made  for  corporate  group  
cases.  This  can  be  justified  based  on  Paul  Davies’s  book  of  Accessory  liability:  
the  failure  to  prevent  causation  of  damage  would  be  equivalent  to  authorisation  
when   the   parent   company   enjoys   some   degree   of   control   over   the   primary  
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tortfeasor.  The  case  of  Chandler  v  Cape886   will  be  the  best  illustration  to  hold  a  
parent  company  jointly  liable  with  its  subsidiary  company  based  on  this  theory.     
  
Particularly,   on  a  basis  of   several   leading   cases   like  CBS  Songs  v  Amstrad  
Consumer  Electronic  plc,887   Moorhouse  v  University  of  New  South  Wales,888  
and  RCA  Corporation  v  John  Fairfax  &  Sons  Ltd,889   the  author  extracts   five  
elements  which  have  been  proposed  in  these  cases  to  establish  joint  liability,  
and  extended  by  the  author  into  the  relationship  of  the  parent  and  subsidiary  
company.   The   following   elements   are   expected   to   provide   an   indication  
relevant   to   the  extension  of   the  authorisation   test   in  group  situations:  (1)   the  
parent  company  exercises  relevant  degree  of  control  over  the  tortious  action  
(activity)  of  the  subsidiary,  or  the  parent  company  has  some  benefits  from  the  
tortious  activity;;  (2)  the  parent  company  has  the  power  to  authorise  and  control  
the   tortious   activities   of   their   subsidiary,   and   has   any   purported   exercise   of  
such   power;;   and  might   have   granted   the   subsidiary   the   right   to   commit   the  
tortious  activity;;   (3)   the  tort   is  committed  by  the  means  that   the  subsidiary   is  
under  certain  degree  of  control;;  (4)  the  parent  company  makes  the  business  
available  to  the  subsidiary,  with  knowledge  or  having  reason  to  suspect  that  it  
is  likely  to  lead  to  tort  commission;;  or  (5)  the  parent  company  can  be  said  to  
authorise  the  subsidiary  to  commit  a  tort  if  the  parent  has  some  types  of  control  
over  the  subsidiary  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  tort.  
  
English  courts  have  not  applied   the  doctrine  of   joint   tortfeasance   in  personal  
injury  claims  against  a  parent  company.  In  the  case  of  Chandler  v  Cape  plc,890  
the   claimant   brought   an   action   based   on   the   theory   of   joint   liability,   but   this  
issue   was   circumvented   by   the   court.   Fortunately,   this   possibility   was   not  
declined  by  the  court,  and  the  advantage  of  this  remedy  is  that  the  tests  for  joint  
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tortfeasance   permit   courts   to   look   behind   the   concept   of   concerted   action,  
procurement,   and   authorisation,   and   to   figure   out   the   substance   of   the  
defendant’s  conduct.     
  
In   Chapter   5,   the   author   considered   the   possibility   of   parent   company’s  
vicarious  liability  for  its  subsidiary  company’s  tort.  Vicarious  liability  belongs  to  
the  system  of   joint   liability,  and   is  also  one  category  of  strict   liability.  As  one  
way  to  achieve  joint  liability,  this  theory  makes  one  strictly  liable  for  the  torts  of  
another  based  on  the  relationship  but  not  the  existence  of  fault.  As  a  special  
category   of   joint   liability   to   provide   a   solution   where   it   is   difficult   to   find   a  
personal   duty,   the   theory   of   vicarious   liability   thus   deserves   further  
consideration.  Recent  UK  case  law  has  revealed  that  the  boundary  of  vicarious  
liability  has  been  broadened,  and  this  chapter  argued  that  it  is  time  to  consider  
whether  a  legal  person  can  be  vicariously  liable  for  another  legal  entity’s  tort.  
The  research  was  then  divided  into  two  general  segments.  In  the  first  part,  the  
author   considered   whether   the   leading   justifications   for   the   existence   of  
vicarious  liability  can  well  explain  its  extension  in  corporate  group  cases.  In  the  
second   part,   the   author   discussed   the   possibility   of   vicarious   liability’s   tests  
being  applied  in  group  situations.     
  
It   can   be   concluded   that   the   underlying   rationales   of   vicarious   liability   are  
altogether  able   to  explain   the   theory’s  extension   in  group  cases,  but   liability  
should  be  conditioned  on  the  relationship  and  close  connection  requirements  
being  met.   That   is   because   not   a   single   rationale   can   perfectly   explain   the  
theory,  and  the  courts  have  drawn  the  thread  that  vicarious  liability  should  be  
justified   on   the   basis   of   a   combination   of   all   the   rationales.   Particularly,   the  
consideration  of  rationales  is  from  the  perspective  of  social  and  policy  grounds,  
so   the   rationales   alone   cannot   justify   the   existence   of   vicarious   liability,   but  
contribute  to  explain  the  rationality  when  the  tests  for  liability  are  satisfied.     
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However,  not  all  the  relevant  policies  are  in  favour  of  the  theory’s  application  in  
group  cases.  One  prominent  problem  is  that   it   is  very  difficult   to  say  that  the  
realisation   of   vicarious   liability   for   a   company’s   tort   does   not   contradict   the  
policy  of   limited   liability.   If  a  company  behaves  as  an  employee  of   its  parent  
company,   it   will   definitely   lose   its   corporate   personality,   because   as   an  
employee,   this   company   should   do   business   totally   for   the   benefits   and  
objectives  of  its  parent  company.  A  legal  person  is  not  equivalent  to  a  natural  
person,  and  the  purpose  of  creation  of  a  legal  person  is  not  to  make  it  behave  
like   a   natural   person  but   to   give   it   some   “features”   like   a   natural   person.   In  
practice,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  determine  that  a  company  loses  its  corporate  
personality,  and  this  is  one  hurdle  to  realising  the  parent  company’s  vicarious  
liability.  
  
As   to   the  application  of   the   two-­stage   test   for   vicarious   liability   in   the  group  
situation,   it   is   concluded   that   while   the   “close-­connection”   test   can   be  
well-­satisfied   in   proper   situation,   it   is   still   extremely   difficult   to   meet   the  
relationship  requirement.  Even  though   in  recent   leading  cases,   the  Supreme  
Court  has  broadened  the  test  in  a  way  that  a  relationship  “akin  to  employment”  
but  without   a   real   contract   relationship  will   suffice,   it   is   difficult   to   prove   the  
relationship   “akin   to   employment”   between   the   parent   company   and   the  
subsidiary   company.   One   reason   provided   by   the   author   is   that   the   test   of  
entrepreneur  for  ascertaining  a  relationship  akin  to  employment  can  rarely  be  
met.  This  is  because  this  test  examines  whether  the  person  is  in  business  on  
his  own  account.  However,  in  a  real  group  relationship,  it  will  be  a  rare  moment  
that  a  subsidiary  company  loses  its  separate  legal  personality  and  carries  on  
business   on   its   parent   company’s   behalf,   and   behaves   as   an   employee.  
Another   reason   is   that   the   requirement   of   “akin   to   employment”   in   a  
parent-­subsidiary   relationship   will   drag   the   discussion   back   to   the   same  
problem  faced  by  the  enforcement  of  the  doctrine  of  piercing  the  corporate  veil.  
The  courts  again  are  worried  about  its  conflict  with  the  corporate  law  principles  
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of  limited  liability  and  separate  legal  personality.     
  
Particularly,  emphasis  should  be  given  to  the  issue  of  “control”,  which  is  central  
to  the  determination  of  parent  company’s  negligence  liability,  joint  liability  and  
the  discussion  of  vicarious  liability.     
  
The  element  of  control  is  considered  as  decisive  in  constructing  a  direct  duty  of  
care  of  the  parent  company  to  its  subsidiary  companies’  employees,  or  to  third  
parties  affected  by  the  tortious  acts  of  the  subsidiaries.  The  central  question  is  
what  degree  of  control  can  lead  to  a  sufficient  proximity  relationship  for  a  duty  
of   care.   It   could  be  generally   concluded   that,   to  establishing  a  duty  of   care,  
there   should   be   a   tight   causal   link   between   the   level   and   format   of   control  
exercised   by   the   parent   company   and   the   claimed   damage.   A   majority  
shareholding,  or  a  complete  control   is  not  strictly  required  by  English  courts.  
Recent   corporate   tort   claims   provide   us   an   opportunity   to   draw   out   some  
specific  and  practical  guidelines  on  the  extent  of  “control”,  based  on  which  a  
duty  of  care  can  be  reasonably  established.     
  
In  Chandler’s  case,   the  parent  company  Cape  had   ultimate   control   over   the  
health   and   safety   polices   and   measures   which   were   taken   to   protect   the  
claimants  from  the  risk  of  exposure  to  asbestos.  This  degree  of  control,  as  held  
by  the  Court  of  Appeal,  is  sufficient  to  construct  a  special  relationship  for  a  duty  
of  care.  In  the  case  of  Vedanta,  the  parent  company  exercised  a  high  level  of  
control   over   the   subsidiary   company   KCM’s   mining   operation   and  
infrastructure,  which  gave  rise  to  the  damage  to  the  community  citizens.  In  the  
case   of   Okpabi,   the   parent   company   RDS   had   no   specific   control   over  
particular  operation  which  led  to,  or  had  a  close  connection  with  the  damage.  
The  fact  that  RDS  issued  mandatory  policies  across  the  Shell  group,  was  not  
enough   in   the  opinion  of   the  majority  of   the  Court   of  Appeal.  SPDC,  as   the  
subsidiary  company  retained  autonomy  with  respect  to  the  imposition  of  those  
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group  policies  and  practices.  The  court  required  proof  of  active  involvements  in  
the  subsidiary  company’s  operation.  
  
To  draw  a  brief  conclusion,  as  considered  by  English  courts  in  recent  corporate  
tort   cases,   the   level   or   format   of   control   that   would   satisfy   a   proximity  
relationship  for  a  duty  of  care  should  be:  (1)   the  parent  company  has  a  high  
level  of  control  over   the  measures  and  policies   (for  example,   the  health  and  
safety   policies)   which   are   taken   to   protect   the   claimant   from   the   risk   of  
suffering   the   damage;;   (2)   the   parent   company   exercises   control   over   the  
subsidiary’s   material   or   specific   operation,   which   give   rise   to   the   harm.   It  
should  be  noted  that  the  mere  fact  that  the  parent  company  issues  general  and  
mandatory   requirements  and  policies  across  all   subsidiary  companies   is  not  
very  enough  to  construct  a  duty  of  care;;  (3)  the  parent  company  has  intensive  
and  day-­to-­day  control  over  the  management  of  the  subsidiary  company.     
  
When   considering   establishing   the   parent   company’s   joint   liability   with   its  
subsidiary  companies,  the  element  of  control  is  also  a  crucial  basis  upon  which  
the  participation   links   (concerted  action,  procurement,  and  authorization)  are  
forged   in  corporate  cases.  The  parent  company’s  control   is  one  of   the  entry  
points  to  find  “concerted  action”  and  “authorization”.     
  
To   demonstrate   that   the   parent   company   has   concerted   action   with   the  
subsidiary,  in  accordance  with  Amoco  Cadiz,  the  author  summarises  following  
factors  which  are  helpful:  (1)  the  parent  company  exercises  domination  control;;  
(2)  the  parent  company  exercises  specific  control  over  the  design,  construction,  
operation,  and  management  of  a  project  of  the  subsidiary  which  gives  rise  to  
the  damage.  
  
Based   on   the   cases   of  CBS  Songs,  Moorhouse   v   University   of   New  South  
Wales,  and  RCA  Corporation  v  John  Fairfax  &  Sons  Ltd,  the  author  drew  out  
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some   propositions   involving   control,   which   are   helpful   to   establishing   the  
authorisation  link  for  joint  liability.  They  are  :  (1)  the  parent  company  exercises  
a  relevant  degree  of  control  over  the  tortious  action  (activity)  of  the  subsidiary,  
or  the  parent  company  obtains  some  benefits  from  the  tortious  activity;;  (2)  the  
parent  company  has  the  power  to  authorise  and  control  the  tortious  activities  of  
their  subsidiary,  and  initiates  any  purported  exercise  of  such  power;;  and  might  
have  granted  the  subsidiary  the  right  to  commit  the  tortious  activity;;  (3)  the  tort  
is   committed   by   the  means   that   the   subsidiary   is   under   a   certain   degree  of  
control;;  (4)  the  parent  company  makes  the  business  available  to  the  subsidiary,  
with   knowledge   or   having   reason   to   suspect   that   it   is   likely   to   lead   to  
commission  of  a  tort;;  or  (5)  the  parent  company  can  be  said  to  authorise  the  
subsidiary   to   commit  a   tort   if   the  parent  has  some   types  of   control  over   the  
subsidiary  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  tort.  
  
As  regard  to  the  establishment  of  vicarious  liability,   the  test  of  control   is  also  
considered  as  one  of  several  essential   tests   for  determining   the   relationship  
“akin   to   employment”   in   the   current   legal   practice.   According   to   the   recent  
leading  case  JGE  v  English  Province  of  Our  Lady  of  Charity,  the  test  of  control  
could  be  understood  in  a  wider  way.  It  is  to  “examine  the  degree  to  which  the  
employer  is  accountable  to  the  employee,  or  to  what  extent  he  is  subject  to  the  
managerial  procedures  of  the  employer  in  relation  to  such  matters  as  quality  of  
work,   performance,   and   productivity   etc.”891;;   and   to   examine   “the   degree   of  
managerial  control  which  is  exercised  over  the  activity  and  this  may  depend  on  
how  far  a  person  is  integrated  into  the  organization  of  the  enterprise.”892   This  
is   a   new   way   of   evaluating   an   employment   relationship   for   determining  
vicarious  liability  and  its  extension  in  corporate  group  cases.     
  
The   concept   of   control,   as   summarised   above,   plays   a   central   role   in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
891   ibid  [72].  
892   ibid.  
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determining  negligence  liability,  joint  liability,  and  vicarious  liability  in  corporate  
group   cases.   The   requirements   of   the   level   and   format   of   control   for  
establishing   those   liability   are   different,   and   vary   depending   on   the   facts   of  
every  single  case.  There  is  no  fixed  standard  to  measure  the  required  level  of  
“guilty  control”  to  establishing  the  liability.  However,  we  can  make  one  general  
conclusion  that  it  would  be  reasonable  to  find  liability  if  there  is  a  clear  causal  
connection  between  the  performance  of  control  of  the  parent  company  and  the  
subsidiary’s  torts  that  lead  to  the  claimed  damage.     
  
The  final  conclusion  would  be  that,  compared  with  the  remedies  based  on  the  
tort  of  negligence  and   joint   tortfeasance  based  on   the  defendant   tortfeasor’s  
participation,   the   theory  of   vicarious   liability  has  potential   shortcomings  as  a  
principled  approach.  It  might  be  possible  that  the  parent  company  is  vicariously  
liable   for   its   subsidiary’s   tort   in   special   circumstances   where   the   subsidiary  
behaves   as   an   employee   and   carries   on   business   on   behalf   of   its   parent  
company.  However,  this  will  be  extremely  rare.  Therefore,  it  is  recommended  
in   this   thesis   that   the   tort   of   negligence   and   joint   tortfeasance   in   corporate  
group  cases  be  further  developed,  to  cover  more  novel  circumstances  such  as  
some   personal   injury   cases   against   the   parent   company.   Because   the  
company   law   doctrine   of   piercing   the   corporate   veil   still   has   a   degree   of  
uncertainty,  more  appropriate  solutions  are  expected,  not  only  for  the  remedy  
of  corporations’  unsecured  creditors,  but  also  for  the  maintenance  of  dominant  
corporate  law  principles  and  for  the  balance  between  corporate  responsibilities  
and   unsecured   creditors’   protections.   Tort   law   approaches   will   provide   the  
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